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Preface
Discussion about European politics has changed in the past decade 
or so, in turn inviting, among other things, several inquiries into the 
Radical Left and altering the terms on which decisions are made as 
to what to research and publish. Correspondingly, the trend of the 
1990s, which saw a large downsizing in academic research about the 
Left and a large rise in the volume of literature about the far right, 
which continues until today, has shifted dramatically. A large number 
of articles and books employing rigorous analysis about the European 
Radical Left and the politics of contention and resistance have been 
produced. Writing about the Left, be it about partisans or activists, 
elections, governments, strikes or the occupation of public squares, 
is a new norm that for many years was not as common. So, why write 
yet another book? What has prompted it?
In an attempt to make a modest contribution to this flourish-
ing literature, both academic and political, two points of departure 
were taken in the broader scene of a dialogue on the prospects and 
challenges of alternative futures. First, plenty is being said about 
the contemporary Radical Left from the past to the present, but 
little about the past in the present. For this author, it often felt that 
in socialist strategy and or the study of radical politics, the histori-
cal benchmark is not properly set or understood when a discovery, a 
novelty, a fundamental change, a critical juncture or a breakthrough 
are claimed or implied. To understand the evolution of politics 
entails asking if and how politics ‘recur’ – is there historical ‘recur-
rence’, analogy or parallel – not in what concerns events, of course, 
but in terms of the forms political conflict and within it the Radical 
Left take. An attempt to capture long-term development and place 
the contemporary within a complex sequence of events also opens up 
space for tracing cross-national as well as country-specific legacies, 
which often determine whether the Radical Left moves backwards 
or forwards.
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Second, to say the least, there is still meagre discussion about the 
diversity of actorness on the European Radical Left and the dynamics 
between different ways of mobilising in opposition to capitalism 
and neoliberalism. Indicatively, while the New Left of the 1960s 
constituted above all a constellation of New Social Movements, an 
authoritative voice in this domain, Donatella della Porta, recently 
lamented that the Radical Left has so far largely received ‘a silence in 
social movement studies’. If anything, an understanding of the Radical 
Left today requires above all a (re)interpretation of the political itself, 
including the most subtle forms of engaging with socialist and pro-
gressive politics. It thus seemed important to zoom out and consider 
both institutional and electoral affairs and the politics of activism, 
including relations between the relevant forces. Given its comparative 
purview, a fair warning about the book at hand is that it encourages 
more a rethinking of the Radical Left in Europe since the 1960s rather 
than aspiring to a proper, start-to-finish historical reconstruction. 
Largely the product of a longer period of gestation, the book 
was written during the past four years or so, and during this time 
a number of individuals have provided me with ideas and critical 
comments on chapters and parts of the manuscript in development. 
Elin Haugsgjerd Allern, David Bailey, Ioannis Balampanidis, Amieke 
Bouma, Paolo Chiocchetti, Leandros Fischer, Loukia Kotronaki, 
Christos Mais, Kevin Morgan, Andreas Panayiotou, Serafim Sepheri-
ades, Yiannis Stavrakakis and Aimilia Vilou each offered constructive 
feedback. Costas Eleftheriou and Gregoris Ioannou read the whole of 
the draft manuscript and provided meticulous comments, with both 
conceptual and empirical insights. Pluto’s three anonymous reviewers 
suggested very sharp improvements and David Castle as the editor 
has been, to these final moments, very supportive and incisive. 
Alexandros Gregoriou and Panos Panagiotopoulos offered valuable 
research assistance with data collection. Christophoros Christopho-
rou and Andrea Pedrazzani assisted me with survey data analysis. 
Informal discussions with Charis Psaltis, Orestis Antonas, Andreas 
Panayiotou, Stergios Mitas, Nicos Trimikliniotis, Kleitos Papastylia-




Drafts of different chapters of the book were presented at the 
Annual Conference of the Italian Political Science Association in 
September 2018 in Urbino, Italy; the European Sociological Asso-
ciation Annual Conference in August 2019, in Manchester; and the 
seminar series of the Laboratory of Contentious Politics, Panteion 
University, Athens in November 2020. Thanks, therefore, are also due 
to the discussants and participants of the relevant audiences. Some 
of the arguments were also presented at a seminar presentation on 
the Radical Left at the 2019 European Elections organised by the 
Institute of Alternative Politics in Athens; and at the seminar series of 
the University of Glasgow’s Sociology Group. Sharp remarks on these 
occasions have helped to refine the thinking behind the book’s story. 
All these individuals, although bearing no responsibility for the 
interpretations advanced and any errors in the book, which are fully 
the author’s own, have infused the materialisation and shape of the 
research and writing phases. This is greatly appreciated. Finally, 
small parts of text in Chapters 4, 5 and 7 are reproduced by permis-
sion of Christian Fuchs and tripleC: Communication, Capitalism and 






Mobilisation, Resistance and  





Since the global financial crisis of 2008, western Europe, like many 
other regions, has witnessed large-scale social and political upheaval. 
A significant part of this has been resistance from radicals and 
progressives to neoliberal governance. Initially, mobilisation focused 
on support of better democracy and against the implementation 
of aggressive austerity measures, and subsequently on many other 
frontages. Many scholars and commentators have treated this phase 
stretching into 2020 as signalling at least a redefinition of progres-
sive politics and at most a dramatic increase in the mobilisation of 
anti-establishment forces, responding to a post-democratic capitalist 
crisis through polymorphous dissent.1 In this light novelty on the 
Radical Left has been announced aplenty during recent years.
Social movement studies research highlights novelty, adaptation 
and learning. The apparent ubiquity of upheaval in the wake of the 
crisis has generated talk of its divergence from previous episodes of 
intensified mobilisation. Activists and scholars alike spoke of ‘new’ or 
‘third wave’ anarchism,2 and post-anarchism,3 blending with citizen-
ship claims into ‘anarchocitizenism’.4 More broadly, the most recently 
emerging social movement actors have been identified as a new global 
movement phenomenon,5 as ‘occupy social movements’,6 ‘populist 
social movements’,7 ‘new social movements’8 and ‘new new social 
movements’.9 The Radical Left now also includes the ‘digital party’,10 
the ‘new left populist parties’11 and reradicalised social democracy as 
in the phase under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership of the British Labour 
Party. More generally, historical sociology has suggested relative 
novelty in the contemporary period12 to which one would expect the 
Radical Left to logically respond by adapting. Yet it is not clear what 
this adaptation has entailed, how far it has gone and what it looks like 
today in the third decade of the twenty-first century. 
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Does the frequent invocation of radical reinvigoration as something 
which discontinues the old underestimate the socialist lineage? 
In what sense is the new a misused or misunderstood term, amid 
a broader mania of neologisms, including the ones about the ‘New 
Right’, the ‘New Centre’, ‘the populist radical right’, the ‘Alt Right’, the 
‘new extremism’ and so on? What can unravelling this definitional 
issue teach us about the Radical Left in general, and about radical left 
parties (RLPs) and movements in particular? The task at hand is to 
historicise the Radical Left of today, to bring into the light continuities 
and discontinuities between different historical instances of radical 
left politics in western Europe. In order to achieve this purpose 
the book analyses and explains parallels and distinctions between 
and across three periods of time in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries during which the western European Radical Left has been 
conventionally understood as ‘new’. These periods include:
• The main developments around radical mobilisation after 
the mid-1960s and into the late 1970s (what we will call the 
Long ’68, symbolised by the May 1968 uprisings in France and 
considered as the temporal high ground of the New Left).
• The period between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, during 
which the Global Justice Movement (GJM) was a central figure 
of radical politics and many RLPs supported it.
• The post-2008 movements and parties until today and into the 
global Covid-19 pandemic (alternatively, we refer to this period 
also as the 2010s). 
The relevance of left radicalism has been acknowledged in much of 
the literature on the 1960s/1970s.13 It is also to be found in work on 
the GJM and anti-austerity protests in Europe.14 The three decades 
considered here include what have come to be known as protest 
‘waves’, part of broader and longer periods that resemble ‘cycles of 
contention’, or in the language here: mobilisation and resistance. 
While these ‘waves’ are taken into consideration the perspective on 
‘newness’ does not look at waves of contention but at the Radical Left 
during (and beyond) these waves, out of which ‘newness’ emerges, 
or to which ‘newness’ gradually comes to belong. Via a comparison 
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between the Radical Left during these time spans, the book aims 
at interrogating patterns of evolution since the 1960s and offers an 
interpretation which rationalises them. The motive of our intended 
scrutiny is that ‘newness’ has been repeatedly pointed out for the 
Radical Left in scholarly research15 without offering the appropriate 
comparative analysis that would qualify and nuance the term across 
multiple alleged episodes.
the european radical left and ‘newness’
The three periods of ‘newness’ taken up have been reflected upon as 
distinct epochs for the Left as a whole. They have also been endowed, 
at least in the eyes of their protagonists, with the symbolic significance 
of a key and global ‘moment’ in the struggle for a better world. The 
post-2008 period in Europe has been unfolding within the context 
of a global wave of dissent since 2008.16 The Long ’68 was also the 
‘Global ’68’, the result of three geographically defined mobilisation 
cycles, which in coinciding and influencing each other gave rise to ‘a 
globality’: student and worker protests in the West; anti-bureaucratic 
dissidents in the Soviet bloc; and national liberation movements in 
the so-called Third World.17 In this sense, 1968, like the end of World 
War II in 1945 and the fall of the Berlin Wall up to the Soviet Union’s 
(USSR) disintegration in 1989–91, has been seen as a ‘transnational 
moment of change’.18 Post-2008 seems to fit into this category as 
well, as do the events surrounding the GJM from the mid-1990s to 
approximately the mid-2000s. 
More specifically, in the Long ’68, students, workers and others 
fuelled partisan trajectories, produced intellectual openings and 
challenged entrenched cultural values and social behaviour. Starting 
in 1968 and lasting for about three years, demonstrations, social and 
political disorder and violence were a global phenomenon that was 
sufficient for the period to be understood as revolutionary. Over the 
decade, between the late 1960s and the late 1970s, with stretching back 
and forth in some countries, material and non-material grievances 
mobilised extensively, both in the electoral and the non-electoral 
realm. The truly massive bibliography that exists about the political 
and (indeed) cultural subversions and openings during these two 
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decades itself testifies to how they reverberate in historical terms. 
The wake of ’68 received not only observations about ‘newness’ but 
a whole strain of research into ‘new social movements’ (NSMs). 
Among scholars contributing to this tradition of investigation, itself 
signalling a renewal of academic reflection on social movements, 
there has been strong agreement that the social forces of the 1960s and 
1970s reconceived political participation, and in doing so ultimately 
blurred conflict over wealth distribution.19 
In the second half of the 1990s and until the mid-2000s, western 
Europe was host to a left radicalism that criticised neoliberal globali-
sation and its private and public international institutions on multiple 
policy dimensions. This period had a strong anti-European Union 
(EU) and anti-war element, channelled into protest in western Europe 
but paralleled with crises in Asia and Latin America, followed by exten-
sive grassroots mobilisation. Likewise, post-2008, the ten years or so 
after the explosion of the global financial bust which severely affected 
the eurozone and especially Europe’s southern periphery, have seen 
an unparalleled series of crises, from austerity, authoritarianism and 
anti-immigrant sentiment, to climate discussions, and by the end of 
2020 the Covid-19 pandemic and a refuelled economic crisis.20 Global 
protests have been rising dramatically, increasing worldwide by more 
than 10 per cent annually between 2009 and 2019.21 
In the book, under discussion is above all a broader comparative 
historical sociology of the European Radical Left. The question of 
the new is not merely a lexicological issue; by incorporating the past 
into our interpretative grid we can better appreciate and understand 
the current state of affairs on the European Radical Left, as well as 
evaluate its future challenges and assess its moves forward.22 In this 
light it becomes a meaningful task to discern the old and the new in 
historical time, since the scrutiny of ‘newness’ in a macro-historical 
comparative fashion can in turn clarify the following: how ‘newness’ 
and thus change has been perhaps, or not, overstated for the socialist 
politics of today or before, or not sufficiently contextualised in cross-
country terms; the connections of left radicalism with macro-level 
changes such as large-scale shifts in technology, economics and 
politics; and the prospects of contemporary left radicalism in Europe 
based on its precedents. 
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Our analytical choice of looking at ‘newness’ concerns significa-
tions of change, such as adaptation, rupture and transformation, or 
gradual, incremental evolution. These notions lie at the core of both 
sociology and political science, more specifically the study of systems 
and conflict within and between institutions.23 Among radical intel-
lectuals, there is a long-lasting debate about what constitutes the new 
socio-economic transformation. Historical materialism as developed 
by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels was an explanation of historical 
evolution from one economic system to another, each time with the 
same reason – class conflict, an ingrained antithesis – producing 
the subsequent one. Cornelius Castoriades wrote about the ‘uncon-
ditioned new’, the new emerging ‘out of nothing’, continuing with 
theorists such as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek. From the post-
Marxist perspective, ‘radically new inventions’ are seen as ‘neither 
already available in prior circumstances nor causally preordained by 
antecedent conditions’.24 Possibilities for radical system change can 
in this sense lie in ‘emergent publics’, which cannot be foretold.25 Our 
pursuit is to turn the radical preoccupation with the historically new 
and historical change on its head, applying it to socialist politics itself. 
On the Radical Left, what are the emergent publics across time and 
how new are they? To what extent have today’s inventions emerged 
out of nothing?
To be useful, ‘newness’ can be a non-dichotomous variable, a 
spectrum with dimensions along which institutional and non-
institutional actors can be gauged and compared. To simply choose 
to describe a party or group of political actors as new or not new is 
to miss the more fine-grained question of how and in terms of which 
of its manifestations the European Radical Left has changed or trans-
formed, or simply demonstrated a situation of historical recurrence 
or inertia between key phases of mobilisation and resistance. A 
new phenomenon is not necessarily something recently discovered 
or exhibited which has not existed before. In the case of social and 
political forces, where the prefix ‘new’ is added to collective actors, 
‘newness’ may denote the revival of another or others of the same 
kind. In this book, we set the benchmark somewhat higher, since 
radical revival is, as we already know, present across all periods of 
‘newness’, which effectively legitimises announcing a ‘New Left’ every 
The European Radical Left
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time this space intensifies its mobilisation. Rather, here we define the 
‘new’ and ‘newness’ relatively – ‘for something to be new it must be 
other than the old, it must be different’.26 But difference itself needs 
to be operationalised through theoretical notions. Our conceptual 
grid is elaborated in the rest of this chapter, which presents an actor-
centred framework of analysis, aiming to go beyond an either/or 
understanding of ‘newness’.
parties, movements, history
The actors are multiple on the Radical Left, so when it is addressed, 
distinct means and agents of mobilisation and resistance are at stake. 
The Radical Left has been researched predominantly from the ‘party’s 
viewpoint’, that is, with an emphasis on party calculations, strategies, 
electoral tactics and institutional dilemmas. This angle has its use-
fulness and as a disciplinary strain it has generated rich party theory 
about left radicalism. But it cannot hide what is clearly implied: that 
parties (and institutional politics) are the natural locus of power and 
thus have the most endemic significance on the Radical Left, among 
the different types of actors and mobilisation formats employed in 
socialist resistance. This is of course, in part at least, a normative 
assessment, as the progressive impact of left radicalism in parliament 
or the state, as opposed to the streets, cannot be accurately operation-
alised and measured, even if they can be distinguished.
Filtering left radicalism through party politics and social movement 
studies, each domain broadens and contextualises the other, and 
together they enable a macro-historical view at the level of the 
Radical Left in western Europe in its (near) totality. The analysis also 
addresses other organised or quasi-organised actors of left radicalism 
– such as left-wing trade unions, the left wings of social democratic 
parties and Green parties (SDPs and GPs), subcultures within the 
left, intellectual activity and protest participation, wider commu-
nity action and other campaigns. Because this is for the most part 
currently missing, and is employed mainly in case study research, 
three gaps remain unfilled in our collective wisdom about mobilisa-
tion and resistance by radicals. What does a two-level assessment of 
radical politics looks like? More specifically, in what fashion do RLPs 
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evolve as compared to more loosely structured social movements (or 
the interest-based trade union bodies)? And how has the interaction 
or, as conceptualised in this book, linkage between these two types 
of entities developed across time and countries? The first question is 
about the multifold conjunction between and across different types 
of radical collective action at any given point, which can be simulta-
neous or asynchronous. The second speaks to the viewpoints of both 
social movements and activists on one level and political parties and 
politicians on another. Together, they allow us to consider both social 
and institutional politics on the Radical Left as theoretically equiva-
lent versions of system critical mobilisation.
Next is how to connect our actor-centred framework with historical 
evolution. A comparison, or rather juxtaposition, of three historical 
instances of radical left politics, as is the approach of this book, lies 
within the analytical search for ‘generalisations about common prop-
erties and principles of variation among instances across time and 
space’.27 Having periods of ‘newness’ as cases can facilitate the revela-
tion of key differences while at the same time cater for capturing those 
phenomena that hold across temporal settings and thus suggest his-
torical resonance and political continuity.28 Following the paradigm 
of causal stories, we need to unpack aggregated variables through a 
comparative historical inquiry.29 At one and the same time two tasks 
are pertinent: to juxtapose across time the indirect manifestations of 
historical contexts on radical identities, rhetoric and organisation, 
while searching for variation across countries and accounting for 
it. A delicate balance needs to be pursued between ‘individualising 
and generalising comparisons’; between capturing idiosyncrasies and 
cultural nuances on the one hand and illuminating trends of univer-
sal applicability on the other; and between descriptive accuracy and 
general ‘causal laws’.30
Hence the tone of any generalisations of the argument has to take 
into account the complexities that inevitably arise within the large 
scope adapted in the book; more specifically, the national varia-
tion across countries. The national political system generates and 
responds to protest, movement and party dynamics, influencing 
parameters such as the salience of issues in the public sphere, insur-
gent consciousness and broader constraints and opportunities. It 
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also conditions what is generally acceptable, hostile, unconventional 
or mainstream in terms of language, ideas, institutions or histori-
cal legacies. The narrative proceeds and the book concludes with 
four criteria in mind: what the predominant and most visible trend 
is inside the political family in each of the periods considered and 
across them; which the ‘exceptions’ are and why; how variable the 
situation is across countries; and how the western European left has 
evolved in itself but also in relation to its globality. 
To provide the ground for associating actor ‘newness’ with their 
changing setting, it is necessary to identify the main objects (phe-
nomena): the observed processes (towards a series of outcomes) 
and events (landmark occurrences) during particular periods. The 
distinct parameters of the historical context since the 1960s are exten-
sively integrated into the rest of the book and summarised in Chapter 
9. In Appendix 1, these are outlined for each decade considered 
and the periods between them as concerns Europe-wide and global 
trends. Moreover, to associate structure with agency, social processes 
with political actorness, the analysis requires not only a delineation of 
different histories but also their in-between times. Events and devel-
opments such as the onset of neoliberal globalisation after the 1970s, 
or the financial crisis of 2008 several years after the peak of the GJM, 
or the events of 1989–1991 leading to the USSR’s fall and the disso-
lution of the international socialist bloc, or technological advances 
like the social media, need to be brought in. We ought to suggest 
that features and moments of social life have facilitated or inhibited 
a particular evolution in actor characteristics. The narrative must be 
wed to the identification of causal mechanisms and sequential pro-
cesses across periods and over time. It must also retain sensitivity 
for the long-term development perspective: slow outcomes and thus 
underlying factors of change which become visible over the very long 
term,31 or ones catalysed by certain events but preceded by earlier 
conditioning factors. 
overview of the book
The book is divided into three parts. In the rest of Part I, Chapter 2 
is devoted to introducing and elaborating the main concepts guiding 
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the empirical focus. It outlines a comparative approach towards the 
study of the Radical Left, centring on mobilisation by several types 
of individual and collective agents, chiefly parties and movements, 
as constituent parts of a political space qua family, navigating the 
friction between resistance and co-optation and/or demobilisa-
tion. Distinguishing between group ideas and ideologies, rhetoric 
and communication, and organisation, including composition and 
linkage, the framework examines analytically distinct but interre-
lated aspects of mobilisation and resistance. Chapter 2 also provides 
a working definition of the Radical Left that brings in its universe of 
collective forces. 
Part II and III proceed on the basis of the taxonomical approach, 
drawing out the chief similarities and differences between the three 
periods of ‘newness’ in question, considering in turn identities, 
rhetoric and organisation as actor dimensions of comparative analysis. 
While Part II concentrates on social movements (and activism), Part 
III deals with political parties and electoral competition. In each 
chapter, sections reflect key ideas, rhetorical patterns and organi-
sational tendencies within the Left, asking how these have changed 
(or not) until today. Chapters 3 and 6 deal with democracy and 
opposition to prevailing economic processes and doctrines, solidar-
ity, immigration and internationalism. In this perspective attitudes 
towards European integration are a key part of the story. Chapter 4 
and 7 are about the rigidity or by contrast the universality of radical 
left rhetoric, revolution and utopia, and populism and nationalism, as 
signifiers of left-wing identity in the communicative sphere. Chapters 
5 and 8 engage with the radical politics of space, the tension between 
horizontal and vertical (hierarchical) organisation, democracy as a 
procedural form of organising the party or movement, state legality, 
civil resistance and violence, and the constituencies of left radicalism. 
Within the chapters of Parts II and III, each section follows a broadly 
(although not very strict) chronological order.
In all, each dimension of analysis is structured on key, selected 
topics, which although they do not exhaust what one could ask and 
say about the Radical Left, nevertheless they respond to circulating 
claims about ‘newness’ and reference themes that are both topical and 
historical; core themes of diachronic intellectual debate so to allow a 
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long-term evaluation. They also incorporate overarching sub-issues, 
and this allows us to expose various other more specific, relevant 
discussion points about left radicalism. Empirically, the book is 
argument-driven and methodologically it relies on: (1) a synthetic 
view and critical discussion of the existing literatures focusing on 
anti-systemic mobilisation and resistance across disciplines, namely 
political science, political sociology, political economy, history and 
social theory; and (2) the analysis of aggregate and country-level data 
from rigorous surveys and other primary sources, which include 
websites, online archives, interventions by activists and politicians, 
and other communication material. Not all of these sources are used 
directly in the text.
As ideas are transposed into actions, social movements and parties 
in Europe, the main mobilisers of left radicalism share a number of 
similarities as well as differences with the radical mobilisers of the 
1960s/1970s and the GJM. Which ones they are and why things have 
evolved in this way is what the conclusions try to synthesise through 
summarising and accounting for the Radical Left’s life-course over 





A time-honoured instrument of political analysis is the notion of party 
families. These are groupings of political parties across countries, 
sharing common features and often connected through transnational 
political networks. A number of indicators are used to capture the 
perimeters of party families, including ideology and policy, origins, 
labels and international affiliations. Out of these indicators, the most 
important one is the first concerning parties’ links, and by extension 
parties’ links to cleavages, which often albeit not always capture the 
other three indicators as well.1 Party system studies based on cleavage 
theory probe the idea that the structuration of political conflict is a 
function of the number, nature and dynamics between distinct social 
divides based on class, religion, ethnicity, geographical periphery and 
values.2 Although, in terms of cleavage and party system alignment 
patterns, European countries show considerable variation, political 
conflict is considered to be cross-nationally structured and charac-
terised by similar divides across western Europe.3
It would of course be restrictive to consider parties as the only 
available medium of being or becoming a political subject and actor 
on the Radical Left, or otherwise enacting a political identity or rit-
ualising a power struggle. Particularly at a time of a historical low 
in party membership, deidentification with parties and widespread 
disaffection with institutional politics, being political is not only nor 
mainly being partisan. Taking as a hint that party ideologies are the 
most commonly used tool of deciding which parties belong to one or 
another family, normative political ideas as a source of antagonism 
are the starting point for elucidating the separating lines between 
political spaces. Given that political actors are of diverse ideologi-
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cal types, one can speak more broadly of political families occupying 
a range of space on the political spectrum and its axes of conflict, 
and within them families of parties, trade unions, social movement 
organisations and other sectional and value groups.
political families: how to study them?
Taking one step back on the conceptual ladder towards higher levels 
of abstraction allows us to obtain a larger selection of political actor 
types than that permitted by the notion of the party family. It is there-
fore a more appropriate theoretical format for understanding how 
political ideas are channelled into activity, in parallel and intersecting 
processes of human interaction, which include but are not limited to 
party systems. In turn, our investigation must be broader than what 
politics is often taken to mean, as the study of the Radical Left, like 
that of any other actors or families of actors in social and political 
space, is a phenomenon at the crossroads of political science, sociol-
ogy and anthropology. It is an inherently multi-disciplinary subject 
of study and its routinisation by human beings is an individual and 
social as well as political praxis.4
A political family is a group of actors with common ideological ref-
erences and policy preferences engaged in social and political conflict 
within and also outside of state institutions. Enacting a system of 
ideas in everyday society and politics, a political family draws from 
proximate historical ideologies or ideological traditions, in essence 
combining them in envisioning a series of goals. The word as used 
in this book assumes the possibility of different organisational types 
and ideological mixes coexisting within the same broad arrange-
ment of ideas, which has existed as a historical social force since 
the French Revolution. The Left is in a sense a constituent part of 
organising around a systemic contradiction between oppressors and 
oppressed. Political families denote political activity that is often 
diverse in nature and purpose, driven and inspired from within the 
same system of thought. Their function is the embodiment and per-
formance of systematised values, principles and beliefs that defend 
popular grievances. These ideas denote a political space, which 
becomes a family when it is collectively engaged in social and politi-
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cal conflict; theoretically speaking this collective engagement ranges 
from full fragmentation to organic unity. Strictly speaking, politi-
cal families are spaces qua families because to constitute themselves 
as a family with common denominators and little internal conflict 
is itself variable across country and historical contexts. After all, 
in party family theory, because the concept is deductively derived, 
fragmentation within historical, political groupings can be low or 
high, at the national or the transnational level, affecting the family’s 
cohesion but not the very notion of family as reflective of the social 
origins of issue conflict. But we can still broadly transpose the con-
figurations of European party families onto their broader, political 
space. We can thus continue to speak of the Radical Left and (also 
extreme) Right, the mainstream or centre-left and its historical or 
contemporary variants (social democrats, most Greens/liberal envi-
ronmentalists and others) and the mainstream or centre-right and its 
variants (Christian Democrats, Conservatives and Liberals).5
On the whole, political families denote the ideational proximities 
and concrete relations between distinct types of mobilisers within a 
political space. Figure 2.1 illustrates the conceptual architecture of 
political families. They are composed of actors connected through a 
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Figure 2.1 Delimiting the study of political families 
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network-like structure, which engage in institutional and non-insti-
tutional mobilisation. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Radical 
Left specifically, has mobilised through trade unions or trade union 
fractions; anti-fascist militia groups in 1920s Italy; political clubs 
during the period of the French Revolution; ethical socialist charities 
in the UK; agrarian associations in late nineteenth-century Russia; 
freedom or independence movements in Latin America, Africa and 
Asia; social bandits, indigenous populations and local churches in 
various Latin American countries and elsewhere; or academics, 
public intellectuals and artists. 
In this historical sense we can speak of several types of mobilis-
ers or components of a political space, acting (not merely thinking 
about how to act) to achieve certain objectives on the basis of shared 
principles. This can happen either in an organised or unorganised 
fashion, collectively or individually, to different degrees of inten-
sity and antagonism. The transposition of ideas into discourse and 
behaviour presupposes a cognitive process of ideological thinking 
whose starting place is the human mind. The mobilisers of any polit-
ical family are at the most basic level individual agents, who then 
join organisations and coordinate and mobilise through them to the 
extent that collective political identities are both shaped by and affect 
individual ones. 
In this book, we focus primarily on RLPs and radical social move-
ments and activism because they are the most diachronic and global 
agents of mobilisation and resistance. At the most basic level, ‘a social 
movement is a collectivity of actors who want to achieve their goal 
or goals by influencing the decisions of a target’.6 These collectivities 
are commonly seen as having a network structure, using ‘unconven-
tional’, that is, non-institutional or not only institutional, means of 
political action, espousing shared beliefs, practising solidarity and 
pursuing conflictual aims.7 Networks translate into loose associations, 
which involve informal interactions between individuals, groups and 
organisations.8 Social movements as understood here are engaged in 
‘sequences of contentious politics’,9 have change-oriented goals and a 
degree of organisation and exhibit more or less temporal continuity, 
even when they mutate compositionally or adapt organisationally.10
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The term social movement encompasses both what has come to be 
called social movement organisations (SMOs)11 and relatively unor-
ganised turmoil or protest activity expressing discontent without 
clearly defined proposals and a prescribed structure. The distinc-
tion between the individual and the collective level is a crucial one in 
mobilisation studies.12 Given that any political family entails agents 
acting in an organised fashion, or individual or informal group action 
without regular affiliation to a larger crowd, it must also encompass 
the mass trends through and around organised forces which channel 
themselves in activity, agitation and protest. These are wider than 
the range of participants identifying with specific organised groups. 
Here there is also a role for intellectuals (high-skilled opinion leaders, 
experts or other personas) intervening in the public sphere, who link 
movements as audiences and are recruited for electoral purposes by 
parties, sign petitions, organise nationally and transnationally, but 
are foremost defined by their individual capacities, actions, scholarly 
work or militancy.
The social and political arenas of mobilisation host different actors, 
endowed with distinctive capacities in relation to political power 
strictly defined as lying within the ambit of the institutions of gov-
ernance. Parties are stable political entities that have regular access 
to the media, the state and political institutions, and they are legally 
bound to follow electoral rules that in turn shape the nature of party 
competition. The fact that parliamentary parties have a formal role 
in organising legislation impacts on their strategic calculus, organisa-
tional structure and programmatic positions in ways which, unlike in 
social movements, concern the ‘uneasy relationship between partici-
pation, competition and representation’.13 Co-optation in institutional 
arenas, such as the party system or government, is of course more 
likely than in extra-institutional or less formal and binding settings, 
which are further away from the corridors of public decision-mak-
ing power. On the other hand, proximity to power may fuel partisan 
life, something which remains a void in social movements, especially 
loose and prefigurative ones that are almost never exposed to power 
motives.
What are regularly referred to as movement cycles with synco-
pated mobilisation waves do not always coincide with the electoral 
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cycles of their ideologically proximate parties, especially if transna-
tional mobilisation is taken under consideration. Movements, after 
all, emerge partly to claim social space that lies unoccupied by parties 
and perform functions that parties do not pursue to the fullest.14 
When parties are busy remaking themselves into electoral machines, 
movements (and interest groups) fill the role previously and par-
tially played by the mass party on the ground.15 As social movements 
and parties are not substitutable, on the Left, especially where extra-
institutional action was the way into politics, movements (starting 
with trade unions) have often injected party systems with dynamism, 
innovation and debate. Systematically, as we will see, party formation 
on the Left and electoral realignment towards the Left have been the 
outcome of mobilisation by organised actors outside or against the 
state.
Mobilisation is a historical process employed as a means to resist, 
among other things, securing interests, defending dominant prac-
tices, creating art, feeling good or accumulating social capital. 
Resistance – literally the refusal to accept or comply with some-
thing and the display of opposition to it – is endogenously a political 
concept as it relates directly to the contestation of power and signals 
dissent from a dominant narrative, an imposed series of ‘universal 
truths’, which in the times of neoliberalism have been summed up by 
TINA (‘There Is No Alternative’). Adam Roberts, referring to resist-
ance, wrote of ‘activities against a particular power, force, policy or 
regime’.16 Vinthagen and Lilja suggested that ‘resistance is a subal-
tern response to power; a practice that challenges and which might 
undermine power’.17 In this sense, an act of resistance is undertaken 
by someone subordinate, as a response and challenge to power, and 
‘contains at least the possibility that power gets undermined by the 
act’.18 Paul Routledge defined resistance as ‘any action imbued with 
intent that attempts to challenge, change or retain particular circum-
stances relating to societal relations, processes and/or institutions … 
[which] imply some form of contestation … [and] cannot be sepa-
rated from practices of domination’.19 This last point of the de facto 
inseparability of resistance and domination is expressed by Michel 
Foucault’s analysis which transformed orthodox understandings of 
power, shifting concern from abolishing power altogether to ‘what 
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forms of power do we want to live with and which forms do we wish 
to limit or prevent?’20
Indeed, a common point in the above (as well as other) defini-
tions is that although resistance constitutes a counterpoint to global 
power, it can theoretically be performed inside as well as outside of 
state institutions and it can be effective or co-opted. In other words, 
it can either reinforce or reverse the usual direction of co-optation 
by the magnetic forces of the power being challenged. The history 
of resistance is full of temporal and spatial variations. As a politics 
which predates democratic practice, it has been evolving on the 
basis of centuries-old elaborations of how to respond to oppression, 
ranging from being aggressive and transformative to being defensive 
and limited. The form of resistance is determined at the same time by 
the meaning and pervasiveness of the act of oppression itself.21
Focusing on the European continent, resistance is connected to 
the Radical Left as long as it translates into a vocal opposition to 
the reproduction or infusion of perceived socially unjust power rela-
tions and structures. Resistance can theoretically be practised by 
all political and party families, yet the history of the Radical Left is 
more closely tied to the collective interests of the oppressed, subor-
dinate and subaltern sections of society, and thus those most likely 
to resist systemic forces. Therefore, not all political families resist; 
some rather dominate by pursuing or negotiating the interests of the 
dominators. 
Yet resistance can be co-opted. Co-optation is equivalent to ‘the de-
subjectification of a subjectivity initially fabricated under relations 
of domination’.22 It can include the process through which an anti-
attitude towards the dominant practices, whose criticism renders 
resistance to what it is, becomes a pro-attitude in declaration and 
in practice. That is, when there is positional – ideological or pro-
grammatic – change that clearly violates policy pledges or ideational 
principles that are employed in the critique of that notion of the 
good society, which is embodied by those exercising or attempting to 
exercise domination. Co-optation will thus naturally lead to deradi-
calisation.23 Importantly, the history of the Left is full of instances of 
‘compromise’, ‘moderation’ and ‘defeat’. A number of dilemmas have 
been pointed out between consistency and co-optation, which have 
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often constituted important sources of tensions within the Radical 
Left. These tensions were on many occasions resolved in favour of co-
optation, as concerns, for example, the EU,24 the pursuit of executive 
office25 or electoralism.26
Co-optation can also concern the teleological dimension of 
ideology (the long-term vision of society by a particular family of 
political actors), generic rhetorical schemas which avoid reveal-
ing one’s true credentials or organisational practice which diverges 
from ideological principles. For social movements, co-optation 
might mean a number of things: either inflow into parties compro-
mising in parliament or being defeated electorally; or movement 
demobilisation, that is, social implications analogous to the elec-
toral desubjectification of parties. For party leaderships, unlike for 
activists, electoral defeat, analogous to social movement demobili-
sation, does not mean co-optation; often, electoral defeat might be 
the product of appearing ‘too radical’. Co-optation and resistance are 
temporal, dynamic, intermingled processes, which actors and collec-
tivities navigate through crafting a more or less successful strategy on 
the basis of specific goals.
Any actor engaged in political conflict and in mobilisation thinks, 
speaks and organises, thus a collective action framework can both 
capture and compare movements and parties across their key func-
tions. Analytically distinguishing between the ideational, the 
rhetorical and the organisational elements allows us to address all 
and any political actors in processes of mobilisation and resistance 
without narrowing down the scope of analysis appropriate at the level 
of political families to more specialist concepts. More field-specific 
conceptualisations will provide useful analytical tools in the book 
when it comes to examining each of the three dimensions of analysis 
consulted here. Indeed, the main point of scrutinising identities, 
rhetoric and organisation is not that more detailed tools of investi-
gation cannot be employed depending on whether it is movements 
or parties or other actors under discussion. It is that one can also fall 
back on categories providing the possibility for generalisations across 
collective action types (and including individual agents) at the level 




First, the Radical Left like any other political space is intrinsically 
connected to systems of thought. Accordingly, as we know from the 
work of Michael Freeden, ideational morphologies include central, 
adjacent and peripheral ideas.27 Studying the morphology of ideolo-
gies allows one to consider each value, principle, theme or belief by 
itself as well as in relation to the others, to approach its content and 
significance, or put differently, its salience. This is what determines 
its relational weight within a political family. The salience of currents 
within a political family can change as there is no particular reason 
as to why one should exclude the presumption of a dynamic nature 
between the centre and the periphery of an ideational system.28 Ideas 
and often the visions to which these lead can be added, abandoned or 
modified. They can also move from the centre to the periphery and 
vice versa, in this way obtaining more or less salience. Theoretically, 
both the centre and the periphery can enlarge, simply incorporating 
more ideas as social forces on the ground find ways to accommodate 
them systemically. This is a plausible assumption as long as it is taken 
into account that change in one concept, whether its addition, aban-
donment or modification, generates further ideational realignment 
within the ideological system, because the latter’s essence is above all 
relational.29
The morphological perspective is important because it reveals the 
central and less central variants of ideologies and by extension the 
constellations of agents expressing these variants. By itself, though, it 
is still insufficient for our task. Political families reveal the assump-
tion that ideas can only be understood in terms of mobilisation, as 
‘manifestation[s] of a particular being-in-the-world of conscious 
actors; of human subjects’.30 Ideologies and systems of ideas are thus 
understood here in the sense used within the Gramscian tradition 
that sees ideology as an action-oriented system of values and beliefs 
that allow different groups to make sense of the world. Social linguis-
tics, for example, remind us that knowledge, values, intentions and 
goals of actions are properties of mental representations, themselves 
generated by the human mind.31 In turn, the mind is often driven by 
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interests that ideas rationalise, although not necessarily the material 
interests of all groups espousing these ideas.32
This experiential dimension – the connection of the realm of ideas 
with the condition of human existence – entails that only through 
their enactment can we understand ideas, by tracing the processes 
in which their exponents apply them.33 The assumption here is that 
ideologies and systems of ideas are not composed of concepts with 
strictly given meanings, hence we cannot explain their development 
without tracing how they are practised, reflected upon and contested 
by people or organisations.34 We have to accept that the location of 
ideas is to be found in thought, behaviour and discourse. It is impos-
sible to study ideological phenomena as purely ideational since 
ideologies influence both language and political behaviour.35 The 
ideational morphology of political families is thus only one dimen-
sion of analysis that concerns the interrelations between different 
ideas within the confines of the family’s actual political action.
John Schwartzmantel clarified aptly the role of social and polit-
ical organisation in understanding ideas: ‘so ideologies cannot be 
divorced from movements, whether political parties or broader social 
movements, which move in the “real world” of politics, and require 
a certain constituency and social base’.36 An ideology is thereby not 
reducible to a system of ideas in a vacuum; ideas are the driving 
forces of the human agency that allows them to materialise into social 
and political activity. Political families are constituted through the 
very act of mobilisation in favour of systematised and contextualised 
ideas. Out of this mobilisation approach to ideas and the subsequent 
focus on social movements and parties, three analytical categories 
are addressed (Figure 2.2). The book considers central ideas and 
programmatic positions, as the key identity features and ideological 
referents of actors. At large, ideologies develop a worldview premised 
on three main axes: how the past has evolved and what this entailed; 
what the present looks like; and what the future should look like and 
how to get there.37 Programmatic positioning cannot capture by itself 
the radicalism or broader identity of the European Radical Left. As in 
the ‘European tradition’ of social movement theory, different kinds 
of mobiliser bear meanings and axioms that reflect their historical 
positioning and can thus be ideologically and politically situated. 
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Collective identities are not only pre-existing givens; most impor-
tantly, they form and are negotiated through and during collective 
action.38
For parties, examining policies often assumes that in different 
countries the same policy means the same thing;39 this is certainly 
not the case given that radicalism as a relational property can 
easily vary according to the national ‘superstructure’. Additionally, 
party ideology signifies more than programmatic positioning as 
it goes beyond the characterisation of parties simply by the policy 
dimensions on which they compete and into their domains of identi-
fication.40 Social movements and party ideology or identity are thus 
blends of programmatic positions and ideas, deriving from an organ-
isation’s origins and the social fault lines which produced it. They also 
evolve through processes of micro-interaction within the confines of 
mobilisation and resistance. Therefore, to understand radical identi-
ties, one must focus on what form they take, when projected to the 
outside and debated within the political family itself. 
While ideas about the past, present or future (whether values 
such as freedom, equality and community, or principles such as 
democracy, sovereignty and solidarity) denote the founding stones 
of an actor’s identity, programmatic positions reveal the objectives 
of actors in terms of concrete policy measures. This is so in what 
concerns demands upon governance for the immediate short term 
and in relation to the long-term, more teleological dimension of a 
good society. Teleology is about attention to and preoccupation with 
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ideal-type social systems and a plan to attain a better future. Utopian 
thinking, whether revolutionary planning or prefiguring ideal soci-
eties, can form a strong bind among radicals, while its absence, 
beyond conducing division, can damage legitimacy. If anti-establish-
ment forces present no feasible alternative proposal, then the view 
that they are merely blame shifters provoking with easy promises 
prevails more easily. 
The book also examines rhetoric in mobilisation and resistance 
on the western European Radical Left, that is, ‘the choice of words 
(diction), the figures and forms of speech and the overall tone of a 
discourse’.41 Rhetoric refers to spoken or written language and is the 
sum of and interaction between the rhetorical components or frames 
employed in communication. Framing refers to ‘the conscious, stra-
tegic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of 
the world and of them that legitimate and motivate collective action’.42 
In Benford and Snow’s words, a frame is ‘an interpretive schema that 
simplifies and condenses “the world out there” by selectively punc-
tuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and 
sequences of actions within one’s present or past environments’.43
How do social movements and parties articulate discursively 
their opposition to entrenched politics, communicating their profile 
to society at large? In what ways do they codify a political synthe-
sis through the signals of their collective language? According 
to the classic study by James March and Jonah Olsen on the ‘new 
institutionalism(s)’, all institutions have a formative culture, and his-
torical antecedents inform rhetorical tradition in particular spaces.44 
Hence, there is the oft-used distinction for casting the broad socialist 
movement between ‘the Left’ and ‘the progressives’, or ‘the progres-
sive space’. The former uses ‘a capitalised, collective singular’, which 
invokes a unified or rigid bloc, while the latter (‘progressives’) ‘retain 
their individuality while happening to share certain values’.45 Given 
that their symbolisms differ as to the invocation of the collective as 
opposed to the individual, these terms can be assumed to reflect or 
wish to emphasise where one stands as to negative liberty, or as to 
their proximity to the centre.
Rhetoric operates as the storyline contextualising ideas and pro-
grammatic positions. It simultaneously seeks to ingrain convictions 
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and shape fertile grievances.46 Positions arrived at in movement 
assemblies or party congresses are framed and performed through 
the means and tricks of language, speech, art, design and culture, in 
the process triggering emotions, realisations or rationalistic appeal. 
One element of political communication and thus rhetoric is casting 
oneself, projecting the movement’s or party’s image and circum-
scribing left radicalism more generally. Slogans, leadership speeches, 
manifestos and the organisation’s or action’s name, as the very 
punchlines of mobilising under a political banner, provide crucial 
information in this respect. 
A second element of political rhetoric is how some terms, concepts 
and schemas of discourse unpack an ideological principle or politi-
cal message. Terms and concepts, as well as labels, are employed to 
serve political narratives. Discourse is thus important; the common 
circulating concepts within academia, politics and activism inform 
militant ways of perceiving and saying things and update theoreti-
cal and argumentative debates. In this sense, book titles, scholarly 
strains or theories, intellectual figures and pamphlets can all tell us 
something about radical left rhetoric, where the intellectual and the 
political coincide, especially among movements. Schemas can be 
characterisations, narratives, binaries or trichotomies. Is an actor 
exclusive or inclusive? Which category of the population is she 
addressing the most? Against which opponents? How is the hard-
liner/moderate divide in politics at large played out in the radical 
left space? More generally, how are ideological messages packaged 
into discourse through communicative framing? Two labels often 
ascribed to the Left, nationalism and populism, are by and large 
rhetorical schemas. Framing something in nationalist and populist 
terms certainly engenders ideas and positions – such as national self-
determination, a particular approach to ethnic conflict or an end 
to elite corruption – although it is not defined by them. National-
ism and populism do not offer the complexity of ideational systems, 
while they constitute performances centred primarily, although not 
entirely, on rhetoric and discourse. Their main difference is whether 
a binary or schema works vertically in casting a hierarchy (as in 
populism) or horizontally (as in nationalism).47
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The third dimension of analysis is organisation, by which we mean 
how mobilisation and resistance are ‘administered’: their structures 
and procedures through which leaders, members and sympathisers 
organise and practice their politics. The structural aspects of a party 
or movement organisation concern the delimited settings through 
which individuals engage in politics. These organisational formats 
include: party or group offices and bodies, more generally patterns 
of hierarchy and internal procedures, and the ‘party models’ in use;48 
physical space and how it is associated with political purposes; and 
existing technological resources and communication channels of 
mobilisation upon which actors capitalise, such as the internet and 
social media. In addition, for parties, the occupation of executive and 
parliamentary office means operating within the structures of the 
capitalist state. 
Incumbency may trigger the redistribution of power towards one 
of the party’s three organisational faces, the party in public office, as 
distinct from the party in central office and on the ground (member-
ship). This entails institutionalised encroachment into the state by 
parties, for example, their public financing.49 Procedures determine 
how mobilisation unfolds, the processes of decision-making and the 
forms resistance takes. Movement tactics or ‘repertoires of action’, 
for example, can be less or more uncivil, passive or confrontational, 
violent or peaceful. Decision-making processes can be more or less 
vertical and horizontal, and more or less participatory, representa-
tive, efficient or alternative to the broader political space. 
Mobilisation and resistance (or the opposite, co-optation) can both 
be linked and unconnected to the state, both street based and parlia-
ment based, both in the presence of the subaltern or that of political 
elites. To organise includes networking and cooperation with others 
and thus provokes the notion of societal (also called organisational) 
linkage between different types of organisations such as social move-
ments, unions and parties. This concerns, among other things, the 
role of individuals in the connective chains of mobilisation and 
resistance. Linkage as a broader concept of democratic theory, as per 
aggregating ideas and interests in opposition to and via the state, can 
be specified in the relations between different types of democratic 
actors.50 We are thus concerned with common strategies to achieve 
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shared goals and possible interorganisational penetration between 
collective actors. In the entire history of communist and social-
ist parties, linkage with social forces, both interest based and value 
based, was from the very process of party formation a paramount 
feature of mobilisation. Speaking of this, Hilary Wainwright sug-
gested that there might be ‘a permanent tension, inherent in the very 
nature of political organisations whose source of radicalism rests on 
the knowledge and power of grass roots movements but whose stabil-
ity and lasting, cumulative political impact requires at least a foothold 
within the existing political system’.51 
At the most basic level, members of parties often engage with 
movements, thus prompting changes in partisan attitudes.52 Party–
movement linkages can be very loose and informal, as civil society 
organisations want to stress their autonomy and non-partisan char-
acter, and political parties do not wish to give the impression of 
wanting to hegemonise social movements so as not to alienate them.53 
In fact, movements can only hope to achieve significantly compro-
mised policy change: ‘a movement’s demands are not only filtered 
through partisan politicisation processes; they also acquire further 
mediation and compromise within parliaments’.54 For a social move-
ment’s demand to become a policy pledge within the party manifesto 
and from there law is a long process ridden with conflict and the 
politics of sectional and popular pressure opposite electoral incentive 
and public office. Yet the boundaries between institutionalised and 
extra-institutional politics have been ‘fuzzy and permeable’.55 State 
institutions, parties and social movements are interpenetrated, the 
last two of these developing out of institutions, responding to their 
pressures or acting as allies in parallel arenas of mobilisation.56
Social movements and parties with common values and inter-
ests do not necessarily compete – for attention, resources or political 
influence. They also interact, and this interaction varies in both 
strength and form. The conditions and factors driving organisational 
ties are telling as to the nature of democracy. For example, whether 
party–group linkages act as a counterweight to the deficiencies of 
programmatic party competition or conversely constitute its mirror, 
thereby reproducing its logic of antagonism and democratic deficits. 
Reflecting on the broader literature, some argue that it is shared 
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basic policy views that decide interaction and its strength, while 
others argue that it is non-ideological factors and more specifically 
the exchange of tangible resources– such as money, campaigning 
for parties and favourable legislation for groups.57 Political exchange 
models seem to provide much explanatory capacity, although a his-
torical institutionalist eye has also emphasised that organic and close 
arrangements between trade unions and parties last over the long 
term through changes in their environment.58 Early on, French polit-
ical scientist Maurice Duverger explained that because of their lack of 
state and business resources, more broadly their lack of higher-class 
support, parties which form outside the legislative arena will be more 
likely to develop networks for mass support to counteract their insti-
tutional weakness.59
Organisational linkage is also informed by ideology, orienting 
the organisations across existing possibilities of social groups and 
how top down, or conversely bottom up, linkage is. Overall, both in 
terms of direction and strength, linkage is pursued in line with each 
side’s needs and interests, their organisational autonomy, ideologi-
cal orientation and the historical association between them. Hence, 
the realities of party–movement linkage vary across time, countries, 
social movement types, party systems, party families, parties and 
the dynamics between the tendencies inside them. All of these var-
iables, we seek to show, can influence linkage on the Radical Left. 
External linkage also interacts within internal linkages between a 
group’s organisational components – for example, leaders, activists 
and members.60 Competing factions, or when leaders seek to con-
solidate their power, may also condition a party’s environmental 
linkage.61 Conversely, movements might induce intra-party polari-
sation.62 New member or voter inflow can alter power dynamics and 
drive organisational change in order to accommodate newly acquired 
constituency profiles or utilise recently formed associations with 
sections of society previously detached from the party.
When deeply entrenched in the organisational culture of parties, 
centralism and leadership power grabs may alienate movements. As 
an indication, where the membership base is not effectively auton-
omous, linkage will likewise resemble a top-down process, where it 
is sought to control and guide outside forces rather than engage in 
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a more open process of mutual learning and adaptation with them. 
Office seeking may also work towards disrupting linkages. As Hutter 
et al. explain, in seeking office parties turn to movements; however, 
once inside the government they turn towards the median voter and 
away from radical commitments, while movements who chose to 
align with, or helped to propel, the new incumbent party to power 
tend to remain fixed to their radical positions.63 
Social movements are, it should be maintained, different from the 
typical professional group because they are more ephemeral, that is, 
they last less in time almost by definition.64 They also have a loose 
organisational structure that makes formal interaction with insti-
tutional actors rather complex. Thus parties are less incentivised to 
maintain a close association with them.65 The terms of leadership 
strategy and whether the party organisation seeks the upper hand 
by way of enjoying political capital and power resources is associated 
with how top down the linkage is. Yet parties with ancillary struc-
tures (like the archetypical Communist Party, see Chapter 8) are not 
necessarily less oriented towards linkage with society. Rather, it is 
their conception of the Left, and how its social unity should be forged 
in society, which differs from the more autonomist perspectives and 
libertarian approaches to party and alliance building. Bottom-up 
linkage in its ideal type, in other words, corresponds more to the 
claim of a ‘progressive space’, which underlines above all individual-
ity and heterogeneity.
Beyond linkages and other structures and procedures, the very 
process of mobilisation and resistance, whether in elections or protest, 
rests upon social subjects, the micro-agency driving either societal 
currents or formalised groups. Thus our dimension of organisation, 
finally, also concerns the composition of radical movements and 
parties, their social roots or absence thereof. Composition reflects the 
collective interests, demographics, classes and generations a group 
attracts or claims to represent, seeks to mobilise and identifies as 
political allies, key historical subjects or newly emerging forces to be 
approached or confronted. Sectional, demographic and class sections 
of society, themselves, alter or fluctuate in relevance across time. 
Which classes and sections of society are prioritised for representa-
tion by parties determine the core organisation – party models of 
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organisation have centred on the elites (caucus party), masses (mass 
party), cadres (cadre party), median voter (catch-all party, business 
party), working class (Leninist party), or state (cartel party).66 Indeed, 
organisational and other features of parties depend strongly on their 
positions in the national party system, and on relations with state 
institutions and voters.67 Developments which affect party systems, 
the state and voters have incapacitated the mass model in so far it is 
no longer adequate for optimal electoral competition.68 Party decline 
in Western democracies has meant organisational decline in particu-
lar, that is, erosion in the links tying parties to their electors.69 More 
specifically, the near universal collapse of party memberships across 
the board translates into a crisis of partisan voluntarism.70 
Analytically distinguishing between the ideational, the rhetori-
cal and the organisational elements allows us to address all and any 
political actors in processes of mobilisation and resistance, without 
narrowing down the scope of analysis appropriate at the level of 
political families to more specialist concepts. More field-specific con-
ceptualisations will provide useful analytical tools in the book when 
it comes to examining each of the three dimensions of analysis con-
sulted here. Indeed, the main point of scrutinising identities, rhetoric 
and organisation is not that more detailed tools of investigation 
cannot be employed depending on whether it is movements, parties 
or other actors under discussion. It is that one can also fall back on 
categories providing the possibility for generalisations across collec-
tive action types (and including individual agents) at the level of the 
political family: the European Radical Left.
the radical left: what’s in this political family?
The fundamental characteristics highlighted for contemporary RLPs 
and movements by Luke March and Cas Mudde offer a useful depic-
tion of the Radical Left’s ideational and policy core, its internal (re)
configuration partly withstanding. It is therefore a solid first step 
in our definition of the Radical Left as a political space or family 
through time.71 This particular political family is today said to 
either reject consumerism and neoliberalism, or even fundamen-
tally oppose capitalist profit; it advocates for extensive redistribution 
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and the establishment of alternative institutions and structures of 
political and economic governance that reinforce social justice; it 
identifies economic inequality as the basis of existing arrangements 
and espouses its elimination through the establishment of collective 
economic and social rights; it is more anti-capitalist and less anti-
democratic while it does articulate a critique of capitalist democracy 
and offers its own democratic alternative; it embraces international 
solidarity and asserts that national and regional socio-political issues 
reflect global dynamics. The first two characteristics denote radical-
ism and the last four a left-wing identity according to the definition’s 
authors.72
Radicalism means advocating root-and-branch, systemic change 
which doesn’t merely change policy and reaches into the rules of 
governance. Left radicalism in the current conjuncture signals a 
vision of redistribution of economic and political power towards the 
marginalised, the exploited and the excluded, actively performing 
repertoires of resistance to one or more out of a number of identified 
and interrelated enemies: inequality, exploitation, elitism, neoliber-
alism, exclusion, authoritarianism, racism, xenophobia, chauvinism, 
fascism and so on. To use customary labels assigned to political tra-
ditions to define its ideational composition, the Radical Left includes 
anarchism and various forms of libertarianism, Trotskyism, Maoism, 
radical ecology, old fashioned social democracy, communism in its 
Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist strains and even some currents of 
social liberalism; their cross-fertilisation within the human mind, 
in parties and in movements; and their reciprocal influences. The 
prime goals or principles and the strategy of fulfilling them may vary 
spatially and temporally and across types of organisation. The value 
substance remains a (contested) combination of freedom, equality 
and fraternity, ranging between a radical libertarian and a radical 
egalitarian perspective; involving a wide horizon of institutional 
and non-institutional policy and strategic options; and that can take 
varying organisational shapes when enacted in practice. 
At the most abstract level, and in the tradition Norberto Bobbio, 
social egalitarianism is always a key component of this political family 
even in its libertarian varieties (‘egalibertarianism’). It is a necessary 
as well as a sufficient condition for the family coming into shape, 
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the family’s sine qua non. More specifically, inequality is a deriva-
tive social problem that arises from exploitation: the exercise of one’s 
capital over other people’s needs and wants. Then come freedom and 
fraternity. Αs a tool for the historical analysis of the European Radical 
Left as a political family, the triptych of freedom, equality and fra-
ternity may seem reductionist. Yet, when isolating the core of the 
family’s ideational morphology, the triptych is useful to illustrate that 
historical change may not concern the range and nature of princi-
ples. Rather, it might affect their strategic combination and each one’s 
salience during the process and in the opportunity structure of par-
ticular mobilisation waves. 
To assess evolution and dissect change, we need to further specify 
left radicalism in terms of the actors we shall engage with. Mobilisa-
tion and resistance by radical left movements as central actors denote 
collectivities that have ‘a firm base in ideologically driven left-wing 
groups and have tended to predominantly mobilise left-wing-ori-
ented activists’.73 A note of caution is, however, due, since radical 
left movements often operate in large protests, occupations or other 
widespread demonstrations of resistance. Within them, coloura-
tions of radicalism differ across the boundaries of the smaller groups 
inside. In the grounds of mass mobilisation, multiple organisations, 
campaigns, initiatives and networks within networks coexist, and so 
do multiple shades and magnitudes of radicalism.
When it comes to the study of political parties, with focus placed 
chiefly on the party system and the electoral arena, the idea that the 
Radical Left is located to the left (and not simply on the left) of con-
temporary or mainstream social democracy has been unquestioned 
in recent literature. Hence the popular use of the term ‘far left’ inter-
changeably with RLPs. There is a problem with this assertion, making 
it in part ahistorical and rendering the concept of left radicalism 
applicable only to the contemporary period once social democracy 
completed its shift to the right. Further, the positional conceptualisa-
tion of the Radical Left applies only to the party system – there is no 
use of this approach for social movements. It also excludes radicals 
who (have) mobilise(d) from within SDPs and GPs. Overall, this is 
a restrictive view for macro-historical endeavours and raises a point 
made by Chiocchetti, who argued that ‘the adjective “radical” is not 
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to be understood as a substantive but as a predominantly relational 
qualifier’.74 
Approaching the Left relationally would of course first have to 
establish the point of comparison, that is, against which ‘others’ one is 
radical? There is an inherent temporal dimension to considering what 
constitutes left radicalism on the ground at any given point in time. 
In this book the others against which one is radical are the centre; a 
Radical Left is thus left of the centre at a distance approaching more 
the extreme end of the spectrum rather than the centre. Yet, to define 
the centre and in turn radicalism is a substantive exercise. If the 
centre denotes mainstream ideas and practices influencing society, 
and radicalism means root-and-branch change, which both the com-
munists and social democrats celebrated in earlier times and which 
gives an empirical face to the positional distance between a centrist 
and a Radical Left.75 What constitutes root-and-branch change in 
given contexts must be understood in the spirit of Bobbio, whereby 
‘[l]eft and right do not represent two sets of fixed ideas, but rather an 
axis which shifts considerably from one generation to the next’.76 The 
significations of root-and-branch change obviously vary across time 
and space, hence radicalism has taken up meanings and associations 
which differ across countries and evolve through history.77 The term 
is also clearly ideologically charged and contested in politics itself, 
and used communicatively to elevate oneself or undermine others. 
This explains why ‘there is no universal accepted definition of radi-
calism, and, by implication, radical attitudes’.78 
To reduce the ambiguity, substantive metrics can inform positional 
understandings of dichotomies such as left–right and by extension 
Radical Left and centre-left. Accordingly, the Radical Left rests on a 
series of theoretical choices. These primarily include: 
• A specific conception of equality, initially social above all, 
then also national, cultural and political, which is tampered by 
exploitation. 
• The relation between equality and liberty is such that both 
are centrally present – the former engenders the latter – while 
liberty must never be allowed to harm equality.
The European Radical Left
34
• The level of commitment to rectifying inequality and liberty is 
intense, immediate and often militant. 
• A positive conception of human nature which casts it as adapt-
able and by extension improvable.
• A forward-looking attitude towards historical change, with 
progress signalling a decrease in oppression, either its intensity 
or the brutality of its form, or both. 
• A more generally progressive view of history wherein the role 
of human agency is structurally situated, as constantly striving 
for a better future, as a result of the antithesis which inevitably 
arises out of oppression or inequality.79
Any kind of historical approach to left radicalism which includes 
political parties must consider that during a long period of time, 
SDPs and their ancillary organisations were substantively radical, 
even if in terms of position they were that time’s centre-left.80 From 
there, a rightward transition unfolded with the espousal of neolib-
eralism in the 1980s, 1990s and thereafter.81 When taking the party 
family as a whole in Europe, SDPs and their organisations may still 
host radicals and sometimes differentiate themselves from the centre-
right. However, in reflection of the progressive exodus of the working 
class and the youth from social democratic ranks, they project 
neither radical policy visions of left-wing principles nor a rhetoric 
that diverges from the neoliberal mainstream.82 When social democ-
racy shifted from radical to mainstream in a substantive manner was 
the time, to paraphrase Gerassimos Moschonas, of ‘mutation’ in the 
historical movement, out of socialism and into the centre-left.83 
Nevertheless, if the threshold between a radical and a centre-left 
is ‘to radically transform, not just reform contemporary capitalism’,84 
then social democracy’s policies of internationalism, welfare and 
democracy did transform contemporary capitalism after World War 
II, before succumbing to the undoing of its glorious past achieve-
ments. In the decades before the 1980s, and in part depending on 
the case, the distinctions were not always clear between the centre-
left and Radical Left. Three points are worth highlighting here. First, 
in terms of economic and social policy positions only a handful of 
communist parties (CPs) were revolutionary after the 1930s, in the 
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sense of arguing for the subversion of the state or excluding on prin-
ciple participation in the branches of government. This is a point 
made well by Carl Boggs, who explains that once the Popular Front 
strategy materialised on the ground, the Leninist party effectively 
disappeared, in so far as insurrectionary hopes and goals were being 
progressively abandoned.85
Second, CPs and SDPs converged somewhere around Keynesian-
ism on economic policy, often making their actual incongruity when 
negotiating programmatic agreements a matter of degree of redistri-
bution and state intervention, or in reverse material compromise in 
terms of pre-established demands. The 1960s and early 1970s social 
democratic governments in the UK (Harold Wilson’s cabinet), West 
Germany (under the chancellorship of Willy Brandt) and Sweden 
(with Olof Palme as prime minister) all operated in defence of trade 
unions, investing in industries under state control and a universal 
welfare state. These policy axes are more or less what today’s Radical 
Left strives to promote. Third, both the communists and the social 
democrats had and some of them still have ‘orthodox’ and ‘reformist’ 
or ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ sections. Until today most of the SDPs host 
a number of left-wing tendencies or dissenters, ‘the usual suspects’ 
who are significantly more radical than the party’s politics, advocat-
ing a less consensual labourism and being more involved with social 
movements. 
Who would dare question then or today that many students sup-
porting or mobilising within the same Labour Party that Ralph 
Miliband86 was famously accusing of trumping socialism with parlia-
mentarism and electoralism espoused a radical policy agenda, or at 
least a more radical one than the party leadership majority? Or that 
they understood themselves as anti-capitalist? How can we doubt 
the historical presence of radical left militants in the British Labour 
Party within the context of the UK’s two-party system? Or that Olof 
Palme, the social democratic leader and Sweden’s premier in the 
1970s, inspired socialist students and introduced policy measures 
which compare as much more radical than the policy demands of 
today’s European RLPs?87 Is it at all possible to draw clear ideological 
lines today between the militant parts of the left wing of the German 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and various sections of Die Linke? 
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Haven’t activists on the radical left space turned to pirate parties in 
certain northern European countries? Additionally, aren’t there some 
GPs which are oriented towards the left, such as in the UK?
We can argue that the institutional lines of differentiation across 
political space are not fixed in time and across place. Yesterday’s RLPs 
have not remained such until today, but they could once be reason-
ably classified as advocating a radical egalitarianism in the form of 
systematic redistribution, underlined by a commitment to a socialist 
state of affairs, a hostile stance to NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) and the EU, internationalist solidarity and social mili-
tancy. Consider the belief that state institutions regulate the conflict 
between labour and capital, or the claim by social democrats to rep-
resent the working class and by extension the people as a whole. 
Consider the political ties between SDPs and labour unions, as well 
as the teleological dimension of social democracy, which was offi-
cially socialism as an advanced democracy. In fact, all of the axes 
sketched by March and Mudde as defining the Radical Left after the 
USSR’s fall once applied to the SDPs as well,88 although the dichoto-
mies between communism and social democracy structured socialist 
movements for much of the last century. While SDPs since about the 
1980s–1990s (depending on the case) became increasingly centrist, a 
part of them at least, if not whole parties in many cases, satisfied fully 
the ideological criteria of the Radical Left, while not being strictly 
anti-capitalist or with revolutionary credentials. In deeply polarised 
issues or contexts this radicalism showed clearly in SDPs or their 
cadres.
Given that a Radical Left can be identified as such first and foremost 
at the individual level and across organisations, and also across the 
institutional–non-institutional nexus, the notion of a social and polit-
ical space must transcend the formal boundaries of parties and social 
movements and must include the social democrats or their affiliated 
organisations as potential returnees to their older self. 
PART II





Social Movement Identities  
and Left Radicalism
introduction
Many movements emerged in western Europe once the effects of the 
2008 global financial crash were felt: the Austurvöllur, the indignados 
(or 15M movement) and Platform for People Affected by Mortgages 
(PAH) in Spain, the Syntagma Square ‘aganaktismenoi’ in Greece, 
Blockupy in Germany, UK Uncut, Occupy London and the cam-
paigns against tuition fees, the People before Profit in Ireland, the 
‘Screw the Troika’ movement and the Citizens’ Debt Audit Group in 
Portugal and the Living in the Crisis network and various activist 
networks behind the Five Star Movement in Italy (M5S). Through 
the 2010s many other movements sprung up, among them the Gilet 
Jaunes in France exploding against the government; Momentum in 
the UK, which managed to make the Labour Party under Jeremy 
Corbyn the largest membership party in Europe; and the climate 
movements, Extinction Rebellion or the global Fridays for the Future 
school strikes in 2018, inspired by Swedish teenager activist Greta 
Thunberg. 
Given that all the above movements and organisations have been 
much wider than the Radical Left strictly speaking, and that many 
other more strictly radical organisations exist on a more systematic 
basis, it is not clear whether they should be labelled ‘anti-capital-
ist’, ‘anti-neoliberal’, ‘anti-austerity’ or ‘pro-democracy’, ‘progressive 
movements’ or ‘counter-movements’. They have been called all of 
these names.1 The literature on the GJM also used different labels 
for the movements: ‘alter-globalisation movement(s)’, ‘anti-globalisa-
tion movement(s)’, ‘anti-neoliberal globalisation movements’, ‘global 
justice movement(s)’, ‘anti-systemic movements’ or ‘anti-establish-
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ment movements’.2 Out of the Long ’68, the mobilisers included 
anarchism and autonomism, radical ecology, anti-fascism, the peace 
movements, second-wave feminism and revolutionary organisations. 
Having these labels as a background, our task here is to decode the 
ideas and positions of radical left movements and draw out their 
ideational trajectories between the Long ’68, the GJM years and post-
2008. In order to facilitate a broad discussion in this direction, we 
grapple with the Radical Left’s key diachronic ideas.
This chapter starts with equality and freedom, two of the elements 
that constitute the triptych of left radicalism. First, we delve into the 
historicity of a term popular in the 2010s, ‘radical democracy’, before 
turning to the meaning of anti-capitalism, with reference to the old 
divides – between reforming capitalism and revolutionary outlooks 
envisioning its overthrow, between statism and extra-institutional 
struggles – that have existed since the organised Left’s inception in the 
nineteenth century. The chapter then examines how internationalism 
and solidarity, which complete the triptych, have been understood 
and projected. The anti-war movement is treated in a distinct section, 
and subsequently the EU (and before it the European Economic 
Community, EEC) as a social movement target is discussed – how 
has the regionalisation of politics affected left radicalism through 
movements? 
social movements and democracy’s radical 
versions 
The self-organisation, direct action, enhanced deliberation and shift 
to multiple leaders, a critique of elections, plus the experience of the 
anti-war, feminist, anti-racist and other movements focusing on the 
commodification of social and public goods, all have roots in the 
1960s and 1970s. As Marianne Maeckelbergh sums up, ‘the political 
legacy of the 1960s lies in the lasting significance of movement exper-
iments with democracy as part of a prefigurative strategy for social 
change that is still relevant today because it is still in practice today’.3 
Democratisation was a key issue for left-wing students in eastern 
central Europe too. Here a contradiction arose between the notion 
of democracy and the realities of communism. In Belgrade, protests 
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called for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the right to 
demonstrate, occupying the city’s university. In Czechoslovakia, the 
democratisation of the political and economic system itself was at 
stake; ‘socialism with a human face’ was the opposition.4 Although 
not so much the case in eastern Europe, in the West the ‘legacy of 
1968’ is represented by democratic participation in the society’s and 
the polity’s affairs, which was both demanded and won.5 In southern 
Europe, the Left’s democracy was mostly a response to the dictatorial 
past. Parliamentary democracy was new, it signalled progress away 
from fascism, it had to be consolidated and defended, and nothing 
short of it would ever be acceptable.
A key part of the New Left was the direct democracy of anarchists 
and second-wave feminism. In exposing patriarchy, it often took as 
its starting point the patriarchal obstacles to true democratic par-
ticipation, which women had not really experienced in the various 
movements of the New Left. Some of the other key issues upon which 
feminist protests in the USA and Europe mobilised included equal 
opportunities in the workplace and ‘reproductive rights’, especially 
access to the contraceptive pill and abortion rights, the point being 
that women’s emancipation could arrive only through better democ-
racy.6 The organisational spirit of feminist movements would translate 
into a democratic imprint, thoroughly pervading their disseminated 
discourse and above all their organisations – whether journals and 
magazines, the very popular consciousness-raising groups or even 
parties. For the feminists, the struggle against patriarchy could only 
be anti-hierarchical. 
The left-wing milieu of the 1960s and 1970s was appealed to by 
western European Marxism, the ‘heterodox kind’, more democratic 
and open to cultural imaginaries than its eastern European variant; 
more critical of deterministic tendencies in the name of historical 
materialism; and refusing to silence its critique of the patriarchal and 
authoritarian elements inscribed in Soviet politics.7 The theoretical 
drive of participatory, direct and alternative ideas of democracy flows 
through elaborations of ‘radical democracy’ as a long-term goal as 
well as an everyday social and political custom. Theories of radical 
democracy have been consolidated by the ontological turn in politi-
cal theory most notably with Laclau’s post-Marxist approach to social 
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antagonism.8 However, in terms of normative substance they date 
back to Rousseau and Marx, and in terms of political symbolism they 
are most connected to the contentious acts of the 1960s and 1970s 
that sought emancipation without identifying this process exclusively 
with either class or representation.9 
During the GJM years, the amalgam of forces driving the movement 
was initially concerned with the structural adjustment programmes 
in indebted, less developed countries in the early 1990s, emphasis-
ing transnational solidarity over the formed gap between the ‘Global 
North’ and the ‘Global South’. Protests and mobilisation against 
transnational financial institutions, trade agreements and corpo-
rations took place first in Central and South America and Africa. 
Focused on the transnational and international arenas of policymak-
ing a key demand was for the hegemonic countries to acknowledge 
the debts and damages in various directions that the Global North 
and its hegemonic powers imposed on the underdeveloped world 
of the Global South.10 Common to all of the campaigns in the GJM 
was the critique of understanding market deregulation as a positive 
effect of technological advance. A neo-imperialist strategy adopted 
and defended by international financial institutions drove this nat-
uralisation. It was argued that the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
aligning with the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of Eight (G8) 
(and the EU), benefited multinational corporations and international 
elite networks in finance. 
Concerning the GJM in particular, the question of internal democ-
racy was of the highest importance, not only because of the social 
context in which it emerged and the technological means available, 
but because among the objectives of the GJM, democratic partici-
pation and the democratisation of the institutions and mechanisms 
of globalisation were key objectives. The WTO protests in Seattle 
in 1999 and the G8 demonstrations in Genoa in 2001 signalled the 
GJM’s explosion to prominence. The GJM would more generally meet 
on the occasions of the European and World Social Forums (ESFs 
and WSFs). Some of the large organisations that gave stability to the 
European parts of the GJM at the national level were the Association 
pour la Taxation des Transactions financières et pour l’Action Cit-
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oyenne (Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions and 
Citizen’s Action, Attac), the emerging Solidaires, Unitaires, Démocra-
tiques trade unions and Confédération Paysanne in France, Attac in 
Germany, Spain and the Scandinavian countries, Associazione Ricre-
ativa Culturale Italiana, La Rete di Lilliput and Dissobedienti in Italy, 
which also influenced the Spanish autonomist currents, black blocks 
and anti-fascists across nearly all countries, and feminist and radical 
ecological groups, as well as several trade unions (radical as well as 
mainstream) which interacted with these organisations in the context 
of the ESFs and beyond.
Democracy was also important because anarchism played an 
important part in the GJM. Its logic was ‘that no one will ever convert 
anyone else entirely to their point of view’, following ‘the motto, if 
you are willing to act like an anarchist now, your long-term vision is 
pretty much your own business’.11 In fact, during the three periods 
examined in the book there has been a renewed interest in anar-
chist theory because radical politics and movements have often been 
‘anarchist’ in organisational form.12 To a great extent anarchism and 
autonomism in the 1970s lent its aims, lifestyles and tactics to the 
1990s social movement wave on the Left. Autonomism is multifac-
eted, and since the 1960s has cut across ideas and forms of activism, 
feminism, squatting movements, disarmament campaigns, the rock 
and punk music scenes and anti-fascist street fighting.13 Inside the 
GJM, the ‘new anarchism’ and its driving force has been more a sen-
sibility or methodology rather than a dogma or an abstract radical 
theory.14 From this perspective, the breakthroughs or novelties of the 
GJM’s ‘new anarchism’ amount to multiple, often disjointed retheori-
sations of violence, political power, the state and democracy.15 Their 
commonality was the articulation of a non-sectarian and inclusive 
conception of anarchist thinking focused on process and experi-
mentation rather than the vindication of an ideology. While other 
contemporary theories of democracy are concerned with the ways 
in which identities and interests are aggregated or accommodated, 
radical democrats emphasise how what is elsewhere conceived as 
the rules of the game – such as citizen participation in political deci-
sion-making and the limits of representation as necessary evils – are 
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themselves effectively under dispute, without ‘preordained content’.16 
In this sense radical democracy is always a ‘work in progress’.17
More recently, neoliberal management transformed the global 
crash of 2008 from a financial crisis into a fiscal crisis through the 
massive rescue of banks. For western Europe it all begins in Iceland. 
When at the end of 2008 Icelandic banks defaulted and material crises 
ensued, struggle unfolded at multiple levels: the social, legal, polit-
ical and economic. Social movements, civic groups and campaigns, 
and other collectives in Iceland demanded alternative structures and 
processes, called for social and economic justice, encouraged partic-
ipation and demanded transparency. From web-based participatory 
budgeting to direct democracy experiments with deliberative assem-
blies, the ‘Pots and Pans Revolution’ (Bϊsahaldabyltingin) was the first 
case of intense and mass grassroots mobilisation in Europe after the 
financial crash. Iceland dealt with the crisis if not in a truly radical 
manner, then in an unconventional fashion that differed from else-
where in that it didn’t save its banks in which there was substantial 
foreign capital, in this way resisting powerful EU member states. 
Effectively, this meant that both company and household loans were 
given a write-down, which was quite extensive in most cases. Civil 
society was a key player in the process of drafting a new constitution 
through crowdsourcing, which translated for Iceland into a novel 
experiment with statehood, and in securing a ‘No’ in the two refer-
endums on the Icesave debts (to the UK and the Netherlands).18 In 
this sense, Iceland has been a case of a clear impact of contentious 
politics on governance.19 
In the square occupations of 2010 in Spain and Greece as well, 
the economic crisis in Europe was quickly labelled political: neolib-
eral mentalities were deemed responsible for democratic deficits and 
distortions. Economics and its cultural manifestations were seen as 
inevitably affecting the scope and quality of politics while existing 
modes of governance seen as limiting the potential for economic 
justice. Because neoliberalism is a global system, European pro-
democracy mobilisation can be seen as part of a global current for 
‘real democracy’.20 The very idea of political representation as prac-
tised in the West was fundamentally challenged by the Occupy 
movements.21 In the midst of large-scale and cross-country polit-
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ical fluidity, and the public’s decreasing levels of institutional trust 
and incumbent punishment, the promotion of democracy became a 
second ‘master frame’ or ‘master signifier’ for tens of mobilisations in 
Europe.22 In identifying an enemy, many of the activists were driven 
by the notion of ‘post-democracy’ that has neo-Marxist roots, and 
connected the process of democratic erosion to neoliberal economic 
practice.23 The movements’ criticism of national, and secondar-
ily transnational and intergovernmental, institutions was projected 
onto a vision for a more decentralised, autonomous, participatory 
and deliberative politics, reflected in self-organisation and coopera-
tive association. The movements questioned the viability and justice 
of existing representative political structures, and promoted democ-
racy outside of its liberal format and beyond constitutionalism as the 
mode of governance for a sovereign people.
The term ‘pro-democracy movements’ that accompanies many 
radical left groups emerging in post-2008 Europe too often implies 
that today’s European Radical Left is more democratic than before. 
It is not really the extent to which democratic practice has been a 
feature of mobilisation and debate that differs between the post-2008 
movements and those of previous epochs but instead the histori-
cally specific understanding and actualisation of democracy. If in the 
1960s radical conceptions of democracy aimed to enhance partici-
pation, enrich deliberation, challenge the USSR and so on, today’s 
radical democracy is a method of accommodating and appropriating 
multiplicity in the context of distinct but also shared social struggles. 
In retrospect, however, by adding radical democracy to anti-austerity 
the post-2008 movements in Europe did not call for alternative forms 
of political participation that were wholly new in spirit. 
There is no doubt that recent movements have placed a great rhe-
torical emphasis on radical democracy, both as a goal and as an 
everyday experience; and that their repertoires of decision-mak-
ing expanded innovatively, as we discuss later. That said, history 
is replete with democratic concerns within both the revolutionary 
and reformist left. Lenin’s The State and Revolution (1917) is entirely 
devoted to this, in an attempt to deconstruct bourgeois democracy 
(and social democratic support for it) and accentuate the class basis 
of seemingly democratic political institutions. After 1935 and the 
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inauguration of the Popular Front strategy by the Third International 
amid concerns regarding the dramatic rise of historical fascism, com-
munists gradually abandoned the advocacy of Soviet democracy but 
constantly talked of ‘democratisation’, ‘progressive democracy’ and 
‘popular democracy’. In the junta regimes of southern Europe during 
the 1960s and 1970s, being democratic was one of the key identifi-
ers of left-wing and progressive citizens, who were persecuted by the 
dictatorial regimes and fought against the supporters of monarchies. 
Moreover, Eurocommunists, as we discuss later, saw their central task 
in democratising the state and society. 
To recapitulate, hitherto, democratic practice and its conceptual-
isation are what change in the eyes of activists who mobilise more 
or less around its various manifestations. ‘The meaning of self-gov-
ernment and democracy in society changes over time, with social 
movements often playing an active role in that change.’24 First, 
diverse, radical movements exercise informal control of institutions 
and elites, enlarge the scope of politic debate and cultivate citizen par-
ticipation and associative (rather than competitive) practices. Radical 
movements also fight an evolving type of hegemonic democracy, as 
perceived to be imposed and managed by the elites through the lens 
of critiques and principles. In the 1960s and 1970s, the enemy was 
corrupt democracy on the Left and Right and Stalinist authoritari-
anism, thus it was also identified in the socialist camp. The critical 
imaginary argued that established democratic practice mediated the 
materiality of alienation, produced unresponsive behemoths in the 
party system and excluded various sections of the population by not 
acknowledging their rights. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, the criticism was on the elitist democ-
racy of the neoliberal and impersonal international organisations, 
the hegemonic states and their disrespect for human rights, social 
equality and dignity. In the 2010s, the enemy has been that of ‘legal 
democracy’ or ‘technocratic democracy’, testified by the technocratic 
governments of Greece (led by Lucas Papademos) and Italy (led by 
Mario Monti) in 2011–12 and 2011–13, respectively. The Radical 
Left’s movements and parties vehemently opposed these. Techno-
cratic democracy restricts political power to unelected ‘enlightened 
elites’ and is a key feature of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ whereby 
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the capitalist state has turned into a less democratic entity insulated 
from social and political conflict.25 Government and public office 
becomes ‘technocratic’ in an attempt to depoliticise authority and 
shift responsibility away from politics.26 In addition, the enemy of 
movements in the early 2010s was representative but corrupt and 
shallow democracy.
As 2020 was progressing and a second phase of lockdowns across 
Europe set in, anti-authoritarianism and civil liberties became a more 
apparent front of struggle in which many unions, student groups 
and movements from the Radical Left, among other sections of civil 
society, participated. Many governments across the world and within 
Europe have violated ‘rights-protective democratic ideals and insti-
tutions’ to an extent ‘beyond that which has been strictly demanded 
by the exigencies of the pandemic’.27 A look at almost any radical 
left website or publication shows that authoritarianism takes central 
stage in the positions of radical left movements and groups. Liberal 
democratic institutions are being reclaimed this time round rather 
than rejected, as at the beginning of the previous decade.
Across the whole spectrum of radical mobilisers, democracy 
has been a central idea and position, in opposition to authoritar-
ian measures implemented in the name of containing Covid-19 and 
public safety. Social scientists on the Radical Left have already began 
seeking ways to understand this ‘new crisis of democracy’, which can 
awaken anti-authoritarian sensitivities. What is required is essen-
tially to dissect what caused governments in Europe, mostly but not 
only those on the right wing, to slip into democratic backsliding in 
the face of the pandemic. A discursive battle has ensued in various 
countries broadly structured along the main areas affected by author-
itarianism – executive orders versus required legislation, the right to 
gather and to protest, authoritarianism as a response of governments 
with inadequate health care systems, the constitutionality of restric-
tive measures (everywhere) or police violence.
In retrospect, we see a qualitative shift after 2008 and then again 
in 2020 regarding the question of democracy, rather than one of size, 
similar to both the GJM and the Long ’68, while there is a thoroughly 
historic character to the democracy debate within the Radical Left.
The European Radical Left
48
the fire once again? between anti-capitalism  
and anti-neoliberalism
To get a fuller picture of radical movement identity, let us recall the 
dialectical drift between democratic and economic claims, democ-
racy and capitalism, or more generically political procedure and 
economic structure.28 Herein lies the old divide of the Left between 
root-and-branch change, understood as reforming the system in a 
perpetually progressive direction until it is transformed, and over-
throwing it, through frontal opposition and utter rejection of activity 
through its structures and institutions, and of the capacity to develop 
out of itself and into a different system. 
The prevalence of revolutionary spirits and confrontational 
dissent, and the broader revolutionary left internationally, emerged 
in the years 1967–9 and was a sizeable force. Its social milieu bore 
a conviction that revolution was around the corner.29 Slogans such 
as ‘smash capitalism’ or ‘smash the system’ became commonplace in 
the UK. ‘Everything, now’ by the Vive Revolution group in France 
expressed the development of utopian notions of unlimited growth. 
The Il Manifesto group in Italy spoke of the immediate fulfilment 
of communism premised upon the conviction that abundance was 
to be imminently achieved,30 hence also the slogan, ‘We want eve-
rything’, through which Nani Ballestrini’s classic biographical 1971 
novel came to symbolise the years of revolution in Italy.31 In 1968 
the global roar of conflict and resistance was unique. Chris Harman 
wrote about it succinctly:
Every so often there is a year which casts a spell on a generation 
… 1968 was such a year. 1968 was a year in which revolt shook 
at least three major governments and produced a wave of hope 
among young people living under many others. It was the year the 
peasant guerrillas of one of the world’s smaller nations stood up 
to the mightiest power in human history. It was the year the Black 
ghettos of the United States rose in revolt to protest at the murder of 
the leader of non-violence, Martin Luther King. It was the year the 
city of Berlin suddenly became the international focus for a student 
movement that challenged the power of the blocs that divided it. 
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It was the year tear gas and billy clubs were used to make sure the 
US Democratic Party convention would select a presidential can-
didate who had been rejected by voters in every primary. It was 
the year the Mexican government massacred more than 100 dem-
onstrators in order to ensure that the Olympic Games could take 
place under ‘peaceful’ conditions. It was, above all, the year that the 
biggest general strike to that point in history paralysed France and 
caused its government to panic.32
Revolutionary ideas were effectively a counter-force on the Left 
after almost three decades of reformism by the established commu-
nist and socialist parties. They gained momentum by the generational 
gap between pre- and post-war radicals, extreme right violence 
and the international situation of counter-insurgencies. There was 
major impact of new Third World ideologies on western Europe, 
profoundly so in terms of revolutionary cultures.33 Direct, ideologi-
cal-cultural influences pervaded not only constitutional democracies 
but also affected, although in a more nuanced manner, southern 
European societies under dictatorship, mostly in the 1970s.34 Intel-
lectual searches into revolutionary politics flourished and various 
radical academics were in contact with counter-insurgencies. Slogans 
of revolt echoed the words of the Third World’s heroes, such as most 
famously Che Guevara (‘Two, Three, Many Vietnams’). The tactics of 
guerrilla warfare were often the result of training abroad and helping 
with revolutions where they had started. 
After the conservatives taking hold of France and restoring order 
and favourable opinion, the Left losing the elections of 1969, the 
communists still excluded from power in Italy and the oil crises 
of 1973 and 1974 which paralysed production in many coun-
tries, neither ‘abundance’ nor ‘everything’ could be perceived as 
possible. The defeat of the revolutionary left was clear a few years 
after the French May of ’68 – the historiographical consensus indi-
cating between about 1973 and 1976 – and it occurred both in the 
ballot box and by force.35 Political defeat meant a particular social 
climate. Public opinion data from the 1970s in France indicate that 
the majoritarian position supported gradual reform and only a small 
percentage (about 5 to 10 per cent maximum) revolution. This was 
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even lower in other western European countries.36 In terms of an ori-
entation towards socio-economic issues and by extension radicalism 
itself, there is indeed a discontinuity between the 1960s and the post-
2008 movements, but continuity between the latter and the GJM. The 
radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s as expressed in the public sphere 
entails all the richness of the ‘silent revolution’ of ecology, sexual lib-
eration, communitarianism, broadening the spectrum of civil rights 
and cultural critique.37
It is still clear in the historiographical consensus that confidence 
in visions of large-scale transformation from below was declining, 
and by the end of the 1970s it was marginal and stigmatised. ‘A more 
conservative trend in thought became predominant’, resting on post-
structuralist and post-modernist readings of both the 1968 events 
and ideas in general.38 Post-structuralism bred reformism because it 
fundamentally challenged the Marxist ‘notion that social hierarchies 
of various kinds are essentially immovable until inequalities within 
production relations are removed’.39 Thereby, there can be no theoret-
ically justified need to displace capitalism. The complex interaction 
of ‘economic structure’ and ‘historical agency’ were underplayed in 
such a way that politics was no longer understood as arising out of 
historical and material realities.40 At its worst, post-structuralism 
engaged in what Tony Judt called ‘verbal gymnastics’.41 Similarly, 
Perry Anderson observed a ‘veritable débandade of so many leading 
French thinkers of the Left since 1976’.42 Beyond and above broad-
ening the scope of left radicalism as a historical social force, identity 
politics as the decentring of class and the politics of recognition and 
inclusivity also confronted, challenged and often replaced Marxism.
To specify further the dialectic between reformism and revolu-
tionary visions, the question of attitudes towards the state is a central 
one. Radical left opinion has veered between a ‘state-centric’ per-
spective and those that viewed the state as an intrinsic enemy and 
pursued instead civil transformation and individual emancipation. 
The state-centric perspective has diachronically proved trium-
phant within the European Radical Left, arguing that the immediate 
source of power and influence is located in the apparatus of gov-
ernance. Therefore, the most appropriate way forward has been a 
‘two-step strategy’, first gaining power and then using it to ‘trans-
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form the world’.43 Any sort of anti-systemic activity could thus only 
be attained through political mediation and the eventual control 
of state power, which in turn suggested a centralised direction of 
the movement and hence the creation of permanent, professional 
political organisations, that as we will see later have been joined 
by activists from all three waves of mobilisation under question. 
The anarcho-syndicalist position was repeatedly marginalised upon 
the conviction that given the social context and the distribution of 
political power in capitalism, spontaneity would both heighten the 
internal divisions of wage labour and maintain insufficient political 
capacity when opposing its enemies.44 
This crisis of Marxism was situated in an economic crisis. Before 
the 1970s, neoliberalism in western Europe was chiefly an intellectual 
project which launched a critique of the post-war Keynesian ortho-
doxy, subsequently promoting austerity and monetarism as a ‘solution’ 
to a stagflation crisis. The first practices of neoliberal policies were 
undertaken in the 1970s outside of Europe, notably in Salvador Allen-
de’s Chile under the auspices of the 1973 USA-backed military coup. 
Soon after, there followed the governments of Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan. According to hegemonic forces the crisis could not 
be resolved by means of macroeconomics, state intervention and the 
orchestration of the world economy by the World Bank through the 
gold–dollar standard. Hence, on America’s initiative, there came the 
collapse of the post-war Bretton Woods monetary arrangements of 
the previous 25 years. Yet the various emancipatory movements of 
the 1960s framed the economic situation in accordance to their sec-
tionalised goals and in contrast to the largely pro-Keynesian stance 
of communists and social democrats who focused more on redistri-
bution than recognition. Theirs was a critique of a failing system not 
due to strictly economic factors but rather developmental strategy 
more broadly. Various non-communist groups criticised the institu-
tionalised social protection embedded in Europe’s welfare states of 
the post-war era. Nancy Fraser’s succinct account is worth quoting 
at length:
For example, New Leftists exposed the oppressive character of 
bureaucratically organised social protections, which disempowered 
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their beneficiaries, turning citizens into clients. Anti-imperialist 
and anti-war activists criticised the national framing of first-world 
social protections, which were financed on the backs of postcolonial 
peoples whom they excluded. ... Meanwhile, feminists revealed the 
oppressive character of protections premised on the ‘family wage’ 
and on androcentric views of ‘work’ and ‘contribution’, showing 
that what was protected was less ‘society’ per se than male domi-
nation. LGBT activists unmasked the invidious character of public 
provision premised on restrictive, hetero-normative definitions of 
family. Disability rights activists exposed the exclusionary charac-
ter of built environments that encoded able-ist views of mobility 
and ability. Multiculturalists disclosed the oppressive character of 
social protections premised on majority religious or ethnocultural 
self-understandings, which penalise members of minority groups. 
And on and on.45
For the emerging social movement critics looking into rights 
beyond the sphere of production there was often little worthwhile to 
defend. Hence, there arose a revolutionary response to crisis that was 
not limited to sustaining the welfare arrangements of the post-war 
boom. There also emerged a conflict line between intersectional-
ity and classical Marxism, about the relative significance of class as 
opposed to ethnicity, gender and sexuality. By extension, the notion 
of crisis was not, either in the 1960s and 1970s nor subsequently, 
understood exclusively in economic terms. In the 1960s, a literature 
appeared that was more aware and more critical of the many ‘con-
tradictions in social development’.46 Crisis was a buzzword for many 
academics writing in the 1970s, and it was not always or not only 
conceived as unfolding exclusively in the labour market in terms of 
conflict; it expanded to the crisis of the university, society, politics 
and international relations.47 According to Habermas, it was a ‘legit-
imation crisis’.48 
Student revolts led to analyses of the oppressive and non-egalitar-
ian functions of mass education in capitalist society, out of which 
emanated rhetoric about social control. During the 1960s, universi-
ties were changing across western Europe. Students numbers nearly 
doubled in various countries and this generated pressure on the 
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system through organised student unions and groups. This, among 
other manifestations of student and academic turmoil, is captured by 
a book written at the time by Wallerstein and Starr, titled The Univer-
sity Crisis Reader: The Liberal University under Attack.49 Growth in 
the number of technocrats and the cultural intelligentsia, as well as 
the development of subjects such as sociology and subsequently the 
field of cultural studies, opened up multiple questions for discussion 
about the foundations and social purpose of mass education.
During the GJM, academic debate about the centrality of struc-
tural conflict re-emerged. Such conflict was not or no longer pacified, 
as argued by frameworks of ‘post-industrial society’, ‘relative afflu-
ence’ and ‘post-materialist values’. The Giddenian suggestion that 
‘We are middle classes now’ soon found its opposite thesis. The 
limitations of neoliberal policies were clear in terms of environmen-
tal sustainability, social and global equality, and economic growth. 
Activist analyses, such as those by Attac, identified instabilities in 
the supposed self-regulation of the global and EU market, detect-
ing emerging pathologies in neoliberalism and financial economic 
realities. A series of economic and financial crises broke out in coun-
tries which eventually adopted neoliberal policies – Mexico (1994), 
Turkey (2001), Argentina (2001–2), and the Asian crisis of 1997 – 
against which one of Attac’s founding slogans was produced: ‘Disarm 
the Markets’. The crash in Argentina was also an issue taken on pas-
sionately by European party and social movement activists, pointing 
to how neoliberal policies were malignant and ineffective, namely, the 
IMF’s recommendations for Argentina to open its economy, liberal-
ise labour relations and privatise public capital. A first quasi-obituary 
emerged out of the intellectual fuel that drove the GJM. For several 
social scientists from various disciplines, neoliberalism in the 2000s 
was no longer a hegemonic force because it proved to be too prob-
lematic in too many countries as well as on a transnational scale.50
Though anarchism, horizontal politics, anti-capitalism and a 
critique of representation lay at the core of widespread protest and 
activism, GJM organisations put forward a number of objectives 
suggesting their institutional orientation: the Tobin tax; taxation of 
the rich; debt relief; changing international trade rules and barriers, 
and fair trade; the implementation of a universal basic income; the 
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reduction of the working week; the defence of the public sector and 
democratically renationalising privatised services; the introduction 
of ecological measures that discourage extractivism, avoid climate 
change, protect the environment and are universally binding; the end 
of the military-industrial complex, including the demise of NATO; 
universal nuclear disarmament; and support of civil liberties. With 
the GJM, the NSMs’ policy repertoires re-emerge through a combi-
national whole to a significant extent. 
The claims of the chief global pro-democracy events of 2010 
were mass, direct democracy, occupation and provocation. But 
like the GJM, anarchism was only part of the mix. ‘Autonomous 
spaces’ in society or the Occupiers’ ‘politics of exodus’ did not char-
acterise the movements throughout the 2010s, which instead 
projected a more populist and statist image geared towards 
making neo-Keynesian demands. Indeed, all post-2008 move-
ments sought to reappropriate the municipal, regional, national and 
supranational institutions of the state. The positions of organisations 
of the Occupy assemblies, Real Democrazia Ya!, UK Uncut, the Screw 
the Troika movement in Portugal, Gilets Jaunes and Noit Debut in 
France and many others have been explicitly anti-austerity and wel-
farist rather than anti-capitalist.51
Through state intervention, the overall exemplar has been to 
reverse the logic of austerity back to a more anthropocentric cap-
italism: shift back from finance domination to wage-led growth; 
redistribute income from capital back to wage earners; undo pre-
carity as a tool reinforcing the financialisation of everyday life; 
reduce inequality and stratification, poverty and exclusion; deacti-
vate the penetration of state institutions by big corporations and thus 
redemocratise the economy; return from a coercive workfare back to 
citizenship rights shared through welfare provisions and empowering 
society; and deconstruct the values of hierarchy and competitiveness, 
so as to foster a communitarian and cooperative spirit. The anti-aus-
terity movement, in being reformist and statist, as a whole exhibited 
two interlinked discourses: a politics of redistribution and a real 
(primarily more participatory and horizontal) democracy, the latter 
facilitating or its absence impeding the former.52 This very sequence 
of real democracy as necessary for anti-austerity, and thus a better, 
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fairer capitalism, carries forward a historical combination of the 
Long ’68: Bernsteinian social democratic discourse of post-World 
War II Keynesian welfare state expansion and the rise of new demo-
cratic spirits through the New Left.53
‘Degrowth’ constituted an axis of positions, emerging through 
activist scholarship in the 2000s. This happened at a time of vibrant 
debate over the meaning of development and the increase of human 
well-being, at one and the same time as gross domestic product 
(GDP) came to be regarded as at best a partial measure of happiness. 
The term has existed since the 1970s but became prominent in the 
2000s, especially after the first international degrowth conference in 
Paris in 2008. Connecting multiple prefigurative social movements, 
degrowth has animated a variety of ‘nowtopias’ in the context of anti-
globalisation and climate justice struggles. These, for example, include 
ideas about production for users rather than exchange, the decom-
modification of labour through its partial substitution with political 
participation and the rejection of utilitarian thinking in arranging 
for the circulation of goods.54 Degrowth evoked opposition to neo-
liberalism’s guiding principle – that growth was the solution to all ills 
and benefited everyone. Underpinning the term is a radical rejection 
of eco-modernism and specifically growth as the driver of human 
and social development, extractivism as necessary and inevitable 
for human flourishing and industrialism as naturally progressive. 
Degrowth informs multiple types of groups, especially in France, 
Italy and Spain, but also in continental and northern Europe – from 
buen vivir to ecovillages, to institutes for new economic ideas, to anti-
advertising movements, solidarity economies and food sovereignty, 
among others.55 As the concept, which appears quite transformative 
opposite mainstream economics, still suffers from conceptual and 
policy ambiguity, degrowth has remained a marginal, decentred and 
variegated social movement in western Europe, not seriously taken 
up by RLPs and unions.56
All in all, the post-2008 crisis period has not radically changed 
the programmatic direction of social movements into an explicitly 
anti-capitalist direction. The social movements of the 2010s have 
stimulated the same type of RLPs (the reformist, democratic social-
ist parties) as during the GJM years. In addition, the demands of 
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the movements themselves are anti-neoliberal, although driven by 
‘composite identities’ as in the GJM and by more or less radical (or 
more or less well informed) reformism. In a sense, the GJM was a 
bridge between the 1960s and the 2010s, because as a protest wave 
it attracted the participation of traditional left-wing militants, which 
in turn legitimated the lingo and political turn to a more classless 
civil society that continues today. While the 1960s had a clear revolu-
tionary, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist content and form, which 
faded during the 1970s, the GJM and the post-2008 movements have 
not reignited the flames. It seems that Chris Harman remains correct 
in declaring that the Long ’68 was The Fire Last Time. 
Neither did the climate change movements exploding in 2018 
change the social democratic profile of radical struggles, in spite 
of their easy popularisation of ‘System Change, Not Climate 
Change’. For groups such as Extinction Rebellion, known for sab-
otaging commuter trains in the UK and civil disobedience, they 
stretch back in time to participant sections of Global Climate 
Summits; engagement with anti-capitalism does not describe the 
majorities therein. What characterises them the most is that their 
cause is ‘beyond politics’. This means a lack of articulate strategy, as 
they on the one hand advocate for radical proposals – decarbonisa-
tion by 2025, nuclear disarmament etc. – but on the other hand are 
far from suggesting a programme to do so. This is the most common 
criticism by radical activists of Greta Thunberg and the Fridays for 
the Future school strikes as well. 
A resulting line of division has been between system critical framings 
and those oriented around individual (including leadership) action.57 
Radical constructions of the climate crisis utilise the climate (or envi-
ronmental) justice frame, pointing to the problem being capitalism 
and consequently the solution being its dismantling, which contrasts 
with the climate change paradigm of organisations such as Green-
peace and Friends of the Earth, which aim to raise awareness, change 
habits and bridge climate struggles with frames of human rights, thus 
widely promoting ‘environmental rights’ (see also Chapter 4).58 The 
radicalisation of the ‘climate justice paradigm’ has meant shifting 
action repertoires of campaign initiatives and gatherings such as 
the Camps for Climate Action towards more civil disobedience and 
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confrontational tactics. In this manner, they resemble the urgent 
and self-legitimated spirit of the anti-nuclear movements of earlier 
decades, which raised nuclear energy as the biggest emergency for 
human civilisation to justify much of their interruptive and destruc-
tive action.59 The justice frame is nevertheless explicitly a multi-issue 
one, encompassing climate in a wider referent to justice, which 
ranges from indigenous populations to food sovereignty, austerity 
and many other issues. Contemporary climate justice movements are 
best understood as entrenched in cross-cutting struggles and in this 
sense also (although not totally) differentiated from the more single-
issue orientations of the past anti-nuclear movements.60
Radical discourses, even the justice frame which is effectively a 
bridge between distinct currents, diverge from most climate change 
policy currently following market-based and utilitarian approaches 
to ‘sustainable governance’. Prevalent thinking combines the 
approach of ‘green governmentality’ (obviously a capitalist one) and 
the discourse of ecological modernisation, rather than civic environ-
mentalism, bottom-up ecology and climate justice frameworks. The 
mainstream intellectual trend talks of ‘global environmental manage-
ment’ and thus of ‘planning’ and ‘regulation’. It diagnoses the problem 
as ‘market failure’, or ‘vested interests’ such as the fuel industry, which 
is problematically treated as an autonomous actor within capitalist 
networks.61 Among radical movements and activists, nevertheless, 
perspectives range: between socialist-led environmental preserva-
tion through strict state regulation, most obviously among partisan 
actors; eco-socialist and anarchist revolutions; deep ecological and 
neo-primitive views of consumption and human behaviour; and the 
vision of localism for a capitalism of small towns or eco-communities. 
Within the context of wider networks, these perspectives coexist and 
interact under the banner of climate justice, ‘while respecting each 
other’s ideological and tactical diversity’, as one such European 
network of 59 distinct organisations, BY2020WeRiseUP, reminds 
us on its website.62 Anti-systemic environmental and climate dis-
course, therefore, has on the one hand emphasised climate justice as 
counterposed to capitalism, while on the other hand it is itself plural 
in its teleology, that is, the ideal conditions for this or that form of 
eco-socialism or civic environmentalism. 
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Alex Callinicos’ point, in his Anti-Capitalist Manifesto, about 
concrete measures providing remedies to problems and ‘introducing 
a different social logic’, is of essence in the current incarnations of 
the revolution–reform debate. Callinicos comes from a revolution-
ary crowd which strives for socialism but embraces reform based 
on a twofold argument that is historical: responding to the imme-
diate needs of the oppressed, and changing the superstructure to 
make the modes of production more vulnerable to transformation.63 
The response would be that some of these positions are not realisa-
ble within the confines of capitalism and the counterargument that 
their responsiveness to reality and the magnitude of change they 
imply makes them anti-systemic and thus anti-capitalist; statist but 
in a substantively revolutionary sense. Overall, reform can be radical 
enough to require a fundamental change of political course. 
In this direction the GJM broke ground as out of it an overall 
critique of globalised capitalism was significantly specified.64 The 
GJM and its intellectual production elaborated how it is not gov-
ernments that have the first say in world economic governance but 
international organisations, which are neither elected nor accounta-
ble. How structural adjustment programmes by the World Bank lead 
to the opposite of what they promise: rising poverty in underdevel-
oped countries. How a race to the bottom arises because developing 
countries are forced to compete with each other to attract multina-
tionals pushing governments to reduce labour and environmental 
protections. How due to unconstrained training, hiring and firing 
procedures multinationals generate very little technology transfer, 
and that they repatriate profits, operate on brands and are linked 
to child labour sweatshops in Asian countries and elsewhere. How 
capital benefits from the increase in temporary and part-time con-
tracts, which generate precarious labour. Given the significant 
weakening of union densities and collective bargaining over the 
years, how there are new challenges for trade unions. How increas-
ing differences between low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers 
generate an explosive social climate. 
At the same time, what began in the Long ’68 as a shift away from 
historical materialism and continued with the GJM has not really 
shifted in the 2010s. It is succinctly described by Simon Tormey as 
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amounting to a reshaped radical politics over the long term; what 
can be called anti-neoliberalism as opposition to this, today’s aggres-
sive incarnation of capitalism, but without an elaborate scheme to get 
there, a ‘scientific socialism’ foretelling history or a shared vision of 
socialism. Tormey outlines this as follows: ‘Today’s radicals are less 
inclined to seek out an emancipatory scheme with universal appeal 
and application. They are more certain of what they are against than 
what they are for.’ Accordingly, they ‘forsak[e] doctrine, certainty, 
and messiahs for alliances, affinities, coalitions, and dialogue’.65 
Anti-neoliberalism does not share with capitalism the latter’s fixed 
ideology and does not necessarily include the rejection of key cap-
italist features such as wage labour or private property. Comparing 
post-1991 activism with the Long ’68 and especially factoring in Cold 
War communism, anti-capitalism may appear to be the new minority 
and anti-neoliberalism the new majority. 
To pose the pertinent question: has left radicalism in European 
societies radically changed over the long term, if only towards an 
increasingly anti-neoliberal view? To what extent does the anti-cap-
italism/anti-neoliberalism distinction hold? To state the obvious, 
the radicalisation of the masses during mobilisation waves does 
not necessarily mean the majority identify as socialists or leftists. 
In socio-cognitive terms, the process of radicalisation during 
specific mobilisations can be temporary, as demobilisation and/or 
co-optation can drive deradicalisation. Anti-capitalism and anti-neo-
liberalism are also overlapping. On one level, in certain countries, 
such as the UK and Greece, anti-capitalism is a more common term 
among radical forces.66 It has also been constituted as a ‘master frame’ 
to provide ‘unity in opposition’ to neoliberalism, with the Zapatistas 
playing a central role in this framing.67 Anti-capitalism is, neverthe-
less, a subset of the anti-neoliberal crowd that has protested since the 
late 1990s. 
Robert Latham spoke about ‘the perennial duality of reform and 
revolution’, of which this is the most contemporary manifestation: 
‘the either/or of an anti-capitalism of total revolution and an agonis-
tic, fractional post-Marxist politics working to reduce oppression and 
hardship within capitalism’.68 In terms of identifying the key source 
of social problems as capitalism or not, a firm boundary would need 
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to be spelled out. But that itself, to be formulated in praxis, entails 
a range of issues, from property rights to inheritance taxes, from 
profit-making firms to constrains on individual (negative) freedom 
to supranational governance, over which neither the anti-neoliber-
als nor the anti-capitalists are united in terms of position and plan. 
The boundary is also often made blurry due to uneven and combined 
development, which undermines the narrative of a ‘capitalist totality’, 
‘a singular’ order.69
Nevertheless, together, anti-capitalism and anti-neoliberalism as 
the manifestations of the reformist/revolutionary divide are still 
minorities in society. Using data from the European Values Survey, 
for western European countries between the 1980s and 2017, Figure 
3.1 illustrates the percentage of radical left individual identities, 
measured as those reporting self-placement in the first three scores 
(1, 2 and 3) of the left–right scale (1–10). The percentage ranges 
between 14.9 per cent in the 1980s to about 20 per cent in 2017. It 
has risen nearly linearly by about 5 per cent, showing over the long 
term a soft and consistent radicalisation. Across time, the percent-
age of radical left identities within western European societies is 
lower than the number of individuals approving strongly of various 
types of movements – which go up to 60 and 70 per cent of the 
population. 
A gap exists between the identities of radical left movements and 
the mixture of identities among all those engaged in mobilisation 
and resistance. This is telling of the constant need for careful strategy, 
fronts and coalitions between radical movements themselves, and 
between the Radical Left and other sections of political contention. 
Meanwhile, the actual ‘demand’ for radical policies is higher than 
what is achieved on average by RLPs, so when we turn to parties the 
endeavour of electoral success is how to attract all of the ideological 
constituency in question.70 As to the number of radical left identities, 
there is also considerable variation among countries for each period 
shown here, which can go up to 20 per cent (one in five). Some cases, 
like Spain and Greece, with a rich left tradition score close to 30 per 
cent. France and Italy are also higher than the average for the most 
part but fluctuate more. In others, such as Austria, Ireland or Malta, 
radical left identities score much lower but have radicalised in the 
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sense of roughly doubling their percentages in the 2000s. During the 
2010s, no radicalisation can be recorded; in fact, on average there is a 
very slight decline, and in various countries (as in Italy and France) a 
decline of about 5 per cent.
How all this has translated into the politics of mobilisation and 
resistance after the 2008 crisis is seen in all of the southern European 
movements mentioned so far. These have included many ideological 
sections and produced various political organisations. The indigna-
dos in Spain, for example, participated in and helped build parties 
claiming to be part of its legacy from the left (Podemos), the politics of 
piracy (Partido X), as well as the centre-right (Ciudadanos). In Italy, 
the Italian comedian Beppe Grillo’s M5S has systematically avoided a 
self-placement across the Left and Right, insisting that its anti-estab-
lishment stance seeks to move beyond this anachronistic schema. Its 
rise to prominence in the late 2000s was fuelled by post-material-
ist ground activity, especially among environmental movements. In 
Greece, parts of the Syntagma Square movements ended up in the 
Figure 3.1 Left radicalism as self-identity in western Europe (1981–2017)
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conservative-nationalist formation Independent Greeks, which then 
entered into a coalition government with the Coalition of the Radical 
Left (SYRIZA). In Portugal, many activists chose independent poli-
ticians, some of whom were highly successful at the first post-crisis 
legislative elections.71 In Spain, Podemos attracted many protest votes 
with anti-mainstream sentiment, distinguished on average from the 
established electorate of the communists and IU (United Left) as 
being more moderate.72
In the Covid-19 pandemic situation, quarantine measures and 
social distancing, the disruption of economic activity and the 
urgency for healthcare may have generated new beginnings. The 
perception circulating through radical interventions has been that 
of a major and highly threatening backshift in social organisation, 
political behaviour and democratic rights. Radical movements have 
responded to this by filtering through the pandemic all the issues 
of alternative thought that have accumulated through their lineage: 
labour and worker rights; economy, nature and deforestation; care 
and vulnerability; disability rights; globalisation and financial mis-
behaviour; feminism, social reproduction and gendered violence; 
prisoner rights; colonialism and indigenous populations; housing 
problems; and urban political economy, police states and surveillance 
systems. There has thus been a fusion of radical movements into the 
wider civil society, engaging activists in here-and-now problems and 
the immediate political priority of disseminating solidarity, direct 
action and do-it-yourself (DIY) politics so as to help society resist 
and autonomously defend itself. 
To the extent that mutual aid and social empathy came into gen-
eralised usage, ‘an ideological insurrection’ has been at play, the very 
antithesis of the neoliberalist glorification of competition.73 Resisting 
social regression, ideas of citizenship and counteracting on institu-
tionalised authoritarianism by emergency has reopened. This is so 
not more than ten years since the Occupy movements, while at the 
same time generating performances of the state from outside of it. 
This is another breeding group for anarchist ideas for autonomy, an 
opportunity for prefiguration and expanding human possibilities, 
communal arrangements and collective refusal.
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The pandemic also means a situation where social survival, well-
being and above all human health depend on the resources states 
command and from which many sections of society are excluded. 
Hence programmatic positions of welfarism, redistribution, free 
healthcare for all, policies of counteracting oppression and social 
exclusion, and better pay and working conditions, as well as several 
strikes by unions in the public sector, have been set anew. E-petitions 
have also multiplied, and include demands for Eurobonds, suspen-
sion of rents for students or a fairer tax system to fund the Covid 
relief effort.74 During the Covid-19 pandemic, social provisions and 
state intervention have been unprecedented in the short term, as well 
as desired by capitalist interests that need high levels of market-based 
consumption. Keynesian economic behaviour, the demand-driven 
capitalism which neoliberalism had displaced, arose in 2020 as the 
only sufficient response by many governments to managing the 
social situation. 
For millennials especially, such high levels of state intervention 
and its effectiveness in many cases has been something unprec-
edented in their political experiences, which brings relief and is to 
be desired.75 But there are already signs of renewed austerity as dis-
course has emerged about bloated public sectors and inefficient states. 
This could create an even greater focus on sustained Keynesian and 
demand management policies or, instead, reawaken anti-capitalism 
by reminding people that state intervention, as with the govern-
ment economic stimuli after 2008, can only be temporary because 
capital will soon command states to tighten their belts so as not to 
stifle competitiveness. We cannot be sure at this point whether, out 
of the conjuncture the ideas and positions of radical social move-
ments, the shift will be in the direction of another New Deal and 
regulatory governance or a more anarchist and anti-capitalist inter-
pretation of social progress. The ideological dialectic within radical 
left movements may be undergoing a transition as we speak, in so far 
as many movements and civil society groups during the pandemic 
have been acting as watchdogs, organisers of material exchange and 
service providers, as well as anti-authoritarian resistance against state 
suppression of civil liberties.
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solidarity and internationalism
Solidarity during the pandemic reminds us that as an idea, it is not 
only multidimensional but also dialectical between different targets 
of solidarity. Solidarity can be focused the most on a particular col-
lective subject or geographical region. This depends on the historical 
flow of events, such as regional integration, the dynamics of interna-
tional conflict or the economy, or the pervasiveness of misery in one’s 
own country. Internationalist solidarity means that the external sup-
porters of a struggle provide local populations with crucial resources 
– legitimacy, publicity, funding and information – overall commu-
nicating resonance with their purpose. As the spaces of solidarity 
can change so can its overall character. It can be intensely politi-
cal, as in the 1960s and 1970s, rights based as with pro-immigration 
movements or global as in calling for unity in diversity, as with the 
paradigm of the Zapatistas in the GJM.76
Solidarity, on one level, lies in the ambit of proletarian internation-
alism, which sought the unity of ‘all workers’ independent of country 
and translated into the doctrine of allegiance to the international 
movement of labour, led by the USSR. In the 1960s and 1970s, and as it 
was espoused by students, solidarity was understood mostly as a form 
of international alliance, central to the ‘world-historical movement’ 
as emerging in a period of global turmoil.77 Solidarity was effectively 
extended beyond proletarian internationalism’s stricter crowd (the 
workers). Revolutions in China then Cuba, and national liberation 
struggles in Algeria, Angola, Vietnam and elsewhere, forced Europe 
‘to reassess its place in the world’ as its empires were receding.78 
Third Worldism combined anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism 
within Europe, vividly illustrated by striking Fiat workers in Turin, 
who, responding to Che Guevara’s message, affirmed that ‘Vietnam is 
in our factories’.79 It also brought into focus aid to developing coun-
tries and ending apartheid. Since the late 1940s, decolonisation was 
gathering pace and thoroughly influenced the European Left. In both 
theory and practice, the Third World undermined a Eurocentric 
worldview, which also permeated Marxist and radical theory.80 In the 
USA, France, Italy, Germany and other northern countries, the artic-
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ulation of anti-colonial discourse and the production of anti-racist 
thinking happened ‘in, through, and against Western universities’.81 
Revolting students in western Europe had counterparts across con-
tinents in terms of perceived revolutionary potential: the Blacks in 
the USA, the peasants in China and Cambodia, the indigenous guer-
rillas in Latin America. However, the Long ’68 was global, not only 
because it described many countries but also because it had explicitly 
internationalist and transnationalist policy content, shared with the 
GJM movements 30 years later. The post-2008 movements, on the 
other hand, do not strongly promote a specific, international policy 
agenda which resembles either the GJM’s debt repayment by the ‘post-
colonised’ Global South and terror legislation, or the anti-apartheid 
demands of the 1960s for no contact with countries practising it, or 
an end to the war in Vietnam. The contemporary period is where 
intra-national and European solidarity predominated over interna-
tional solidarity and the indication is precisely a very thin (where 
existent) programmatic content linked to other regions or countries. 
During the Long ’68 the meanings and dynamics of migrant labour 
was an important issue – in France and the UK, for example, immi-
grants from North Africa and southern Europe or Asia were leading 
important social struggles, in many cases starting much earlier. In 
the aftermath of May ’68 in France, immigrant workers set up non-
union committees across the country.82 In West Germany, the wildcat 
strike by Turkish workers at the Ford factory in Cologne in 1973 
was a product of the 1968 groundwork for labour militancy among 
immigrants. It included shop-floor actions by workers, rent strikes, 
extended hunger strikes and mobilisations in solidarity with Palestine, 
as well as political organising. In the UK, the historical beginnings of 
ethnic and immigrant movements go back to the 1970s and 1980s. 
Immigrants throughout the Commonwealth and empire, needed 
to satisfy the industrial needs of post-war Britain and experiencing 
many forms of institutionalised, workplace-based and wider social 
racism, often became mobilised in defence of their communities.83
Western European trade unions varied a lot in terms of their 
stances towards immigrant workers. Overall, a divided working class 
emerged because immigrant workers posed dilemmas for established 
unions: on the one hand, immigrants came with specific communi-
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cation deficits, work ethics, needs and cultures, while on the other, 
it was important to organise them to prevent divisions in the work-
force. Conflicts of interest between foreign and domestic workers (as 
in Germany), opposition to immigration for many years (as in France 
and Switzerland) and the very absence of measures to combat dis-
crimination in the workplace led to frustration.84 Frustration with 
unions produced new organising sites, the ‘emergence of the polit-
ical subjectivity of the immigrant workers across national lines’.85 
For France, the Algerian War of Independence (1952–64) had been 
a crucial source of experiences that, in the circumstances of ’68 and 
after, led to the articulation of a problematic regarding the (multi-
ethnic) condition immigré.86 In Germany, students from Latin 
America and Asia, which rapidly grew in number over the 1950s and 
1960s, exposed German students to Third World ideologies.87 For 
the UK, a legendary case in point is the Grunswick strike between 
1976 and 1978, an instance of trade unions responding to the inter-
ests of women and members of ethnic minority communities.88 In 
that country, migrants from the ‘colonial states’ had citizenship rights 
and were among the first in western Europe to engage in contentious 
claims beyond the workplace and the community.89
The popular slogan during the Long ’68 in France – ‘French and 
immigrant workers united’ – became contested during that decade’s 
historical sequence. ‘It elided the specificity of the modes of subjection 
immigrant workers faced, and failed to capture the forms of politici-
sation that could address these material conditions.’90 However, the 
slogan was a reaction to the conservatism and implicit racism of the 
corporatist trade union bureaucracies of western Europe, which in 
large part regarded migrant labour as temporary and thus of second-
ary significance. Such an opinion continues today in various union 
settings, depending of course on the industry. It was in the context 
of postcolonial dynamics that struggles waged by formerly colo-
nised subjects would explode and gradually came to be seen as more 
complex and multidimensional than a labourist viewpoint could 
account for. Immigrant workers entered the cultural sphere too, to 
reflect and claim their autonomy, to channel their critique of Third 
Worldism within colonial states and to weave out the ways in which, 
contrary to communist and social democratic dogma, cultural differ-
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ence in the working class was at stake politically.91 A solidarity gap 
was the harsh reality of the times for immigrant populations. The 
established Left had to appeal to a conservative working class, which 
often meant negative attitudes by trade union members and commu-
nist supporters.92
Between the movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the GJM, soli-
darity with underdeveloped areas and countries was a feature of both 
cases, but in the latter period solidarity was not expressed so much 
by those who were to benefit from it. During the GJM, solidarity 
was more circular and thus global: ‘an expression of a more exten-
sive global consciousness that constructs the grievances of physically, 
socially and culturally distant people as deeply intertwined’; hence 
the Zapatistas serving to inspire and not merely receiving solidar-
ity.93 By the mid-2010s, solidarity would again shift in a unilateral 
direction, immigration overshadowing all other fronts of solidarity 
struggles. During the GJM years, a large number of pro-immigration 
civil society groups and radical organisations operated, but the 2010s 
were a watershed and witnessed the beginning of the war in Syria in 
2015. 
Pro-immigration positions have been, nevertheless, a feature also 
of the GJM’s European sections. In view of the EU’s Schengen Treaty 
in the 1990s, there emerged a novel rhetorical construction of the EU’s 
hostile and neocolonialist attitude towards immigrants and refugees. 
This was expressed through ‘fortress Europe’ to describe a system 
in which freedom of movement within the EU is premised in the 
restriction of free movement into the EU.94 The figure of the ‘illegal 
immigrant’ (or ‘undocumented immigrant’) also became politically 
contested and its pro and anti sides are more or less aligned with the 
left–right cleavage.95 A chief struggle for radicals has thus been to 
challenge and deconstruct the notion of illegality as applied to mobile 
populations by the media or politicians – the most universal slogan to 
this end being ‘No one is illegal’. ‘Migration is not a crime’ is a unifying 
claim through which radical activists are bound with humanitarians 
and appeal to immigration as an inviolable right of all human beings, 
at the same time as responding to the criminalisation of immigra-
tion, both by the mainstream media and government authorities. ‘We 
are all immigrants’ is perhaps the example which best echoes interna-
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tionalism. It implicitly identifies the immigrant as a universal subject, 
between borders and within time, and in turn alludes to the interna-
tionality of the origins, destinations and sources of immigration and 
refugeehood. 
In the 2010s, internationalist solidarity in western Europe centred 
primarily on millions of refugees and immigrants from Middle 
Eastern and African zones of conflict, famine, repression and polit-
ical turmoil trying to enter the old continent. The issue has been 
especially politicised where the countries of ‘first arrival’, like Italy 
and Greece, are situated. Immigrant rights activists, progressive 
politicians and local leaders in many European cities have used cit-
izenship claims to defend the welcoming approach of their refuge 
localities, where urban citizenship is defined not by refugee or immi-
gration status but simply by place of residence.96 Radical intellectuals 
have called for the left ‘to predicate border politics on the potential of 
border struggles’.97 As the argument goes, borders are a fundamental 
aspect of labour politics, which has become increasingly fragmented 
and sectionalised, and an important tool to use in any attempt to 
reimagine and construct a solid internationalism.98
With borders understood as crystallising and reproducing relations 
of domination, opening them is the way to break with domination’s 
mechanisms and structures. Open borders has become a common 
position for many parts of the European Radical Left. Τhe arguments 
are several: borders ‘are a form of global apartheid’, which preserves the 
power of the wealthy at the expense of the oppressed; borders and the 
EU’s policies towards them ‘produce violence but do not stop immi-
gration’; ‘blaming migrants for low wages’ or ‘stealing jobs’ ‘divides 
workers and creates a race to the bottom’; capital and big business 
already have open borders and thus, from a class or economic view-
point, there is an unequal distribution of human rights.99
Free cross-border migration can operate as a counter-action to 
capitalist and colonial impositions.100 But open borders takes the 
existence of nation states and thus borders as a fact, in a sense being 
more pragmatic in proposing a first step towards global equality; 
hence it must be differentiated from no borders. This is a more radical 
leap to the second step of fundamental transformation in the ways 
populations are territorialised without first opening borders. One 
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such example is the No Border Network’s slogan, ‘No borders, no 
nations, stop deportations!’ Effectively, the difference between ‘open 
borders’ and ‘no borders’ is one of framing and arises out of diver-
gence in teleological radicalism and pragmatism – for example, is it 
possible to abolish borders without first opening them? Historical 
and contemporary ambiguities about the nation state and the father-
land echo this concern. ‘Open borders’ and ‘no borders’ don’t have to 
be mutually exclusive. Proponents of open borders take the nation 
state for granted from a variety of angles (which may be market-lib-
ertarian and liberal on the Right, political-economic on the Left). No 
Border activists focus on contemporary border struggles and the way 
borders shape new subjectivities, beyond and within the nation state, 
eventually eroding its significance as a unit of territory. In activist 
practice, the distinction is blurry at best. Antifa and anarchist move-
ments frequently protest outside immigrant detention camps. Legal 
activists document how conditions violate international or human 
rights law, and organisers expose border patrols. All these activities 
are transcending the border as normality.
Pro-immigration movements have spanned the whole of the radical 
left space, from youth and women organisations of SDPs and RLPs to 
Trotskyist, anarchist and other revolutionary forces. A multipurpose 
repertoire of contending immigration control and restriction has 
evolved since about the 1990s and 2000s. It includes essays, opinion 
articles and pamphlets that resist the branding of immigrants and 
seek to naturalise immigration. It includes campaigns for deporta-
tions under the EU’s Dublin Regulation, and specific cases, usually 
including individuals from various ideological spaces. Equally, multi-
ideological charity networks collect food and other primary goods. 
There are also festivals or camps, welcoming committees, activism in 
monitoring detention camps, feminist women’s rights networks and 
initiatives of solidarity with hunger strikers, legal action and cam-
paigns against pushbacks. In the radical literature regarding the most 
recent wave of pro-immigration activism, novel concepts have gained 
attention and attracted interventions, such as ‘border regime’, ‘border 
spectacle’, ‘autonomy of migration’ or ‘border as method’.101 These 
concepts and the wider interdisciplinary discussion on borders struc-
turalise the understanding of immigration and refugeehood and thus 
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offer a corrective discourse that deciphers these phenomena as cir-
cumstantial or chiefly economic. 
Today, about 70 years after the debates opened, there is an 
entrenched sensitivity in radical literature centred on the immigrant’s 
point of view as the source of true solidarity and the groundwork for 
any meaningful internationalism. Just as Third Worldism introduced 
prisms of thought to Western radicals, so too recent experiences 
with immigrant solidarity and struggles to decolonise the systems of 
the imperial core have fostered theoretical avenues that attempt to 
capture the immigrant subject and weave border politics into politi-
cal sociology.
war, peace, internationalism
The other obvious axis of internationalism and solidarity concerns 
war, peace and their link to imperialism since Lenin. The anti-war 
movements of the 2010s compare little to the 1990s and early 2000s 
and even less to the anti-war movement of the Long ’68. Over the 
whole of democratic western Europe, the Vietnam War was vehe-
mently opposed by students, radical intellectuals and CPs and SDPs. 
But although it often characterises the period’s strong sense of soli-
darity and the Third World’s influence on Europe, Vietnam was still 
one war to which opposition did not mean agreement on all things 
related to peace. To observe a long-lasting line of conflict from the 
Cold War period we can look especially at the anti-nuclear move-
ments opposed to a USSR engaged in the arms race with the USA. 
Since the 1950s, the new form of anti-war activism came from diverse 
cultural and political backgrounds, including catholic groups (e.g. 
this was important in Italy), as well as Protestant Christian organisa-
tions. Altogether, they challenged the post-war consensus in Europe 
and espoused a progressive-liberal-conservative anti-communism.102 
The USSR had its own peace movement organised and operating in 
accordance with the Soviet line and through nationally based sections 
of the World Peace Council, in addition to various other affiliated 
associations such as World Institute for Peace, the World Democratic 
Federation of Youth and the International Federation of Resistance 
Fighters.103 
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The CPs and the various National Peace Councils in western 
Europe and elsewhere sought to become a broad movement. In 
interaction with other mass ancillary structures of the international 
movement led by Moscow, they had a broad reach and a notewor-
thy presence across the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, they were 
instrumentalised for the Soviet Union’s foreign policy, supporting 
socialist countries and effectively mobilising under external con-
straints. Although the communist peace movement described itself 
as ‘an open movement’, and often fused with other local and national 
initiatives, a ‘bloc mentality’ infused it. As Wernicke summarised, 
‘there was a constant clash between intentions and practical realities 
whenever, at the international and domestic levels, concrete strategies 
were required to build broad peace alliances which might transcend 
bloc allegiance’.104 Between the USSR and the peace and anti-war 
movements, solidarity was a contested notion. Both the crushing of 
the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1983 
were presented by the USSR (and contested by movements) as acts of 
solidarity with the people.
It is thus important to underline that historically a radical anti-war 
position or the broader anti-war movement does not necessar-
ily oppose armies and all things military;105 hence the USSR called 
the structures it led internationally a ‘peace movement’. Let us 
remember that the organising principle of left internationalism since 
1914 places opposition to respective imperialisms as its top priority. 
Thus German radical leaders Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg 
mostly opposed the German, not the Russian, war effort and Lenin 
vice versa. Anti-militarism and anti-imperialism conflicted as the 
nuclear threat produced pacifist mass movements, but in the protests 
against Vietnam calls for peace in that country were voiced along 
with ‘weapons for the Vietcong’. Pacifism surged by the late 1970s and 
early 1980s due to the rise and spread of the ecological movement. But 
the Radical Left of the Long ’68, both students and parties, supported 
the notion of ‘just war’, the justification being anti-imperialist strug-
gles necessary for freedom and democracy. The notion of principled 
pacifism was a minority position during this period and typically 
described as defeatist. It also interplayed with Cold War politics. For 
example, in the UK the European Nuclear Disarmament movement 
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founded by key figures of the New Left like E. P. Thompson, who 
had split with the Communist Party after the crushing of the Hun-
garian Uprising in 1956, campaigned against Soviet nuclear weapons 
as part of its strategy of ‘détente from below’, while the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND, established in 1958) focused on uni-
lateral British disarmament as the ‘pro-Soviet lobby’ had prevailed 
internally.106
Full opposition to war continues to divide activists and groups who, 
for example, refuse to sign declarations not explicitly demanding the 
abolition of the military. Organisations against war are distinguished 
into pacifist or non-violent on the one side and (in broad terms) anti-
imperialist on the other side, through their names and blurbs, hence 
a common line of distinction is between the peace movement and 
the anti-war movement. Hence, CND campaigns for ‘British nuclear 
disarmament’ and ‘a global ban on nuclear weapons’, ‘missile defense 
and weapons in space’, ‘opposition to NATO’ and the ‘prevention and 
cessation of wars in which nuclear weapons may be used’. It is also 
‘encouraging non-military solutions to conflict’.107 But it includes, 
cooperates with and addresses both pacifists and more traditional 
anti-imperialists. Similar groups in Germany, such as the German 
section of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear 
War or the German Peace Society – United War Resisters, neither 
explicitly link militarism to capitalism nor officially endorse non-
violence. As in the rest of the movements in which the Radical Left 
participates, some groups and associations are critical of the capital-
ist-militarist system in its entirety and many are not. As an activist 
reported about the German peace and anti-war movements in 2001 
at the point of declining momentum, ‘[i]n their peace and anti-war 
work, many people never reach a criticism of the dynamics intrin-
sic to the military, nor to a fundamental criticism of the military’.108
The GJM was indeed historically situated in the context of the 
Balkan wars and NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia’s disintegration, 
the American invasion of Afghanistan and the US-led invasion and 
occupation of Iraq in the post-9/11 universe. The USA’s subsequent 
response to the terrorist organisation Al Qaida via the War on Terror 
was opposed as a worldwide offensive against civil liberties. On 15 
February 2003, demonstrations across many countries to oppose the 
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Iraq War constituted the ‘largest protest event in human history’.109 
This anti-war movement generated massive demonstrations in 
Britain, including a very large wave of school walkouts and at times 
more than a million people on the streets.110 In the rest of Europe 
the anti-war movement also awoke and tens of thousands protested 
and mobilised. In the wake of the USA-led invasion and occupation 
of Iraq, the multiple, local anti-bases movement became effectively 
internationalised; a global campaign emerged to ‘map, expose, and 
counter the global military presence of the United States and others’. 
It eventually included 400 organisations.111 At the same time, dis-
cussions of Islamophobia opened widely within European societies, 
especially in France and the UK with significant Muslim populations. 
The War on Terror cultivated, according to many anti-war move-
ments and rights organisations, a governmentality of Islamophobia 
that discriminates and marginalises ethnic and cultural minorities.
After the end of the Cold War, anti-base movements were rein-
forced by sharing tactics and ideas against the USA’s revered ‘dogma 
of military bases abroad’.112 Without Cold War constraints and given 
the considerable withdrawal of Russian military bases, the Radical 
Left as a whole, its movements and parties, became more cohesive 
in its anti-base positions. Anti-base movements were also reinforced 
in the context of the emerging GJM, which conveyed to anti-base 
activism the value of organising globally.113 Guantanamo, the USA’s 
Cuban outpost of extreme torture of ‘suspected terrorists’, became a 
symbol of both the anti-war movements and the GJM post-2001.114 
Shared critique identified the role of bases in enabling wars, the vio-
lation of local sovereignty as explained by the undemocratic way 
through which war is launched and plays out, damage and harm to 
local populations and their connections to global economic injus-
tice.115 Through deliberation at the WSF and ESFs a concrete although 
somewhat short-lived achievement was reached: launching the Inter-
national Network for the Abolition of Foreign Military Bases (No 
Bases) in Quito and Manta, Ecuador, from 5 to 9 March 2007. The 
emphasis on bases aimed at highlighting the ways in which globalisa-
tion was premised on militarisation, itself perpetuating material and 
other injustice. As explained by an American activist-scholar who 
participated: ‘without foreign military bases, wars would be so much 
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more difficult to wage; without wars, the pursuit of geo-strategic and 
economic interests over democracy and self-determination would be 
so much harder’.116
The anti-war movement and its links to the Radical Left continue. 
Today there are many established disarmament campaigns and more 
than a handful of anti-war or peace organisations in each western 
European country. Marches outside of American embassies on key 
occasions have customary status, and anti-militarisation collectives 
and analyses through decades of interdisciplinary peace research 
starting in the 1950s make inroads to deconstructing peace and 
connecting capitalism with war. Organised support for conscien-
tious objection is an important nucleus of activism where military 
service is compulsory (as in Cyprus and Greece). Large protests 
against visits by Donald Trump (or previously other US presidents) 
or NATO counter-summits are also evident. Saudi Arabia’s war in 
Yemen, sustained by its weaponry deals with the West, although not 
commanding large-scale solidarity, has been opposed by dockers in 
France and Italy who in 2019 refused to load military equipment 
onto ships, their unions calling for a strike.117
There are sprouts of anti-war and peace activity, primarily institu-
tional or campaign activities, demonstrations and (only then) some 
direct action. But the dynamic of the anti-war movement in the 2010s 
has been dormant in terms of mass anti-war and pro-peace mobi-
lisations. For one thing, strategy has been recently contested. With 
Russia’s militarism expanding and playing an important role in the 
conflict in Syria, the Radical Left is far from unanimous on how to 
end the war in terms of policy measures and even the demand for 
withdrawal. Indeed, the war in Syria is taking place through the mul-
tilateral intervention and support of the various local groups. It could 
be called ‘war via representatives’, rather than an explicit invasion. 
In opposition to any political support for a state entity, some argue 
that supporting Assad, or Gaddafi before him, betrays an irrational-
ity, a ‘fetishism’ of state sovereignty whereby ‘solidarity is … extended 
to states (seen as the main actor in a struggle for liberation), rather 
than oppressed or underprivileged groups in any given society, no 
matter that state’s tyranny’.118 In the UK, the politics of the Stop the 
War Coalition (STWC, established 2001) have been criticised by 
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prominent pro-peace intellectuals, many of them Muslim, for ide-
alising the Russian-Assad side and for being more anti-West than 
pro-peace.119 Such criticisms surfaced at various points, from 2013 
until 2018, and included resignations, criticism of Jeremy Corbyn for 
his involvement in the STWC, open letters from Muslim activists and 
intellectuals and accusations from campaign groups. In reality, the 
majority of STWC is not pro-Assad, as many of the criticisms are a 
result of propaganda launched by the pro-war media and lobbyists 
seeking to cast doubt over the morality of STWC politics. France is 
the ultimate battleground for what Tangiuef coined ‘islamo-leftism’ 
(islamogauche) in 2002, referring to connections between radical left 
and global justice activists in the early 2000s and groups like Hamas 
and Hezbollah.120 The term has since been highly politicised by the 
extreme Right and its leader, Marine Le Pen, and the Right, including 
the Macron government.
The Palestinian–Israeli conflict is the most central front of near 
unity on the Radical Left in Europe as well as the USA. Yet, many 
left-wing activists are suspicious towards the Boycott, Divestment, 
Sanctions campaign, but in Britain and France the issue is more 
sensitive and more easily invites accusations of anti-Semitism. A con-
ception of Israel as an apartheid state is still widely accepted in radical 
spaces across various types of movements and ideological strains, 
within and outside academia, to the extent of consistent activity, 
frequent pan-European initiatives and the cross-country presence of 
organisations such as the Israeli Committee Against House Demo-
litions (in the UK and Finland). In Italy, the recent initiative Spazi 
Liberi di Appartheid Israeliana brought together social and cultural 
centres, unions, collectives and parties.
To compare the 2000s with the 2010s, it can be argued that the 
Saddam regime in Iraq was no less repressive of the Left than the 
Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya against which foreign inter-
vention was carried out; the difference was the existence in 2011 
(as opposed to 2003) of massive mobilisations in the Arab world 
with revolutionary ramifications. In contrast to the George W. Bush 
administration (2001–9), US President Barack Obama was also 
oriented towards the ‘pivot to Asia’ policy but tried to outsource the 
Middle East to others, giving the impression to many (erroneously) 
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that the USA was not pursuing any regime change policies in the 
region anymore. Instead, the Obama administration allocated more 
money to war than Bush, didn’t take troops out of Iraq and Afghan-
istan and deployed special operations in tens of countries.121 The 
differences within the anti-war movement today extend the familiar 
divergences of the early 1900s. They concern decoding the reading 
of the situation (specifically, is US imperialism still dominant?) and 
whether to take a purely propagandistic position (i.e. against all impe-
rialisms) or build anti-war mobilisations centred on simple demands, 
such as no war against Syria or withdrawal from Libya, or as during 
the GJM, closing the Guantanamo prison or NATO withdrawal from 
the former Yugoslavia.
internationalism and european integration
In understanding the overall internationalist outlook of the Radical 
Left, European integration matters in so far as it circumscribes protest 
and mobilisation regionally. During the bailouts in southern Europe, 
solidarity emerged as a feature between the activists and protes-
tors in countries with a similar standing within the eurozone and in 
relation to debt. The Greek case attracted the most solidarity events 
from other countries. Worldwide, a campaign began called ‘We are 
all Greeks’ and ‘in support of the Greek people’. Spanish activists pro-
tested the Cypriot universal haircut on bank deposits, the so-called 
bail-in of March 2013, which was initially rejected by parliament. In 
response to shared grievances, solidarities emerged between coun-
tries undergoing similar problems and pressures within the context of 
austerity and neoliberalism. Resonance bred solidarity in this sense, 
but the latter was also expressed within the hegemonic EU countries 
and by non-European intellectuals, politicians, groups and activists. 
In Germany, notably, radical groups launched multiple protests and 
events in solidarity with those harmed by the German government; 
Die Linke was an important force within the parliamentary arena, 
arguing that Greece was being exploited and blamed at the same 
time. As has been argued, ‘[t]his indicates that although the move-
ment’s development has been deeply influenced by the nationally 
uneven impact of the crisis and austerity, activists make concerted 
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efforts to transcend the entrenched politico-economic differences 
between them’.122
As the EU was ‘one of the key crisis actors for contention’, radical 
left and other movements became increasingly concerned about the 
EU as a pivotal agent dictating austerity (and deciding on debt) on the 
continent.123 Pan-European groups and campaigns – Democracy in 
Europe 2025 (DieM 2025), the hundreds of organisations calling for 
a ‘European Spring’ against austerity and anti-democratic EU policies 
in 2013 or the multinational strikes in 2012 – played a significant 
role in transnationalising the anti-austerity struggles in Europe, tying 
together activists and organisations both within and across European 
regions. An emphasis on Europe needs to be qualified in any case. 
Tapping into collective grievances is more effectively achieved by 
framing the discussion at the national, and then European, level. Put 
differently, the more specific the enemy (the government or the EU, 
or the troika, or the Eurogroup, or all of these under ‘the elites’) the 
easier it is to mobilise people and achieve impact. Radical activists 
of many policy domains are ‘playing a double-level game’ since EU 
institutions are increasingly targeted due to their involvement, but 
national government policy remains the chief locus of mobilisation 
and cause of protest.124 For anti-austerity and pro-democracy move-
ments as well as unions, the nation state or particular institutions have 
trumped the EU or the troika in terms of focus.125 As a memorandum 
of austerity was not the case in various instances – e.g. Iceland – and 
in other countries – for example in southern Europe or Ireland – its 
peak phase had passed, the EU level as a target of protest has been 
progressively trumped by the national level in terms of demands and 
criticism. However, during severe austerity national parliaments had 
to approve the bailouts and the process thus became contestable in 
national political competition. In addition, if the initial anti-austerity 
movements focused on the national level, subsequent mobilisations, 
such as the Gilet Jaunes in France and various national or sectional 
strikes, were even more centred on the national level regarding both 
their roots and their targets.126 The Gilet Jaunes protests ignited in 
response to increases to fuel prices but also echoed the destruction 
of the middle class and its displacement in the class map to a set of 
social peripheries.127 
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Meanwhile, the rhetorical framing of austerity and mobilisation 
against it are codified among activists as acts of resistance to problems 
that are global or international and thus require systemic, transcon-
tinental transformation. The simultaneous mobilisation of Occupy 
movements in tens of countries legitimated these views and enhanced 
globalist outlooks among movement participants.128 In the context of 
anti-austerity protest, ‘Europe’, as Della Porta and Parks report from 
their interviews, ‘was seen as a main problem and the very identifi-
cation of a European identity as problematic’.129 There is, however, 
some evidence of generational divides. Where older activists appreci-
ate Europe’s legacy of twentieth-century wars and the European social 
model, younger activists blame neoliberal Europe and take it for 
granted because neoliberalism is all they have experienced.130 Among 
radical movements there has not emerged a coherent or collective 
call for an EU exit. This is a position which neither guarantees more 
internationalist solidarity by itself nor clearly looks strategically supe-
rior for most activists on the Radical Left than staying in and fighting 
from there. Many movements and activists in the GJM were explicitly 
pro-European integration but disagreed with its political direction.131
There has been, nevertheless, a gradual Europeanisation of radical 
and other social movements.132 It is defined as their capacity to 
mobilise with the EU as a focus and as an increasing emphasis on 
EU issues and European identities. It is compounded with the frag-
mented transnationalisation of party politics that we will discuss 
later. Social movements have adapted to multilevel governance by 
increasing their numbers of actors operating exclusively at the EU 
level, expanding their transnational networks and focusing on an 
increasing number of European targets (agencies, institutions, offi-
cials). These tendencies have been documented for deliberations over 
an EU constitution (c.2004), campaigns such as against the Bolkestin 
Directive’s (2006) aim to create a single market for services and the 
Transnational Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP, 2013–16) 
between the EU and the United States.133 During the pandemic some-
thing on the left, which took both an international and transnational 
shape, has been the support for issuing Eurobonds as well as direct 
fiscal stimuli into the economies and societies of Europe, which nine 
countries inside the EU proposed but the hegemonic forces led by 
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Germany declined. In addition there is the Right to Cure campaign 
of the European Citizens Initiative, supported by many left-wing 
actors and more generally a vehement critic of the EU’s organisation 
of vaccines and its interaction with the pharmaceutical-industrial 
complex.
A parallel reality is that the EU provides political opportunities to 
radical and other groups to mobilise in pursuit of a particular goal – 
against very restrictive asylum policy, for better labour rights, against 
the violation of civil liberties, or fighting environmental damage 
condoned by the national government. This is where, in some coun-
tries from time to time in others systematically, the EU serves as a 
progressive force to be utilised for local or national political battles. 
Such political opportunities can be EU law, funding from specific 
programmes or communiqués and interventions by EU institutions 
and agencies condemning or supporting developments at the national 
level. For all the Euroscepticism of the radical social movements, the 
EU’s arms and branches can be a useful tool in opposing national 
government excesses or in support of democratising forces. This also 
became apparent during the pandemic, during which the European 
Court of Human Rights, organisations like Amnesty International 
and the European Commission itself became tools for reinforcing 
and substantiating claims against government restrictions.
In perspective, the line between Eurocentrism, Europeanisation 
and internationalism is thin. Eurocentrism is both a form of orien-
talism and imperialism to be opposed by the radical movements and 
a de facto reality for mobilisation and resistance given the high rec-
ognition of the role of EU institutions and policies. It wouldn’t be 
illogical to associate this Europeanisation with the lack of solidar-
ity during the entire 2010s towards non-EU countries and regions 
through formulated and collective solidarity policies or demands. In 
any case, post-2008 the comparatively thin internationalism of the last 
mobilisation wave within Europe is conjoined with a largely Europe-
anised protest space. This is an appropriate time for radical theory to 
dissect whether the concrete political situation in which movements 
and activists find themselves practically means overvaluing devel-
opments and agency in Europe, and depreciating the dynamic and 
The European Radical Left
80
relevance of less developed and oppressed nations, which would be 
Eurocentrism.
retrospective
Ideological development shows lasting lines of division for which the 
past plays an important role – as a benchmark and spring of con-
testation. Ideas take up meanings that reflect their contemporary 
political resonance. The idea of sovereignty has evolved not in its 
core meaning of sovereign power but in respect of where this power 
is located: in the people, the nation, the locality or the food pro-
duction and consumption process. Democracy has not changed in 
terms of the salience ascribed to democratic claims on the Radical 
Left but rather in what concerns its envisioned applications and pro-
tested pathologies. Solidarity shifts between the national, European 
and international levels and solidifies into specific policies according 
to each one’s prominence in the public sphere, although solidarity is 
always found in all directions. 
Differences in movement identity between the three periods 
of ‘newness’ concern how certain themes have been projected in 
relation to others and the way in which they are analysed, evoked and 
contextualised. Many of the identity traits ascribed to the post-2008 
social movements – pro-democracy, neo-anarchism, anti-auster-
ity mobilisation and the politicisation of class and its simultaneous 
marriage with issues that transcend material inequality and exploita-
tion – apply to the Long ’68 and in some cases much earlier, although 
they do not always characterise the epoch or the self-identities of 
activists back then. Returning to the issue of labels with which the 
chapter started, the radical left movements have always had multiple 
identities, which as we will see subsequently translate into multiple 
vocabularies and organisational forms. They have been pro-democ-
racy, anti-globalisation and alternative globalisation, statist and 
anti-statist, anti-capitalist and anti-neoliberal, as well as anti-sys-
temic and reformist. 
We are thus prompted to return to the notion of salience ascribed 
to ideas and positions in the theoretical sketch of the book. This is 
the main issue at hand in long-term evolution. In each period, radical 
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movement identities shift relationally when casting the mobilisation 
wave as a whole and radical identities within it. The NSMs envi-
sioned a world without deprivation, hegemony, war and any form 
of alienation. Their vision was for equality and material abundance, 
against consumption-driven puritanism and authoritarian socialism. 
They introduced, to society and the traditional left, existential self-
fulfilment, expressive freedom and sexual emancipation, civil rights 
for minorities and a blending of nationalism and socialism through 
Third World prisms and demands. A reformulated socialist longing 
in radical movement spaces broke with the sterile orthodoxy of the 
USSR, continuing a pre-emerging, wider political critique of existing 
socialism set off by Stalin’s death. 
The imaginary of the GJM was prefigurative, reformist in its policy 
demands, transnationally theorised and focused and speaking of 
social and economic justice under the rubric of anti-neoliberalism. 
It, too, sought to resuscitate the left, but only after a historical defeat 
which significantly pushed down the electoral fortune of social-
ist parties and CPs and oriented activism towards working outside 
the framework of teleological certainty and historical specificity. In 
post-2008 spaces, the key imaginaries coexist but also follow the 
sequence of emerging struggles in terms of the frames and positions 
driving actual mobilisation – from anti-austerity and pro-democ-
racy, to climate justice and immigrant solidarity, to health, welfare 
and anti-authoritarianism. 
Between the 1960s and today, it is the prominence of some ideas 
and positions in relation to others and in the context of mobilisation 
and resistance that has chiefly changed. Namely, the dynamic between 
revolution and reformism; claims and representations of democra-
cy’s current pathologies; evolving manifestations of solidarity; the 
potential and form of anti-war movements; the dialectic between 
anti-imperialism and pacifism; and the push and pull of Eurocen-
trism, Europeanisation and Euroscepticism. Thereby, change is not 
so concerned with the range or multiplicity of radical left claims and 
attitudes. These became significantly more pluralised after the 1960s, 
hence the discourse of NSMs offers meaning, among other things, to 
the ideological broadening of the European Radical Left. 
82
4
Patterns in Social Movement Rhetoric
introduction
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the ways in which the post-
2008 movements of the European Radical Left are distinct, or not, 
from those of the 1960s/1970s and the GJM in terms of rhetoric. We 
take a step further, based on Chapter 3, by looking more inquisitively 
at what rhetorical style and strategies emerge from the ideational tra-
jectories documented so far. The chapter first considers the shift from 
class-based and revolutionary discourse to universalistic language 
and its associated features – emotions, vagueness, less doctrine, 
human rights and the broad category of citizen. In continuing our 
earlier point on the gradual passage of revolutionary positions, we 
elaborate on how revolution and utopia have been resignified. As a 
particular type of universalistic rhetoric and statist policy seeking, 
we then discuss ‘new left populism’, inquiring into the broader debate 
about crowds, masses and how to analyse and approach them as 
agents of progress. Is the alleged acceleration of left populism during 
the 2000s and 2010s valid?
Like populism, nationalism takes many forms according to the 
ideology to which it attaches. Like populism, nationalism has been 
an issue for the Left from its very beginnings. Like populism, nation-
alism works through a binary, a self-identification with the patria or 
nationhood as opposed to the unpatriotic or nationally treacherous. 
In-groupism and out-groupism can be circumscribed through local, 
regional or national political arenas; as with populism they evoke ter-
ritoriality, but unlike populism they are horizontally defined. 
universalism, revolution, utopia, rights
The critical characteristic of both the GJM context and the post-2008 
situation in Europe is dispossession; this has shaped the vocab-
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ulary of social movement politics.1 As David Harvey explains, the 
mechanism affecting the relationship between neoliberalism and 
mobilisation against it, accumulation by dispossession – different 
from accumulation through the expansion of wage labour as in the 
1960s – is fragmented and thus hard to oppose without appeal to 
universal principles evoking commonality and humanism.2 An issue 
can activate emerging publics either in a universal or particularistic 
manner, the former meaning ‘issues that have no specific reference 
to a well-defined social group’, while the latter denotes framings in 
a way that issues ‘are intrinsically related to specific social groups’.3 
Harvey argues that ‘dispossession entails the loss of rights. Hence the 
turn to a universalistic rhetoric of human rights, dignity, sustaina-
ble ecological practices, environmental rights, and the like, as the 
basis for a unified oppositional politics.’4 Extreme forms of exploi-
tation under conditions of return to primitive modes of expansion 
produced emerging ruling classes and popular classes, which neces-
sitated reframing opposition to exploitation. Similarly, Saskia Sassen’s 
use of the term ‘expulsions’, as the human and social condition under 
‘brutality’ and ‘complexity’, described the increase in disparities cur-
rently being faced by populations worldwide.5 Like in the analysis of 
Harvey, Sassen’s argument implies the need to recalibrate resistance, 
largely because it reveals atypical forms of struggles and suggests 
multiplicity and diversity. 
In the GJM, and even more so in anti-austerity protests, traditional 
workers mobilised along with precarious workers, public sector 
workers, pensioners and the unemployed, students, farmers and 
indigenous people, LGBTQ (Lesbians, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, 
Queer) activists, pacifists and revolutionaries. A more encompass-
ing language has often been the product of protests bringing together 
heterogeneous coalitions of citizens united as the losers and critics of 
neoliberal globalisation. However, they are relatively heterogeneous 
regarding their structural locations, their demographic features and 
their attitudinal traits; after all, a large part of globalisation’s so-called 
losers, especially those with a lower educational background, unite 
around the extreme right. The Zapatista slogan, ‘one no, many yeses’, 
or its support for diversity of different life forms as with the phrase 
a ‘world in which many worlds have their place’, expressed this large 
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diversity in the collective subject. Many mobilised sections of the 
movement were inspired to unite in an oppositional front around a 
shared rejection of neoliberal globalisation, but without being limited 
to fixed meanings. Rather, the goal was to construct a counter-hegem-
onic force and (in Gramscian terms) fight a war of position.6 
In accordance with Harvey’s rationale of universalistic rhetoric and 
what it entails – sensations, generic slogans and unspecified meanings 
– is above all a question of necessity and strategy under conditions of 
a frontal attack by neoliberal elites and unprecedented socio-political 
diversity among the oppressed. All-encompassing slogans are some-
times too vague to openly invoke radicalism. Consider the names of 
the past decade’s movements: ‘Get up’ (Aufstehen) in Germany; ‘We 
Can’ (Podemos) in Spain or ‘indignation’ more broadly; ‘Rising Up’ 
(UK), ‘RISE’ in Scotland or ‘Momentum’ in the UK; or ‘Common 
Sense’ (Senso Comune) in Italy. They are connected by the call to 
react and demand change, and the ideological and policy net implied 
by their labels can be too opaque to reflect or sustain coherence. 
Their nominal invocations are generic, untargeted and often make 
mention of traits of behaviour (ability, reaction, awareness) that are 
more connected to motivation and emotion rather than particular 
ideological colours. Consider here also some of the catch-all-like 
statements of the Spanish 2010 movement Real Democracy Now!, 
such as the following, which would be unthinkable in ‘a strictly left-
wing’ movement: 
Some of us consider ourselves progressive, others conservative. 
Some of us are believers, some not. Some of us have clearly defined 
ideologies, others are apolitical, but we are all concerned and angry 
about the political, economic, and social outlook which we see 
around us; corruption among politicians, businessmen, bankers, 
leaves us helpless, without a voice. This situation has become 
normal, a daily suffering, without hope. But if we join forces, we can 
change it. It’s time to change things, time to build a better society 
together.7
In movements and protest, from strikes to demonstrations to 
sit-ins, emotions have a critical function. Their framing in discourse 
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reclaims them as central to our cognitive and evaluative capacities; 
thus ‘love’, ‘anger’, ‘indignation’ and so on can be very important, 
legitimate and unifying elements among activist conceptions of social 
justice.8 Projecting emotions is radical itself by way of bringing, in the 
words of Chantal Mouffe, passions into politics, which has anyway 
been enduringly central to political conflict, political history and 
political thought but dismissed as irrational by predominant percep-
tions of politics.9 To the extent that it is emotional the movements’ 
contribution is thus counter-hegemonic, given the mainstream 
liberal narrative of the historical and progressive victory of reason 
over emotions.10 At the same time, emotional, rhetorical and other 
appeals are neither politically exclusive – thus they can inform a 
politics promoting violence, hate and discrimination – nor specific 
in terms of policy. They can therefore end up mixing a very heteroge-
neous crowd, bound only or mostly by emotions and passions rather 
than a collective political culture, and thus easy to demobilise or split. 
Indeed, counter-hegemony may be more difficult to shape without 
fixed meanings, that is, specific ideas about the past, the present and 
the future, which can be shared between the oppressed and reconcile 
multiple sectionalities.
To decode social movement names and appeals we have to take 
into consideration their organic composition and their intended 
audience as key indicators; both of these, in terms of movements or 
protests such as the above, are much broader than the space of left 
radicalism strictly speaking, as we saw in Chapter 3. A key part of the 
pragmatic formula in doing social movement politics is the percep-
tion that, as David Snow and colleagues have suggested, the successes 
and failures of social movements depend partly on their ability to 
frame grievances in ways that resonate with mainstream beliefs and 
values.11 Humanism and rights are such mainstream ideas, and for 
coalition building with ‘ideological others’ pragmatism is effective. 
This is, in fact, an ancient realisation, reflected in the Aristotelian 
analysis of rhetoric. A personal account of an Occupy London Stock 
Exchange activist portrays succinctly the point by explaining the 
rationale behind replacing the banner ‘Capitalism is Crisis’ in the 
occupied space with ‘All Power to the 99%’: ‘If we as Occupy came out 
full guns blazing saying we are anti-capitalists, it would have played 
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into the mainstream frame, which would have led to fewer people lis-
tening to us.’12
Over time and within the broad space of radical and progressive 
movements, we can note a number of discursive trends: the substi-
tution by many Anglo-American activists of terms like ‘exploitation’, 
which signifies exploiters in economic terms above all constituting 
the ruling class, with terms such as ‘class bias’, which signifies misbe-
haviour towards persons of low economic status, detecting a snobbish 
attitude rather than a problem of social and economic structure. In 
Anglo-Saxon settings, we can also note a shift from the language of 
‘oppression’ to the language of ‘vulnerability’ or ‘privilege’ and ‘status’, 
which is more entrenched in identitarian concerns. Or the construc-
tion of the enemy as ‘capitalism’ in the 1960s and as ‘neoliberalism’ in 
the 2000s; or the notion of a ‘battle’, which is important in and of itself 
as self-serving progress, as opposed to being simply a factor in the 
process of ‘revolution’; or the further consolidation of ‘an everyday 
revolution’, which can dampen visions of mass-scale rupture; or the 
near total fading of the notion of ‘agitation’; importantly, also the 
prevalence of citizenship and the citizen as opposed to the ‘workers’ 
or the ‘oppressed’.
Anarchism, for its part in revolution’s shifting significations, is also 
a space whereby revolutionaries in both Europe and beyond ‘have 
increasingly abandoned even talking about seizing power’. They 
have ‘begun to formulate radically different ideas of what a revolu-
tion would even mean’.13 Many anarchists rethought the concept in 
the midst of sustained incapacity for a mass overthrow. The begin-
ning of change in the ideological thought of anarchist authors can 
be traced in the aftermath of World War II, when the defeat of the 
Spanish anarchists during the civil war (1936–9) that ended in 
Franco’s reign made revolution look at best ‘a temporally elongated 
phenomenon’, ‘without a climactic endpoint’.14 Between the 1960s 
and the GJM, in the context of heated debate, the prefigurative diver-
gence from classical anarchism was confronted with polemics and 
accusations of reformism. In opposition to the increasingly majori-
tarian position that a ‘revolutionary exodus’ strategy is necessary to 
construct an alternative infrastructure for the renewal of social rela-
tions, various thinkers and activists have persisted in the direction of 
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overthrow. Other than this, today it is a minoritarian mode of ideo-
logical thinking.
The discontinuity in the anarchist tradition fits into a generalised 
shift from understanding change as a process rather than an event, 
thereby reconceptualising revolution and emphasising non-violence, 
education and opposition to ‘domination’ rather than ‘oppression’. It 
is today reflected in key contemporary figures of anarchist thought – 
among them James Scott, Richard Day and the late David Graeber. 
They have sought to ‘de-fetishise socio-political innovation’, the very 
meaning of the new, by ‘envisaging it as a long-term process of resist-
ance and open, ongoing, plural experimentations rather than as an 
instantaneous and miraculous eruption’.15 Occupy’s anarchists, for 
example, like their precursors in the GJM, exhibit a strong associa-
tion between utopianism and prefigurative politics. As Ruth Kinna 
argues, the anarchist utopian strain rejects ‘scientistic’, ‘historicist’ 
and ‘instrumental’ ways of constructing the connection between the 
means of struggle and its end. Rather, their utopia is evoked to assert 
and highlight that alternative structures, norms and behaviours are 
possible and to craft their way forward in a way consistent ‘with their 
principles, precisely in order to resist unspecified abstract utopias or 
blueprints’.16 
This drawn-out process, gradually changing the internal dynamics 
of global anarchism, is not only the ‘defetishisation’ of revolution, 
inasmuch as there has been a substantive, political repositioning grav-
itating towards an attitude on the state that is much more complex 
than the classical persuasion of smashing it. In the post-war period, 
the welfare system was identified as partly progressive in providing 
self-determination through social security and universal education. 
Western European countries were also becoming increasingly geared 
towards decentralisation and regional planning. Anarchist thought 
registered these developments through recasting anarchism not 
merely as a negative struggle of opposition to domination, but also 
as co-creative alongside already available infrastructures offered by 
the state in the service of resistance.17 Then, the coexistence between 
citizenship claims and anarchist theory in the Occupy movements 
that was noted in Chapter 3, as well the GJM’s engagement with 
international institutions, must thus be situated as the most recent 
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manifestation of the gradual shift to an evolutionary understanding 
of revolution. This, we could argue in historical terms, makes large 
crowds with many anarchists inside them more plausible.
The discourse of everydayness may be driven by the response to 
a more general problem that has to do with modernity and therein 
the meaning of and right to revolt. This argument about capitalism 
and its consolidation through ideologies suggests that in moder-
nity the archaic demand for self-government has been substituted 
by the emphasis on consent, at the same time as the average person 
has shifted from ‘passions’ to ‘interests’, and has no time for ‘conven-
tional’ politics.18 Since the 1970s, in a context where politics as such 
has been contested and redefined, revolution, and the commitment, 
potential, planning and other necessities for revolution, have become 
obsolete or nearly extinct in society. This is not to say that radical 
spaces lack utopian mindsets; emerging utopias have indeed com-
manded already significant attention.19 One can be utopian and not 
expect or strive for revolution as an overthrow or a rupture – be it a 
‘permanent’ general strike or other transformative outbreaks among 
the people – as understood in earlier decades. 
There gradually came a phase, 1989 being a turning point and 
preceded by several other milestones, where vibrant utopias became 
completely bereft of a revolutionary plan that would realise them on 
a mass scale. Most other castles of revolution had been failing since 
the 1960s. The Soviet bloc was the biggest and more powerful one 
of all. For the Left, this was the end not of history but of the noble 
future, after which a period of existential anxiety ensued, as popular 
confidence in the feasibility of socialism deteriorated. Latin Amer-
ica’s influence from the 1990s onwards also contrasted with what 
kind of politics was emulated or drawn upon from the other side of 
the Atlantic during the global 1960s. Latin American left populism 
has been a state-centred reformism with mass appeal, which as in 
Venezuela became possible due to high oil revenues and strong 
economic conditions.20 In this sense, the teleological disarming of 
the broad Left has been a slow outcome. ‘Utopias’ are today back on 
the agenda, and in this respect all periods of ‘newness’ resemble each 
other. Over the long term and starting soon after ’68, however, the 
very meaning of revolution on the Left has evolved, and the ‘revolu-
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tionary plan’ has lost its communist-inspired substance and appears 
weak and suspicious of criminality in the wider public sphere. Then 
again, an accumulation of politically motivated utopias can be a nec-
essary, although insufficient, condition for a widely shared, relatively 
coherent way of transforming social relations. 
In parallel, since the 1970s, the broad Left has evolved in such a 
way that human rights rather than anti-imperialism animate the 
progressive space of internationalism. Solidarity claims in support 
of migrants or the victims of war are today premised on argu-
ments revolving around the legal discourse of international law and 
fuelled by humanitarianism.21 This was a process that started with 
1970s anti-war activists mobilising against American military inter-
vention in northern Vietnam and subsequently siding with human 
rights as opposed to the sovereignty of Vietnam.22 The 1970s was 
filled with ‘embarrassing’ instances where Third World revolution-
ary communism negated itself through mass slaughter, displacement 
and common terrorism, being accused of genocide and trigger-
ing memories of the holocaust.23 Most relevant historical research 
confirms that the publication of Aleksandr’s Solzhenistyn’s The Gulag 
Archipelago, originally published in Russian in 1974 and focusing on 
the daily lives inside the Soviet system of labour camps (gulags), was 
a significant milestone in this direction.24 It fed into a thorough ‘eth-
icification’ of French politics, itself generated in the aftermath of May 
1968 and the subsequent discussions of its political defeat and appro-
priate legacy. Revolutionary zeal was also discredited in this light of 
revolutionary regimes being challenged on ethical terms that invoked 
the need for regulating systems aimed at legalising political behav-
iour upon the premise of respect for fundamental human principles 
regarding the rights of all people.25
This transformation sparked debate in the 1970s and 1980s, which 
divided radicals and progressives over, for instance, whether the Left 
should be ‘for’ or ‘against’ constitutionalism and the rule of law, includ-
ing international law.26 Most importantly, as the language of human 
rights was becoming increasingly prevalent from about the 1970s, the 
socialist vocabulary started to decline. This concerned France in par-
ticular as a central place for intellectual debates on political violence 
and rights. It was from there that Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors 
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without Borders) emerged to configure, or rather displace, Third 
Worldism and attract many leftists towards a radical humanitarian-
ism.27 A significant event, even before The Gulag Archipelago, was 
the Palestinian terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics, which 
proved important in prompting French Maoists, among others, to 
rethink how militant attitudes combine with politics.28
In both Europe and the USA, the 1960s was cast as a triumph of 
constitutional rights by movements. In the global context of ‘univer-
salising intellectuals’ (such as Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi 
and Nelson Mandela) and the growth in civil rights lawyers and 
community organising, rights guaranteed in the Constitution were 
forcefully defended and litigated.29 The main advocates of ‘respect 
for international law’ were the pro-Soviet CPs, while in opposition 
the ‘humanitarian interventionists’ behind imperial powers viewed 
the concept of respect for sovereignty enshrined in international law 
as anachronistic.30 The triumph of constitutional rights had, after all, 
come from below, as American and European liberalism was firmly 
embedded within the anti-communist Cold War consensus and only 
reluctantly accepted the demands of the civil rights movements.
From another angle, rights-centred politics is distrusted within a 
wider distrust of the law in general, their essential function perceived 
to serve ruling-class interests. Political polarisation arose within and 
across radical movement spaces because of the universality and neu-
trality of human rights, as if they had no political relevance, being 
in tension with socialist imaginaries of deep and pervasive social 
and political divisions. Generally, human rights discourse as a way 
to promote the idea of equality sat uncomfortably with radical 
theories of political economy, gender and race, which in recognising 
hierarchies of social status identify communities of the oppressed. 
Dissenting voices on human rights project a radical critique of liberal 
identitarianism, identifying it as a type of reverse puritanism and 
taking things such as ‘political correctness’ and individualism to the 
extreme.
The problem from the very beginning, indeed since the Univer-
sal Declaration (1948), has been that human rights are selective in 
identifying moral concerns, as they ignore distributive and material 
inequality.31 Across time, there remain anti-capitalist sections among 
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left-wing movements that are at best sceptical about human rights 
discourse and at worst totally reject their abstraction as insufficient 
for (or even obstructive to) emancipation. They are also uncom-
fortable with its class origins and its use by Western imperialists 
themselves.32 The socialist critique of human rights starts from a 
critique of individualism as the form (and thus agency) of rights and 
considers them incapable of giving effect to and promoting human 
needs. A radical critique of rights begins therefore from a rejection 
of the subject of rights as the individual. From this perspective, rights 
discourse negates the Left’s notion of solidarity as fundamental to 
any form of strategic opposition against the day’s hegemonies. Devel-
oping out of the Marxist tradition, critical legal thinking has taken 
issue with the fetishism of human rights, which meant ‘denying them 
central status as the sole criterion of questions about morality and 
social justice’ and refusing to anchor the debate ‘within the concep-
tual terrain of liberal legalism’.33
Human rights, more specifically anti-discrimination laws, have 
been interpreted so to prosecute activists. In prosecuting Boycott 
Disinvestment Sanctions activists for their involvement in peaceful 
boycott campaigns, French authorities utilised anti-discrimination 
laws in ways that conform to the standard of anti-discrimination in 
international human rights law.34 Moreover, activists and movements 
criticise groups such as Human Rights Watch for imposing Western, 
orientalist standards on developing countries; standards which utilise 
a culturally and ideologically biased interpretation of universalism.35 
For Palestine especially, critiques of human rights point to its strate-
gic use to undermine the political essence of the Palestinian struggle 
and to legitimise foreign intervention and support of Israel.36
Bartholomew and Breakspear wrote about ‘the possibility of 
pursuing the development of cosmopolitan norms and institutions 
as part of an anti-imperialist strategy, in part by addressing the 
problems of the United Nations (UN), multilateralism and human 
rights instead of rejecting them’.37 Many recognise, for instance, that 
some of the most progressive diagnoses and technical reports about 
health, labour or rights emerge out of the UN’s specialist committees, 
or similarly out of the Council of Europe or organisations such as the 
World Health Organization. Major human rights treaties – the Inter-
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national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the conventions 
on torture, women’s rights, children’s rights and racial discrimina-
tion – have provided resources for social movements active in these 
struggles such as monitoring bodies, linking with civil society, receiv-
ing individual complaints and examining periodic reports by state 
members.38
Disagreement on the Left still remains, in so far as many activ-
ists and partisans are not convinced that the advancement of human 
rights is the way forward for more distributive and material justice, 
and more importantly for moving beyond the consolidation of rights 
within existing society beyond the ‘mere’ broadening of permissibil-
ity. The frame of human rights has, however, become a core part of 
most justice-related struggles across the world. The UN, multilateral-
ism and human rights are not simply ‘problems’ of theory to address 
through reflection; they are often allies or tools, attracting support-
ers across multiple struggles and for issues pertaining to the West and 
beyond. Because defending human rights broadens the scope of soli-
darity expression to the largest possible extent, their advocating may 
be the most useful positioning for many battles on the Left. It may be 
too hard or too late to reformulate questions of imperialism, inequal-
ity and oppression around sharply different nodal points.
Accordingly, the strategy of engaging with, instead of deconstruct-
ing, human rights discourse through a non-liberal perspective that 
recognises both their imperial nature and neoliberal bias on the one 
side, and their cross-sectional appeal and entrenched status as a set of 
humanist ideas on the other side, can appear as the most logical way 
forward today. ‘Rights talk’ can be a useful toolkit of demands for a 
more forceful anti-capitalist politics; although their defence through 
litigation strategies and judicial reviews are not forms of disruption or 
resistance, they are tools to be used strategically and are useful under 
certain contingencies. As Thomas Murray points out, this is basically 
in line with the analysis of rights by Karl Marx in the Grundrisse: it 
treated constitutions as arenas of political conflict with many deter-
minations, not as abstract normative or economic structures.39 This 
has been internalised by anarchists and socialists, as they often, in 
the context of local and national mobilisations, engage in opposition 
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to authoritarian or unjust regimes or legislation through recourse to 
constitutions, civil liberties and violent oppression.
One could counter-argue that, nevertheless, social rights enjoy 
only secondary status when human rights constitute the prevailing 
discourse. After all, this is why from the anarchists to the Trotsky-
ists and democratic socialists, ‘social rights’ is the predominant frame 
of rights talk on the Radical Left, so as to restore balance away from 
the signification of individuality and towards the collective and 
material dimensions of justice. Also, other normative and economic 
structures, which may be independent of rights in a historical sense, 
impinge upon the boundaries of rights and constitutionalism as a 
tool for radical change in the long term. The very challenges faced by 
local movements confirm this in a sense. As broad ideas that infuse 
behaviour, rights and constitutionalism will always condemn a vague 
‘too much’ in protests and action against ‘property rights’, ‘law and 
order’, ‘(negative) freedom’, occupying private and public space and 
other axioms of liberalism that crop up in real-life political conflict, 
whereby opponents seek to demonise illiberal action. 
the few, the many, the people:  
populism and social movements
Like universalistic rhetoric and its manifestation in rights discourse 
and citizen claims, populism is both a rhetorical form and a discur-
sive political strategy. Post-2008, populism has reflected progressive 
ends, most vividly in the case of Podemos, emerging from the Spanish 
indignados movement, SYRIZA in Greece, Momentum and Jeremy 
Corbyn’s electoral campaigns, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s presidential 
campaigns and the discourse of France Insoumise (FI). A radical or 
progressive populism was also evident in the Occupy movements; the 
banner popularised in Ireland and the UK, which stands with ‘the 
millions not the millionaires’; the Gilet Jaunes in 2018 or the Nuit 
Debout in France in 2016, which embraced a democratic, horizontal 
and thus ‘counter’ populism to be differentiated from the hegemonic 
populism of authoritarian and conservative forces;40 and the People’s 
Climate Marches in European and other countries, often backed by 
tactical arguments about inventing ‘the people’ of the environmen-
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tal movement in the conjuncture of a climate crisis as a political 
opportunity. 
As a sort of minimum definition, populism is the discourse which 
pits ordinary people against corrupt elites. It brings together people-
centrism and anti-establishment discourse in a sharply different way 
from right-wing populism. It constructs the people as a progressive, 
forward-looking, inclusive and emancipatory force, in stark contrast 
to the people as an exclusive subject – the product of ethnic attach-
ment, nativist, racist and xenophobic attitudes.41 Populism in its 
progressive colours can prove to be a potential corrective to democ-
racy by restoring the popular sovereignty damaged in the process 
of liberal democratic practice.42 As a strategy of political mobilisa-
tion, populism can also entail organisational features that enable 
its discourse to survive and attract. In the final analysis, as regards 
the widespread claim that there is a populist surge on the European 
Radical Left of the 2010s, what are the differences with previous ‘new 
lefts’? By implication, how new is today’s left populism? 
The 1960s/1970s movements in many ways communicated 
themselves as minoritarian currents within an otherwise conserva-
tive, oppressive and unjust society. They still featured populist-like 
rhetoric. The counter-culture movements in the USA and western 
Europe during the 1960s – communes, social and political satire, 
provocation and absurdity, alternative ‘hippie’ lifestyles and dress 
codes and other habits driven by the attempt to widen consciousness 
– are testament to how the enemy was perceived as the established 
superstructure, imposing a narrow version of possibilities in terms 
of social organisation and asserting dominance through morality. 
This collective political body was perceived as summoning forces 
from various parts of the ideological spectrum, pervading the edu-
cational system and social relations, and inculcating a substantial 
section of the working and middle classes with a robotic subservience 
to systemic demands. Terms such as ‘alienation’, ‘conformity’, ‘author-
ity’ and ‘absurdity’ reverberated a negativism that was a fundamental 
part of the New Left’s ‘rhetorical structure’ across both Europe and 
the USA. Confrontation, as embodied in the movements of the time, 
suggested a radical distinction between the ‘haves’ from the ‘have 
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nots’ and a ‘Manichean struggle’ in which the latter, ‘who confront 
established power do not seek to share: they demand to supplant’.43
Identifying an oppressive out-group as the enemy was a central 
feature of the 1960s and 1970s movements not only in terms of 
rhetoric, partly like left populism today, but also in terms of theory. 
This is exemplified by many social science books of the Long ’68: C. 
Wright Mills’ analysis of dominant ‘vested interests’ in The Power Elite, 
Louis Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses, Goran Therbron’s 
What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules, the Miliband–Poulatzas 
debate concerning the state and social classes in capitalism, or Stuart 
Hall’s model of ‘popular culture’ as ‘a battlefield where a struggle 
between freedom and exploitation is played’.44 The 1960s and 1970s 
were the hiatus of Marxist state theory, its elaborations affecting the 
schemas and binaries of socialist language among militants, and 
around journals such as the New Left Review and others admired by 
students and intellectuals. Marxist sociology had effectively provided 
analytical sketches of what constitutes the establishment, the elites or 
the oligarchy and how these think, act and react, something which 
was feeding directly into mobilisation. 
The very slogan ‘(all) power to the people’ suggests the people/elites 
binary, as the elite is alluded to by the slogan (although not explicitly 
addressed). There is an implicit acknowledgement that there is an 
unfair distribution of power that can in turn be corrected by consign-
ing power to the people. The history of the slogan attests to this. The 
Black Panthers used the slogan ‘All Power to the People’ to protest the 
domination exercised by the white, rich, ruling class. For the Vietnam 
War ‘the people’ stood against the military campaign in Vietnam and 
the economic and political agents driving it; that is, against the estab-
lishment.45 American and English youth would more generally use 
the phrase during the 1960s as a form of rebellion against what they 
perceived as the oppression by the older generation, often referred 
to also as the establishment.46 Indeed, ‘anti-establishment’ became a 
buzzword of the tumultuous 1960s. It was a sensibility unifying dif-
ferent sorts of movements (often issue specific) against ‘the system’ 
or the ‘status quo’. Towards that end of fighting the establishment 
these movements sought to blend aesthetics, ethics and art. Songs 
like ‘Power to the People’, ‘People Get Ready’ and ‘Everyday People’ 
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from American soul music codified politics through cultural perfor-
mance. Third World activists used the ‘Power to the People’ slogan 
to claim self-determination and as a means of radical socio-eco-
nomic change. What other call from radicals has evoked popular 
sovereignty so explicitly, and so evidently connected with the oppres-
sion of the many by the few? To the extent that this slogan came to 
be used by and characterised a multiplicity of radical initiatives and 
groups in 1960s America and Europe across classes, situations and 
organised spaces, a convergence of struggles through identification 
with popular power was already achieved back then in the populist, 
Laclauian sense. 
It has been suggested that the post-2008 movements are distinct 
from those of the 1960s/1970s and the GJM in terms of rhetoric 
and more generally their framing of left radicalism through specific 
notions: their communication to society at large of what they stand 
for and who they are. In terms of their self-perception, while the 
groups of the GJM cast themselves as struggling minorities, they 
were different and clearly more radical than the average citizen in 
European societies. Today’s movements claim to be massive and 
composed of ordinary people who detect an obvious unfairness and 
an evident structural malfunctioning. These movements claimed to 
be the ‘99%’, and their orientation is majoritarianism. Some authors 
contrast this with the GJM’s minoritarianism, since its cultural forms 
include ‘common sense’, ‘normality’ and ‘respectability’, where the 
GJM proclaimed ‘heroism’ and ‘antagonism’.47 Thereby, this is both 
a new strategy of communicating the struggle that emphasises unity 
within diversity and a type of sloganeering reflecting a self-concep-
tion by the activists themselves that eschews the GJM’s – and indeed 
that of the many NSMs of the 1960s – counter-cultural orientation.48 
Gerbaudo’s point, and more generally the novelty that such argu-
ments detect in the 2010s, have to be nuanced, as a developing appeal 
to the masses is evident from earlier decades. During the GJM, an 
out-group of a few elites – those who are profit seeking, self-inter-
ested, environmentally insensitive and so on – was said to exist. 
The main slogan of Genoa was ‘You are G8 we are 6 billion’ and its 
key rhetoric was the Negrian one of the ‘multitude(s)’ against the 
‘Empire’, a schema veritably distinguishing between the main antag-
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onists. Later ESFs insisted on being the expression of ‘civil society’, 
a political body arguably perceived as much larger than the neolib-
eral architects of globalisation. The messages of the GJM made use of 
ample people-centrism, countering the world’s mass populations to 
the ideology and interests behind the dictatorial market, or the huge 
global corporations, or the international economic organisations, or 
a network of all three. These were perceived and communicated as 
deeply counter-popular, and for that matter undemocratic, economic 
institutions.
In terms of the populist language schemas, the picture is one of 
evolution rather than significant change. While the GJM criticised 
capitalism and multinational corporations whereas the movement 
of the squares identified the oligarchy as the enemy, anti-oligarchic 
tendencies, arguments and visions in the form of anti-authoritarian 
and anti-elitist thinking were evident in various manifestations of the 
GJM. This was also the case in the critiques of multinational corpo-
rations and the financial oligarchy that were attacking self-imposed 
hierarchies which effectively lacked popular democratic legitimacy. 
As Hardt and Negri put it in Empire, ‘[t]he transnational aristoc-
racy seems to prefer financial speculation to entrepreneurial virtue 
and thus appears as a parasitical oligarchy’.49 The terms ‘oligarchy’, 
‘elites’ and ‘establishment’ were frequent terms in communiqués by 
key movements and activists of the GJM. Famously, during the 1999 
protests against the WTO, the Earth Rainbow Network launched a 
webpage titled ‘The Anti-Establishment Files’. Within the context of 
opposing a global neoliberal oligarchy, various new words, such as 
McWorld, were invented to allude to a new order of things, whereby 
a few conglomerate companies could decide or influence the way 
of life of millions of people. This rhetoric was indeed underpinned 
by rigorous analysis – as expressed in a bestseller from 1993, The 
McDonaldization of Society by American sociologist George Ritzer. 
A slogan popularised by the GJM was ‘People before profit’, which 
echoed challenges of the pursuit of maximal profit-driven GDP 
growth as the world’s utmost objective (a discussion also taking place 
at the level of the UN).50 Crowds at GJM events were heterogene-
ous in terms of their ideological imaginaries, social characteristics 
and immediate political goals, and they were large or sometimes 
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massive. A key slogan in the Genoa protests was, ‘You are G8, we 
are six billion’. In these ways, the populist current on the post-2008 
European Radical Left can be seen as a continuation, extension and 
elaboration of this initially hesitant and more partial rhetoric in the 
GJM that was conjoined with minoritarian ingredients coming from 
the anarchist space. 
It is not so much the language or rhetorical style of in-groupism, 
counter-hegemony, binaries and popular sovereignty that distin-
guishes the latest movement wave and the Left’s participation. This 
is not what changes but its circumstance, specifically the theories 
informing left populism not merely as discourse but chiefly as strategy 
and politics. The relationship between socialism and populism is on 
the one hand historical and intricate, whereas the ‘people’s legacy in 
communist thinking (Marxism, Leninism and Maoism)’ signals ‘a 
revolutionary alliance of the oppressed (in contrast to the populist 
rendering of the people as an organic unity)’.51 In the presence of per-
vading class divisions and distinctions, an organically unified people 
could only be mythical according to dialectical, materialist analysis to 
begin with. This is why Lenin (who was influenced by certain notions 
of Russian populism), as a Marxist theorist, rejected the view of ‘the 
people’ and distrusted the central role of spontaneity in populist 
analyses.52
Populism could not be reconciled with historical materialist nar-
ratives, hence it lacked an ideological formula justifying its strategic 
use while still remaining loyal to the pillars of classical Marxism. A 
portrait of the people and how they can be bounded into a collective 
political subject was missing in large part and had only started devel-
oping in the 1960s; there had been socialist populist rhetoric since the 
French Revolution, but no articulate theory of how to construe and 
design a counter-hegemonic near organic unity that would justify the 
people–elites binary. Although the translations of Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks, beginning in 1971, had a significant effect on critiques 
of centralism, his approach to counter-hegemony still configured a 
class struggle and accorded political primacy to the working class, 
upon which populism could not rest with theoretical confidence. 
Around the time Ernesto Laclau was publishing the initial formula-
tions of his discursive-strategic approach to populism, David Plotke, 
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an American radical academic commenting on his country’s own 
experience with the phenomenon, noted both positive and negative 
traits to populism as a left-wing strategy. He concluded that, ‘while 
it poses the questions of broad social alliances, it has no means of 
understanding the dynamics of such alliances’.53 
The shift by Laclau from Marxist to post-Marxist populism 
provided him with the tools necessary to formulate more specific 
answers to the above question, while also giving a distinct political 
tone to its adherents which continues today. Shifting away from his-
torical materialism entailed eventually minimising class analysis and 
maximising linguistic constructs and effects. Intellectually, the move 
in strategic priorities from ultimate victory to challenging everyday 
impacts is reflected in how critical analyses of the power dynamics 
of everyday interpersonal interactions have become prominent and 
increasingly sophisticated. In parallel, there has been a relative de-
emphasising of system-level causal mechanisms and teleological 
questions, and in turn a downgrading of the importance ascribed to 
political economy and critical macro-sociology. The linguistic turn 
within the broad humanities and social sciences, originating from 
the quest for methodological hybrids, bore an approach to language 
both as a new datum and as a perspective of analysis.54 Discourse-
oriented studies reinforced and were reinforced by the post-modern 
paradigm, the increasing relevance given to cultural and symbolic 
phenomena and the micro-logics of power. Left populism as theory 
and as a discursive strategy cannot be separated from the gradual 
abandonment of a positivist historiography.
According to some sections of the Left these trends paved the way 
for identity politics and have overall damaged the socialist cause 
– a damage understood as partly inflicted, although perhaps unin-
tentionally, by the Left itself. Based on Louis Althusser’s concept of 
articulation, Laclau and Chantal Mouffe abandoned the Althusse-
rian ‘last instance’ of the economy, essentially class and economic 
analysis. They claimed that without considering a fixed-but-evolving 
structure the superstructure is everything. If everything is articulated 
through discourse, performance and communication then ‘every-
thing is constituted in that articulation’. In doing so, Laclau departed 
from the Marxist tradition’s essentialist logic whereby everything can 
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be reduced to a particular social foundation or a set of structures, and 
explored the possibility of thinking about the political beyond the 
dictum of base–superstructure.55 Among many other rejections or 
revisions of Marxist schemas, ideas and frameworks, this was a very 
important one, since it subverted the analytical compass of socialists.
Earlier we noted a widely documented point: the 1970s was a 
period which, for a mass of left-wing intellectuals (many coming out 
of the revolutionary space), witnessed the realisation that an ideo-
logical and political overhaul of socialism was necessary. Both the 
traditional analytical tools and political demands of the Left were 
under scrutiny. It is by extending this rationale behind intellectual, 
revisionist strains to today’s context that one can understand why 
many see class and broader counter-hegemonic struggles as determi-
nations of discourse. While the rhetoric of movements diachronically 
exhibits various elements of contesting hegemony and constructing 
the in-group and the out-group, left populism as a discursive strategy 
has a distinctive, post-Marxist, theoretico-ideological content, not 
simply strategic implications and particular rhetorical features. 
Most of the things we know about left populism at the theoretical 
and empirical level come from academics and graduates who are 
sympathetic to Laclau and supportive of left populism as the way 
forward in constructing counter-hegemony. Discourse studies and 
the increasing emphasis given to political language, psychoanalysis 
and communication since about the 1960s are poles of attraction and 
output for radicals today.56 Through processes unfolding in society 
and elaborated in political activism and academia there has gradu-
ally advanced a theoretical core of radical populism, consolidated in 
Europe by the 2010s and most celebrated in On Populist Reason.57
Because it is post-Marxist, largely refutes class analysis and revises 
the logic of achieving counter-hegemonic mobilisation towards 
discursive tactics, left populism as theory has been and still is an 
ideological battleground. In its articulation, according to Laclau’s 
post-Marxism, it finds significant resistance within the intellectual 
and activist left. Meiksins-Wood, in The Retreat from Class, gave the 
conceptual and theoretical foundations for a still-existing line of crit-
icism towards Laclau’s post-structuralism for essentially abandoning 
(not only modifying) classical materialism in favour of an approach 
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which is linguistically deterministic.58 Laclau was criticising histor-
ical materialism, the foundations of Marxist political economy, as 
reductive, arriving, according to his critics, at a ‘new reductionism’. 
This was reflected in the avoidance of ‘a more complex engagement’ 
with practices ‘irreducible to linguistics’, structural processes and 
edifices.59 On similar grounds, Jodi Dean has challenged the more 
contemporary strategic implications of left populism as theory, as 
‘indifferent to [their] setting, as if there were no material determi-
nations of political possibility’, ‘the state and the economy […] taken 
as given’. ‘Populist politics’, she concludes, ‘doesn’t try to change these 
given parameters’.60
Left populist strategy is a question of conceptual and ideologi-
cal analysis whereby the structural questions of radical politics are 
not primarily understood in terms of material conflict and politics 
but in the dynamics of language. This is still a broad spectrum in a 
sense, since degrees of linguistic emphasis and shades of anarchist, 
democratic socialist, communist or other backgrounds often suggest 
that the left ‘populist crowd’ is not a monolithic one. Conceptual and 
theoretical spin-offs in the tradition of Laclau’s, Lacan’s and others’ 
cultural critiques and deconstructions of economic or even historical 
certainties have turned into political divisions, as in Latin America 
on many occasions, in Spain more recently and less so elsewhere. 
Chapter 7 returns to this discussion in the context of RLPs. As a pre-
liminary point, populist theory (or more broadly discussions about 
populism) animates discussions about political points. For example, 
regarding whether populism is a successful discursive strategy for the 
Radical Left, whether it can save social democracy and whether the 
recent defeats of various parties and other parts of radical mobilisa-
tion and resistance are to be explained by populism’s limitations or 
a more holistic examination of neoliberal politics that incorporates 
more (not less) economic thinking.
Whatever the case, for the time being the relationship between 
radical movements and populism is threefold. Populism is a frame 
widely used by ‘movement entrepreneurs’ throughout the auster-
ity and (more recently) pandemic periods.61 As a left-wing ideology, 
it characterises parts of the French and Spanish Radical Left. As a 
schema between oppressor and oppressed, it is much more widely 
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disseminated across the whole of Europe and spans the environmen-
tal, communist and democratic socialist currents. In Britain, Bailey 
showed that four key themes reflecting real, existing problems and 
grievances animated the in-group versus out-group schema of the 
anti-austerity movements, from UK Uncut, the Anti-Tuition Fees 
Movement, Occupy London and Sisters Uncut: that elites are self-
serving in supporting austerity; austerity is not the only alternative; 
austerity is damaging and counterproductive; and it is necessary 
to transcend politics as usual by democratising constitutional rep-
resentation structures.62 Popular identity becomes relevant when 
opportunities arise and enemies are specified over problems, but 
these openings can be of so many, various types that it is always dif-
ficult to tell if populist-like schemas have increased from a pre- to a 
post-crisis period, or if they merely gained more visibility through 
the electoral success of their agents. Anyhow, by 2020 an increas-
ing mass of people has been (further) hit by unemployment due to 
the pandemic and extreme poverty is predicted to affect millions for 
several years, and this echoes as a new social reality the rhetoric of 
the 1 per cent compared to the 99 per cent, and of citizens compared 
to the state.
an evolving radical nationalism?
From its very beginnings the global Radical Left has supported 
oppressed ethnicities, national minorities, colonised nations, nations 
without a state and indigenous populations. Socialists utilised 
nationalism ‘as a key player in the politics of modernity’, ‘developed 
in association with ideas of popular sovereignty and mass democ-
racy bound up with ideas of the self-determination of a given people, 
defined by shared history and common political rights’.63 A civic 
nationalist spirit has been there from the very beginning. 
The European movements of the 1960s and 1970s were not preoc-
cupied with an ‘own national sovereignty problem’ in many countries 
but were responding to Third Worldism as the instantiation of the 
postcolonial state through anti-colonial, national liberation struggles. 
National sovereignty in that context was an external idea mostly sup-
ported on behalf of the Third World’s movements. The Third World’s 
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first institutional moment was the Conference of Afro-Asian Nations 
in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. That was the moment that reser-
vations were made public about the growing Cold War between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, in essence signalling the establish-
ment of the Third World as a third bloc (the Non-aligned Movement) 
coalescing around left-nationalist aspirations in a broader political 
project of decolonisation. At that conference, the territorial sover-
eignty of all states was asserted by the endorsement of the principle 
of ‘non-intervention’, as opposed to the Western concept of interna-
tional ‘anarchy’ in global geopolitics.64 
Radical nationalism was the case initially in India under Nehru, 
Egypt under Nasser, Indonesia under Sukarno and Ghana under 
Nkrumah; then Chile under Salvador Allende, Tanzania and Jamaica. 
In all cases, there was an ‘intense valorising of anti-imperialist sover-
eignty around rhetorics of economic independence, popular power, 
social justice, and cultural dignity’.65 Crucial in this conjuncture for 
the eroding hegemony of the USSR was also the Sino–Soviet conflict, 
the demise since the mid-1950s of the alliance between the two super-
powers of national communism, which undermined not only Soviet 
legitimacy but that of the entire socialist camp. The revolutionary 
experiences of the Cuban revolution, the Algerian War of Independ-
ence, the Vietnam War or the Cultural Revolution in China, among 
many others, are examples of experiences in which at a practical level 
the approaches of nationalism were fused with socialism. ‘Patria o 
Muerte’ (Country or Death) marked the Cuban armed revolt and 
illustrated how revolutionary causes could be married to a nationally 
bounded in-group. Nationalist framings in the West also resonated 
well with the state ideology of ‘socialist patriotism’ in eastern Europe 
which blended imageries of socialism and nationhood. It presented 
CPs as heirs to national traditions and as defenders of national inter-
ests and loyalties – those of the state’s own workers and peasants.66
A revival of movements within European states making ethnic, 
cultural and national claims was underway. A revived European 
regionalism in the 1960s and 1970s stood upon the ground of several 
developments. Capitalist regional planning in the post-war period 
was underway, and the 1950s and 1960s underwent significant socio-
economic progress, including notably in the construction industry. 
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The impact of ideological fusions arising from May ’68 and the influ-
ence of the decolonisation struggles inspired new left libertarian and 
revolutionary movements to adopt regionalist outlooks, distinguish-
ing themselves from the centralist tendencies of the Old Left at both 
the party and state levels.67 The centre–periphery cleavage was salient 
in Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, the UK and Switzerland, where both 
left-wing and right-wing regionalist parties formed during the 1960s, 
often increasing their vote shares by the 1970s. In the process of 
forming these parties there were contributions from or alignments 
with a number of NSMs, such as labourism, the peace movement 
and Third Worldism (as in Belgium), revolutionary and libertarian 
movements (as in Spain) or environmental movements (as in France 
and Switzerland). 
Shifting sovereignty forward takes other forms. During the 
GJM, food sovereignty movements both in southern and northern 
European countries opposed corporate control of agriculture and 
focused on the right to healthy and culturally appropriate, locally 
produced and distributed food. Sovereignty was thus rearticulated in 
transnational terms while presenting itself as in partial contradiction 
to the market. GJM also contained currents fighting for indigenous 
sovereignty, exposing the link between the extreme deprivation of 
populations at the local level, corruption and authoritarianism at the 
national level, and the structural cruelty of modern capitalism at the 
global level. Popular education work, undertaken foremost through 
Attac, indicated the pursuit of knowledge sovereignty, away from the 
neoliberal ideas, formulas and doctrines of TINA and the Washing-
ton Consensus.68 At the same time, parts of the GJM, in line with 
Antonio Negri, rejected sovereignty as a left-wing project in favour 
of the decentred ‘empire’, in turn leading to perceptions of the EU as 
potentially progressive in transforming modern life away from sov-
ereign claims. Whereas the anti-colonial struggles against European 
and American imperialism in the 1960s and 1970s were firmly built 
on notions of national sovereignty, ‘empire’ denied the nation state as 
the main possessor of sovereignty. 
Moreover, in the GJM national identities and nationalism in its 
cultural and political sense were far weaker forces than in the 1960s 
or more recently. The GJM’s transnational structure and the spirit of 
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global solidarity celebrated most by the Mexican Zapatistas’ inter-
nationalism conduced to keeping nationhood away from the agenda 
in the global struggle against neoliberalism. As the most popular 
source of inspiration for the GJM, the uprising of the Zapatistas 
in Chiapas, Mexico in 1994 uniquely combined indigenous sover-
eignty with internationalist pluralism, and in this intersubjection 
claims to national independence could not find theoretical ground-
ing. Certainly, debates over the trajectory and status of the nation 
state flourished during the height of the GJM years, but these were 
less guided by an interrogation of globalisation’s consequences. The 
emerging disagreement has been one between those who argue that 
we live in a ‘post-ethnic’ or ‘post-national’ era and those who point 
out that nationalism’s drive has been reinforced because of globalisa-
tion and international governance.69
Sovereignty has been perhaps more directly defended during 
the austerity period. It is often taken as the distinguishing point of 
the Occupy movements, challenging the sovereign rule of repre-
sentatives and insisting that political power has access to collective 
decision-making about the commons.70 To claim that people are de 
facto sovereign through the direct exercise of constituent rule is not a 
novel claim, yet it does constitute a counter-hegemonic conviction in 
democratic theory that challenges the sacrifice of popular sovereign 
power in the name of universal human rights.71 Second, in the pro-
democracy movements, national sovereignty was being reclaimed 
by countries from the markets, other hegemonic EU member states 
and unelected international bodies. Unsurprisingly, national flags, 
anthems and a sense of national pride characterised many of the 
anti-austerity and pro-democracy demonstrations in Europe in the 
aftermath of the crisis.72 
For the first time, one of the implications of the crisis is that we 
can no longer speak of the sovereignty of nation states in a European 
context in that some of these states have the power to legislate and 
implement policy for their territory only formally and not sub-
stantively. The quintessence of the phenomenon of diminished 
sovereignty – especially in the eurozone context – that the Radical 
Left identifies as a problem is the lack of accountability of those 
implementing economic policies. This translates into inherently ille-
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gitimate governance. From this angle, national sovereignty is popular 
sovereignty because only national governments can be accounta-
ble to the people, who in turn can exercise sovereign power through 
them. Therefore, if there is not a people bounded nationally through 
common territory, there is no popular sovereignty. Following this, 
repossessing the national state and the national border as economic 
devices is a defence mechanism against neoliberalism as an edifice to 
counteract its negative consequences.73
But other types of popular sovereignties have been expressed on 
the Left as economic ideas or on scales lesser than the national one. 
In austerity Greece and Spain, sovereignty, or rather its loss, was 
cast in economic terms. In Spain, where various regionalisms limit 
the usefulness of exclusively defending progressive visions through 
underlining national boundaries to evoke the popular, ‘shared sov-
ereignties’ have been called for, for example in the radical municipal 
campaigns of Barcelona. That is, sovereignties of different types 
and between national and subnational arenas of politics.74 Sover-
eignty in certain contexts is not an idea exclusively utilised with the 
nation state in mind. If sovereignty is above all popular, then it can be 
claimed at a certain level of governance in so far as a territorial people 
can be evoked. Given that it suggests socio-economic justice it can 
be linked to forms of collective consumption as well as fiscal policy 
independence. Concerning Brexit, nationalistic arguments prevailed, 
while in Scotland secession was almost identified as the protection of 
the welfare state and as opposition to British neoliberalism. In such 
an environment, nevertheless, for the Radical Left the challenge is 
that popular sovereignty must stand firmly away from ethnocentric 
sovereignties if it is to avoid facilitating a generalised interpretation 
of anti-system politics from Left and Right with common root causes. 
What can count in the communicative sphere is that both Left and 
Right ‘stage their performances of sovereigntism on, behind or inside 
the borders of the existing nation-states’.75
retrospective
The overarching question has been how left radicalism has (re)casted 
and (re)framed its struggles, and what these entail in terms of rhe-
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torical constructs guiding theory, critique and action. The new in 
historical time does not always or mainly entail a break with the 
old. It also entails a reappropriation, adaptation and reinvigoration 
of historical insights into subterranean struggles, through revised 
tools of activist and scholarly analyses, emerging needs and the cor-
responding responses by movements. On some occasions, as per 
the contrast between the GJM’s alleged minoritarianism and the 
populism of Occupy and subsequent movements, historical evolu-
tion can be mistaken for short-term change that boils down to the 
shifting conjuncture alone. In hindsight, both middle-class, sub-
versive, counter-cultural and prefigurative minoritarianism and 
electoralist, populist rhetoric calling to the masses, ordinary citizens 
or the oppressed have been visible mobilisers in different versions of 
the Left’s political sequence.
Likewise, nationalism has been a visible mobiliser for the Radical 
Left through time, but in different ways across the periods of ‘newness’. 
The radical sovereigntist rhetoric of the students and other Third 
Worldist social forces in countries such as France, Germany and Italy 
demanded someone else’s sovereignty and were entrenched in the key 
weapon of mobilisation in the former colonies themselves: national-
ism, patriotism, independence and thus liberty and anti-imperialism. 
In the GJM, nationalism was trumped by globalism or an alterna-
tive globalism, a global justice, rather than a national one. After 
2008, nationalist rhetoric returned but against undemocratic institu-
tions, unaccountable EU bodies and ‘internal colonialism’, notably by 
Germany. While key rhetorical signifiers do not change, the narra-
tive that packs them together does; the idea of national sovereignty or 
self-determination is always present to a greater or lesser degree, for 
western European countries themselves or for outside populations, 
and in opposition to particular enemies, be they American imperi-
alism, German hegemony within the EU or the ‘deep state’ one seeks 
to secede from.
What transpires over time is the substance of political rhetoric 
– the nature and kinds of words and schemas that predominate or 
protrude under certain conditions: the rise of universalism and rights 
advocating as a response to multidimensional and rising disparities; 
the invention of concepts opposed to prolonged or exacerbated sit-
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uations of crisis; the appeal of counter-hegemonic, post-Marxist 
traditions and left populism, opposed by the contemporary anti-
revisionists aiming to sustain emphasis on historical materialism; 
and the softer tone opposing teleological praxis and the progressive 
undermining of revolutionary plans, then a re-ensuing search and 
prefiguration of utopias. Radical rhetoric and the discourses it inter-
nalises have been marked by medium-term and long-term processes 
of social and political change, such as the composition and alignment 
of popular grievances, the ups and downs of economic and political 
orders, the failures and overall legacies of socialism or the shifting 
dynamics between fragments of the radical left space. 
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Organising in  
(Every Subsequent) Movement
To decipher the ways in which social movements have organised 
mobilisation and resistance across the three periods of ‘newness’ 
considered, this chapter examines their structural, procedural and 
compositional aspects. Physical space, as the ‘origins’ of political 
struggles,1 the ever present structure of mobilisation, is addressed 
first, the point being how protest on the Radical Left is grounded in 
the spatial and operational configurations of society. Particular forms 
of radical activism’s political geography animate both their structures 
and procedures. In other words, we begin with space because space is 
both a fundamental aspect of left radicalism’s diversity and has been 
evoked as a signifier specifying historical novelty. Drawing on the 
identification of newness post-2008 as largely conditioned by the 
internet, we situate real and virtual spaces of resistance within radical 
movements across time and outline their broader implications.
In the second section, horizontal and vertical activisms are dis-
cussed and then we address debates about state legality and, opposing 
it, violence, disruption or civil disobedience, which denote proce-
durally confrontational and outspoken tactics. Empirically, how 
often and in what manner has violence been practised by radical left 
movements, and why and to what extent does it go beyond civil dis-
obedience into physical harm and destruction? We then proceed to 
compositional patterns in radical left activism and theory, engaging 
with the social subjects and agitators of radical ‘newness’. Linkage, 
a key part of our investigation, is not exclusively addressed here. 
Rather, it is discussed in the Part III, where the perspectives of move-
ments and parties, as they concern their friends and allies, are put 
together. However, the movements’ evolving orientations to the state 
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as an arena of organising, the organisational counterpart of a topic we 
addressed in Chapter 3, are highlighted.
space as structure of mobilisation:  
between the real and the virtual
The global emergence of Occupy in 2010 and 2011 was both an 
occasion of protest and of experimentation with participation and 
deliberation. Occupy emerged in 950 cities and 82 countries.2 The 
anti-austerity and pro-democracy movements of the post-2008 
period ‘learned democracy’, it has been extensively argued, in order 
to reinvigorate themselves amid the decline of effect in the GJM’s 
forum format.3,4 To pose the historical question, does this process, 
described as learning in the social movement literature, tend to over-
estimate ‘newness’ for the Radical Left? 
Occupying public squares prompts us to revisit the past for the 
European Radical Left. As concerns the GJM, its distinctive organ-
isational feature was that of time and conjuncture, which had an 
anti-establishment use for the movements rather than a particular 
physical space as such. Protests coincided with or followed global 
elite meetings. The occupation of universities, schools, factories, 
railway stations and housing blocks was much more frequent in the 
1960s and 1970s across both Europe and the USA than it has been 
during the whole of the post-2008 period. In the 1960s, sit-ins, teach-
ins and go-ins, which began mostly in the USA with the Students 
for a Democratic Society, subsequently became widely used protest 
methods, revolutionising political protests around the world. Occu-
pying physical space has historically provided the powerless with 
rhetorical and operational openings. The unifying element of the 
streets among the post-2008 mobilisations (compared to the univer-
sity or the factory) that connected the European Radical Left in the 
1960s and 1970s denotes a previously underexplored ‘space where 
new forms of the social and political can be made’.5 In the more pri-
vatised world of the 2010s, squares were utilised as the last public 
spaces, an invocation of the commons as well as a practical response 
to the question of reconstituting the political.6 
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Saskia Sassen’s argument that ‘urban streets have become global 
stages for enacting political change’ is a valid depiction of contempo-
rary protest. Except for the European Radical Left, ‘newness’ seems 
to be overplayed if we follow the broad ‘streets perspective’. In fact, 
the street, the university, the workplace and so on have all gone hand 
in hand when mobilisation turns to resistance; the experience of 
multiple struggles unfolding in parallel and feeding into each other 
over a decade recalls the slogan, ‘Occupy everything’. The streets, after 
all, were claimed in the 1960s by students in France and elsewhere, 
an experience captured by another iconic slogan, ‘Beauty is in the 
street’.7 In Italy, popular slogans were ‘Let us take the city’, ‘The city is 
ours’ and ‘Don’t vote – occupy!’ These social vibrations would later 
be codified as the strain that bore the discourse of the commons, out 
of which emerged the mediated tactic of occupying public squares in 
mass fashion. 
For movements that claimed a specific territorial unit, the street 
and the city precisely invoked communal understandings of urban 
life and instrumentalised the notion of public space as a collective, 
social right. Protest in urban spaces was conjoined with the appear-
ance of urban movements. In principle, public space is important for 
the Left because it is the negation of privatised space and a confron-
tation with public authorities. For the anarchists, it is the foundation 
of self-organisation and its story can best be told perhaps through 
squatters. These today do not compare to their vibrancy in the 1970s 
but do have a continuous presence in many western European cities. 
Their original goals of autonomy and decolonisation remain the 
same: squatting in urban or rural areas is an endeavour of commu-
nity building without authority, private property and the nuclear 
family, adhering to values of full and unconditioned equality and a 
communitarian worldview.8
As with the idea of decentralisation and smaller scales in the 
struggle for democracy, social justice and the recommoning of public 
goods, radical municipalism has resurged during the post-2008 
years. It continues and endorses the squares movements’ inclina-
tion to experimentation as necessary in inventing effective modes of 
struggle and performing democracy. It also expresses the ‘glocal’ spirit 
voiced since the GJM when the sociological concept of ‘glocalisation’ 
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– a rescaling of governance extending both globally or upwards and 
downwards, towards the urban and local – came to symbolise also a 
mode of struggle.9 Again, it continues the legacy of left-wing populist 
government in Latin America, such as Brazil at the time of the first 
WSF, which promoted local-level experimentation with assembly-
based municipal governance. Before contemporary Spain, in other 
contested spaces outside of Europe, such as the Rojava territory in 
northern Syria, municipalism was integrated into a broader radical 
politics; as in Latin America also – notably the Zapatista movement 
in Chiapas and grassroots indigenous movements in Bolivia.10 
In Europe the sociological study of urban movements emerged in 
the Long ’68. In The Urban Question, Manuel Castells began recon-
figuring the field of urban sociology, building on and also departing 
from previous Marxist theories.11 French theorist and radical politi-
cal activist Henri Lefebvre theorised the Production of Space, building 
on his 1968 work The Right to the City as a space of co-creation away 
from the damaging effects to life of what was seen as a raging com-
modification.12 Radical theorisations of social space and urban 
movements came through a critique of the literature on urbanisation, 
highlighting the emergent, progressive social forces at the level of 
the city and the locality in response to the gravity of urban problems 
under capitalism. These problems were categorised under the heading 
of collective consumption: housing shortages, growing discrepancies 
between rents and wages, landlords’ neglect of house maintenance, 
damage to the environment and health of local communities, and 
insufficient local welfare and education. Just as Castells’s ideas influ-
enced Spanish municipalism and Lefebvre French radical sociology 
and activism, the autonomism of Murray Bookchin regarding lib-
ertarian municipalism played into politics through his influence on 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan and 
its transmission to the Syrian branch of the PKK – the Democratic 
Union Party. For Bookchin, people could obtain power only through 
democracy, thus it was necessary to focus institutions on the local, 
municipal, village level where fully democratic forms, like the public 
assembly, can be used as decision-making bodies.13
As these intellectuals theorised municipalism, urban activism and 
the city in relation to capitalism, European governments (primarily 
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social democratic ones) were pursuing large-scale urban renewal and 
modern housing projects. These were at the core of local politics and 
linked to housing struggles and resistance to modernisation plans and 
uneven urban development.14 European cities were ‘contested cities 
in an era of crisis’.15 In Rome, plans over shantytowns were central 
during the 1970s, when the extra-parliamentary left intensified its 
focus on the housing issue and the city more broadly to promote agi-
tation as the trade unions took back control of factory workers.16 In 
the Ruhr, Germany, workers and social movements mixed in a series 
of initiatives to resist the privatisation of the workers’ settlements built 
around 1900.17 In response, for example, to touristification, urban 
movements in Italy like Centro Sociale Leoncavallo, or in Belgium 
like BOM, the public–private neighbourhood development agency 
set up in 1990, are the offspring of the 1970s movements: leftist, social 
cultural and political centres based on self-management and initi-
ated by radical activists and groups.18 The urban movements of today 
make visible the most recently emergent injustices and inequalities 
– those of gentrification and touristification – which reorient the his-
torical debate on the right to the city towards the newly reconfigured 
urban conflict.
In this current of activism, horizontality translates as injecting 
locality into democratic and anti-austerity claims in the context of 
wider visions of autonomous politics and social citizenship claims. An 
international municipalist movement seeks to challenge the power 
of the nation state and the markets from the bottom up. Municipal-
ism is effectively the organisational attempt to weave politics into the 
everyday spaces and lives of people. Social change should start not 
only from national but also with local institutions as they are close 
to concrete social issues. An upturn in municipalism has involved 
mobilisation for access to housing and welfare services at the local 
level; the development of mutual cooperation to counter impover-
ishment, gentrification driven by commercial enterprises such as 
Airbnb and urban degradation, or mobilisations against large specu-
lative projects.19
Across Europe, urban dispossession reached a high point post-
2008. Today, the European Action Coalition for the Right to Housing 
and to the City, which has 23 groups from western Europe, includes 
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tenants’ and housing movements, victims of eviction, those affected 
by debt, slum and self-built neighbourhood dwellers, squatters, 
campaigners and researchers.20 Wider local participation through 
municipalist ideas includes notably the foros locales (local forums) 
in Madrid operating at the city-district level. Another noteworthy 
example has been PAH and the subsequent political trajectory of Ada 
Colau as a chief organiser of the citizen platform Barcelona en Comú 
and mayor of Barcelona. Under Colau, Barcelona implemented a 
number of progressive operations and policies: promoting the direct 
involvement of citizens in policy and budget; redistributing the 
excessive wages of politicians to the community; widening and pro-
moting social and LGBTQ rights; providing refuge to immigrants in 
opposition to restrictive national policies; and managing municipal-
controlled companies. Agendas and manifestos for these positions 
and policies have been based on deliberation and decisions in open 
neighbourhoods or discussion groups focused on particular issues. 
For those pursuing anti-capitalist politics, a number of questions are 
confronted by municipalism. These show that radical municipalism 
is a method for realising social and political goals, not a coherent 
ideological formula for constructing socialism. Without exhausting 
the issue, we can indicatively mention the danger of fetishising ‘the 
local’ and the debatable capacity to supersede or disobey the nation 
state.21 We can additionally point out the resemblance of municipalist 
measures to New Public Management, a point reinforced by the very 
recent electoral disaster of Podemos in the 2021 Madrid elections. 
In retrospect, the municipalist method can be utilised by the right, 
which in this case won a landslide.
Perhaps the truly new relationship of radical contention to space 
in the contemporary period, as has been widely argued, regards 
expansion into a virtual, online public and political sphere. The drive 
towards the occupation of squares and other mass demonstrations 
was largely established through information and communication 
technologies. The internet made possible both the massiveness and 
the spontaneity of occupying public squares post-2008, and it also 
facilitated the establishment of international networks and protest 
events in the GJM. In a sense, the advocates of socialism via spon-
taneous mass uprising obtained a new weapon, as the internet fuels 
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impulsiveness to the purposes of protest and upheaval. Real and 
virtual spaces are connected and coexist in mobilisation practices, 
hence our question is: what has the dialectic between them meant for 
the Radical Left?
Post-2008 is certainly a different social epoch to that in which the 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s operated, yet these movements 
in the USA and Europe did use diverse media: music and its rhetor-
ical artefacts, concerts and radical musical events; the mimeograph 
machine enabling mass-produced flyers before the photocopier; and 
pirate radio. Their contribution to radicalism was less about content 
than opening up channels of expression and disturbing the social 
order.22 Research on the NSMs has elaborated on the repertoires of 
social control and the role that science and information play in power 
relationships and in the growth of institutional discipline and domi-
nation mechanisms on lifestyles and human cognition. Echoing the 
liberating responses of thousands of middle-class activists to what 
were perceived as systemic tendencies towards alienation, discipline, 
domination and coercion, Touraine pointedly described the social 
environment against which the students were revolting as a sociéte 
programmée.23 
The internet and advanced information technologies have contrib-
uted to deprogramming society. In line with resource mobilisation 
theory in social movement studies, resources that can be applied to 
obtain social and political capital, and the ways in which actors use, 
ignore or divide over them, is critical for collective action.24 Online 
activity specifically overcomes obstacles to participation, such as 
time constraints, lack of skills and low income, while at the same time 
helping movements to stress ambitions about changing the world 
and downplaying controversy over their positions.25 Information 
technologies offer themselves as back-end infrastructures for move-
ments, which can be utilised both to organise and to deliberate. The 
spontaneity, immediacy and multimedia functions of contemporary 
online networks entail transmitting emotion, spreading information 
and forming a conduit for inspiration and hope.26 One of the most 
astounding examples of how the contention of neoliberal policies can 
reach and attract millions within a short period of time, making a lot 
of oppositional noise and raising awareness that would not have oth-
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erwise existed – what media scholars call the ‘amplified message’27 
– is the #ThisIsACoup hashtag on Twitter in July 2015. Born in Bar-
celona as a part of a collective campaign, in the passage of a few days 
it reached more than a billion views and prominent support. 
Technological advancement has widened the audience of subver-
sive, anti-systemic discourse and reinforced the attempts of political 
actors to politicise everyday life, launch spontaneous protests and 
initiate pressure on political elites through quick and public atten-
tion. Today’s developments still resonate with the global cultural 
wealth of the 1960s and 1970s, when the ability to both consume and 
produce forms of media was transformed through various optical, 
acoustic and electronic innovations. Radicalism, revolt and dissent 
entered a phase of ‘popular mediatic engagement’.28 Resistance was 
elaborated in culture, through music, satire, self-destructive artistic 
objects and other forms of revolutionary art. In many ways, infor-
mation and communication technologies in the 2000s and 2010s 
mainstreamed many functions that were earlier manifested through 
pirate radio and other radical media: the decentralisation of media; 
systematic feedback from the audience and a process of politi-
cal learning; collective production; social and associational control; 
and self-organisation.29 In these senses, across periods of ‘newness’, 
communication as a key feature of the time’s socio-technical system 
served similar purposes for radicals.
In the 2000s and 2010s the internet aided and prefigured the 
emergence of a reinvigorated thirst for real democracy, while broad-
ening the possibilities of radical action. Municipalist confluences 
within the context of ‘Cities for Change’ in Madrid, Barcelona and 
other Spanish cities have demonstrated innovation in participatory 
technologies. Under the notion of ‘smart cities’, metropolitan areas 
have rejected the neoliberal understanding of the city that is based 
on private entrepreneurship, and apps extract information from city 
data grids. Technology is instead approached through the princi-
ples of open, democratic participation and publically owned data, 
which can help build networks that localise how citizen needs are 
addressed, improve city services, encourage and support cooperative 
production and consumption and inject bottom-up logics to munici-
pal decision-making.30 
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Problems do abide in the radical grounds of online activism. Social 
media and other electronic means such as mobile phones certainly 
facilitate and speed up communication among those who have access, 
yet given that not all people have (the same) access to these means of 
communication there arise inequalities between those ‘within’ and 
those ‘outside’ them, and by extension movements favour or dis-
favour certain issues.31 This debate about digital inequalities was 
especially important and had implications inside many GJM groups, 
especially during the 1990s and early 2000s when social media and 
advanced mobile phone technology were just starting to provide 
new tools of communication. Another chief exchange has been in 
how social media or online activity may dampen militancy, on-the-
ground work and appearance, which is important for real impact, 
relieving grievances and attracting mainstream media attention. The 
lack of real-time activity can also damage the comradeship of groups 
and vibrancy is difficult to maintain during ‘calm’ periods.32 Digital 
organisation is a ‘weak-tie instrument par excellence’.33 Because it is 
so easy to stop and start through digital activism, it may be insuffi-
cient to create a sustainable network of activists. At the same time, 
the multiple expressional forms of digitality can often lead to its 
fetishisation as the only, necessary or most important means of gen-
erating counter-publics. Additionally, centralising tendencies and 
informal power arrangements lacking any form of delegated author-
ity arise in apparently horizontal, online participation in forums and 
consultations.
These pathologies aside, digital tools have been fruitfully appro-
priated by radicals. The shift from early online resources to the 
later ones, from Indymedia, alternative mailing lists, autonomous 
servers and hacker meetings towards Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr 
and messaging apps, signalled change in the use of the internet as 
a platform of organising contention.34 While the GJM activists used 
the internet to organise and coordinate ‘small-group politics’, the 
post-2008 movements turned corporate social media ‘into an expan-
sive medium of mass mobilisation’, an ‘emerging antiestablishment 
digital mass politics’.35 Through social media, groups formed around 
Jeremy Corbyn, Podemos, Occupy platforms and other online spaces 
of political discussion, sometimes with tens of thousands of par-
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ticipants. These were evidence of multiple processes. For example, 
the facilitation of a near constant engagement with politics, the 
perpetuation of informal politics, the critical flow of ideas and delib-
erative democratic spirits. Through online activity the possibilities 
of engagement between different sections of the Radical Left and 
between the Radical Left and other political spaces are conducive to 
leaders becoming more aware of criticism from below, the accumu-
lation of public argument, polemic and political knowledge, and the 
everydayness of publicly voicing an opinion, confronting others or 
scrutinising anything and everything. Compared to the exposures of 
the partisan and activist in the socialist tradition, the terms of social 
and political conduct by which radicals abide have been transformed, 
and the realm of sociality itself redesigned.
In spite of the internet’s relevance to social movement politics 
(and we will return to this shortly), radical activism has been far 
from restricted to the virtual sphere. By the time of the GJM, radical 
repertoires of action had expanded in manifold ways. Indicatively, 
the list of actions sponsored by People’s Global Action to mark the 
Global Day of Actions against Capitalism on 1 May 2000 included 
no fewer than 31 conceivable types – from strikes and demonstra-
tions to critical mass bike rides, carnivals, street parties, handing 
out free food and building gardens.36 Then occupations and forms 
of mobilisation evolved in response to the ‘refugee crisis’, involving 
complex networks of activists. In summing up the debate, Della Porta 
writes that ‘while formal organisations (from left-wing to religious) 
have certainly been influential in supporting migrants … research 
has pointed at the growing importance of self-organised groups, with 
informal organisational structures’.37 Decentralisation and informal-
ity facilitated the temporal adjustment of the movement’s tactics in 
the refugees’ journey: ‘If direct help was most needed at the moment 
of arrival, civil disobedience accompanied migrants along their route, 
and demonstrative protests for the integration of migrants emerged 
at their destination.’38 New experiences were realised in mobilis-
ing to save lives, to make the first and most urgent arrangements, to 
help people at their most desperate, to keep families together, to be 
welcoming on their arrival and to symbolise hope for a new begin-
ning. Groups and individuals may declare themselves apolitical and 
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come from different social classes. Ground tactics have often been 
the focus of activist debate, and disagreements emerged over whether 
humanitarian work had to stop to shift emphasis to the protests and 
the policy demands of the refugees themselves.39 Effectively, discus-
sions or contestations of what solidarity works best in organisational 
terms for the subject on the receiving end are always under way.
Organising solidarity is multifold for radical activists and it 
includes mobilising within wider solidarity communities. The 
economic crisis generated a surge of poverty, exclusion and insecu-
rity that had not been seen since after World War II. This led to an 
upsurge of alternative experiments in the form of cooperatives and 
associations focusing on the production or distribution of goods and 
services, as well as an increasing number of non-mainstream finance 
systems giving rise to an ‘alternative moral economy’.40 As neoliber-
alism and austerity broke down social bonds and relationships, social 
movements created new conditions that brought citizens closer to 
one another. Difficulties with the basic means of subsistence became 
a key mobilising factor. Solidarity initiatives and networks, as well 
as social mini-economies or self-organised healthcare as alternative 
platforms for ‘re-instituting socio-economic relations’, have consti-
tuted survival tactics by vulnerable groups while generating loci for 
progressive and anti-capitalist propaganda.41 What started in public 
square occupations in Greece and Spain evolved into economic soli-
darity movements and mutual aid networks. This happened when the 
occupations declined in force and attendance to a point where it was 
particularly evident that ‘only’ protesting is a politically insufficient 
response to the crisis.42
Direct social actions, as Bosi and Zamponi remind us, ‘repre-
sent a significant part of the repertoire of contention … while they 
tend to be less visible than protest actions, they should still not be 
overlooked and treated like something “new” every time they resur-
face’.43 In the austerity-stricken Italy of the late 1970s, for example, 
extra-parliamentary left-wing activists advocated various counter-
measures to the crisis, including the ‘self-reduction (autoriduzione) 
of public transport fares, public utility bills and cinema and concert 
tickets; “proletarian shopping” (spesa proletaria); housing occu-
pations; and self-management of various social services’.44 Italian 
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autonomist Marxism was an important intellectual and social force 
in this direction, although the associated forms of resistance above 
are much wider in appeal than Italy. Self-management, from alter-
native, feminist-organised kindergartens to communist collectives, 
or the self-reduction of public transport fares, have been relatively 
common practices across time and on both sides of the Atlantic.45 
What did change between the GJM and the post-2008 conjuncture 
was the focus of SMOs. According to Paolo Graziano and Franc-
esca Forno, they shifted from ‘ethical’ economic actions – ‘political 
consumerism, purchasing groups, local organic food schemes, com-
munity renewable energy initiatives, community currencies’46 – to 
solidarity actions developed as ‘coping strategies’ or ‘alternative forms 
of resilience’.47 This was a shift in the rational of solidarity spaces, ini-
tially to politicise (alternative) economic choices and subsequently to 
defend survival. Various groups, never easily defined as Radical Left 
but with radicals almost always participating, have employed innova-
tive organisational and participatory tools. Organising has included 
both the national level – social credit systems, slow food, participa-
tory budgeting, sustainable community management through online 
exchange systems, ethical banking and responsible tourism – and 
international organising, for example focusing on fair trade, oppo-
sition to ‘sweat shop’ factories, degrowth or simplicity movements. 
The rise of what is more broadly understood as political consum-
erism was strongly connected to the GJM, which spoke of the market 
as an arena for political activism; to build counter-markets in a sense 
was understood as a necessary strategy of prefiguring alternative 
economic systems, so as to subsequently advocate them widely.48 By 
the end of the GJM cycle and in the context of poverty, expensive 
housing, gentrification and exclusion, these movements reoriented 
their activities from the global to the local level, explaining the 
growth in such associations in Europe subsequently.49 During the 
crisis, the prevailing pattern between northern and western Europe 
– where, due to cultural opportunity structures, political consumer-
ism has been much more diffuse and close to popular imaginaries 
– and southern Europe has evolved. Due to the crisis and the need 
for cooperative and collectivist responses to counteract economic 
inequality and facilitate welfare outside of the mainstream markets, 
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southern European patterns of political consumption and solidarity 
economy organising expanded.50
To what extent has this expansion grown or sustained itself? 
Two parameters can be raised indicating that direct action struc-
tures have confronted challenges when it comes to radical politics, 
and will probably remain relevant in the future too. First, the move-
ments of self-organising producers at the end had very limited appeal 
and duration without leaving many traces in terms of subsequent 
mobilisation or institutional effect. As a setting, consumption and 
production mini-communities are also ideologically stratified. To 
ground political action in new forms of solidarity and sociability that 
evade free market and consumerist logic is not easy, foremost because 
those involved have varying attitudes towards capitalism, neoliber-
alism, the national Left, government and compromise. Indicatively, 
a divide has been uncovered in ethnographic work, between Greek 
‘solidarians’ who are more liberal minded, softer in tone and oriented 
towards the state on the one hand, and ‘leftists’ arguing that a com-
promise with hegemony leads to dependency on aid and narrating 
political events from a more militant and radical perspective.51 The 
solidarity economy and direct social action movements have not 
avoided the political divisions visible in the wider arena of radical 
left mobilisation. And once organisational experience in such spaces 
accumulates and the sustainability of collective projects is endan-
gered, they often also entail shifting from the ‘hardcore’ to the ‘soft’, 
from the principled to the pragmatist.52
Second, political consumerism and new ways of organising the 
economy face the future in so far as its rise is strongly linked to glo-
balisation, crisis and neoliberalism. As the Covid-19 pandemic has 
again challenged the current developmental system, new spaces for 
solidarity economies and direct social action have been opening 
up across the globe. Although, when compared with other types 
of radical mobilisation – the environmental, rights, Occupy, pro-
democracy and anti-austerity movements – political consumerism 
and solidarity economies are a smaller structure on the whole, organ-
ising in this domain is most likely here to stay. During the pandemic, 
hardship funds, the global rent strikes which started in April 2020 
and above all mutual aid groups have sprung up in the thousands 
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across Europe.53 In this situation, the lines separating activism from 
daily life are more blurred and horizontal procedures, and fully equal 
power distribution, like in the more general movement of political 
consumerism, is more entrenched.
Moving forward, there is another uptick in digital tools. Although 
this time around it is under different conditions, online facilitators 
of communication have been utilised profoundly. Social distancing 
and lockdowns during the Covid-19 pandemic generated a situation 
where cyberspace has been the main arena for mobilisation by social 
movements. Within solidarity communities and mutual aid mini-
societies, activists circulate and explain toolkits and resources to 
increase familiarity with technology. WhatsApp, Facebook and Slack 
have been employed to organise solidarity initiatives or campaigns, 
similar to the online activity of food banks after the onset of the 
global financial crisis.54 Google docs are used to disseminate useful 
information for DIY and sharing experiences across countries, Zoom 
meetings to coordinate action and threads on Signal for up-to-date 
community services. Individuals and groups also mobilise for edu-
cation and awareness raising so as to counteract the spread of false 
information, fake news and conspiracy theories. It is now unthinka-
ble to organise a local struggle without using social media platforms 
and tools. The split between social and economic reproduction that 
the pandemic has normalised through undermining social bonds 
and disconnecting them from labour and productive activity55 has 
to an extent been undone through the digitalities of solidarity and 
contention. 
horizontality and verticality  
in radical left activism
Within space, distinct structures and procedures can range between 
the theoretical maximum point of horizontality on one pole and the 
theoretical maximum point of verticality on the other pole. From 
the spaces in which mobilisation operates on the Radical Left, we 
now turn to how centralised or decentralised they are. Let us begin 
with consensus as a distinguishing procedural feature of horizontal 
politics. Anti-nuclear and peace movements, squatting movements 
Organising in (Every Subsequent) Movement
123
and autonomist social centres have traditionally strived for consen-
sus and rejected any form of hierarchy. Indeed, consensus encounters 
the Radical Left in different ways across time. In the past, consensus 
has expressed the thinking behind the mobilisation of trade union 
militants in tripartite negotiations within the context of corporat-
ist systems and national-level economic planning. It has also always 
been a practice, even an entrenched psychology, in the general secre-
tariats or political bureaus of traditional CPs, which strived to appear 
united, albeit often unsuccessfully so. Crucially, consensus was inter-
preted very differently by democratic centralism, which suggested 
that consensus had to characterise the party over a decision after that 
decision was taken and not before. 
Consensus as aversion to conflict continued into Occupy assemblies 
from the GJM’s Social Forums, where decision-making combined 
limited and controlled forms of delegation with instruments encour-
aging the broadest possible agreement, appealing to dialogue and 
transparency.56 Procedures included not upholding a proposal if 
there is a large minority, thus interpreting the majoritarian princi-
ple less absolutely, as in the anarchist tradition; having facilitators in 
the decision-making process; and allowing decisions to be brought 
back into discussion.57 Consensus as a procedure for decision-mak-
ing in European radical movements travelled there from the ‘Zapatist 
consultation’. Indeed, consensus had emerged in many indigenous 
communities because in such societies there was ‘no way to compel 
a minority to agree with a majority decision – either because there is 
no state with a monopoly of coercive force or because the state has 
nothing to do with local decision-making’.58
Mobilisation in the GJM resonated with the age of mass informa-
tion and the networked society: ‘networking, [a] decentered form 
of organisation and intervention, characteristic of the new social 
movements, mirroring, and counteracting, the networking logic of 
domination in the information society’.59 Unlike the bureaucratic 
and hierarchical traditional labour unions and their concerted deci-
sion-making procedures, the GJM movements adopted a network 
structure, embraced solidarity and hesitated less to employ disruptive 
and aggressive action. The logic of networking involves building hor-
izontal connections, autonomy of the connecting elements, freedom 
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of information circulation and consumption, decentralisation and 
complex coordination, direct democracy and self-management.60 
Internal democracy was crucial, democratic participation and the 
democratisation of the institutions and mechanisms of globalisa-
tion were key objectives and advanced technological means were 
becoming available to utilise in this route.61 We should still refrain 
from reducing the GJM to an anarchist revival; the cleavages within 
the GJM (autonomist, revolutionary left, non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs), Attac) have been documented in detail – this was 
the ‘movement of movements’, the ‘network of networks’.62 
Many on the Radical Left reasonably doubted that the self-
selected, unelected and uncontrollable leadership of the GJM was 
more democratic (responsible and accountable) than the traditional 
leadership of parties and trade unions. Within the GJM a broad dis-
tinction between institutional action and autonomist action has been 
extensively documented. On the one hand, there is a permanent 
organisation, legitimacy accorded to the collective, voting and nego-
tiation in decision-making procedures and a clear division of labour 
and authority. On the other hand, the only legitimate actor is the 
individual acting collectively, and repertoires of contention include 
self-managed projects and lifestyle activism as opposed to demon-
strations and strikes, while organisation is contingent and evolves 
through critical reflection.63 At the WSF of 2005, debates over the 
celebrated but also critiqued as self-refuting book of John Holloway, 
Changing the World without Taking Power, showed the overarch-
ing political dispute: between the horizontal-prefigurative struggle 
as sufficient for self-emancipation, and the more classical social-
ist views of the necessity to devise a political programme, distribute 
authority and confront the government.64 In the absence of doing the 
latter, and given the GJM’s funfair-like operation and atmosphere, a 
performative elitism by academics and NGOs contradicted the very 
proclamations of the WSFs.65
In the European public squares of the 2010s as political realms, the 
assembly was structured on very specific discussion and voting rules, 
following the logic of accommodating large crowds with divergent 
life stories, opinions and emotions. As Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri argued in The Assembly, their celebration of horizontalist 
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movements across the globe, when the multitude assembles, radical 
political possibilities expand. Through ‘leaderless movements’, in 
which the assembly engenders political equality and discourages 
leadership personas, two organisational ideas were manifested. First, 
that for radical democratic change to be effective and lasting, deci-
sion-making structures need to rely on the broadest democratic base 
possible so that the initiative and control of strategy is undertaken by 
the multitude itself. Second, this is so because a leadership problem 
existed: ‘the lack of leaders in the movements today is neither acci-
dental nor isolated: hierarchical structures have been overturned and 
dismantled within the movements as a function of both the crisis of 
representation and a deep aspiration to democracy’.66 
In the assembly, the foremost critics of delegation and representa-
tion – the anarchist and autonomist traditions – shaped consensus 
practices. The term ‘democracy on steroids’ came to mean ‘the active 
(co)creation’ of diverse options outside of majority voting, with 
the only genuinely democratic procedure being consensus deci-
sion-making, an intense but necessary form of government.67 The 
chief objectives lay in satisfying the perspectives of as many people 
as possible, operating on modes of trust building and distributing 
power equally, by contrast with politics as usual. To this end, delib-
erative democracy theory has been central in giving certain types 
of answers to democratic puzzles and producing or reinforcing the 
activist practice of thinking beyond and around the reign of majorities 
in democracies.68 Rules which were thought to facilitate movement 
in this direction in the Occupy assemblies and many other groups 
have included turn-taking, interventions limited in length, gesture 
codes to navigate discussion, the quick publication of proceedings, 
moderation and the feminisation of vocabulary to subvert patriarchy. 
Horizontality is more fitting for prefigurative politics, which occur 
in a group’s own terms of political conflict. But they can be ineffi-
cient and without real impact when the terms of politics are electoral, 
when groups are very large and coordination is pertinent, and when 
quick, tactical decisions need to be taken in situations of intensified 
conflict. 
Within the movements, horizontality has been in tension with ver-
ticality since the emergence of autonomist activism. In the seminal 
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essay The Tyranny of Structurelessness, focused on the Women’s Lib-
eration Movement and its consciousness-raising groups practised 
across the globe, American feminist Jo Freeman suggested that the 
benefits of participatory and horizontal structures cannot replace 
the gaps left by the absence of delegation by democratic procedure, 
and a formal distribution of authority within the organisation.69 Oth-
erwise, the end result is either ineffective or subsumed under the 
banner of the structured organisation operating in the same political 
space. Informal power networks also develop, their chief difference 
with formal ones being that they are ad hoc and undemocratic. Free-
man’s remarks still resonate acutely today. The experience of what 
has been called a prefigurative crisis came when the GJM’s dynamism 
was fading away while no concrete advances were achieved. Looking 
back over the past two decades, it became clear to many theorists 
and activists that anarchism’s emphasis on consensus, autonomy 
and horizontality, spontaneous actions, informal networks and local 
struggles have not succeeded because campaigning organisation has 
not been sustained in a systematic way. The same applies to the post-
2008 wave’s movements: they (re)realised a need for victory in the 
electoral realm that would sustain some sort of effective input into 
the policymaking structures of neoliberalism and exercise a pull 
effect on capital. 
What happened for the GJM and its gradual diffusion into parties 
and NGOs and away from the streets is a standard point for all social 
movements that are declining: institutionalisation. Thus, the GJM’s 
prefigurative politics, whereby near exclusive weight was placed 
on ‘activism’ (as opposed to ‘party politics as usual’), spontaneity, 
consensus and direct action, gave way. Without these having been 
abandoned, the organisational discourse throughout the 2000s and 
2010s, excepting perhaps the mass pro-democracy moment, where 
it happened most vigorously, was more geared towards validating 
the absolute necessity of solid organisation building and practices 
that complement and go beyond planning events of spontaneous 
activism, direct action and prefiguration.70 The very lesson of GJM 
was experienced in the 15M in Spain and facilitated its journey to 
the Podemos party. In this direction, a renewed interest resurfaced in 
Lenin, Gramsci, the party, the comradeship of socialist politics, the 
Organising in (Every Subsequent) Movement
127
social movement organisation, populist politics and leadership, and 
communism as theoretical means to political strategy.71
Since the 2000s a great many parties and electoral coalitions have 
arisen out of partnerships and mergers between public personas, 
extra-parliamentary organisations and social movements: SYRIZA 
in Greece launched before the 2004 legislative elections, a result of 
Synaspismos’s involvement in the Athens ESF and before that the 
‘Space for Dialogue for the Unity and Common Action of the Left’ in 
2001; the contribution of social movements to the electoral mobili-
sation of the Tsipras List (L’arltra Europa con Tsipras) in Italy, which 
won two seats in the 2014 European elections; the establishment 
of the Front de Gauche in France in 2009 and the expansion of its 
constituent groups in 2012; the establishment of the New Anti-cap-
italist Party (NPA) in the same country in 2009, aimed at unifying 
the fractured movements of the French Radical Left and mobilis-
ing primarily Trotskyists; the People before Profit Alliance and its 
cooperation with Solidarity (previously the Anti-austerity Alliance) 
in Ireland and Northern Ireland; the emergence of Respect and later 
Left Unity in the UK as a party of activists, whereby political organ-
ising is established from below and social movements have a strong 
input to the party’s policymaking; and Momentum as a decentralised 
space, which affirmed success at the polls through the Labour Party 
as its prime goal. 
As Wallerstein articulated, the predominant argument inside 
the Radical Left itself is that ‘an anti-systemic movement cannot 
neglect short-term defensive action, including electoral action. The 
world’s populations live in the present, and their immediate needs 
have to be addressed. Any movement that neglects them is bound 
to lose the widespread passive support that is essential for its long-
term success.’72 It is not hyperbole to argue that Europe’s recent 
past was Latin America’s earlier past. Neoliberalism aggressively hit 
Latin America first, resulting in growing anger from the mass citi-
zenry when confronted with structural adjustment programmes and 
policies of economic austerity, and a shift to the left over the past 
two decades, first in society and then in the party system. The most 
prominent examples being the Zapatista and Appista movements in 
Mexico, the Piqueteros and workers’ movements in Argentina, the 
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Chavistas in Venezuela and the Aymara coca-growers and indige-
nous movements in Bolivia.73 Charismatic leaders of the left have 
captured state power via support from, and growth out of, these 
movements, left populism became a central feature of the new, leftist 
governments, and state management went hand in hand with non-
institutional networking and activity.74 
procedure and state legality:  
violence and the european radical left
Having seen so far that multiple ways of organising are always present 
among radical left movements, let us turn to one of the common 
accusations against them in both recent and earlier years in terms of 
method: that they are or can be uncivil or extremist, that is, evasive, 
shocking or provocative. Unlawfulness, illegality and disruption are 
often associated with extremism or ultra-committed doctrines, which 
at core pose the question about radical left movements in opposition 
to the state, particularly its legal system and practices of enforcing 
public order.
In the decades following World War II, political violence – 
state sanctioned, para-state and interstate – thrived as a means of 
engaging in social and political conflict. The international scene was 
one of revolutions, guerrilla warfare, coups d’état, riots and gener-
alised upheaval in Europe, Africa, Latin America and Asia. In this 
context, many on the non-partisan and anarchist Left saw potential 
and concrete results in the ‘critique of guns’, which has existed since 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century within the French, 
Spanish, Italian and Russian anarchist traditions. In the late 1960s, 
left-wing armed guerrilla groups grew out of the social movements of 
the New Left, mixing Marxism, Maoism and the ideologies of Third 
World liberation movements.75
Among the groups that emerged from the social movements 
were: the Brigate Rosse and Prima Linea in Italy; the Red Army 
Faction (RAF) and Bewegung 2. Juni in Germany; the Gauche Pro-
letarienne and later the Action Directe in France; the Grupo de 
Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre in Spain; and the Rev-
olutionary Organisation 17 November in Greece. In Italy, the armed 
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movements of the Radical Left were the largest, with around 50,000 
participants, mainly in their mid-twenties.76 Repertoires of action 
varied according to national context and ideological narrative and 
included threats, assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, small-scale 
attacks on industrial targets or personnel, attacks aimed at liberating 
imprisoned affiliates, theft of state military equipment and robber-
ies. Unlike the looser boundaries of student groups, which were a 
more general phenomenon with a generational identity, revolution-
ary groups were characterised by a strong sense of belonging and 
clear boundaries between the in-group and those outside of it.77 Acti-
vating guerrilla networks in Italy and elsewhere was a process of 
creating a small, secretive circle of trust, mutual claims of resistance 
and emotional ties.
All this occurred within a wider context in which ‘defensive 
violence’ as a sort of organisational concept was losing ground.78 
Violent tactics were often cast as counter-violence, or as a matter of 
active defence; revolutionary violence was understood as necessary 
to counteract the violence inherent in imperialist, capitalist states.79 
At the same time, violence understood as self-defence was justified 
as a way to provoke social upheaval and contribute to the emergence 
of revolutionary conditions and the opportunity for mass subversion. 
For all of the groups, the Maoist and Che Guevarian interpretation of 
violence was more or less the same, in the sense of endorsing violence 
as ‘a necessary condition’ ‘for every revolutionary struggle’.80 Many 
guerrillas in the 1970s sought to bring the war back into ‘the belly of 
the beast’.81 They were in this sense a subversion of Western normality. 
These notions were largely popular also outside the guerrilla groups, 
and counter-violence was supported in principle by many German 
students who protested aggressively and passionately against the 
handling of the RAF by the German state. As only a small, important 
indication, the suicide in a Stuttgart prison cell of Urliche Meinhoff, 
formerly herself a member of the Socialist German Student Union, 
unleashed country-wide protests and, followed by the death of the 
rest of the RAF members, a notoriety ritualised by a massive litera-
ture and popular discourse about the ‘Stammheim myth’.82 
What war meant was still at stake and the cosmos of violent, rev-
olutionary groups had its internal debates, both moral and tactical. 
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Some groups embraced the ‘armed struggle’, such as the Red Brigades 
or RAF. Others rejected it as the chief strategy of action, still justi-
fying and often practising revolutionary violence; for example, the 
groups Lotta Continua and Lotta di Popolo in Italy.83 Divisions also 
existed over political homicide as a ‘decisive event’ for mass emanci-
pation. In fact, the opposite was realised. The kidnapping and murder 
of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades in 
1978 was a decisive event demobilising violent activism and was the 
most representative historical case of the descent into terrorism by 
these groups.84
Debate revolved over which political objective is served by violence, 
and from that over how far and in what ways violence is to be exer-
cised. Through the broader radical movements and intellectuals, a 
threefold distinction in responding to the question of violent action 
was that between ‘under no conditions’, ‘against objects’ or ‘against 
human lives too’. These were also the main demarcation lines of 
feminist attitudes towards violence.85 There was effectively a three-
fold response to the feminists’ own intellectual production on the 
complex processes of systemic violence, with multiple layers – struc-
tural, representational, symbolic, gendered and racialised.86 The chief 
arguments in support of and against violent action were elaborated 
back then by Noam Chomsky in a debate with Hannah Arendt.87 
Absolute opposition to violence may mean, ‘either saying that resort 
to violence is illegitimate even if the consequences are to eliminate a 
greater evil; or saying that under no conceivable circumstances will 
the consequences ever be such as to eliminate a greater evil’. Accord-
ing to Chomsky, the first argument is irreducible moralism and highly 
debatable and the second is historically incorrect. Violence can be 
seen also in a tactical light. It can be seen as justified but is it politi-
cally effective or not? Chomsky’s own defence of non-violence in the 
peace movement against the Vietnam War was indeed premised on 
the conviction that it would constitute ‘suicide’ because the US gov-
ernment had a ‘monopoly of terror’. Affecting all movements is that 
violence ‘antagonises the uncommitted’ when the point is to draw 
them in.88
The wave of radical left violent groups in Europe lasted from the 
late 1960s to approximately the 1980s. One of the last violent, urban 
Organising in (Every Subsequent) Movement
131
guerrilla organisations, the Greek 17 November, was captured in 
2002. It is, though, interesting and important that until today many 
physiognomies of the violent left in previous decades are respected, 
consulted and defended by radicals, both young and old. In the case 
of Greece, where Nicos Koufontinas is a prisoner for life, radical 
activists and intellectuals from the non-communist, extra-parlia-
mentary space, and from within SYRIZA, have routinely mobilised 
against the violation of his rights and the state’s broader political 
repression through its anti-terrorism branch. The issue had also 
been dealt with by the Greek mainstream media as one of possible 
‘connections’ between SYRIZA and 17 November and was utilised 
by its competitors to tarnish the party’s image among a significant 
part of its milieu, which was adamantly against not fully rejecting 17 
November. The Greek case, among essentially all others, shows that 
colourations of association with the historical or contemporary rev-
olutionary, violent group play out, although more subtly, over a long 
period of time. 
More recently, the focus of those connecting or debating the source 
of violence has been elsewhere. In western Europe, the violent Radical 
Left is typically identified in three types of mobilisation: radical envi-
ronmental groups, the Black Bloc associated with the GJM and its 
more recent incarnations in the Antifa movement. Let us consider 
them in turn. First, small cells in the name of animal rights and the 
environment developed in the late 1990s, both within and outside the 
broader movement, and today translate into a broad movement of 
local and international groups of civil disobedience and environmen-
tal resistance. Second, Antifascist (Antifa) groups, often identified as 
a Black Bloc, engage in a number of activities confronting far-right 
activists, politicians and demonstrations; that is, in fighting fascism 
directly. 
What has come to be known as ‘ecoterrorism’ rose from the radical 
sections of the environmentalist movement, which gained currency 
during the 1960s. The tactic of inflicting material damage on devel-
opment projects that destroy the environment (and by extension a 
number of other things, such as threats and letter bombs), is tied to 
the left through the belief that capitalism and profit seeking, as well 
as environmentally unconscious, development inevitably lead to the 
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despoliation of nature. Radical environmentalism thus puts forward 
the claim that ‘if society is left unchecked’, this will lead ultimately 
to the ‘complete degradation of the environment’. In this light, the 
urgency of the damage done to the planet requires a more robust 
response than that of conventional protest.89 
Radical ecology begins to deviate from the classical, socialist strain 
where it concerns the religious-like nature of certain parts of radical 
environmentalism, which project an indigenous-like view of ‘envi-
ronmental degradation as an assault on a sacred, natural world’.90 
Marginal organisations – such as Earth First, the Animal Libera-
tion Front and (only in the USA) the Animal Recovery Mission, ‘A 
Vanguard Defense Organisation’, share a critique of society’s struc-
ture and call for revolutionary change, but are not materialists and 
legitimise their acts as representing the weaker sentient beings in an 
unequal situation between humans and animals. Between the 1970s 
and about 2010, they carried out hundreds of ‘missions’ of property 
and infrastructure destruction or setting animals free, but remained 
detached from mass movements and the working class. In western 
Europe and North America, the liberation of animals has inspired 
thousands of activists, and since the 1970s it has grown into a very 
important social movement in its own right. Accusations by the 
radical left remain that animal liberation is connected to and driven 
by ‘privileged white and middle-class concerns’. From within the 
movement, the concept of total liberation, adapted from Frantz Fanon 
and intersectionality, reflect attempts to connect with wider struggles 
in society through non-particularistic ideological frameworks.91
The post-2008 movement of radical ecology has practised 
‘ecoterrorist tactics’ as part of a broader determination for civil diso-
bedience, specified by activists as resistance to companies which do 
public harm. A 2010 Europol report outlined a number of tactics: 
‘blackmail, sending threatening emails or making warning phone 
calls to their targets, often threatening their family and committing 
physical assault against their property’, or the ‘mass release of animals’, 
and even ‘disinformation methods in order to discredit their targets 
and weaken their public acceptance’.92 ‘Images of sick and abused 
animals are embedded in video footage and made public’.93 These are 
typically classified as ‘ecoterrorism’ by various judges across Europe, 
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whereas activists understand and defend them as ecological sabotage 
(ecotage).94 Importantly, violence is contested among ecotage groups. 
Far from embodying the image of ‘eco-terrorists’, many of ‘those who 
carry out small-scale acts of sabotage are also often engaged in rela-
tively conventional political activity; view sabotage as a complement 
to other action, not as an end in itself; and are committed to avoiding 
physical harm to people’.95 
Some activists find that a non-violent ethos has prevailed, which 
is insufficiently useful in strategic terms and theoretically ill-
informed through unfounded moralism. A known representative of 
this position is climate scholar and activist Andreas Malm, who has 
recently published How to Blow Up a Pipeline.96 In it, he essentially 
advocates a radical upscaling in the confrontation of climate destruc-
tors, including the destruction of luxury commodities like SUVs or 
superyachts, and infrastructure of the fossil fuel industry such as gas 
stations, pipelines and refineries. Malm called out a true emergency 
and the necessity to behave that way in strategic terms and to bear 
the cost of defetishising violence if necessary. His criticism has been 
rebutted in differentiated ways. Leading activists in Extinction Rebel-
lion, who do not endorse anti-capitalism, reject any form of violence. 
Others point out that the consequences of such acts will be devastat-
ing for those involved and the movement more broadly, since they 
will invite repression, which is even heavier than that of today and 
will be disorganising for the cause.97
The other commonly referenced source of violence on the Radical 
Left is the Black Bloc section of the GJM, especially on the occasion 
of the Genoa counter-summit in 2001, which was twisted into 
an iconic sign of destruction; a rain of Molotov bombs and stones 
against heavily armed and aggressive riot police. Here, the notion of 
‘performative violence’ becomes important to distinguish between 
protestors’ and rioters’ intentions and the practice of symbolic con-
frontation-based rituals within a wider array of tactics, and the 
random and senseless violence they were portrayed as committing 
by the media.98 The Black Bloc is really a tactic pursued by anar-
chists and other anti-authoritarians: black clothing and masks are 
worn and activists march in tight formation to express anonymity 
and solidarity as the founding stones of collective resistance whereby 
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the group and not the individual are what matters. Other groups, like 
the Tutte Bianche in Italy, the WOMBLES in Britain and Ya Basta! 
in Spain typically wore white jumpsuits, put on helmets and carried 
shields, intended for protection as they were pushing through the 
barricades of police.99 The overall GJM, which is more prominent in 
Europe (where the Black Bloc originated) than in the USA, is repre-
sented by civil disobedience rather than violence, as no one in these 
groups justifies harming people.100 Rather, their innovations were to 
use blockades or lockdowns for disruption during international elite 
meetings, broadly understood as ‘non-violent warfare’, combined 
with carnival-like and radical art performances.101
Another strain is the thinking behind anti-fascist violence, suggest-
ing the moral duty to contain neofascism with aggressive opposition 
when political institutions fail to do so. This also reveals the strate-
gic assessment that there is much to achieve by confronting fascism 
in the streets and in social life. Within the Antifa movement, often 
violence is only condoned as self-defence, although common criti-
cisms include that Antifa counter-violence often surpasses its claims. 
Violence, however, is not the chief mobilising force of Antifa. Well-
known Antifa tactics in Europe and the USA include the disruption 
of far-right events and speakers, forming human chains in anti-
demonstrations, monitoring reactionary groups on social media 
platforms, ‘doxxing’ or taking over the Twitter accounts of far-right 
groups and posting anti-fascist content. They are confrontational 
and provocative, except they are not at their core geared towards 
personal, physical violence. To connect Antifa and anarchist activist 
solely with violence is to overshadow all of their political, cultural, 
anti-authoritarian, solidarity and other actions, leaving a picture 
narrower than and unreflective of empirical reality. What do become 
central among Antifa groups are questions involving anonymity and 
visibility, in person and online; self-defence and organising vulner-
able groups around it, as in the form of Antifa gyms; dealing with 
infiltrators and with infiltrating; football anti-fascism and networks 
across European countries with diverse social activities; state repres-
sion and anti-police tactics; festivals, social events, publications and 
debate; solidarity with immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers and 
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other oppressed populations; participation in urban and municipal 
movements; fusing with ecological movements.102 
Within Europe, the stark contrast between anti-fascism and its 
opposite became clearer than ever in October 2020, when a historic 
victory for the Greek anti-fascist movement was achieved. The 
leaders of the far-right Golden Dawn party were found guilty in court 
for directing a criminal organisation responsible for the murder of 
Antifa hip-hop musician Pavlos Fyssas, killing migrants and harming 
communist trade unionists, among many other acts of violence. The 
sentencing of Golden Dawn’s fascists has been the largest indictment 
of Nazi crimes since Nuremberg, and the Greek Radical Left was a 
crucial mobilising force of activists, lawyers, politicians, opinion 
leaders and academics in the five-year trial.103 
There are, of course, continuities between various anarchist, 
animal liberation and Antifa organisations which refuse to condemn 
all violence and destruction. The last two are monothematic militant 
groups, whereas anarchist and autonomous violence is not strictly 
dependent on the strategy for particular social issues, such as fascism, 
animals or the environment. Yet violence or illegal action often 
comes with less dialogical communication and thus there is more dif-
ficult linkage between Antifa communities or animal liberationists 
and mass movements. Examples include Antifascistisk Aktion and 
the Rev Front in Sweden, and the Greek Rouvikonas and anarchist 
student groups. As a social force within the Left, these tendencies 
are nevertheless a minority, but a temporal and relational point is 
due here if we are to argue for evolution. Although violence as ter-
rorism is much less identified with the European Radical Left than 
before (e.g. during the 1970s), uncivil resistance and confrontational 
protest have been thoroughly documented as increasing in the past 
two decades on a world scale. Violence in the form of confrontations 
with the police, illegal action, rioting, property destruction, disrup-
tive activities and civil disobedience have been especially common in 
the 2010s globally.104
Many instances from around Europe of illegal direct action within 
universities, the public sector or the local level have generated move-
ments and led to confrontations with the police. Riots between 2008 
and the mid-2010s erupted in Athens, Paris, Stockholm, London and 
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elsewhere. Confrontational tactics by activists reflect a changing role 
by the police, away from what had earlier been characterised as ‘the 
continuing institutionalisation of protest’.105 An increasingly author-
itarian response by police ended the previously alleged pacification 
of police conflict and the routinised forms of public order manage-
ment.106 The criminalisation of protest has grown: a rise in police 
brutality against protestors; anti-immigrant legislation; punishing 
immigrant solidarity for human trafficking, as in Italy and Greece; 
intrusive surveillance measures that violate individual rights and 
explode into scandals, like in the UK; ultraviolent police suppression, 
as in the Catalonian referendum in October 2017; or the anti-G20 
protests in Hamburg in July 2017.107 The shooting of Carlo Giuliani 
at the 2001 protests in Genoa and of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, 
which ignited the Athens riots of 2008, have become symbolic among 
radicals of a vengeful, murdering police. 
Civil disobedience, a nominally extreme measure, has been a 
common procedure of mobilisation and resistance for radical move-
ments, especially during heightened contention or crisis and certainly 
beyond Antifa. In the 1960s and 1970s, its best known manifesta-
tion was that of conscientious objection to military service in the 
Vietnam War in the USA. The other repertoires of civil disobedience 
have already been addressed: anti-fascist fighting, interruption, dis-
ruption, rioting and squatting. During the GJM gatherings, pacifists 
would distinctly separate themselves from the Black Bloc. During 
the 2010s, resistance to the implementation of austerity has included 
illegal utility maintenance for bankrupt households, refusal to pay 
toll charges and rioting at court hearings of house evictions during 
the crisis in Greece.108 The Spanish 15M camp was a ‘laboratory of 
civil disobedience’. This was expressed, for example, in the general 
assembly’s decision to violate the Spanish ‘day of reflection’, during 
which electoral campaigning activity is suspended and a decision was 
taken to evict the camp.109 When plans were announced to privatise 
the health sector in Madrid, employees enclosed themselves in the 
hospitals (encierros) and held massive workforce assemblies, which 
quickly expanded to include users of health services and gave birth to 
the marea blanca, the movement for public sanitation.110 
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In the environmental camp, civil disobedience and direct action 
tactics, as in the UK, helped Extinction Rebellion to grow and gain 
popularity, having today more than 130 groups across the country. 
Breaking windows or blocking public roads and bridges or commuter 
trains have been often referred to by Extinction Rebellion as ‘esca-
lation strategies’, useful for grabbing the attention of the public and 
helping the organisation grow. Civil disobedience has been taken to 
new organisational levels, exemplified by this group’s ‘flopping’ tactic 
when arrested, or their prison guides to movement participants as 
hundreds were arrested. More widely, with the pandemic, civil diso-
bedience has been a contested issue between radical movements and 
parties and right-wing governments as in Cyprus, Greece and Italy, 
which implemented unconstitutional orders for banning peaceful 
demonstrations as part of the Covid-19 safety measures. 
Between the 1960s and today, ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ as under-
stood by liberals – physical violence, paramilitary mobilisation, 
intentions of overthrowing the regime, unlawful behaviour – has 
actually diminished on the European Radical Left. At the same time, 
confrontational tactics and civil disobedience have again become 
more and more features of the disruptive ‘emergent publics’ within, 
across and beyond radical movements. Over the long term, on the 
Radical Left as well as more generally, terroristic violence in Europe 
is largely (although not entirely) gone, while disruptive action, uncivil 
resistance and civil disobedience have, in large part, returned. 
Violence may be less identified as stemming directly from politi-
cal consciousness, compared to the 1960s and 1970s. As it has been 
argued for the recurrent Paris riots, some violent protest repertoires 
denote a proto-political horizon outside of institutional politics.111 
Second, protests in the 2010s are qualitatively different from those 
of the GJM and the Long ’68 when violent groups were explicitly 
on the far left or right. In the mass, spontaneous and heterogeneous 
movements, left-wing violence has often taken place during the same 
event, occasion or period as right-wing violence. A communicative 
problem for radicals in this context is how a ‘two extremes’ thesis 
can more easily polemicise both flanks of the political spectrum as 
illiberal by equalising them as inimical to democracy, irrational and 
senseless.
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In opposing state legality and the rule of law, radical movements 
as a whole exhibit a large spectrum of action over time, which has 
narrowed towards legality but has retained large-scale civil disobe-
dience, especially in countries with a vibrant extra-parliamentary 
ground. 
which radical subjects?
The practices of the mobilised bring up the additional matter of 
which social categories constitute the main agitators, what in Chapter 
2 was introduced as the composition of mobilisation and resistance. 
In Marxist and radical theory this is about the agency of revolution 
or progressive historical change when aligned with oppression. Rev-
olutionary subjects as allies, substitutes or extensions of the working 
class had been sought by prominent Marxist intellectuals for several 
decades before the 1960s: the revolutionary vanguard in Leninism, 
the peasants in Maoist thought, the masses according to Rosa Lux-
emburg or the citizens in the French republican-socialist tradition. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, during the GJM and post-2008, original social 
forces and issues entered the field of protest, and each time the rev-
olutionary subject has not been the working class, at least not the 
only one. Activists, intellectuals, academics and students have been 
important actors in agitation and more symbolically representative 
of the New Left; in Herbert Marcuse’s line of thinking, they have 
been revolutionary subjects as ‘arising from the struggle itself ’.112 In 
France and Italy especially, where 1968 has been highly contested in 
public memory, analyses emphasising the students’ pioneering role 
have faced criticisms for underplaying the force and role of labour 
battles and not taking into account the intersections and interac-
tions between the students and the more general mobilisations of the 
time.113 Here, pursuing this problematic, we deal with today’s radical 
protagonists and compare them to before, the idea being to connect 
class oppression with other socio-demographic elements of mass 
dissent. 
The NSMs and the divisions between them and the Old Left 
emanated from new trajectories of political socialisation among the 
1960s and 1970s youth – more open, liberal and contentious than 
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those of the 1930s generation. In 1968, student protests occurred in 
56 countries and continued in most of them throughout the 1970s. 
High schools students also participated in protests in the hundreds of 
thousands.114 Student radicalisation arose out of the changes within 
capitalism, specifically the large increase in student numbers in many 
countries across the world and the more general transition from elite 
to mass education, during which universities resisted revising their 
traditionalist practices and maintained inadequate facilities.115
In the 1960s, among thinkers like Herbert Marcuse, C. Wright 
Mills, Howard Zinn, Andre Gorz and others, students’ relationship to 
class interests was a flaming topic. There was a widely circulating per-
ception of students as new possible agents of revolutionary activity. 
In contrast to the established left, because of their age, life stage and 
middle-class status many activists comprising the student movements 
and the 1960s New Left, were often ‘despised’ and treated as ‘utopian’, 
‘childish’, ‘destructive’, ‘irrational’, ‘hedonist’ and ‘reckless’.116 In the 
words of Edward Short, education secretary in the 1968 Labour gov-
ernment: ‘They are wreckers who … are concerned only to disrupt 
society. Their weapons are lies, misrepresentations, defamation, 
character assassination, intimidation and, more recently, physical 
violence.’117 In Italy, the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) denounced 
the new movements and activists as ‘adventurist’ extremists, gradu-
ally shifting to framing them as ‘provocateurs’ aiming specifically to 
damage the Left, and finally to approaching them as ‘nihilistic hoo-
ligans’ only interested in destruction.118 These insights point to the 
widely discussed implications of a generational gap and its pervasive-
ness on the European Radical Left and beyond during the 1960s and 
1970s. Youth and students then were a source for cultural renewal 
and the reformulation of radicalism and socialism, especially in the 
context of the university as a free space where thousands are con-
centrated; they embodied neither the conservatism often inscribed 
in traditional working-class constituencies nor the behavioural self-
restraint of communist cadres and militants. 
Although students in the late 1960s kicked off the events of the 
ensuing decade with vehement criticism of the working class, through-
out the 1970s they often connected to class and workers as it became 
apparent how educational supply into the labour market reconfigures 
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class relations. Sections of youth saw their social and economic expec-
tations challenged, if not crushed, and this constituted fertile ground 
for their politicisation and radicalisation.119 The working classes, 
albeit much more heterogeneous and disconnected in occupational 
terms today than before have had, in the three periods considered, 
a strong presence in terms of mobilisation and resistance. Economic 
or welfare grievances have driven demonstrations and activism. The 
movements of the 1960s reacted to the quandary of Fordism – the 
modern model of mass production, put in practice since the 1910s 
– while the post-2008 movements responded to the crises of neolib-
eralism and democracy, yet both waves demanded ‘better institutions 
of collective consumption’.120 Importantly, some of the largest mobi-
lisations of the 1960s and 1970s were workplace based; for example, 
the French general strikes and the Italian ‘hot autumn’ (1969–70), the 
more temporally scattered strike activity in the UK or the strikes of 
1969 and 1973 in West Germany. Depending on the context, strike 
activity included general strikes, sit-ins, walkouts, ‘walk-ins’, wildcat 
strikes and unfair labour practice strikes. 
The crisis in the 1970s came with the rise in labour militancy in 
the context of increased industrial conflict and industrial action, 
especially at the factory level.121 The autoriduzione movement (self-
reduction of prices) spread across Italy in 1974 and worker turmoil 
was sustained by resistance to the austerity programme advocated 
in the context of the PCI’s Compromeso Storico (Historic Compro-
mise), the communists lending support to the Christian Democratic 
(DC) government between 1976 and 1979.122 In France, the largest 
strikes in the twentieth century took place in 1968, along with 
workers’ general assemblies and numerous committees of struggle 
and solidarity in neighbourhoods, which paralysed production and 
communication in the country. It would be a reductionist view to 
consider the social movements and broader left-wing forces of the 
1960s and 1970s as merely ‘counter-cultural’. This would betray ‘the 
very content and meaning of the claims and mottos of most of the 
millions of Belgian, Italian or French workers whose strikes almost 
always had goals concerning wages or working conditions’.123
Two types of worker, which were previously absent from trade 
union struggles, played a crucial role in the 1960s and 1970s. One 
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group was the young, unskilled workers with underpaid jobs, and 
the other consisted of young technicians ‘skilled enough to perform 
delicate tasks which control the productive process, but who have no 
chance of joining the managerial staff ’.124 Two classic works of neo-
Marxist theory, which had significant influence, were Andre Gorz’s 
analysis of rethinking labour strategy and Serge Mallet’s Essays on the 
New Working Class.125 Both criticised the PCF’s (Communist Party of 
France) political strategy and approach towards social stratification 
and towards organising the party and the unions. Theories focusing 
on the increasingly central role of skilled, educated, technical workers 
saw them potentially as the new socialist vanguard.126
New knowledge workers were the prime constituency of the NSMs 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Their preferences arose out of their social 
position. Theories of the ‘new middle class’ have documented the 
emergence of socio-cultural professionals and skilled service workers, 
which are more heterogeneous as a group, open-minded and liberal 
than the old middle class of white-collar office workers, managers 
and technical experts. At the same time, a ‘new working class’ includ-
ing ‘service and office workers with few skills’ emerged alongside the 
‘traditional working class of craftsmen, technical workers and skilled 
agricultural workers’.127 New intermediate social strata posed chal-
lenges for socialist politics as the classification of persons in relation 
to capitalist production (and consumption) became de facto more 
complex.128
In the contemporary social topography, a new subject envisaged as 
potentially revolutionary has been identified in the form of the pre-
cariat.129 What has come to be known as the precarious generation 
is that group of mainly young people who find themselves in pre-
carious employment. Processes of precarisation begin in the labour 
market and include temporary, fixed-term work or unemployment, 
as well as atypical, flexible, cognitive work. Concomitantly, these pro-
cesses extend beyond the workplace to all facets of life. The precariat 
is a concept with a workerist (or operaist) genealogy that can be 
traced between Negri’s (1988) ‘social worker’ and ‘the multitude’.130 
It reflects a fervour that can be attributed to the poor, emigrants and 
immigrants, and other atypical figures in the world of labour, giving 
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them the ability to resist imperial power, hence the multitude (or the 
precariat) is potentially a revolutionary force. 
Italian workerism (or operaismo) of the 1960s had a significant 
intellectual impact on sociological analysis nationally (and to a lesser 
extent internationally) through its project of worker inquiries, and 
yielded strong theoretical journals. Due to the PCI’s shift away from 
class by the 1960s, and the initially intra-party processes and elabo-
rations (also within the Italian Socialist Party) that began workerism 
in the first half of that decade, there has since been a strong worker-
ist bent in some Italian movements.131 Since the 1970s, a number of 
activists and scholars have been engaged with the conditions of post-
Fordism and how the workerist understanding of manual labour in 
the massive factories can be reformulated appropriately to respond 
to the realities of late capitalism, including the insecure settings of 
the gig economy. The difficulties it has faced were largely due to it 
being organic to Fordism and the mass factory.132 Indeed, Standing’s 
analysis of the precariat can be associated with endeavours to update 
class analysis in late capitalism and connects to the emphasis on 
‘precarisation’ as a sign of capitalist transformation, which for some 
scholars is a critical juncture in historical-material development.133 
Standing’s analysis of the precariat is not exhausted by the work-
erist perspective; it is more connected to early ‘social workers’ and 
much less to the notion of the multitude. Yet the new social group it 
identifies is a product of a developing capitalist industry, exploited 
and alienated by its organisation of labour; financialised, to a great 
extent. The origins of the precariat also render it psychologically lib-
erated from labourism (no option, no dependency) and at the same 
time non-commodified, that is, not entrenched in institutionalised 
exchange.134 According to Standing, the precariat is a ‘dangerous 
class’, exactly because of its loose relation to the opportunities and 
constraints of the labour market.135 As Andretta and Della Porta 
show, the precarious generation was largely present in demonstra-
tions across southern Europe and shares multiple socio-demographic 
features and grievances.136 
This is not to suggest that Standing’s thesis of people in long-term 
precarious work gradually forming a dangerous class has not been 
challenged. From an empirical standpoint, Grasso and Giugni, uti-
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lising a dataset of over 10,000 protestors from 72 demonstrations 
(2009–13), report that ‘precarity’ does not form a new social base 
for anti-austerity protests.137 Some scholars find it necessary to dis-
tinguish contention by those who are precarious or unemployed 
from that of people mobilising on behalf of them; the former can be 
subsumed into the movements of the latter.138 Standing’s thesis has 
also been negatively assessed as geographically biased, insufficiently 
contextualised139 and suggesting an artificial distinction within the 
working class.140
Even if we part with the idea of a new class emerging on a global 
scale, precariousness in employment, precarious work and precarity 
as a condition of social life involve a much higher degree of social 
insecurity than that embodied by even the GJM middle-class activ-
ists, and certainly the 1960s and 1970s students and intellectuals. 
Precarity and unemployment connect youth to class antagonism. It 
is in this sense that the class cleavage has been partly ‘redrawn into 
shape’ by contemporary struggles.141 An insecure occupational status 
can trigger political activism by precarious workers ‘both at the indi-
vidual and collective level’, at least as a sort of temporary, political 
cleavage.142 The social and economic interests of precarious youth 
align with those of workers and pensioners in increasingly austere 
public sectors and immigrant populations (which are also largely 
precarious), and are deeply imbued in the contradiction in capital-
ism between capital and labour.
If the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s introduced political issues 
not captured by class analysis alone, then the GJM and the post-
2008 movements bestowed major significance upon class-related 
issues. Empirical studies based on surveys have suggested that the 
recession and its management have directly influenced the patterns 
and volume of protest. Deteriorating economic conditions, eroding 
labour rights and rising individual-level deprivation incentivise 
contention.143 Attesting to the growing significance of class-based 
contention is the relevance of workers and labour issues in acts of 
disruption, such as factory occupations and road blockages,144 as well 
as in protest participation against the neoliberalisation of the public 
sector.145 Constituencies of anti-austerity protest exhibited a distinct 
social composition. On the whole they are younger and more precar-
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ious, more concerned with economic issues and not very embedded 
in political networks.146 
During the post-2008 crisis in Europe, alternative forms of trade 
unionism and new modes in labour mobilisation have been observed 
at the local and national levels. A minority trend of ‘radical political 
unionism’ has either split from the large, mainstream trade unions 
or formed through autonomous establishment and organisation. 
Beyond its engagement in social movement activity, it empha-
sises class struggle and adopts politicised strategies aligned to new 
left-wing formations that present themselves as outsiders.147 Anar-
cho-syndicalism in the European courier sector is a case in point. 
After the first strikes of UK Deliveroo riders in 2016 and their spill-
over to France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, 
a number of anarcho-syndicalist unions got involved: in Germany, 
the Free Workers Union; the Independent Workers’ Union of Great 
Britain; and the National Confederation of Workers in Spain and 
France. The Spanish and French unions were members of the Inter-
national Workers’ Association, which split in 2018, and have been 
since members of the Confederación Internacional del Trabajo that 
emerged out of it. Across countries, cleaners, food industry workers, 
cab drivers and others have independently organised in small, rapidly 
growing unions. Although the precarity and atomisation of the gig 
economy render this sector less prone as a whole to union strug-
gles and power, or to shaping a radical left consciousness, unions 
have mobilised on issues specific to precarious workers. In doing 
so, precarious workers’ unionism has produced several innovations, 
including campaigning in vocational schools, sectoral organising, 
community building and empowerment and consensus democracy 
in practice, each driven by the particular circumstances of precarious 
labour or their industry.148
Turning to age, since the late 1990s the young have been a central 
force both within the GJM and in the post-2008 radical movements, 
including, notably, Jeremy Corbyn’s support base and Momentum, 
Podemos leaders and cadres, SYRIZA, the Occupy movements across 
Europe and the USA and the movements behind Bernie Sanders. 
The young have supported old die-hard socialists in large numbers 
and in diverse ways, reinjecting political force into their historical 
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ideas. The radical youth is profoundly visible today, although things 
have changed: a more aggressive and austere capitalism in the West 
has affected the younger generation, who did not grow up enjoying 
safe labour markets, social security and welfare. In his account of a 
‘new political economy of youth’, Côté explained that ‘we should talk 
about ‘youth-as-a-class’, because the last two generations, Gen Y and 
the millennials, are victims of downward social mobility:149 huge 
increases in house prices leading to a ‘rent generation’; huge amounts 
of student debt along with a shortage of graduate-level jobs; and 
rising youth unemployment, sometimes fed by the extension of the 
retirement age under fiscal austerity programmes.150 These sources 
of political grievance have driven lower age cohorts’ characteristic 
radicalism, captured by the ‘Generation Left’.151 Born in an economic 
climate of crisis and generalised precariousness they understand 
politics differently than previous generations. 
In recent years, students and youth have been tied to poverty, inse-
curity, lack of prospects, the austerity crisis and exploitation. As part 
of the New Left they were reacting against ‘alienation’, ‘consumerism’, 
‘bureaucratisation’, ‘puritanism’ and the ‘gerontocracy’ of European 
politics. At first at least, youth was not experiencing a crisis of cap-
italism, which impoverished or adversely affected their ranks on a 
mass and cross-national scale. On the contrary, the post-war welfare 
systems that existed until roughly the 1980s allowed for substan-
tial social mobility among working-class students, many of whom 
formed successive generations of technicians. There was a wide-
spread (although not easily specified) sense that societies raised on 
capitalist abundance were problematic, and this pervaded intellectu-
als and the young during the 1960s.152 On the other hand, as Goran 
Therborn pointedly observed in emphasising the lack of a gener-
ational divide, as in the 1960s, in Argentina, Portugal, Greece and 
Spain during the 2010s young activists protested alongside their 
parents.153 Public sectors hit by austerity in bailed-out debtor coun-
tries meant a higher number of retirees hit by poverty and insecurity 
in light of pension reform. 
We can observe a similar pattern for intellectuality and its relation 
to class and materiality. Intellectuals were first seen as the basis for 
renewing the left in the realignments and schisms that occurred 
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in 1956 and thereafter, reflecting the concept of ‘newness’ through 
the growing, theoretical and popularised importance accorded to 
agency.154 Both students and intellectuals arrived at militant posi-
tions, being decisive allies of the workers, without any meaningful 
pull from organised political forces.155 By the end of the Long ’68 and 
in the light of economic crisis, Foucault claimed that the left intel-
lectual encountered specific, ‘non-universal’ problems, and in this 
way came ‘closer to the proletariat’.156 The encounter was realised 
because intellectuals, more specifically academics, began engaging in 
‘real, material, everyday’ struggles through their work within circum-
scribed domains. By extension, they frequently confronted the same 
enemy as the working classes, ‘the multinational corporations, the 
judicial and police apparatuses, the property speculators, etc.’157
Shifting forward to today, intellectuals are even closer to the pro-
letariat due to the neoliberalisation of the university sector and the 
prioritisation of laissez-faire logic in education since the 1980s. 
Gradually, but clearly by the 2000s, the global and European univer-
sity sector has exhibited certain trends: more precarious positions 
of employment leading to the replacement of tenured with con-
tingent faculty; an expansion of the private college and university 
sector; online education and a generalised inclination to vocational, 
labour market-targeted training; casting students as customers 
through a clientele-based, private sector approach, while introducing 
annual evaluations and merit pay for faculty to cultivate a competi-
tive environment and limit promotions; following new management 
approaches of assessing outcomes-based performance, often through 
narrowly quantified target-based indicators; and increased reliance 
on external, competitive research funding that has been decreasingly 
forthcoming at the university level. These developments have driven 
the ‘proletarianisation of the professoriate’ constraining the very 
horizons for developing scholarly capacity and social creation.158 
Between the 1960s and today, the left intellectual and student have 
increasingly become, in Foucault’s terms, more ‘specific’, namely 
more integrated into the struggles of the lower and middle classes 
and multiple other oppressed groups. Newness, or rather structural 
change, can be registered in as much as the materialist instinct is 
now more than ever before entrenched in intellectuality and young 
Organising in (Every Subsequent) Movement
147
age, as well as in other groups such as public servants, women and 
pensioners.
A distinguishing factor in the twenty-first-century movements and 
protests globally is that they involve the (impoverished) middle class 
more than before. This same middle class in the 1960s and 1970s 
was a beneficiary of the systemic structures it is now criticising.159 
Because of welfare and healthcare retrenchment and the downsiz-
ing of public sectors, new groups have emerged as a large organised 
crowd for agitation and propaganda. Since about the 2008 financial 
crisis, they include public sector employees, pensioners and other ex-
beneficiaries of state subsidies. This is not to say that one cannot find 
middle-class groups in the 1960s Radical Left in Europe (students, 
professionals). Though as a large organised group and as a space for 
agitation and propaganda, these groups are for the first time engaged 
in contention en masse. 
For movements, then, can we contend that their radical subject 
changes over time? No, given workers and students, various sectional 
groups, intellectuals and the middle-class mix across the three mobi-
lisation waves of the Long ’68, the GJM period and post-2008. Yes, 
because how they are aggregated into the form resistance takes, its 
coherence or fragmented nature, has developed into a large mass of 
citizens with common enemies – neoliberalism and austerity, social 
insecurity and post-democracy. 
retrospective
If the multitude is important, if emergent publics are all-encompass-
ing, then this is so at least in terms of the increased and reaccelerating 
multitude of struggles since the 1960s in which radicals are engaged. 
The Radical Left organises through multiple methodologies. Physical 
and organisational settings and mobilisation experiences among 
activists are numerous and diverse and a diachronic feature on the 
Radical Left, but this is not a European particularity. It is a global 
commonality. The spectrum of activism ranges between the col-
lective and the individual, the institutional and the cultural; from 
violent, disobedient and aggressive to peaceful; from secretive to 
open, pluralist to particularistic, confrontational to consensual, and 
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vertical to horizontal. Additionally, in the 1960s and 1970s, during 
the GJM and post-2008, new social forces and new issues entered the 
field of protest. Each time the mobilising subject has not been the tra-
ditional working class, or at least not the only one. The key tensions 
that are internal to movement demarcations and contrasts are dis-
aggregated into the analytical dimensions of organisation in Table 
5.1, summarising the narrative developed over Chapters 3–5. Alto-
gether, they posit that distinct mobilisation waves entail particular 
types of tensions depending on intertwined processes in the socio-
economic context, such as generational change and the global spirit 
of the times. Because new structures, procedures and compositional 
profiles appear or old ones re-emerge in every subsequent wave, 
division lines are drawn and redrawn in organisational practice. Most 
of these tensions, in columns two and three of Table 5.1, manifest 
themselves concretely in a particular fashion each time. 
Yet, every subsequent mobilisation wave includes both emerging 
sectional interests and the archetypical collective subjects of the 
1960s. It includes disruptive action and solidarity-based initiatives 
– both the utilisation of entrenched protest repertoires and innova-
tive or unprecedented practice. During our time frame and between 
periods of ‘newness’, what has been reconfigured the most in the case 
of radical organisation is the centrality or prominence of certain ways 
of doing politics on the left: the salience, and intellectual and politi-
cal legitimacy, of organisational forms within a broad political space, 
whether guerrilla tactics, uncivil protest, decentralisation and hori-
zontality, hierarchy or spontaneity. In real time, the old and the new 
almost always coexist in radical organisational practice during the 
peak of mobilisation cycles. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of organisational demarcations inside Radical Left 
movements in western Europe
Social movement 
organisations
Tensions within the Radical 
Left
Periods of ‘newness’/cases
Structures Verticality vs. horizontality 
Mobilisation in national vs. 
international arena
Social media vs. on the 
ground work
Secretive vs. transparent
Long ’68 – New Left vs. communists and 
social democrats
GJM years – parties respond to movements
post-2008 – ‘movement parties’ (e.g. 
Podemos, SYRIZA)
GJM and post-2008 – glocal shift
and regionalisation of movement targets
Post-2008 – spontaneity and mass appeal but 
short life of Occupy movements
Long ’68 – radical environmentalism, urban 
guerrillas vs. others
GJM and post-2008 – radical 
environmentalism and Antifa vs. pro-
democracy and anti-austerity movements











Long ’68 – anarchism and left libertarian 
movements vs. orthodox communists and 
their ancillary structures
GJM – anarchism and citizenism during 
Social Forums and Occupy raise practical 
and strategic issues
Long ’68 – communist and socialist 
centralism vs. anarchist and libertarian left
Long ’68 – guerillas
GJM – performative violence
Post-2008 – precarious organising vs. 
mainstream trade unions
GJM – crisis of prefigurative politics: RLPs 
emerge in 2000s
Post-2008 – Occupy’s short durability, more 




Middle class vs. working 
class
Young vs. old
Long ’68 – generational gap, hostile 
exchanges but also linkage gradually
Long ’68 and subsequently – intermediate/
technical strata increasing and diversifying 
(new classes), changing class analysis
Post-2008 – public sector workers, 
impoverished middle class, pensioners, a 
precarious youth/student body
Long ’68 – young radicals (students) 
criticising and reproached by established Left
Long ’68, GJM and post-2008 – recurring 
‘left generations’ but generational divide 
mostly in Long ’68
Long ’68 and subsequently – intellectuality 
becoming more resonant with class

PART III
Past and Present of European  




Radical Left Party Identities in Motion
introduction
As we have seen, ideological tensions have diachronically played out 
between binaries such as reform and revolution, class and identity, 
the state and its outside, or in this book’s idiom, co-optation and 
resistance. Here, we pursue this problematic in mapping the evolving 
Radical Left party family since the Long ’68. In all, we return to the 
ideas of democracy, anti-capitalism and anti-neoliberalism, solidar-
ity and internationalism that were previously dealt with from the 
perspective of movements. To interpret how RLP identities resonate 
in political conflict, we try to situate parties within their national 
party systems and the competitive dynamics of electoral democracy 
where this conflict occurs. A pertinent task is to ask how time and 
conjuncture differentiate party identity as conceived relationally, that 
is, with respect to other partisan identities in society. More specifi-
cally, we need to examine the processes of electoral change since the 
1970s such as social cleavage realignment or dealignment and the 
recomposition of European party systems.1 This perspective has been 
adopted across Parts I and II, looking initially at the Cold War years 
and then beyond them.
Part III turns to internationalism by focusing, as with the move-
ments, on the questions of war, peace and immigration. As in Chapter 
3, the issue is taken further by looking at European integration. The 
regional dimension of the societies, economies and political systems 
of European countries became increasingly important during the 
1990s and 2000s, as EU legislation began to pervasively bind national 
economic and legal systems. In terms of public opinion this process 
of ‘deepening’ has been accompanied by a shift from a ‘permissive 
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consensus’ to a ‘constraining dissensus’.2 Today this new reality is 
clearly evident in the shadow of Brexit. 
electoral democracy, party systems  
and the radical left
What has changed between the 1960s and today in the ideological 
universe of RLPs cannot be overestimated. Obviously, the Radical 
Left has had different histories across western Europe, which resist 
summary presentations amid country-by-country specificities. Nev-
ertheless, trends in most parts of this region begin with the two main 
strands on the Radical Left that have existed since the early twentieth 
century: communism and social democracy. In political science one 
cannot find a typology of party families which does not distinguish 
between these two lefts, but over the long term the labels commu-
nism and social democracy have evolved both in their meaning and 
their place as political visions within the broader political space. 
These two party groups were competing against one another, par-
ticularly where the bulk of aggregate volatility took place primarily 
between groups of parties either on the left or the right side of the 
ideological spectrum, and much less in terms of electoral transfers 
across the two blocs of the party system.3 
In western Europe, both communism and social democracy 
remained committed to the new order arising after 1945 when the 
market system was tempered by political power and the state was 
ascribed a protective role over society in opposition to the laissez-
faire approach. In this way, as Claus Offe underlined, both groups 
disclaimed radical hopes for an end to capitalism, although both also 
diverged sharply and contrasted in policy spirit with the predomi-
nant paradigm of the pre-war period.4 For both, class-centred politics 
was a constant of their self-definition.5 CPs accepted the parliamen-
tary road to socialism and aimed to present themselves as political 
actors who fully respect the constitutional regime. There is a rational 
pattern of co-optation into the post-war consensus, as summarised 
by Hobsbawm: ‘the history of communism in the developed econ-
omies of the west has been the history of revolutionary parties in 
countries without insurrectionary prospects’.6 Nevertheless, the lines 
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of division between the two lefts historically amounted to nothing 
less than an (intra-Left) cleavage. This cleavage reproduced the major 
strands of left radicalism since the Russian Revolution (1917) – its 
main expressions previously being social democracy and anarchism 
– which remained as such until the social democratic mutation.7 
In the first half of the twentieth century, because of the victory of the 
Bolsheviks and the subsequent creation of strong CPs and eventually 
communist regimes in many parts of the world, debates about social 
democracy were about whether to reform or transform capitalism. In 
spite of coalitions, common fronts and convergence over Keynesian 
policy, until well after the 1960s the debate between CPs and SDPs 
focused on projecting two competing economic systems, each side 
outlining its own ideal system’s benefits and identifying flaws in the 
other. SDPs crucially differed on foreign policy, as most of them were 
hostile to the USSR or at best reserved. The decision of the SPD at its 
Bad Godesberg congress in 1959 ‘to break with Marxism’ reverber-
ated beyond the confines of Germany, and Keynesianism triumphed 
over Marxism as the ideological and policy toolkit of Western social 
democracy. Gradually, and depending on the case, SDPs would also 
shift towards support for the West, NATO and the EU, in most cases 
by the 1990s.8
It’s more than clear how developments in capitalism and geopoli-
tics brought about a crisis in both communism and social democracy 
by the 1960s. This ‘double crisis’ of the Left explains the beginning of 
an identity shift, which, as suggested by Geoff Eley, is rather ironic: 
‘just as Western CPs sought to shed the Soviet handicap by remaking 
themselves in the social democratic image, most notably via Euro-
communism, social democracy of the established kind became 
politically a dead end’.9 We will cover the Eurocommunist moment in 
more detail later, but it is important to note it here. Both of the ide-
ologies and identities sprouting out of the intra-Left schism of the 
revolution years were discredited by the 1970s. This was tantamount 
to the early stages of each one’s historical defeats. 
Focusing on party systems reminds us how drawn out this crisis 
can be. Among other things, RLP identity has been affected by how 
radicals responded to or behaved during the introduction of new ide-
ological cleavages since the 1960s. In the 1970s, NSMs influenced 
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western European party systems in three major ways: by producing 
programmatic demands and issue dimensions located outside of the 
realm of traditional controversies over economic issues and which 
various parties gradually incorporated; by spawning left libertarian 
parties and GPs as well as a plethora of revolutionary parties and 
many urban guerrilla groups; and by initiating debates on intra-party 
democracy.10 
The emergence of left libertarian parties and GPs in the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s came from central and northern Europe. Today 
these comprise the predominant profile on the western European 
Radical Left. Left libertarian parties first appeared in Scandinavia 
(the Socialist People’s Party in Denmark, 1959, and Norway, 1961), 
France (various forces in the 1960s and 1970s) and the Netherlands 
(the Political Party of Radicals, 1968) under the label of a New Left. 
Afterwards, GPs attracted considerable electoral support in Austria, 
Belgium, Switzerland and West Germany. This was not a southern 
European phenomenon where other cleavages initially took the place 
of the northern European ‘new politics’ conflict line: in Cyprus the 
national question, in Greece, Portugal and Spain the dictatorships 
and parliamentary democracy itself. 
Left libertarian parties criticised the post-war logic of social devel-
opment, were opposed to having economic growth as the centrepiece 
of the political agenda, advocated more and non-elitist democracy, 
combined libertarian commitments with egalitarian concerns and 
were not satisfied with the bureaucratic welfare state. The policy 
expression of their ‘newness’ came through positions that place these 
parties in opposition to ‘established politics’: the institutions of gov-
ernment, the unresponsive bureaucracy and the political culture of 
the old left-wing parties. Democracy, and the design of society as 
a whole, was, like in the current period of democratic crisis, a core 
issue for both the left libertarians and the early GPs. For the latter, the 
fundis–realos conflict during the 1980s centred on the significance 
of institutional opposition to non-institutional political action. This 
conflict within GPs concerned, among other things, how they should 
organise and mobilise, and more broadly how they should engage 
in modern politics. The conflict cross-cut any left–right distinctions 
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that existed in some of these parties; many Greens saw themselves as 
part of the left although (still) not the socialist movement. 
For GPs, where from the start it was claimed that the left–right 
divide was redundant and had to be transcended (as in the British and 
French Greens), the fundis–realos conflict issues remained uncon-
nected to talk about visions of socio-economic transformation.11 In 
the German and French GPs, until the 1990s there were strong eco-
socialist tendencies that either wanted to tie the parties more closely 
to the socialists or social democrats and emphasise non-ecological 
social issues, or which detested the option of coalition building and 
insisted on political autonomy. Many GP activists and militants orig-
inally came from the left, although they denounced political systems 
and traditions, presented themselves as advocating ‘new politics’ and 
were often disappointed by the CPs or SDPs.12 
The other manifestation of left-wing realignment in the Long ’68 
and its aftermath, beyond the left libertarians, went in a revolution-
ary direction; chiefly, Trotskyism and Maoism.13 Trotskyism’s fate 
was sealed largely by the historical and immoral role assigned to it 
by Stalin. Nevertheless, Soviet politics evolved, and with it so did the 
communist image of Trotskyism:
from a ‘right’ deviation of communism in the late 1920s to a 
criminal non-ideology in the time of the purge trials to bourgeois 
nationalism/Zionism at the end of Stalin’s life to Khrushchevian 
half-hearted revision to a ‘left’ deviation of communism in Brezh-
nev’s time, with a growing variety of nuances among non-Soviet 
communists.14 
During the ‘newness’ of the 1960s and 1970s, a new generation 
of Trotskyists was in part shaped by the changing legacy of Stalin, 
which had come into question, making the issue of Trotskyism a con-
tinuing problem for the CPs.15 Otherwise, Trotskyism was grouped 
with other ‘petty bourgeois’, ‘ultra-left’ deviations, such as anarchism, 
the New Left and Maoism, and was accused of ‘adventurism’ or ‘the 
substitution of revolutionary phrases for deeds’.16 The rhetorical 
manifestations of such divisions are discussed in Chapter 7. Within 
these political circles, and in many western European trade unions, 
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debate emerged in the late 1960s over whether workers’ control over 
production and distribution processes was the only true socialism, 
which was very different from having one leader in charge of deci-
sion-making and a centralised economic system. 
Maoist parties had formed in the 1960s in almost all Western coun-
tries and beyond, mostly splintering from CPs. Conflict between the 
Maoists and Trotskyists occurred in various places. The two currents 
did resemble each other in highlighting the revolutionary poten-
tial in the peasant masses in former colonial countries, denying the 
possibility of ceasing power peacefully and operating incrementally 
thereafter, and in terms of fragmentation and reactionary behaviour 
against potential allies.17 Still, the Maoists all shared a physiog-
nomy comprising elements that differentiated them from everyone 
else on the Radical Left. They saw the role of ‘oppressed people’ and 
‘oppressed countries’ in fighting imperialism as equally important 
for achieving socialism as the role of the working class. They also 
employed a broadly populist language, often replacing ‘the working 
class’ with ‘the people’ in their rhetoric, and thus being accused of 
‘substitutionism’. To put it as simply as possible, the historical role 
ascribed by Marxism to the working class was widened through the 
lens of Third Worldism to include many more social groups. All of 
the main Maoist parties propagated against the CPs, which were 
accused of having been taken over by revisionism, either since the 
1930s or at some point in the two decades thereafter: ‘for many 
Western European radicals, China “was a stick with which to beat the 
undynamic Communist Party at home”’.18
In most of their western European and North American variants, 
Maoist parties were composed mostly of former students who easily 
engaged in competition with each other. Without substantive and 
long-lasting connections to the proletariat, Maoist parties typically 
failed to reach workers in any sustained fashion.19 For the Trotsky-
ist parties that had formed an International in 1938, which by the 
1960s had undergone multiple quarrels and splits, sectarianism has 
been widely explained by the movement’s social and political isola-
tion. Callinicos specified this point with more accuracy, arguing that 
the movement’s very small size combined with its ‘historic isolation 
from mass working class struggles’ translated into ‘the inability to 
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influence events … itself likely to encourage splits: since there is no 
way of settling differences in analysis or policy by practical tests, why 
not break away?’20
The revolutionary parties had a strong intellectual identity, and 
this explains why in some instances sectarianism arose and frag-
mentation was divisive enough to limit an otherwise more obvious 
presence in society and politics. Ideological detail matters more in the 
face of extensive analytical exercises, as reflected in the culture and 
structures of some parties. When it is combined with the falsehood 
of ideological purity or ideological correctness it turns into sectarian-
ism. Hobsbawm made a relevant observation: ‘There is the danger of 
establishing a ghetto in which intellectuals, while claiming to operate 
within the working class movement, really address each other, often 
in terms which are incomprehensible to anyone outside.’21 On many 
occasions, sectarianism reflected the political manifestation of 
the Freudian psychological term ‘narcissism of small differences’, 
whereby competing groups would each claim the moral high ground 
of principles. As Chomsky argued, sectarianism was sometimes the 
outcome of concerns about oppression, authority and rights that 
became important in the 1960s taking an unhealthy form, although 
not commonly and not inevitably.22 Not only did resistance become 
futile by blurring a coherent radical identity in society, spreading the 
seeds of revolutionary marginality and incapacitating Maoist alli-
ances, collective advance and impact on political conflict, it was also 
damaging to the very lives of some of those involved: its record of 
tragic events among Maoist protagonists includes nervous break-
downs, suicides and defamations.23
Between the 1960s and today, Maoist and Trotskyist parties had 
a mild and differentiated role in shaping western European party 
systems. Unlike the Maoists, whose significance was notable in the 
social movements much more than it was for parties, Trotskyists 
had a double effect, although this varied from country to country. 
In the UK and France, Trotskyism (like the New Left as a whole) 
played a key role in sustaining radical politics, both extra-parliamen-
tary action and within sections of the labour or socialist movement 
through entryism. After Mao’s death in 1976, many small Maoist 
parties turned away from China and towards Albanian socialism, 
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while by the end of the 1970s most formal Maoist parties across the 
West fell into decline. Some of them, as in Belgium and Norway, 
tried to become ‘normal’ CPs and disassociate themselves from the 
Third World’s crimes, which had begun to marginalise them com-
pletely. Today Trotskyists are marginal within the broader party 
family, but there are numerous organisations which operate in the 
name of Trotskyism: John Kelly estimated that there were around 22 
British Trotskyist organisations of various particularities in existence 
in 2017, and internationally he identified 23 Fourth Internationals.24 
In the UK, a presence inside the national parliament has only been 
achieved through the Labour Party. The Trotskyists are important at 
the municipal level and have played a critical, leading role in many 
struggles: the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (1966–71); the Anti-
Nazi League (1977–81); the movement of Rock against Racism and 
subsequently the organisation Love Music Hate Racism (1976–); the 
Anti-Poll Tax Federation (1989–91); and the STWC (2001–).25
By the GJM years, as their autonomous strength faded in most 
countries, Maoists and Trotskyists entered democratic socialist 
coalition parties – like SYRIZA, British Left Unity, the Portuguese 
Left Bloc, Die Linke in Germany and Podemos in Spain. In some 
countries, notably in Greece, they have an important role in the 
extra-parliamentary left (Anticapitalist Left Cooperation for the 
Overthrow, ANTARSYA). In the UK, ‘thousands of former revolu-
tionaries who became disillusioned by the collapse of the movements 
of the 1960s and 1970s’ joined the Labour Party in the 1980s under 
the umbrella of Tony Benn’s influence. Trotskyists rejoined the 
Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn in 2015.26 But it is France which 
remains the only country where Trotskyism commands autonomous 
status in left-wing presidential politics, essentially leading the organ-
ised movements of the historical anti-capitalist left. The reasons for 
the French exception can be loosely summarised as including Trot-
sky’s concrete connections with French socialist militants during his 
exile in France between 1933 and 1934, subsequently consolidating a 
lasting political cultural current within the left-wing vote; the many 
organisational faces or nuclei of Trotskyism in the political sphere, 
a ‘multiple Bolshevism’ addressing differentiated social milieus and 
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ideological spaces and the incredible capacity and sophistication of 
the Trotskyist tradition in the practice of revolutionary organisation.27
Revolutionary and left libertarian parties have produced new com-
petition for the established Left since the 1970s. But new parties 
have been a more systematic feature for the Radical Left compared 
to the SDPs and GPs. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 inspect the aggregate and 
disaggregated levels of ‘newness’ for the three pillars on the Left to 
estimate how interparty competition therein has (or has not) become 
increasingly unstable and unpredictable. New parties are defined as 
new entrants in the electoral arena that have contested national elec-
tions for the first time and obtaining 1 per cent or more of the vote. 
Table 6.1 Aggregate number of new SDPs, CPs/RLPs and GPs per western 
European country (1960–2019)
Country Social democracy Communist/socialist Green Total
Austria 1 0 4 5
Belgium 4 1 2 7
Cyprus 2 1 1 4
Denmark 2 5 3 10
Finland 0 2 2 4
France 2 7 3 12
Germany 0 2 2 4
Greece 7 6 2 15
Iceland 3 4 5 12
Ireland 2 5 1 8
Italy 8 6 2 16
Malta 2 0 1 3
Netherlands 0 1 2 3
Norway 0 3 1 4
Portugal 7 9 2 18
Spain 1 7 1 9
Switzerland 0 3 3 6
United Kingdom 2 0 1 3
Total 43 62 38 143
Source: Holger Döring and Philip Manow, Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov): 
Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern Democracies, development 
version, 2019. Party family classifications based on ParlGov codes.
Notes: Only parties winning more than 1.0 per cent vote share in elections. In ParlGov, mergers 
and party splits count as a new party ‘if the (largest) predecessor party won less than 75% 
of the combined vote of all preceding parties in the last election’. Otherwise such cases only 
count as renames not as new parties.
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Relationally, the total number of new RLPs since the 1960s has been 
higher than both the Social Democrats and Greens (almost double 
the latter). We could understand this as a more unstable pattern of 
politics on the Radical Left rather than the centre-left, which is the 
product of many factors, including Cold War dynamics, the impact of 
the USSR’s fall, deeper historical divisions and national institutional 
factors. Looking behind the numbers, we can say that almost none 
of the new RLPs emerging since the 1960s can be classified as a CP, 
although this does not mean Marxism-Leninism has been entirely 
out of the picture, since both Maoists and Trotskyists self-defined as 
Marxists-Leninists. 
In certain countries no new actors emerged. In Malta, the UK and 
Austria (effectively also in Cyprus, the Netherlands and Belgium) new 
Table 6.2 New RLPs per decade per western European country (1960–2019)
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Total
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belgium 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Cyprus 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Denmark 1 0 1 1 2 0 5
Finland 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
France 1 2 0 2 1 1 7
Germany 1 0 0 1 0 0 2
Greece 0 0 1 0 1 4 6
Iceland 1 0 1 0 0 2 4
Ireland 1 0 1 2 0 1 5
Italy 1 2 0 1 1 1 6
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Norway 1 2 0 0 0 0 3
Portugal 0 4 3 2 0 0 9
Spain 0 2 1 0 0 4 7
Switzerland 0 2 0 1 0 0 3
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 7 15 10 11 6 13 62
Source: ParlGov. Party family classifications based on ParlGov codes.
Notes: Only parties winning more than 1.0 per cent vote share in elections. In ParlGov, mergers 
and party splits count as a new party ‘if the (largest) predecessor party won less than 75% 
of the combined vote of all preceding parties in the last election’. Otherwise such cases only 
count as renames not as new parties.
Radical Left Party Identities in Motion
163
RLPs have not appeared or were subsequently absorbed into other, 
established organisations. These are frozen party systems with a ‘fun-
damental bias towards stability’ that characterises western European 
party systems as a whole, although less so the Radical Left than the 
Greens and the social democrats.28 Still, in many countries the same 
actors of the 1960s or 1970s or their successors dominate the polit-
ical landscape. In these cases, the organisational anchor point of 
left radicalism in the national party system has remained the same 
throughout, and identities carry on through subsequent reconstitu-
tions. Looking at trends over time, the most ‘populous’ decade was 
the 1970s, followed by the 2010s and then the 1990s and 1980s. New 
RLPs appear in the Long ’68, the GJM years and in the post-2008 
crisis period, as well as during the years of intensified Soviet crisis 
and dissolution. That is, across and between periods of ‘newness’. 
The data should be read primarily as concerning the Radical Left’s 
identity fragmentation within the party system in a relational way. 
Data collection issues prevent the inclusion of all new parties. A loose 
view, however, which becomes clearer in subsequent chapters, allows 
us to underline the marked difference between the 1960s and 1970s 
and the 2010s. Twenty years before the end of the Cold War was the 
time of heavy and bitter splintering in virtually all radical spaces of 
European party systems. After 1990, sects, groups and micro-parties 
converged into a unified organisational whole. There is therefore a 
universalising tendency between distinct organisations analogous 
to the rhetorical patterns reviewed earlier. It is quite different from 
the bitter antagonism of the Long ’68, when more historical cleavage 
lines ran through the Radical Left. 
However, in the Long ’68 ‘newness’ did not only arrive through 
new parties and movements, fragmenting the identities of RLPs in 
party systems. It also came from within the universe of established 
CPs. From 1973 until the 1980s, the Italian communists under 
Enrico Berlinguer, the French communists under Georges Marchais 
and the Spanish communists under Santiago Carillo embraced what 
came to be known as Eurocommunism. They held various meetings 
across Europe, issued common statements and made collective inter-
ventions. Their ideological horizon was also largely adopted by some 
Scandinavian CPs, the British communists and the Greek Eurocom-
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munists, which had split from the KKE (Communist Party of Greece) 
in 1968. Eurocommunism was three things overall. It was an elec-
toral strategy aimed at appealing to the middle classes, an ideological 
revision that moved away from Marxism-Leninism (both as inter-
preted and practised in the USSR) and it was a sign of increasing 
disaffection with the USSR in the West.29 This meant the espousal of 
an interpretation of democracy and human rights that differed greatly 
from the orthodox line. There came a subsequent acceptance of polit-
ical pluralism, both during and after the period socialism was built. 
Southern European countries already had their own social democ-
racy by the 1970s, which was labelled as communist and approached 
the democratic state with a positive, ‘constructive’ attitude, revealing 
a conviction that although it was controlled by the ruling classes it 
could still be democratised and serve popular interests if the balance 
of power within it was appropriate.30 
The Eurocommunists’ fate was sealed by the early 1980s. Although 
they emphasised the goal of electoral victory and chose strategies 
targeted at winning over non-communist votes, the result was far 
from grand electoral victories in the medium term. Between the 
elections of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the PCI, PCF and PCE 
(Communist Party of Spain) each lost about a million votes, while the 
KKE Interior halved its vote share.31 By the mid-1980s, there was no 
such thing as Eurocommunism being practised as an alliance between 
parties. Yet, we must note that the paradigmatic turn away from rev-
olution and towards reform, and the ideological spirit of the Long 
’68, was also present within the communist movement: ‘A socialist 
strategy remained the ultimate and desirable goal, but the road map 
leading in this direction no longer contained instructions for sudden, 
radical breaks and associated cataclysmic events but, instead, a series 
of intercalated structural reforms which, in due time, would bring 
about the same result.’32
the end of anti-capitalism?
During the 1990s a course of recomposition began. It had its roots 
in the divisions and failures emerging from the 1980s, which was 
nothing short of a crisis already, not least in the Soviet Communist 
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Party itself.33 After the fall of the Berlin Wall, among other associ-
ated, dominant notions of historical development, it was popularly 
claimed that the battle of ideologies had ended and with it history 
itself.34 In this ‘final’ ideological hegemony, it was widely claimed, lib-
eralism emerged victorious. Communism (along with fascism) was 
said to have failed, liberty was the opposite of socialism, class was 
unimportant and eastern Europe finally became ‘democratic’ and 
could be incorporated into Western ‘normality’. Policies encourag-
ing central planning and speaking in the name of the working class 
raised suspicion. To be as clear as possible: the most seismic discon-
tinuity since the 1960s was the end of the USSR and its impact on 
global political developments and on RLPs. 
Foremost, this is evidenced within party systems rather than 
looking at post-1990 movements alone, such as the GJM, which had 
distinct dynamics involving anarchism and autonomism. A funda-
mental reshaping of the Radical Left took place where qualitatively 
new organisations or permutations of existing ones developed. There 
was an assortment of immediate responses to the end of ‘actually 
existing socialism’. What they had in common was that the outcomes 
were produced by the internal balance of power between the Stalinist 
and orthodox segments and the reformist or ‘renewal left’. National 
perestroikas were pursued by reformers in almost all parties and 
many of their advocates eventually ended up either in New Left or 
non-left-wing politics. 
Orthodox parties in which pro-Soviet forces predominated rejected 
the failure of communism and continued to prioritise a socialist 
transformation in the means of production. These parties initially 
included the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), the PCF in France, 
the Danish Communist Party, the Belgian Communist Party (PCB) 
and the KKE in Greece. The PCF and the PCB eventually shifted to 
change their initial interpretation. The Party of Communist Refoun-
dation (Rifondazione) in Italy and the PCE in Spain and most of the 
Scandinavian parties in the 1990s argued that socialism had failed 
because it degenerated into Stalinism, and that the original principles 
of Marxism had to be redrawn and enriched with insights from the 
struggles of movements and local groups. Parties whose conclusion 
was that the collapse of communism in eastern Europe represented 
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a failure of communism itself abandoned all communist credentials 
and transformed into non-CPs of the Left. These were the PCI in 
Italy, which became an SDP, the Communist Party of Great Britain, 
the Communist Party of Finland and the Communist Party of the 
Netherlands.35 
An identity crisis for the communist left was, moreover, coupled 
with its profound electoral weakening. The family’s aggregate elec-
toral strength fell from 19.1 million votes (9.4 per cent) in 1988 to 
11.2 million votes (5.1 per cent) in 1993. Most RLPs lost moder-
ately or heavily and the Radical Left as a political force across Europe 
was significantly relegated post-1991.36 The end of ‘actually existing 
socialism’ has, since the 1960s, been the key moment of collective 
change for RLPs. In addition to electoral downsizing, this came in the 
form of internal conflict about left-wing memory, defeat and the past, 
ideological challenges and revisions, organisational weakening and 
fragmentation. The impact of the USSR’s fall must be nuanced only 
in the light of continuing historical facts, of which there are two that 
are most important. In terms of size, the European Radical Left has 
been a relatively ‘small party family’ throughout, only in a few cases 
consistently getting more than 30 per cent of the vote (e.g. in Cyprus 
and Italy).37 In most countries it rarely polled above about 15 per cent 
and in some countries, such as Austria, West Germany (until unifi-
cation) and the UK, it never entered parliament as an autonomous 
force. Soviet dissolution thus did not transform electoral dynamics 
across most countries between the communists and social demo-
crats. Indeed, the most marked electoral decline for RLPs happened 
during the 1980s.38
Initial responses to and the effects of the Soviet collapse do not 
of course exhaust the diversity of European RLPs today; things have 
changed significantly since then. Thus, for the purposes of identify-
ing a political morphology among RLPs in Europe, the distinction 
between communist and non/post-communist left parties that ini-
tially emerged in the aftermath of Soviet collapse is not very useful. 
The last ten years or so have in many ways been unique because of the 
global financial crisis and its European implications, uniting RLPs 
around anti-austerity. This has effectively meant opposing legislation 
that seeks to restructure the public sector and its finances, cut back 
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on welfare provisions, privatise public utilities and commodify the 
commons. Compared to the 1990s, during the crisis RLPs have been 
markedly different – a revitalised space, both in terms of electoral 
performance and movement mobilisation.
The interpretation of the post-2008 crisis by most RLPs – the 
communist and workers’ parties excepted – is geared, as in the move-
ments, towards a critique, not of capitalism and its underlying social 
processes but of the symptoms of neoliberalism: financialisation, 
rising inequality, precarity, welfare state retrenchment and the com-
modification of public goods.39 The overall policy profile amounts 
to ‘a new Keynesianism’, combined with a plea for democratising the 
channels of political representation and, since the rise of the climate 
movements, addressing the climate emergency. One should also note 
that many of the battles the Radical Left has fought successfully, by 
proposing legislation around which majority coalitions formed (e.g. 
in Portugal and Greece), often concern ‘new politics’ issues. These 
issues range from domestic violence, civil rights and guarantees, the 
fight against racism and discrimination, gay marriage and other more 
localised issues, such as bullfighting in Portugal and Spain. 
To add another parameter of evolving political dynamics, along 
the way technological development has also had implications for the 
Left in the context of party systems. The digital revolution played 
into the emergence of pirate parties and their rise since the early 
2000s. This has been an uneven phenomenon limited to continen-
tal and northern Europe, where the issue was most salient. In all the 
cases of newly formed pirate parties they have been anti-authoritar-
ian, aiming to enhance civic liberties, to give open access to culture 
through the internet and to fight or resist ‘institutional corruption’ 
and the influence of corporations. Their roots lie in internet activism 
and protest against digital copyright law. Although pointing to the 
malfunctions of capitalism, pirate parties are predominantly middle-
class organisations and avoid using anti-capitalist rhetoric or putting 
forward ideas about extensive redistribution: ‘pirate politics merely 
tweaks the logic of existing regimes.’40 Statistical analysis of elec-
toral survey data has shown that the prime driver of voting for pirate 
parties has been political distrust, and interviews with Pirate Party 
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activists illustrate that they do not self-define in left–right terms.41 In 
what ways then, if any, has this party family been challenging RLPs? 
In those countries where pirate parties did become an important 
competitor in the party system, they had a twofold influence, which 
is very time-specific. Sections of the protest vote going to RLPs were 
drawn to the Pirates, most evidently in Germany. Die Linke and Rosa 
Luxemburg Stiftung launched a number of meetings and events to 
understand and respond to this party phenomenon and its impli-
cations for the Left’s strategy. Die Linke also spent a period testing 
‘liquid democracy’, out of which certain new democratic operations 
emerged.42 In Sweden, in terms of both timing and extent, the Left 
Party, among others, has been influenced by the Pirates’ presence,43 in 
developing many features and online tools for organising and agenda 
setting, under the Pirates-initiated pretext of decentralisation and 
directness as the partisan manifestations of horizontalist politics.44 
Although with a partial and faded influence, the politics of digital 
rights responded to emerging puzzles about communicative capital-
ism, bringing into focus the political economy of piracy and how this 
can serve as a form of resistance to the media industry and big cor-
porations. Piracy has emerged out of the fundamental conflicts in the 
contemporary information society, which reshaped competition over 
material wealth.45 From this perspective, pirate parties are political 
manifestations of a systemic phenomenon, with technological devel-
opment in the free market bringing into opposition the zero-sum 
logic of multinational and finance capitalism, which is catalytic in 
diffusing digital science, and the logic of the ‘commons’ arising from 
universities and other producers of digital science.46 This led to the 
politicisation of issues – access to knowledge, rights to privacy and 
the meaning of freedom and property in the digital public sphere.47 
In terms that are more tangible and ongoing, the Radical Left 
has been confronted by a resurgent radical and extreme right, with 
many elements and incarnations of right-wing extremism, which has 
become a key competitor attracting part of the blue-collar working 
class. The increasing importance of working-class constituencies 
raises questions that are most relevant to the Left’s identity. A ‘pro-
letarianisation’ of radical and extreme right party constituencies 
was reported in the 1990s across various European countries. This 
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process has led to the eventual predominance of working-class votes 
among the far-right social milieu.48 Without a strong social policy 
offering, which is virtually impossible under conditions of perma-
nent austerity, welfare chauvinism as a sort of pseudo-socialism has 
certainly worked electorally. According to empirical tests, support for 
the radical right decreases the likelihood of electoral success for RLPs 
significantly.49 However, RLPs carry some of the blame over the long 
term. Failure in office on various occasions since the 1990s may have 
fed the growth of the extreme right, which could more easily claim 
an ‘anti-establishment’ identity and sell the narrative of a sold-out or 
‘like all the rest’ left. Nevertheless, the crisis-ridden and marginalisa-
tion processes inscribed in European neoliberalism and globalisation 
have also generated distinct patterns of politics.
solidarity and internationalism
Changing historical patterns have also translated into evolving 
dynamics of solidarity and expressions of internationalism. The 
struggles of colonialised people across the globe exposed the notion 
of ‘national communism’, since national liberation was prioritised 
over socialist revolution as a necessary stage preceding it. Yet, beyond 
mainly the PCI and the forces of the New Left, CPs clung to loyalty to 
an overarching centre focused on the USSR. This demarcated them 
from the ‘internationalist revolutionaries’ ‘without a country’, of the 
New Left which criticised CPs as ‘social democratic’ and ‘revision-
ists’ being more oriented towards the militancy and strategy infusing 
the writings of Frantz Fanon on peasant revolutions.50 Still, the USSR 
was the self-proclaimed leader of the international peace movement 
and the most important financier of national liberation struggles 
across the world. The World Peace Council was at the centre of soli-
darity struggles among the communists during the entire Cold War 
period. For the Soviet leadership, pacifism was condemned, and ‘as 
Third World states emerged and national liberation movements con-
solidated political ideologies, the concept of just war acquired new 
meaning within anti-imperialist discourse’.51 That is why the USSR 
and all the loyal CPs in western Europe took sides in the Arab–
Israeli wars and supported military intervention in Afghanistan in 
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1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan divided the Eurocommu-
nist parties, however – the PCI condemned it explicitly, the PCE 
hesitantly and the PCF realigned itself away from the ‘national road’ 
back to the ‘internationalist stance’ of the USSR. In doing so, the PCI 
joined a number of European socialist leaders – Mitterand in France, 
Papadreou in Greece, Soares in Portugal, Gonzales in Spain, Brandt 
in Germany – in the pursuit of a Third Worldism distinct from the 
Soviet one, as well as the backing of Eastern dissent.52 As historian 
Basil Davidson pointedly observed, the Eurocommunists shared with 
the national liberation movements resistance to ‘models imposed 
from outside’.53
What effectively differentiated the European and global context 
of the 1960s and 1970s from the post-1990 climate is primarily the 
dynamic (and organisational density) of the international peace 
movement. It was a time that most of the left, including SDPs, rejected 
European integration, either because of entrenched national tradi-
tions, as in the UK, or because of solidarity with the Third World and 
the EU’s free market ideology. But social democracy was divided as 
well, into the ‘right-wing “social democrats”, who supported Atlanti-
cism, nuclear deterrence and European integration’ and the ‘ left-wing 
“socialists”’ who rejected them.54 As we saw in Chapter 3, since the 
1980s little remains the same in terms of how the idea of solidarity 
and internationalism are mobilised on the ground, as both the nature 
of wars changes and a unipolar geopolitics emerges. In the 2000s and 
2010s, for the Radical Left there are no models to be imposed from 
outside in situations of war, famine or disaster. In lieu of the pre-
existing Soviet, former Yugoslavian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban or 
other models, no new ones have arisen and, ironic as this might seem, 
no outside models also means more negative argumentation, rather 
than a positive, concrete contribution to system change abroad. 
On immigration, RLPs are not entirely united in their positions 
either. Since the 1980s, there has been a gradual but steady rise in the 
extreme and radical right, which reached a climax in the 2010s and is 
connected to, although not fully explained by, immigration. On the 
Radical Left, although for activists and intellectuals pro-immigration 
is the natural place, from the perspective of party leaders and govern-
ment officials the issue is more complex. In most European countries, 
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the Radical Left is the most pro-immigration position there is, with 
all parties declaring vehement opposition to xenophobia, racism and 
Islamophobia, and participating in struggles, demonstrations and 
other pro-immigration initiatives, links to anti-racist forums and 
immigration working groups. At the EU level, the European United 
Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) has launched multiple initiatives 
and vigorous criticism of the EU’s immigration policies and espe-
cially immigrant detention centres and conditions therein. 
Immigration is fundamentally a neutral policy issue from a partisan 
perspective, with the exception of its evident association to the rise of 
the radical right. One can see this in the history of western European 
politics in the 1960s and 1970s, whereby both parties of the Left and 
the Right promoted some of the earliest policies to restrict immigra-
tion in Europe.55 For the communists a much-cited historical case 
of ethnicised representations of social issues is the PCF mayor of 
Vitry-sur-Seine, Paul Mercieca, who just before Christmas 1980 led 
communist members and supporters in preventing 300 immigrants 
from Mali from being rehoused in a hostel in Vitry by disconnecting 
utilities and smashing the interior of the building. This was called a 
‘direct action’. A demonstration followed in support of the action in 
which the PCF’s leadership participated.56 In the April presidential 
elections of 1981, one of the PCF’s campaign slogans was ‘Stop immi-
gration, official and illegal’.57
The PCF of today is markedly different in its immigration policy, 
and it was an exception even in the 1970s: for example, compared to 
Sweden, where both the CP and the social democrats were pro-immi-
gration. Yet, the point remains that nationally and locally, RLPs have 
particular incentives to withdraw support for the multicultural ideal 
and restrict immigration. In essence, they face an electoral trade-off 
due to the different economic impacts of immigration on differ-
ent segments of the electorate upon which the Left relies. Distinct 
policies entail costs and benefits for different income categories of the 
population. Native low-skilled workers lose the most from integrated 
markets with free movement between them, and given their reliance 
on publicly subsidised welfare provisions a competitive imaginary 
against immigrants can be created for jobs, public resources and 
space. The Left also seeks to ‘catch’ high-skilled workers and profes-
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sionals, who typically have less apprehension of immigrants because 
they are on the ‘winning side’ of neoliberal globalisation. The radical 
right has largely cultivated and capitalised on anti-immigrant senti-
ments among blue-collar workers, and statistical analysis has shown 
that RLP opposition parties have repositioned themselves on the 
immigration issue by way of contagion from the anti-immigration 
forces on the radical and extreme right.58 RLPs in government – the 
ongoing government in Spain, the SYRIZA government or German 
regional governments in coalitions with Die Linke – have behaved in 
similar ways: immigration from third countries has to be limited and 
regulated. Deportations by the Left have already occurred plenty of 
times. 
Given the above-mentioned electoral dilemmas and national his-
torical traditions, frictions arise on the issue. The most discussed case 
is Sahra Wagenknecht’s Aufstehen (Get Up) movement, her various 
interventions for stricter immigration and asylum controls and laws, 
and the internal conflict inside the German Die Linke which led to 
her resignation from the party’s parliamentary group leadership. 
Concerns were expressed that the German left-wing support for the 
‘open border’ position, in addition to recognising the right to asylum, 
was pushing voters away from the party. Unchecked immigration, 
the narrative goes, increases pressure on Germans seeking work 
and domestic social systems, benefiting the (then newly emerging 
German) far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). Wagenkne-
cht’s strategy was to try ‘to beat the AfD in its own game’, suggesting 
that the Left has been too consumed with political correctness and 
identity politics, and should instead refuse to abandon its core base 
support by not acknowledging their grievances as legitimate.59
For Wagenknecht, advocating for open borders is ‘the opposite of 
what is left-wing because it encourages exploitation, threatens com-
munity, and undermines popular sovereignty’.60 In German social 
democracy, a historical position has been that the rise of Nazism 
rested upon the impoverishment of the masses which migration 
can catalyse. This has remained entrenched as the initial and over-
arching interpretation of the German social democratic approach 
to ‘uncontrolled immigration’. Oscar Lafontaine, once very distinct 
from Wagenknecht, is a social democratic politician involved in the 
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Radical Left since the 1990s, who has systematically expressed hostile 
positions towards the prospect of immigrants coming to Germany, 
including, as he had argued during the period of German unification 
in 1989, East German immigrants.61 The electoralist, constituency-
argued logic of politicians like Lafontaine has a historical lineage, 
although more recently scepticism or straight out anti-immigration 
by the centre-left and RLPs has been turned into an electoral weapon 
in opposition to a forceful extreme right and political polarisation 
over the issue during the post-2008 crisis.
Another important example of strict immigration positions comes 
from the Netherlands where, in the run-up to the 2019 European elec-
tions, the Socialist Party (SP) adopted a more ‘harsh’ line on asylum 
and immigration issues. This is partly because, since the 1980s, this 
party has traditionally emphasised native Dutch workers. The SP’s 
outlook was derived from its origins as a Stalinist-Maoist party which 
followed the ‘theory of socialism in one country’ and Mao’s ‘mass line’. 
These respectively meant adopting the view that socialism could and 
should be built within the national state and addressing conservative 
constituencies with racist outlooks and grievances against immi-
grants.62 In both Die Linke and the SP, the line in many ways signals 
old standpoints that remained present throughout. The Swedish Vän-
sterpartiet and Danish Socialist People’s Party also witnessed internal 
debates or dissent over the issue. Events in the 2010s led to intensi-
fied politics over immigration-related issues, more discussions that 
are open and more visible disagreements. Divisions emerged over 
party behaviour towards immigrant communities, candidate selec-
tion in parliamentary elections or leadership statements.63 
Historically, there has been division inside the Left between a form 
of socialist cosmopolitanism whereby ‘workingmen have no country’ 
and the assumption that the working class is a patriotic and authen-
tic force of the nation.64 The modern transliteration of this tension 
is between internationalist solidarity with all oppressed communi-
ties and pragmatic concern about existing pressures on the wages 
and social security of national constituencies – primarily, the white 
working class. Given marginal or non-existing overlap between the 
radical milieus of the two poles of the spectrum, it is the endurance 
of dividing lines standing out, not contagion from the radical right.65 
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The lines of division between more and less progressive, or more or 
less restrictive, policies towards immigration have been diachronic. 
Currently, we can broadly distinguish between parties with less restric-
tive policies towards immigration, such as the Left Bloc, SYRIZA and 
Vänsterpartiet, and more restrictive policies, such as the Dutch SP, or 
Jan Luc Mélenchon’s France Insoumise and (for some time) Jeremy 
Corbyn, who do not endorse in principle free movement within the 
EU.66 We can observe disagreement among RLPs as manifested in roll 
call votes among members of their group inside the European Par-
liament (EP).67 On solidarity, the partisan trajectory is positionally 
variegated and on average different from the movements of the Long 
’68 to today. It is through activism primarily, and not institutional 
politics, that open borders are being promoted on the Radical Left in 
terms of political work. A significant part of this activism is through 
the youth, syndicalist, women’s and other organisations that operate 
through parties, like in the KKE and the extra-parliamentary Left in 
Greece, Podemos and IU in Spain, the Labour Party in the UK or the 
Scandinavian radical and labour parties. Nevertheless, a dissonance 
remains between the internationalism of pure and uncompromised 
solidarity and the pragmatics of leadership, governance and electoral 
opportunism.
internationalism and european integration
European integration is a key part of the Radical Left’s story post-
1991, affecting its internationalist prisms. How so becomes clear only 
when compared with the Cold World period, because the accelera-
tion of integration in a neoliberal direction roughly coincides with 
the events of 1989–91. In the 1970s, the Eurocommunists aside, all 
other parties stood against European integration per se by reject-
ing the Common Market and in most cases any form of association 
agreement between their own country and the EEC.68 CPs were con-
cerned that the EEC institutions would consolidate the USA’s control 
over western Europe and play a reactionary role in the Cold War 
context. The idea of European integration came to the forefront of 
European politics as a means to reaccelerate economic growth in 
Europe, as well as a response to the strategy of the USSR that con-
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tested the interests of the USA.69 Since, in many cases, an anti-EEC 
platform also accrued electoral benefits, a policy of what would 
today be called full-blown Euroscepticism went easily uncontested 
in various countries.70 The EU was equalised with NATO, in both 
analysis and slogan. It was conceived as the regional, political arm 
of Western imperialism, behind its pro-peace and cooperation dis-
course; an economic project of capitalist accumulation with internal 
contradictions among competing hegemonic states, trumping labour 
rights and creating obstacles to socialism expanding westwards. Divi-
sions on European integration had already emerged among CPs in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and in the 1970s they were particularly impor-
tant because of Eurocommunism. 
The PCI, PCE and the Greek KKE Interior in particular approached 
the question of European integration differently from the orthodox 
view. It is in this political strain, starting in the aftermath of the 
first New Left, that a ‘soft’ Euroscepticism emerged, which did not 
oppose an altogether different process of integration, and was willing 
to engage with liberal, intergovernmental and transnational insti-
tutions. Its purpose was not to overturn European integration, but 
rather to democratise its politics and institutions, in the same way 
as it sought to democratise national institutions. If in the Long ’68 
something important happened on the communist left in relation 
to the EU, it was a convergence on the necessity to be represented 
within EU institutions. With democracy as a key signifier, CPs could 
not easily refuse representation in the institution that commands 
parliamentary control over the executive at the EEC level. The first 
concrete steps to establish relations with the EEC were taken in 1963 
by the PCI-controlled Confederazione Generale Italiano dei Lavora-
tori. By 1971, leading Central Committee members of the PCF issued 
a positive view of participation in the EP, stating that the commu-
nist-socialist coalition programme would include ‘participation’ in 
‘European institutions’ more broadly.71
The Communists and Allies Group in the EP was established in 
1973 and initially had two members – the CPs of Italy and France. 
The group was subsequently joined by the KKE, PCP and PCE in 
the 1980s. It lacked a coherent group policy and there was no agreed 
outline towards institutional change in the community, including 
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the questions of direct elections and the EP budgetary powers; the 
control of multinational corporations and any checks and balances 
to constrain them; or matters directly emerging from détente and its 
instrumentalisation between the USA and the USSR.72 The European 
policies of communists diverged over support or rejection of the 
internationalisation of the productive (capitalist) forces, and their 
broader relations with the USSR were at odds to an extent.73
The transformation of the PCI into an SDP after its 1990 congress 
and its official departure from the European United Left group inside 
the EP was catalytic in this sense because it led to the group’s collapse 
and redrew lines of division. In this conjuncture, a key moment was 
the Treaty of Maastricht, ratified in 1992 and introducing, among 
other things, the criteria necessary for the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) to be realised. The anti-Maastricht platform which character-
ised the vast majority of European RLPs contributed to the creation 
of GUE/NGL and thus fed into launching the most sustained trans-
national political group of the Radical Left so far. From Maastricht a 
four-part criticism of the EU’s socio-economic terrain emerged: 
1. Against the restrictions on national budgetary autonomy as 
foreseen in the EMU’s convergence criteria and the Stability 
and Growth Pact, and in turn associated with cuts in public and 
welfare spending.
2. Support for a ‘social Europe’, where articulate and generous welfare 
is institutionalised and employment is prioritised. 
3. The lack of democratic accountability in relation to the European 
Central Bank. 
4. Popular sovereignty through the EP.
Maastricht signalled a ‘new’ type of critique by the European 
Radical Left, expressed extensively and more cohesively across 
parties of the democratic socialist type, as well as movements in the 
European sections of the GJM. Maastricht was a key moment in a 
quadruple sense. It was a watershed in terms of what seeking radical 
change within the EU meant; it consolidated reformism towards 
the EU via soft Euroscepticism; it helped produce some unity and 
consolidate the networking capable of formulating a collective criti-
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cism of the EU (as an evolved entity); and it subsequently mounted 
opposition against the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. Launching 
opposition to Maastricht also meant the re-emergence of national 
sovereignty as a key theme; this was raised first as a red flag by the 
French communists more than 30 years before.74
At the same time, the evolving relationship between the national 
and European arenas in radical left politics, which we examined in 
Chapter 3 in relation to social movements, plays out even more clearly 
in parties. A sign of historical change has, since the 1990s, been the 
transnationalisation of radical left politics at the European level. A 
number of organisations have been formed alongside GUE/NGL. The 
establishment of the European Left Party (ELP, 2004), the European 
Anti-Capitalist Left (EACL, 2004), the Northern Green Left Alliance 
(2004), the Initiative of Communist and Workers’ Parties (INITIA-
TIVE, 2013) and Democracy in Europe 2025 (DiEM25) all came in 
the context of realising that regional politics mattered.
The foundation of the EACL may have responded to the ELP’s 
foundation, yet its activity is not as important compared to the Fourth 
International meetings.75 Like the orthodox communist and workers’ 
parties, these are more purely internationalist.76 The ELP, on the other 
hand, is the Europeanist left, funded largely by the EU. This shows 
that Europe as a centre of gravity for the international affiliations of 
RLPs is itself contested, at least between anti-capitalist and demo-
cratic socialists. Aiming to reform the EU from within, most forces 
within the ELP have become increasingly open to broader progres-
sive alliances. These include, although are not limited to, the social 
democrats. This has been the line of parties such as Rifondazione and 
the IU in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which, for example, engaged 
with the campaign initiatives of Ken Coates, a New Left veteran and 
Labour Party MEP from 1989 to 1998 until his expulsion, and then 
an independent member of GUE/NGL from 1998 to 1999.77
SYRIZA’s U-turn in 2015 concerning the Greek bailout was 
a critical moment. After the ‘No’ result in the July referendum on 
whether to accept the offer of Greece’s creditors for a bailout, the 
party sidestepped the result and complied. Some parties left the ELP 
and founded Now the People, associated with Plan B, for structurally 
reforming the EU treaties, while warning that if EU elites refuse con-
The European Radical Left
178
cessions then disobedience (that is, exit) would be the only option. 
The Northern Green Left Alliance is an association within the Nordic 
Council. Some of its parties are also part of NGL inside the EP, which 
was created during Europe’s ‘Scandinavian engagement’.78 Others 
have joined the Greens. INITIATIVE is largely carried by the KKE 
in Greece, which organises meetings among some 28 parties, mostly 
without parliamentary representation, and views the EU as ‘an impe-
rialist core’. 
At a peak of fragmented transnationalisation today, there are at least 
five different organisations with European-level coordination outside 
the EP. Within these five groups there are parties and MEPs who have 
left the GUE/NGL (such as the KKE); and all of them exclude left-
wing forces belonging to the Greens or to the social democrats. At 
the same time, parties such as Podemos, SYRIZA and DiEM25 are 
connected with some SDPs or GPs, their delegates participating in 
initiatives under the framework of organisations such as Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, the think tank of the SPD, or other social liberal 
entities. Left-wing Euroscepticism is deeply divided in its political 
expressions and institutionalised at the European level in multiple 
bodies, hindering the potential of establishing an EU-wide, counter-
hegemonic, historical bloc (in Gramscian terms).
The regionalisation of a radical left politics has been a gradual 
process facilitated by transnational linkages between parties and 
accelerated by the crisis, and it coincides with an ideologico-polit-
ical paradigm shift. In the terms of Fritz Scharpf, the Radical Left 
has shifted from predominantly a critique of ‘negative integration’, 
for example, the elimination of custom and trade barriers, towards 
‘positive integration’, which is concerned with the EU’s regulatory 
powers and its potential to intervene in the capitalist economy.79 
At present, the predominant position on the European Radical Left 
echoes the argument articulated within critical political economy 
that neoliberal dominance within the EU is relative, contested and 
explained by the political weakness of European social democ-
racy from Maastricht onwards.80 It is thus potentially temporary 
and worth fighting for under a social democratic programme. The 
Keynesian paradigm updated to fit the current stage of European 
integration appears to be necessary and sufficient. As a result of this 
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and a number of other political convictions, among the most elec-
torally successful RLPs a soft Euroscepticism has taken centre stage. 
Although it does suggest far-reaching reforms in all aspects of EU 
policymaking, it no longer contradicts the spirit of further European 
integration based on the free market and pooled sovereignty. This 
broader shift to a softer Euroscepticism materialised for RLPs in the 
1990s and 2000s.81
By the 2010s, a policy repertoire developed that had been shaped 
within distinct parties during the 1990s – the French, Italian, 
Spanish, Portuguese and some of the Scandinavian Radical Left. It 
arose partly in the context of the European sections of the GJM, and 
the relevant campaigns of the time had attracted the majority of elec-
torally relevant parties at the transnational level. The predominant 
democratic socialist proposals among RLPs on the EU are reflected 
in the policy positions of the ELP and DiEM25, which have an overall 
orientation of moderating the excesses of the market via intervention 
from the state, while at the same time rebuilding a ‘Social Europe’.82 
This general policy orientation in what concerns the economy comes 
with a democratic redesign of the EU’s architecture, constraints on 
the financial sector, state-centred environmentalism and more gener-
ally a progressive (equally if not more than the social democrats and 
the Greens) attitude towards ‘new politics issues’. Most of the key pro-
grammatic positions are addressed in Table 6.3. All of these policies 
in essence reflect a general conviction that the EU must be a regula-
tory state, in line with positive views of European integration. 
During the immediate aftermath of the eurozone crisis, many 
argued that to beat austerity Greece or any other country must break 
free from the euro. This was the broad policy content symbolised in 
the term ‘rupture’, which echoed across southern Europe. SYRIZA 
and many others, however, have insisted on fighting austerity from 
within the eurozone, thus rejecting the option of exit. Some of its 
initially prominent party-associated intellectuals, such as Costas 
Lapavitsas, forcefully defended exit during the bailout negotiations 
of 2015. In this way, ceding sovereignty, abolishing national curren-
cies or accepting EU law and regulations as supreme prevent a real 
break with austerity and neoliberalism. In fact, authors like Lapavit-
sas – an MP only for six months in 2015 – argue that eurozone and 
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EU membership eliminates the possibility of initiating socially trans-
formative policy measures.83 Others go one step further, arguing that 
exiting the EU ‘also represents a form of internationalism: if the EU is 
the common enemy of the subaltern classes in Europe, the only way 
to actually fight is by means of a series of exits’.84
Serious threats of an exit have not really been launched by European 
RLPs, and although sovereignist factions have been strengthened 
across the board, the crisis has not really increased Euroscepticism 
Table 6.3 Main policy positions of the ELP and DiEM25 by domain (2019)
Policy domain Policy position




No to Lisbon Treaty (no constitu-
tionalisation of neoliberal order)
New pact on growth, full employ-
ment and social and environmental 
protection to replace Stability and 
Growth Pact 
Debt redemption for poorest coun-
tries and reformulation of World 
Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment 
Programmes
Opposition to the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership 
and the USA–EU free market
Tax on financial transactions
No to Lisbon Treaty (no constitutionali-
sation of neoliberal order)
An investment-left recovery and con-
vergence programme
Break up ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks
European Clearing Union for exchange 
rates (Keynesian inspired)
Universal dividend
Pan-European Coordination, to max-
imise outcomes across euro and non-
euro countries.
Tax on financial transactions 
Opposition to the Transatlantic Trade 






Free universal, public healthcare
More investment on alternative 
energy sources
Decrease emissions by 30– 40 per 
cent until 2020
In support/developing Charter of 
Fundamental Rights
An Emergency Social Solidarity Pro-
gram (housing, anti-poverty, jobs 
guarantee)
EU minimum wage/pension
Free, universal, public healthcare
More investment in alternative energy 
sources (and Green agency)
Progressive CO2 tax based on the level of 
a country’s development and emissions.
Foreign Policy Ending EU military engagement 
abroad
Dissolution of NATO and replace-
ment with a new International Coop-
erative Security System 
Opposition to the EU’s anti-terror-
ism policy 
Replacement of defence agency with 
disarmament agency
Reform of UN
A foreign policy where non-Europeans 
are ‘ends in themselves’
Opposition to the EU’s anti-terrorism 
policy
Independence from NATO/anti-NATO
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beyond mostly confirming the already Eurorejectionist views of 
orthodox CPs.85 The year 2015 saw a break among Eurocritical 
forces, with some actors reasonably feeling the need to differentiate 
themselves from SYRIZA’s ‘capitulation’ to the austerity demands 
of Greece’s bailout creditors. Yet the majority position is far from 
advocating an exit. If eurozone exit was discursively on the table in 
the early 2010s, and various RLP bureaus across Europe were looking 
into it as an option and weighing the costs and benefits, it was left 
deep inside the drawers of the rest of that decade. For SYRIZA itself, 
eurozone exit was never officially a defended political option to 
begin with. 
During the Brexit years, leaving the EU was a minority position 
in the UK within the space from Labour to its left. The predomi-
nant position argued that none of the problems faced, including 
Policy domain Policy position
ELP DiEM 25 
Agricultural 
Policy
Reform Common Agricultural 
Policy in an anti-neoliberal direc-
tion; transform European industrial, 
agricultural and land-use policy to be 
environmentally friendly
Reform Common Agricultural Policy in 
an anti-neoliberal direction; transform 
European industrial, agricultural and 
land-use policy from to be environ-
mentally friendly
EU Institutions Referenda on landmark EU decisions
Popular control over EU institutions 
EP to gain legislative initiative
PR electoral system in Euroelections




Full transparency (including EU 
Council, Economic and Financial Af-
fairs Council, European Central Bank 
and Eurogroup meetings to be live 
streamed)
Constitutional Assembly (within two 
years)
Against EU–Turkey migration deal – 
raising the issue at the European Court 
of Justice
Source: Adapted from Richard Dunhpy and Luke March, The European Left Party (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2020), pp. 216–20; European Left Party, Political Document – Reset 
Europe, Go Left, 2019, www.european-left.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Political-Document-
Final-version-EL-Congress-2019.pdf; DiEM, European New Deal, 2019, https://diem25.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/European-New-Deal-Complete-Policy-Paper.pdf; DiEM25, The European 
Union Will Be Democratised, Or It Will Disintegrate, 2019, https://diem25.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/diem25_english_long.pdf; DiEM25, The Green New Deal for Europe, 2019, https://
diem25.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/diem25_english_long.pdf.
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economic recession, climate change and military conflict, can be 
resolved on a national basis. Rather, only by creating concrete links 
across European and international borders can they be addressed.86 
The minority position posited that Britain’s future depended much 
more on the domestic economic policies of future governments and 
much less on the result of the battle between Brexit and Remain. The 
minority position was that many aspects of the Labour manifesto 
under Jeremy Corbyn – such as the renationalisation of public utili-
ties, state support for companies or the adoption of capital controls 
– would be constrained under EU law. Almost certainly they would 
have been challenged by the European Commission and European 
Court of Justice, according to the defenders of nationally based 
socialist politics.87 The Left Party in Sweden shifted its long-stand-
ing pledge for Swedish exit from the EU and did not campaign for 
‘Swexit’ in the double election of May 2019. In the same European 
elections in Denmark, one seat went from the hard Eurosceptic 
Danish People’s Party to the Red–Green alliance, a softer critic of the 
EU. These results are not to be perceived as surprising; as concerns 
the euro, there are also precedents in the opposite direction of criticis-
ing it: in the 1990s, RLPs in Italy, France and Finland contributed to 
the introduction of the European single currency as junior partners 
in centre-left governments.88 In 1992, the Coalition of the Left and 
Progress, the predecessor of and main party inside SYRIZA, had 
voted in favour of Maastricht in the Greek parliament.
Reclaiming sovereignty by advocating exit from the eurozone and 
the EU is projected by those in favour as necessary for meaningful 
statist regulation of the economy. On the other hand, left sovereignism 
creates fear that extreme forces will benefit from a resolute Euroscep-
ticism in public opinion. Especially in the event of a series of exits, 
and more broadly a disintegration process set in motion by Brexit or 
otherwise, the majority of parties within the Radical Left may worry 
about an extremist backlash with consequences not worth risking. 
retrospective
How have the ideas and programmatic positions of European RLPs 
developed since the Long ’68? Discontinuity has manifested itself 
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above all in the dialectics internal to the radical left space. The pre-
vailing identity on the European Radical Left evolves because the 
relative position of this political family’s historical currents, tenden-
cies or traditions changes. Over the long term, change is significant. 
Between the 1960s and today, social democracy exited the radical 
party space and in the 2010s showed some signs of repositioning, 
most notably in the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, the Scottish 
National Party’s centre-left turn under the leadership of Nicola 
Sturgeon and the Portuguese Socialist-Radical left coalition. Trot-
skyism remains fragmented and important in France and (less so) in 
the UK and Ireland. Stalinism almost died out, and only survives in 
minuscule forces in Europe outside of parliament, beyond only the 
KKE’s explicit defence of Stalin. Maoism has no distinguishing con-
temporary theory, and communism is no more than a unifying claim 
to a past identity. Red–Green alliances, still the stronger in Scandi-
navia and northern Europe, have effectively expanded southwards, 
in an analogous way to the environmental, feminist and anti-nuclear 
movements. 
Democratic socialism now claims the vanguard role of this party 
family, and it becomes what social democracy more or less was, 
rallying behind it both reformists and anti-capitalists. Whether 
social democracy is called radical today or not – which depends on 
the country concerned – does not change its underlying paradigm of 
state intervention in the economy, guided by demand-driven macro-
economics and the political initiative and pragmatism required to do 
this. Taking everything together, a Eurocommunist heritage, and a 
reradicalised social democracy, runs through the veins of most con-
temporary RLPs. It is the counterpart or rather reflection of social 
movements’ anti-neoliberalism, while also incarnated in the softer 
versions of Euroscepticism predominant today.
RLP adaptation and change in the ideational and programmatic 
realms appear in historical retrospect as both necessarily familiar 
and novel or particular. Here we must once again emphasise that the 
events of 1989–91 created shockwaves, leading to massive change 
on the Left. Those events changed the global balance of power and 
shook up the Left in all of its manifestations, putting it on the defen-
sive. Nonetheless, for multiple processes of morphological change in 
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tune with the very compositional patterns of this family, the starting 
point was the Long ’68 (its cultural, social and political manifesta-
tions) and the precedent dynamic generated in the 1950s. What 
prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s was radical dissent from Stalin-
ism and communist orthodoxy. It morphed into Eurocommunism 
(where the social democratic space was available) or left libertari-
anism, where the post-materialist/identity cleavages were mature 
enough to be turned into politics. A long, historical process is at play 
that incorporates the effects of the USSR’s end as the most critical 
moment, although it cannot be reduced to it. It was then that dem-
ocratic socialism started climbing up the ideological ladder. Dissent 
from the Soviet model circulated widely, reformism and Keynesian 
democratic politics became increasingly consolidated and environ-
mentalism turned into a mass although decentralised movement, 
which subsequently entered institutional politics. 
Finally, changing party systems brings into focus issues that were 
not treated as significant by the Left or were not previously incor-
porated into Marxist and critical analysis, at least by parties. The 
electoral incentive to do so arises in the context of ‘new’ competitors 
or neighbours in the form of both movements and parties – whether 
the left libertarians and the Greens of the 1980s, the pirate parties in 
the 2000s or the extreme right, particularly in the 2010s. In embod-
ying new social divides, new competitors make it necessary to craft 
new strategies that previously were not urgently articulated. Each 
time, this means the RLP is judged anew based on more (and inter-
secting) issue dimensions than the labour–capital dichotomy. 
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7
Continuities and Changes  
in Radical Left Party Rhetoric
introduction
To articulate resistance and fuel mobilisation a political vocabulary 
is employed within a broader public sphere of diverse, more or less 
predominant discourses. This chapter inspects how RLPs have been 
framing their electoral and political mobilisation since the 1960s 
and during each episode of the New Left examined in the book. The 
chapter starts by considering the names and labels of CPs and RLPs, 
their ways of addressing allies or competitors and the key rhetorical 
signifiers of their identity. Ideological aspects of their operation such 
as their (de)legitimising impact on the wider political system can be 
fruitfully addressed in terms of party verbal behaviour.1
Bearing in mind that the Radical Left has been increasingly under-
stood as populist, and that this is a relatively new strategy or novel 
perspective, our subsequent goal is to revisit the question of populist 
schemata as political language, continuing from the twofold premise 
of the analysis in Chapter 4: left populism as a diachronic and con-
tested discursive strategy. In the third section we turn to the nexus 
between socialism and nationalism. In the movements, this becomes 
clear through the prism of Third Worldism and regional sentiment, 
blended with anti-capitalist or progressive ideologies. In display-
ing how the European Radical Left interplays within nationalist and 
patriotic framings in different historical eras and political settings, 
we approach nationhood as a schema of framing various types of 
grievances. The aim is to resist dichotomous and thus very rough 
understandings of the relationship in question – a nationalist versus 
a non- or anti-nationalist Radical Left. 
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electioneering, radicalism and pragmatism
Above all, in framing their identity the majority and the most 
successful parties to the left of social democracy today define and 
label themselves as ‘Radical Left’ or simply ‘Left’. How has such an 
all-encompassing definition of ‘left radicalism’ come about and what 
preceded it? 
Since Lenin and during the whole Cold War period, three doctrines 
defined the official communist ideology: the ‘dictatorship of the pro-
letariat’, which marked how socialist society is organised, identifying 
the transitory political system to communism; proletarian interna-
tionalism, briefly discussed in Chapter 3; and ‘democratic centralism’, 
examined in Chapter 8, which defines how CPs would organise and 
mobilise. There were also many other circulating signifiers of western 
European communist language – ‘advanced democracy’, ‘bourgeois 
democracy’, ‘socialism’ and ‘socialist democracy’, ‘new type of state’, 
‘undivided popular sovereignty’, ‘revolution’, ‘proletariat’, ‘struggle’, 
‘masses’, ‘the guiding party’ and ‘against the rule of the bourgeoisie’. 
Many of these were slightly modified versions of Slavic expressions 
found in the communist lexicon in Russia and eastern Europe. Com-
munist discourse centred around the party, the working class and 
the masses (or ‘the people’), against ‘imperialists’ and ‘warmongers’, 
‘tyranny’ and ‘fascism’, ‘revisionism’ and ‘reactionary social democ-
racy’.2 Words like ‘the people’ and ‘popular’ signified both labour and 
the nation as a whole. In language more than in actual experience, 
the communists’ enemies were both of the other lefts – the social 
democrats and ultra-left – and the capitalists. This said, the Marxist 
vocabulary of self-labels, schemas and teleological convictions was 
shared by the SDPs well after World War II. While, in many cases, 
the social democrats were clearly anti-communist, some of the main 
social democratic agents in western Europe – the British Labour 
Party, the German SDP and the French Section of the Workers’ Inter-
national – still appealed to socialist notions and persuasions, despite 
internal pulls and pushes.
‘Revisionism’ was always meant to signal a break with the ‘truth’ of 
Marxist ‘scientific socialism’ and Bolshevik orthodoxy. The original 
debate on revisionism took place in the 1890s, largely in response 
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to Eduard Bernstein’s social democratic formulations as opposed to 
the revolutionary current in the European labour movement. By the 
1940s and 1950s, revisionism was used to defend a Soviet and Stalin-
ist orthodoxy from critics who advocated a more independent and 
even, at times, revolutionary path. Tito’s Yugoslavia was condemned 
as revisionist after 1948 when it broke its Soviet ties, and during 
the Sino–Soviet split from the late 1950s each side condemned the 
other as revisionist. Eastern European militants who voiced the 
need for a more humanistic socialism, as in Hungary in the 1950s 
or Czechoslovakia in the 1960s, were also ‘revisionists’. During the 
1970s, Eurocommunists had been condemned as revisionist by 
orthodox parties. At the same time, student movements and dissi-
dents from communist and socialist parties attacked the revisionism 
and ‘bureaucratic centralism’ of the Old Left – notably, the PCI and 
Socialist Party in Italy, the KKE in Greece and the PCF in France. 
Trotskyist critiques of ‘deformed workers’ states’, or ‘state capitalism’, 
a concept by the historic British Trotskyist leader Tony Cliff, signi-
fied the worse kind of revisionism: that at state level. Accordingly, the 
relationship between the state and workers was the equivalent to that 
between private employer interests and workers in the West.
Revisionism has been a key signifier of the Left’s doctrinal history, 
and its absence today indicates the gradual fading away of doctrine 
itself in this space. But the 1950s revisionism was different from that 
of the late nineteenth century. In the debates of the 1890s revisionism 
was a right-wing deviation from communism, with different views 
on issues like the prospects of capitalism, the debate on gradualism 
versus revolution and the merits of bourgeois democracy. In contrast, 
revisionism was intrinsically connected to dissent from Stalinism 
from the 1950s and those labelled as revisionists were often more 
radical (or to the left) than the defenders of orthodox communism.3 
Accordingly, radical revolutionaries with strong credentials, utopians 
and libertarian Marxists and anti-fascist violent groups, were all ‘revi-
sionists’ and at the same time ‘ultra-left’ and even ‘extreme’. By way 
of a historical twist, the ‘two extremes’ thesis that has been used fer-
vently against the left during the post-2008 crisis period, and has also 
developed into a strain of academic arguments, was utilised by the 
communist leaders in the late 1970s. It identified the student radicals 
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as equally dangerous to the fascists in order to maintain a distance 
between their own ranks and the radicalised left youth, who were 
often organised in violent groups.
Another fashionable concept in the 1960s, illustrating the need to 
navigate between protest and legitimacy, between revolutionary cre-
dentials and war of position, was that of ‘structural reforms’, a term 
often used to distinguish between the ‘true’ Left and the revision-
ists. These were not merely reforms but ‘structural reforms’, meaning 
that they were meant to be deeper and implemented with a horizon 
for socialist transformation, unlike the attempts of social democratic 
rivals at reforming capitalism. They were nonetheless ‘reforms’ and 
thus non-insurrectionist or agitative in direction. The concept was 
used by CPs in western Europe in opposition to social democracy, 
and seen as aiming to sustain capitalist structures rather than eventu-
ally overthrow them. Eurocommunists referred to structural reforms 
to signify economic policy change combined with political democ-
ratisation. Within the revolutionary Left, the term was used mostly 
with the addition of the prefix ‘anti-capitalist’, but was also contested 
as it came up against more difficult criteria and could persuade 
only if it directly challenged the capitalist base: the means of pro-
duction. In an important article defending the position of ‘workers 
control’ during a time when it was ‘on the order of the day’ among the 
European anti-capitalist left, Belgian Trotskyist leader Ernest Mandel 
argued that ‘workers’ control is ... an anti-capitalist structural reform 
par excellance’. He went on to illustrate the ease with which accu-
sations of reformism were launched: ‘At this point, we can dismiss 
an objection raised by sectarian “purists”: “Calling for anti-capitalist 
structural reforms makes you a reformist,” they tell us. “Doesn’t your 
demand contain the word ‘reform’?”.’4
Communist rhetorical identity was underpinned by a revolution-
ary spirit, carrying forward as a discursive culture expressed in the 
parties’ journals and newspapers, the writings and letters of party 
leaders, and the symbolisms of party culture. Political reality was rit-
ualised through youth festivals, local-level commemorations, tributes 
to past party leaders, the glorifying of past heroes and institution-
alised cultural creation via the party and its ancillary structures. 
Communist discourse and cultural performance suggested anti-capi-
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talism and offered a background ideology which sustained coherence 
in the face of tactical compromise, political defeat or alliance-driven 
communication by the leadership. In reality, most communist and 
workers parties in western Europe talked in revolutionary terms, 
used Leninist language and communicated an insurrectionary vision 
but played fully by the rules of parliamentarism and capitalism. In 
Italy, this was often referred to as a policy of dopienza (duplicity), 
as expressed in the PCI’s slogan of the 1970s, di lotta e di governo (‘a 
party of government and a party of struggle’). Duplicity of identity 
played into the evolution of party rhetoric. In most places, leader-
ship rhetoric strived to navigate the tensions between two functions: 
being anti-system parties and voicing intense, dramatic, overplayed, 
confrontational and revolutionary language; while also being an 
opposition loyal to the regime, ‘responsible’ towards the nation state, 
and thereby opposed to any kind of revolutionary and spontaneous 
agitation. 
To understand the balancing acts of communists in terms of doing 
and saying things, one has to factor in the socio-political environment 
in the West during the Cold War. It was intensely anti-communist, 
with anti-communism conceived as ‘the rejection, exposure or sup-
pression’ of communist manifestations.5 Anti-communist hysteria 
– the ‘red scares’ facilitated by the media, capital and the state, and 
opposition to communism as a foreign intervention, as a challenge 
to the catholic faith and as an agent of modernity and thus an enemy 
of tradition, culture and custom – used confrontational language and 
could often put the Left on the defensive. From the 1950s, a litera-
ture was also developing that would soon morph into the ‘totalitarian’ 
approach of Soviet politics, which has been gradually mainstreamed 
in the social sciences and especially political science.6 According to 
the totalitarian approach, communist ideology is habitually under-
stood as bearing certain qualities – impersonal address, repetition, 
limited informational value, tautology – so as to better enforce 
authoritarianism through rhetorically manipulating the audience.7 
As Soviet statehood became cast as totalitarian, the social trans-
formations that CPs aspired to were delegitimised, and terms such as 
the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ came to be challenged, rethought 
or abandoned. The concept had been rendered less relevant in 1961, 
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when the Soviet communists declared that the phase of the ‘dic-
tatorship of the proletariat’ had ended. This was soon followed by 
the dropping of the concept by western European communists: the 
Finnish Communist Party dropped it first in 1961, then Italy and 
France; Eurocommunism was espoused, among other things, by 
dropping the dictatorship of the proletariat.8 Today, very few parties 
sustain the term, again, with the exception of the Greek commu-
nists. What remains today is the struggle of hegemony. It goes back 
to Gramsci’s refashioning of the Leninist ‘dictatorship of the proletar-
iat’ into the ‘hegemony of the working class’, but it no longer identifies 
a transitory state (dictatorship of the proletariat) or the forces of gov-
ernment therein (proletariat or working class). Having ‘proletarian 
dictatorship’ as a concept of teleology reflected a Leninist heritage, 
which subsequently came to be revised, contested or dismissed. How 
could it not, given the shifting class composition of Western soci-
eties, Third World ‘dictatorships of the proletariat’ turned violent, 
global protest diversified beyond labour conflicts and human rights 
discourse?
In the 1960s all the forces associated with the New Left in Europe, 
including Trotskyists, Maoists, violent groups, Guevarists and anar-
chists, as mentioned in Chapter 6, were cast as an ‘ultra-left’ and 
other nationally based variations. The term was used pejoratively by 
Marxists for groups and parties advocating revolutionary or violent 
strategies that were considered to overestimate political conscious-
ness within society or underestimate the long-term consequences 
of what they were proposing.9 ‘Left-wing radicalism’ also described 
these same groups as left-wing deviations from the Marxist-Leninist 
‘general line’. On the right, deviations were expressed by ‘revisionism’, 
‘opportunism’, ‘social democratism’ or ‘reconciliationism’, terms that 
were frenetically deployed.10
In Left-Wing Radicalism: An Infantile Disorder, Lenin had argued 
that ‘extreme revolutionarism’ had a class character, and lacked in 
endurance, organisability and discipline. By the 1970s this discourse 
would be slightly differentiated depending on the country. In Italy, 
instead of ‘left-wing radicalism’ one often spoke of the ‘ultra-left’ 
and of ‘left-wing extremism’, while in France ‘left-wing radicalism’, 
‘left-wing extremism’ and ‘gauchism’ were seen as ‘synonyms’.11 In 
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all countries, a petit bourgeois consciousness was identified in these 
non-communist spaces and blamed for the deviations. Commu-
nist critiques of left-wing radicals often dismissed their stratagem as 
overplaying the tempo and dynamic of development, proposing ini-
tiatives that downplayed the limits to militancy and overestimated its 
intensity and the appeal of violence, and not appreciating the risk of 
overturning the milestones of historical democratic struggles. Unlike 
Leninist orthodoxy, the ‘ultra-left’ believed in the proletariat’s spon-
taneous revolt. The ultra-left was thus an issue that reached beyond 
the Stalinist USSR and the Eastern Bloc, where they were understood 
most vehemently as ‘opportunists’ or ‘revisionists’. Yet, during Lenin’s 
time, the Radical Left was not an anti-Stalinist left (Stalinism did not 
exist), while in the 1960s and 1970s it was that above all. Lenin was 
in many respects reclaimed rather than deconstructed by ultra-left-
ists, through Trotsky, Mao, Che Guevara and Castro, Ho Chi Min and 
other Third World theoreticians and political leaders. 
The discourse inherited from Lenin’s time would continue until 
the 1990s, where in academia many scholars would not initially go 
beyond the communist–post-communist distinction. The term 
Radical Left as a self-label of a new space arrived in parallel with the 
rightward shift of traditional social democracy to a mainstream one. 
For those to the left of social democracy it was crucial to emphasise 
that the latter was no longer ‘radical’ or ‘left’. Between the 1990s and 
the 2000s various parties appeared in Europe which made reference 
to themselves as a ‘radical left’ or simply ‘the left’: the Left Bloc in 
Portugal, Die Linke in Germany, Rifondazione in Italy calling itself ‘la 
sinistra radicale’, the Swedish Left Party, the IU in Spain, the Parti de 
Gauche in France, the Finnish Left Alliance and SYRIZA in Greece. 
The problematic of labelling oneself in the midst of historical defeat 
is vividly portrayed by the case of Ari Setälä, a Sweden-based Finn, 
who noted in one motion to the Swedish Left Party-Communists’ 
twenty-ninth congress in May 1990: ‘Communists we are no longer, 
Social Democrats we can never be, so let us be Left Socialists.’12, 13 
That congress eventually voted for another name, simply calling itself 
the Left Party.
By the 1990s social democracy was damaged as a framework by 
important parties in its own tradition. The ‘third way’, as it was labelled 
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in the UK, or the New Centre (Neue Mitte), as it was launched in 
Germany, signalled the rejection by SDPs of a socialist, even left-wing 
identity. By the early 2000s, the discourse of social democracy had 
changed, becoming effectively neoliberal and focused on ‘efficiency’, 
‘prudent state finances’, responding to ‘new challenges’, transcending 
the socialist–capitalist dichotomy and prioritising ‘growth’ and ‘the 
markets’ while treating taxpayers as ‘customers’.14 For many parts of 
third way philosophy, the left–right distinction was old and mean-
ingless because politics was no longer adversarial and therefore it was 
all about valence politics: who does what better.15 By calling them-
selves left, left wing or radical left, RLPs in the 1990s were in part 
responding to the space made available by the social democratic drift 
towards the centre and under the hegemony of neoliberalism. Simple, 
explicit referents to the left can be a defence of its politics’ continuing 
relevance, a reminder of the inherently conflictual nature of capital-
ist affairs.
The left and left radicalism becomes an important term in the 
post-socialist universe where new realities in the battle of ideas 
and language were consolidated. While many parties continue to 
embrace ‘socialism’ in their official names, few new parliamentary 
parties emerging in the 1960s and especially the 1990s and beyond 
use orthodox terms such as ‘communist’, ‘socialist’ (only), ‘Marxist-
Leninist’ or ‘workers’ party’.16 This was an era in which communist 
discourse and Leninist framings had become empty rhetoric, as the 
regimes of ‘actually, existing socialism’ lacked and lost legitimacy. As 
the discourse of those challenging the USSR and international social-
ism prevailed, rhetorical constraints came into play for those marked 
by its defeat.17
Rhetorical evolution among RLPs must be nuanced on two grounds: 
ideological and electoral. Initially, given that rhetoric is connected to 
different ideological traditions on the Radical Left, it should reflect 
distinct rhetorical styles in terms of self-descriptions, schemas, 
concepts and teleology. And it does. Luke March’s typology of con-
temporary RLPs, although based according to the author on distinct 
ideological traditions, reveals a lot about differences in the rhetorical 
styles of certain types of parties compared to others.18 Anti-capitalists 
(e.g. the KKE, the PCP and Trotskyist parties) denounce all compro-
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mise with ‘bourgeois’ political forces, including social democracy, 
and define capitalism and profit, and not merely neoliberalism, as 
the enemy.19 They are, after all, self-labelled as communist, Marx-
ist-Leninist or workers’ parties, which are party names that imply a 
certain ideological heritage. They also speak more about economic 
and labour issues in their manifestos.20 Red-Green and democratic 
socialist parties (e.g. SYRIZA, Podemos, the Swedish Vänsterpartiet, 
the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (SV) or the Finnish Left Alliance) 
‘define themselves in opposition to’ both ‘totalitarian communism 
and neo-liberal social democracy’, while giving more attention to 
feminism, environmentalism, self-management, direct democracy 
and the rights of minorities. Their emphasis on socio-cultural issues 
is greater than for the CPs.21
These patterns are also evident across the distinct transnational 
radical left groupings that we reviewed in Chapter 6. The rhetoric of 
GUE/NGL, ELP and DiEM25 stands apart from that of the commu-
nist INITIATIVE or the EACL. In the last two groups, declarations 
centre around ‘peace and socialism’, a critique of imperialism, capital 
and monopolies, and more emphasis on economic interests, demands 
and categories. For the organisations of parties that are not strictly 
anti-capitalist, a softer repertoire of signifiers is utilised: a ‘people’s 
Europe’, a ‘social Europe’, a ‘democratic Europe’, ‘more and better jobs’, 
‘the enforcement of human rights’, ‘against elites’, ‘anti-fascism’ and 
‘anti-racism’ and ‘sustainable economic development’.
Moreover, rhetorical evolution due to changing geopolitical 
dynamics aside, there are electoral pulls for all RLPs. Competing in 
the liberal capitalist public sphere bears constraints. This becomes 
particularly evident in electoral slogans, the epitome of pragmatist 
contingency. To set our discussion again a concrete empirical base, 
Appendix 2 presents the campaign slogans of various parliamen-
tary CPs and RLPs in eight countries between the 1960s and today 
– France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden 
and Spain. Some elements of RLP rhetoric are diachronic, ideological 
change and electoral necessity notwithstanding. 
There are four discernible patterns. First, there are universalistic 
framings: catchy but vague language is always present and very differ-
ent from revolutionary, technical and ideological discourse. Within 
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electoral slogans, one cannot find words like ‘revolution’, ‘proletariat’, 
‘working class’, ‘insurrection’, ‘capital’, ‘bourgeois’ or even ‘socialism’ 
for the most part, and not one reference against capitalism. Under-
stood in terms of party politics, western European CPs are electoral 
entities and their slogans, like all slogans, are relatively short, catchy 
and broad, evoking emotion and ambivalence. Electoral sloganeer-
ing entails pragmatism as an endogenous condition. To attract the 
youth, slogans need to be in the range of direct experience. Yet even 
judging them within these boundaries, radical left electoral slogans 
are not provocative, explicitly subversive or specific in terms of their 
targets, visions or tools of struggle. Subsequently, radical left elec-
toral rhetoric does not really reproduce the lexicon of communist 
and socialist discourse because that’s the discourse of the party and 
partisans, not the electorate or broad alliances. Through the consist-
ency of avoiding such rhetoric in key electoral slogans, we can see one 
of electoralism’s constraints, which is shared by other party families: 
teleology and official ideological discourse, as enshrined in party 
statutes, is systematically, avoided.
By comparison, Trotskyist and Maoist appeals, names and schemas 
remain more fixed, like the wider beyond-slogans discourse of parties 
such as the KKE and the PCP. For the Socialist Workers’ Party in 
the UK and Lutte Ouvrière in France, the workers figure centrally in 
their festivals, and there is still debate over when communist states 
‘degenerated’ after the revolution. The French NPA reminds us by 
name that it is anti-capitalist; previously it was the Ligue Comuniste 
Revolutionaire. ANTARSYA in Greece translates as Anticapitalist 
Left Cooperation for the Overthrow.
Second, we can assume that the European Radical Left, like social 
democracy, does what was identified in Jeremy Corbyn’s campaigns. 
That is, it has a preoccupation with ‘the Old, the New, “new times”’, 
‘renewal, finding the true original path, making the journey to a better 
place, being true to an original purpose and all of these in relation or 
contrast to the practical, rhetorical exigency of gaining power’.22 This 
‘newness’ has always been there, was problematised by Marxist theory 
and is a logical corollary of emphasising one’s capacity to imagine 
alternative futures and differentiate from the incumbent status quo. 
‘Newness’ was also ingrained in Cold War dynamics; changing the 
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world would accord one side more legitimacy as it was the only 
way to ‘prove’ the universal applicability of their ideology, including 
through a ‘war of the mind’.23 In crude terms, having an anti-system 
profile and being excluded from power combine to produce an oppo-
sitional tone geared towards improvement rather than sustenance. 
The ongoing expression of the need for a journey, a transition which 
makes things better and fairer, is ‘the alternative’ used across differ-
ent types of actors and responding to the 1980s Thatcherite maxim 
TINA. Yet, terms such as ‘new’, ‘renewal’, ‘change’, ‘departure’, ‘social 
reconstruction’, ‘turn’ and ‘structural or new democratic reform’ are 
always there.
Third, we can observe a consistent appeal to democracy in the 
movements – ‘democratic change’, ‘democratic majority’, ‘democratic 
state’, ‘democratic government’, ‘democratisation’, ‘popular democ-
racy’ and ‘socialist democracy’. The language of democracy for 
radical left movements is diachronically present in RLP rhetoric as 
well. In a sense it is ‘democracy’ which becomes the telos of RLPs 
in terms of policy during office. This is a softer, more generic telos 
to promote electorally in preference to the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat. But although generic, one can identify distinct spaces in the 
Cold War left according to how they framed democracy and asso-
ciated concepts: for example, ‘democratic centralism’ (communist), 
‘proletarian democracy’, ‘state capitalism’, ‘economism’ (Trotsky-
ist), ‘socialist democracy’ (social democrats), ‘advanced democracy’ 
(communist), ‘degenerated workers’ state’ and ‘bureaucratic cen-
tralism’ (Trotskyists), ‘direct democracy’ and ‘democratic socialism’ 
(libertarian) and ‘microbureaucracies’ (anti-Trotskyist). 
The fourth pattern we can flesh out of Appendix 2 concerns the 
social subject to which electoral slogans make reference. It is almost 
always much broader than the working class. Although it has been 
reasonably suggested that since 1990 all RLPs have defined the 
‘working class’ more widely than the traditional blue-collar strata, 
and nationalistically in terms of presenting themselves as ‘defending 
national workers and not Moscow’s foreign policy’,24 in Appendix 2 
the pattern is more consistent and starts earlier than commonly sug-
gested. Only in a few cases do we see mention of ‘workers’ (and there 
is no such reference anywhere in Appendix 2 after the 1980s), while 
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on most occasions the social subject is ‘the people’ or the country, and 
this is evident since the 1960s. Again, the pattern can be accounted 
for by the nature of sloganeering, but we are looking here into elec-
toral rhetoric as a product of opportunities and constraints within 
capitalist liberal democracies. To say the least, therefore, in terms of 
their electoral communication, parliamentary RLPs are in certain 
respects like all other parties: making use of signifiers with a wider 
scope than their official ideology’s concepts. But people-centrism in 
particular was a central signifier of both the SDP and CP strategies 
to enable the conditions of the workers to constitute themselves as a 
class. Both lefts talked of the ‘simple people’, the ‘have nots’, ‘the sub-
altern classes’, ‘the people’ or the ‘uneducated’, which have sovereign 
power opposite capital, itself realised through organising the working 
class.25 Patriotism and nationhood had discursive utility in this vein, 
as frames of a national people, in its majority from the working and 
lower middle classes. To investigate the rhetorical social subject of 
the Left between popular and national sovereignty, we now continue 
with these notions of ‘people’, ‘country’ and ‘nation’, as conjunctions 
of elections and the theory of counter-hegemonic strategy.
populism and european rlps
It is evident from the political rhetoric of social movements that ‘new 
left populism’ has special relevance for parties. Much of what has 
been written has to do with electoral strategies and the discourse of 
party leaders and politicians.26 This is not surprising since the con-
testation of political power has directly engendered a lot of populist 
and deceptive electoral mobilisations across the whole of the politi-
cal spectrum. This strain of research is rich and insightful, and above 
all effective in differentiating progressive populism from conserva-
tive and authoritarian facets of the phenomenon. However, it needs 
to be nuanced in so far it suggests ‘newness’ for the left. To do this, the 
story cannot be reduced to a dichotomous question – is today’s left 
or that of the 1970s communist and other RLPs populist or not? This 
would miss the complexity entailed in how people–elite binaries can 
serve or inhibit, divide or unify, socialist struggle. 
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Although Marxism-Leninism had defeated populist ideology for 
CPs, upholding dialectical materialism as the only ‘scientific social-
ism’, in political language people-centrism won the day early on. This 
was largely due to the experience of the Popular Fronts, especially 
where anti-fascist resistance became a national movement, as in Italy. 
People’s Republics, people’s museums and people’s daily newspa-
pers have all been the subject of historical struggle communicated in 
communist discourse systematically, widely and in diverse forms. Its 
political history develops out of the Cold War, when ‘people’s democ-
racy’ became a standard term to euphemistically describe socialism 
in eastern Europe.27 This rhetorical practice of socialist states casting 
themselves in popular terms initially represented a new communist 
nomenclature that retheorised the development of ‘actually existing 
socialism’. It went beyond distinguishing between non-socialist, 
‘bourgeois’ regimes and socialist states as the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat. The Soviet leadership argued anew that the present was the 
stage of gradual mixing between state and society, as per the predic-
tions of Marxist theory, whereby the bureaucratic state based on the 
dictatorship of the proletariat gradually withers away into socialism.28
Beyond the social democratic and communist construction of a 
popular imaginary, in the 1950s and 1960s populism appeared in 
debates about decolonisation, the conceptualisation and future of 
‘peasantism’ and the origins and developments of Maoism. Consider 
the following passage written by Mao Zedong and appearing in The 
People’s Daily in June 1957:
The concept of ‘the people’ varies in content in different countries 
and in different periods of history in a given country. Take our 
own country for example. During the War of Resistance Against 
Japan, all those classes, strata and social groups opposing Japanese 
aggression came within the category of the people, while the 
Japanese imperialists, their Chinese collaborators and the pro-Jap-
anese elements were all enemies of the people. During the War 
of Liberation, the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs – the 
bureaucrat-capitalists, the landlords and the Kuomintang reac-
tionaries who represented these two classes – were the enemies of 
the people, while the other classes, strata and social groups, which 
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opposed them, all came within the category of the people. At the 
present stage, the period of building socialism, the classes, strata 
and social groups which favour, support and work for the cause of 
socialist construction all come within the category of the people, 
while the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revo-
lution and are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction are all 
enemies of the people.29
French and European Maoism, like the passage above, cast social-
ist struggles in terms of binaries, addressed the popular masses 
and evoked people-centrism constantly, called for people’s power, 
posited that true socialism is one ‘from the masses to the masses’ and 
acknowledged contradictions within the oppressed, borrowing from 
a language already consolidated in Mao’s writings and political ini-
tiatives by the 1950s. In Maoist experiments of ‘going to the people’, 
militants and intellectuals joined workers on factory assembly lines 
before and after May 1968 in France – the process known as itablisse-
ment. ‘May was about losing one’s self to the masses in a quasi-religious 
abjection, and losing one’s individual voice to the cadences of “mili-
tant-speak,” the langue de bois.’30
Multiple other historical instances stand out as representative of 
left-wing populist-like movements or intellects in Europe: Euro-
communist people-centrism inherited from the Popular Front-era 
CPs, striving for alliances across class strata; late nineteenth-cen-
tury French socialist thought reflected in the Blanquists’ attunement 
with mass politics and populism, as inherited from the Jacobin tra-
dition during the years of the French Revolution and as a form of 
anti-parliamentarism;31 the writings of the Russian populists and also 
the early Marx, which often referred to the people without specifying 
whom it included.32 Considering this diachronicity in the problem-
atic of left populism, it is right to claim that populism can sound ‘thin 
or perfunctory’ in contrast to deep and carefully articulated social-
ist commitments.33 Pauline Johnson specified populism’s ‘demagogic 
reformatting of democratic justification’ as colluding with neoliberal 
power.34 Demagoguery replaces the intent to build a ‘rational con-
sensus about matters of social justice’, as it involves flattering of the 
audience, projecting the blame away, avoiding any sort of reflectivity 
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and self-criticism, repeating apparently obvious policy positions and 
making extremely generous promising.35
Because of left populism’s slippery slope unto demagoguery, 
uncritical reflection and schematic language without explanation, 
there lies a partial incompatibility with socialism as a series of analyt-
ical doctrines. Tension is evident above all historically: neither in the 
1960s, nor earlier or more recently, has the Radical Left, even its ‘new’ 
component alone, reached a consensus on populism. This point was 
already raised earlier for populism and radical movements in terms 
of theory, so here let us look at strategy in terms of party competi-
tion. Theoretical divisions over left populism in the case of parties 
concern above all electoral technique and the performative qualities 
of particular political personas. Neither in terms of language use nor 
in relation to theorising imminent struggles is there, or perhaps can 
there be, unanimity on such complex issues as framing the in-group, 
the out-group and the relationship between them in an attempt to 
conduce effective counter-hegemony. In the 1970s, Trotskyists were 
criticising Maoist populism for being too vague and indeed coun-
ter-revolutionary in replacing the opposition between Right and Left 
by the one between us and them, the people and the elites, or the 
underdogs and the privileged. Others considered that Leninism and 
Maoism are connected; the former can help organise the party (the 
leadership element), while the latter can help organise the masses 
(popular element).36
In Populism Left and Right, Marxist academic and member of Attac 
France, Eric Fassin, considered explicitly populism’s strategic use. He 
cautioned against the alleged potential of populist politics on the left 
for transforming right-wing resentment of migrants and minorities 
into contention against economic elites.37 This has been a chief aspi-
ration among the adherents of left populism, which often responds 
to the capacity of the radical right over the last four or so decades 
to mobilise the white middle classes through cultural populism by 
formulating its own civic and counter-hegemonic populist genus.38 
The presupposition here is that the fury and rage of the far-right 
support base can be reoriented away from racist populist move-
ments and towards socialist ones. Fassin dismisses this left-wing 
populist idea as he considers the orientation of far-right supporters 
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to be more structural and immovable towards the Radical Left than 
assumed by the left populist analysis. It is argued that the left cannot 
benefit from entering into cultural and identity ‘warfare’, which was 
in the first place initiated by the radical right and has so far served 
neoliberalism.39
The political positions that these criticisms (like the earlier ones 
we considered) inform, can be described as at least a reserved and 
partial endorsement of populism in certain contexts, and at worse as 
left-wing ‘anti-populism’. In the spirit of internally contested mobili-
sation waves, not all of the radical left aligns behind populism in the 
period after the 2008 financial crisis or more generally in the 2000s. 
While some Trotskyist and other extra-parliamentary currents, for 
example, denounce post-Marxism and populism as its derivative 
strategy for undermining the prominent role of class and the labour–
capital dichotomy in the development of society and the design of 
socialist strategy, others have participated in broad parties such as 
the Die Linke in Germany, the Left Front in France and Podemos in 
Spain. Certain radical feminist critiques of populism suggest that it is 
an obstacle to feminising politics and is actually reinforcing patriar-
chal systems;40 this is not an unfair criticism given that a woman has 
rarely led radical left populism in either Latin America or Europe. 
The orthodox communists, the KKE and PCP, do not deviate from 
a strict and absolute class-based understanding of contemporary 
struggles so their people-centrism and anti-establishment discourse 
is intentionally left short of a left populist strategy and theory. This 
applies to any communist or workers’ party in Europe, no matter 
how small or large they are. Communist orthodoxy dislikes populist 
theory and strategy. 
Clearly, left populism is a majoritarian phenomenon today on the 
European Radical Left. Its main representative cases are quite strong 
and successful in comparative terms. Its key frames are also pre-
dominant – people-centrism, variations of ‘the many, not the few’, 
crisis and urgency, popular sovereignty, ordinariness and massive-
ness.41 Yet, when we turn to culture rather than ideology the picture 
becomes even more complex. Pointedly, some of the parties identi-
fied as representative examples of party populism, such as SYRIZA in 
Greece and Die Linke in Germany, approach populism mostly as an 
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ideological dispositif and not a positive self-description like Podemos 
or FI. Populist strategy and the Radical Left are connected accord-
ing to the country and history in question, and are partly related to 
native understandings and uses of the very term itself. Few Scandi-
navian militants or partisans would identify as left-wing populist, 
especially given a particular socio-economic development and an 
overall context where it is mostly nationalist and nativist identifi-
cations that engage in populist politics.42 Spain, on the other hand, 
has Latin American influences and a more turbulent domestic envi-
ronment and historical trajectory. Until about 2018, it also had no 
electorally relevant competition from the extreme right. Parties like 
SYRIZA and Die Linke may to all intents and purposes voice populist 
rhetoric but certainly do not defend a populist strategy, which in their 
national-cultural contexts is synonymous with cheap and superficial 
politics – the politics of many promises and no actions.43 
In the most emblematic case of patriotic populism as a party 
strategy, Podemos experienced a deep ideological rift between its 
two main groups that crystalised after the 2015 general election. 
On one side were those in favour of consolidating support among 
leftist voters through emphasising the radical identity of the party 
(a position represented by party leader Pablo Iglesias and former IU 
members). On the other were those advocating a broader appeal, pri-
marily relying on ‘populist reason’ and less so on anti-capitalism that 
would more effectively attract moderate and centre-left voters. This 
latter position was represented by the party’s former secretary for 
policy, strategy and campaigning, Iñigo Errejón, and his supporters 
who left the party to found another platform in 2019.44
On the one hand, populism is embraced by anti-capitalists, com-
munists and social democrats, partisans and activists, cutting across 
older divides. On the other hand, it is also either rejected en masse as a 
theory-informed discursive practice or as a label, or still debated and 
scrutinised as a broader political strategy, depending on the organ-
isation in question and its internal balance of power. In particular, 
the usefulness for and association of populism with electoralism is 
contested. The ‘populist’ style of mobilisation has often been accused 
of reformism or opportunism because it propagates all-inclusive 
formulas for counter-hegemony. As James Petras explained about the 
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1970s socialist left, ‘the indistinctness of the slogans, in terms of spec-
ifying which class interests would benefit or be adversely affected, 
was considered by many in the Left as a clever electoral tactic to 
secure lower-class support without alienating the middle class’.45 The 
problem, he continues, is that ‘[i]n the aftermath of the elections, the 
vagueness of the promises allowed several of the Socialist leaders to 
state that they had not in fact promised any radical social reforms 
and therefore were following the same political-economic trajectory 
traced out before the elections’. In short, populism may work against 
accountability and pledge fulfilment.46 According to Seraphim Sefer-
iades’s definition, populism is itself a deceptive politics.47
Be that as it may, left populism is also specifically ideological. Left 
populist forces are ‘not anti-statist but directed towards the state and 
its “return to the people”, through a transformed, collective posture 
towards the vehicle of electoral representation’. Effectively, the state 
can create and defend the politico-economic sovereignty of the subor-
dinated.48 Post-Marxism channelled into party systems the embrace 
of combining populism and realpolitik; a point made by Boris Frankel 
in the late 1990s after almost two decades into neoliberalism and one 
decade after Soviet dissolution.49 We are now four decades ahead of 
these phenomena and populism is still combined with realpolitik, 
and more specifically office seeking. Populism’s rhetorical package, as 
it has been pointedly remarked, can read ‘like a wish list for a socialist 
and radical-democratic agenda’.50 Left populism as theory has always 
predominantly come in reformist colours, as the rhetorical strategy 
of piecemeal reforms in a progressive direction. Populist strategy and 
theory do not primarily arise from as strict a dichotomy as that of 
capital–labour. Rather, they generalise the contradiction and in the 
process end up with a redistributive, Keynesian, inclusive, welfare-
oriented and democratised capitalism.
nationalism, patriotism and framing resistance
Since the mid-nineteenth century, left-leaning sovereignist discourse 
has always existed. For our purposes we can begin with the 1960s. 
In Belgium, state-wide parties collapsed after the regionalist mobili-
sations experience at that time, while in the UK devolution politics 
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ensued and in Northern Ireland the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
was established (1969–72) and the civil rights movement was under 
way. In France, it was the first time that the Jacobin conception of an 
indivisible and centralised France was challenged by the Left. In all 
cases, this left regionalism had cultural and democratic justifications, 
consolidating and respecting: the pluralism of popular cultures; ter-
ritorial self-management; alternative models of policymaking that 
break with capitalism and the oppression of peripheries by its policies 
aiming at a uniform society; and revisiting revolutionary rupture 
through the fusion of regional and national arenas as loci of struggle. 
This leftist regionalism is premised on cultural and democratic jus-
tifications: respect for and development of popular cultures, and 
self-management of territorial issues by those concerned. It also has 
a cognitive and strategic dimension.51
Radical regionalism was different from the CPs’ love of country. 
Nationhood tapped into the student–CPs dividing line. For instance, 
radical student leaders would typically snub the French flag while 
the CP raised it. For the CPs, revolution was not on the agenda, and 
patriotism, as David Broder argued, dressed up their reformism, 
which was to nationalise industry and fight imperialism.52 This pat-
riotism served as ‘social lever’, as in the case of the PCF. Combined 
with anti-fascism, it served to strengthen the party’s working-class 
constituencies and attach it both to France and to the many immi-
grants seeking integration and joining its activities.53 In Italy, national 
framings also appeared in the context of critique towards the USSR 
and its satellites and the attempt to establish ‘polycentrism’. In the 
1950s, historic PCI leader Palmiro Togliatti had theorised the need 
for Italian independence and a different geopolitical system than that 
institutionalised through the Cold War. 
This framing of nationhood – the national road to socialism and 
the patriotism that was intended to appeal much beyond the pro-
Soviet sections of society – was different from the PCF’s historical 
attachment to the Soviet leadership for most of its Cold War exist-
ence. Rather, the ideological explanation of the PCF’s nationalism 
and sovereignist rhetoric lay exclusively in their anti-imperialism and 
specifically their analysis of the French ruling class as organically con-
nected to the exterior of the USA, betraying the French nation in this 
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way.54 Yet in both cases during the 1960s and 1970s, seeking popular 
votes through here-and-there invocations of national grandeur con-
tinued the post-1945 strategy of using republican referents. The 
passionate love for country was often associated with the claim that 
75,000 PCF members had been killed during the resistance.55 Pre-
cisely in the same manner, Greek Cypriot patriotism was animated 
with anti-fascism, to which AKEL (Progressive Party of Working 
People), the CP of a small island, was proud to say that it contributed 
by sending volunteers to the war. 
Between the Cold War and the RLPs during the GJM years, there 
has been a key discontinuity, the same one as for movements and 
protest. The centre–periphery cleavage has been reactivated in the 
context of the delegitimation of the nation state as caused by economic 
globalisation and European integration. The growing geographical 
polarisation of European populations into major urban areas and 
declining rural areas and towns have restructured European party 
competition since the ‘new regionalism’ of the 1980s, whose initial 
vibrations derived from the Long ’68. Many regionalisms and local-
isms surfaced at the time, as altogether the above processes translate 
into geographical inequalities. Perceptions of local or regional decline 
can drive populist voting and work through electoral in-groupism 
based on the locally shared community.56 By the middle of the last 
decade, subnational claims to self-determination came to the fore 
in western Europe through the cases of Catalonia and Scotland and 
then the electoral success of Sinn Féin in Ireland towards the end of 
Brexit. The shared sovereignties discourse we saw in Chapter 4 finds 
electoral resonance.
Left nationalism has also come through austerity and has had ‘pat-
riotism’ and civic nationhood as its anchor points. Although SYRIZA, 
Podemos or its splinter platform More Country (Mais Pais) are the 
most discussed cases, many more parties from various ideological 
traditions employ patriotism.57 Left patriotism and an ethnocentric 
outlook that advocates people-to-people solidarity is shared among 
all periods of ‘newness’ and among all traditions. Through time, 
therefore, one unchanging rhetorical trait of left radicalism in con-
testing elections and building political capital is an identification 
with the country in question, which can of course range from high 
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to low and inform multiple policy positions but is always there. The 
patria is the institutional platform upon which a number of progres-
sive political tasks can be taken – consolidating a plethora of social, 
political and economic rights so as to: include minorities and the 
oppressed, which comprise altogether a large majority; provide free 
and generous welfare for everyone; and undo the democratic deficits 
generated by capitalism, imperialism and neoliberal globalisation. 
The eurozone crisis also fuelled analyses about the European centre 
and the periphery. Southern European countries were, according to 
many activists, taken advantage of by the hegemonic states of the EU, 
such as Germany and France, which were to benefit the most from 
the EU’s economy. This way of framing the crisis was popular among 
the office-seeking Left in Greece, for example, but was also premised 
on an ethnocentric economic narrative different from movements, 
which saw a ‘plan C’ in constructing the commons from below.58 The 
diagnosis in this narrative was essentially that the main structural 
problem of Greek capitalism is the transfer of fiscal and monetary 
control to EU institutions, which do not operate for the good of the 
country but are synchronised with the needs of the hegemonic EU 
states and their export-based economies.
In the opposite camp, the defenders of austerity and neoliberal-
ism referred to the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland and/or Italy, Greece and 
Spain), where they argued there lies a cultural and historically perva-
sive predisposition to laziness, corruption, patronage and clientelism, 
blame shifting and wasteful spending. A key term for legitimising 
neoliberal discourse in the Greek case, for example, was ‘anomy’, used 
to construct the crisis as the outcome of Greek political culture, irra-
tional and lawless.59 These claims pointed to a conclusion: it was the 
peripheral countries that were to blame in explaining the eurozone 
crisis, and more specifically their public sectors and economic 
models. It was them that had to change as a result. Moreover, 
the efficient, productive and hard-working German (and other 
European) taxpayers were unfairly paying for the anarchic Greeks. 
A form of intra-European orientalism abounded in these media-
driven polemics. A historical analogy is pertinent in revealing the 
evolving impact of neoliberalism on European politics – the southern 
European periphery presents itself as the new ‘Third World’, it bears 
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the debts once born by Latin American, African and Asian countries 
by former colonial powers or international institutions. Debt capi-
talism has essentially expanded geographically, further sharpening 
the divide between countries regarding economic hegemony and 
subordination. 
Within this broader agenda, crises of the public sector became con-
tested domestically, as national capital in countries such as the UK, 
Cyprus, Ireland, Italy and Spain overemphasised the bad condition of 
the state and the responsibility of overblown and unproductive civil 
services, in an attempt to legitimise cuts and welfare retrenchment. 
Trade unions, along with left-wing parties and movements, contested 
this narrative, and held that the need for austerity-driven bailout pro-
grammes was the responsibility of the banks. Movements such as UK 
Uncut presented themselves as exposing malpractice and lies, decon-
structing mainstream soundbites, such as ‘We are all in this together’, 
and in turn defending the position that there is an alternative.60 We 
can see here contestation over the locus of crisis: on one side, blame 
shifting to the ‘inefficient, south European state’ or the public sector 
in line with neoliberal convictions; and on the other side, exposing 
the lack of state oversight over financial fraud and the banking 
system’s self-imposed problems, in line with the anti-austerity forces.
Hegemonic framings of the peripheral member states of the EU 
depoliticised and racialised economic and distributional questions, 
as well as signalled the return of colonial dynamics back into Europe 
through the culturalisation of politics, complementing the post-polit-
ical neoliberal hegemony.61 The very thesis of southern European 
exceptionalism was an axis of political conflict in the years of the 
crisis. Its delegitimisation was a task undertaken by radical scholars 
and activists as part of their opposition to the EU’s economic policy, 
the bailouts and their defenders domestically. In this setting, centre–
periphery schemas have been employed widely to describe and 
explain responses to the crisis. Accordingly, the eurozone crisis can 
be understood as the outcome of a structural imbalance between core 
and periphery countries.62 It is against this theoretical backdrop that 
much of the anti-Germanism mentioned earlier took a substantively 
neo-anti-imperialist form, as crafted by RLP strategy.63
Continuities and Changes in Radical Left Party Rhetoric
207
The examples are so numerous and consistently present in the 
Left’s history that we should consider patriotism and nationhood at 
the regional or country level as useful, tactical propaganda tools for 
socio-economic struggles. We saw how the great proletarian interna-
tionalists had a national flavour to declare: a defence of country and 
a people that guards its sovereignty against imperialism. Wallerstein’s 
analysis is illuminating in this respect: the rise of nationalist move-
ments can be attributed to their locally rooted realisation that as a 
‘weak majority’ in a ‘weak state’ their best option is that of a ‘state struc-
ture’.64 When it comes to nationalism, as Connor Walker discussed, it 
is thus one thing to be a believer in ethnic particularism and another 
to be a manipulator, shrouding socialism in a national rhetoric to 
attain political goals, as communists sought to do.65 Nationalism and 
patriotism can be strong performative weapons motivating and ener-
gising civic engagement.66 Patriotic appeals allow the electorate to 
feel proud of their country or region in supporting specific socio-
economic goals and political actors. 
Accordingly, there is sometimes a strategic calculus by socialists 
who seek to encourage and channel nationalist claims or transmit a 
patriotic aura. One could theoretically argue, however, that the stra-
tegic value of casting an economic and social struggle as patriotic and 
national may increase or decrease, on average, over time. The strate-
gic use of nationalism may backfire, and it often has. This is implied 
in evaluations of left nationalism as a constrained manifestation of 
the progressive vision since at least the 1990s. Arresting this tendency 
is an article titled, ‘The Movement that Dare Not Speak Its Name’.67 
In the contemporary period, amid the global rise of the authoritar-
ian ethno-populist Right, anti-terrorism and liberals speaking of ties 
between ‘the extremes’, the Left cannot legitimately frame its strug-
gles as national and patriotic because this is the distinctive feature of 
its far-right opposition and other key opponents: locally, nationally, 
regionally and globally. With such framings, easy accusations would 
be prompted and labels such as the ‘populist left’ or the ‘extremist left’ 
would more easily resonate. 
Political opportunities for nationalism’s emancipatory content 
open and close. In Scotland, the referendum of 2015 triggered a 
mass progressive social movement and an explosion of working-class 
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activity that was far greater than previous campaigns related to the 
GJM or the anti-war movement.68 Yet the ‘left turn’ of the centrist 
Scottish National Party, under the leadership of Nicola Sturgeon, 
absorbed energy and votes from radicals, and the same time many 
Scottish nationalists adopted an elastic attitude towards neoliberal 
politics.69 For Sinn Féin’s historic electoral success in Ireland in 2020, 
the reawakening of anti-British nationalism as a result of Brexit may 
have helped. This resembles the era before the Good Friday Agree-
ment that ended the Troubles, as during the 1960s civil resistance 
movement many political actors tried to combine the republican tra-
dition with left-wing politics. Ireland’s nationalist past, as an observer 
remarked, ‘broke through’ to again become a vote winner when tied 
to the left. This has been so in spite of Sinn Féin’s connections to the 
IRA military council, which echo the dark (militaristic and violent) 
side to its nationalism in the public sphere.70 In a country where 
housing was a flaming topic, Ireland’s neoliberal model was under 
scrutiny, and as there are no nativist or strictly anti-immigration 
parties, left nationalism and national unity thrives mostly in egali-
tarian colours.
Yet the strategic value of framing party mobilisation according 
to the stipulations of nationhood also varies according to domestic 
circumstances. On one side, radical left claims to secession in 
Scotland, Spain and Ireland are expressive of radical contention’s 
deep roots in the traditional cultures of mobilisation (such as nation-
alism) which have pervaded the class structure. When understood 
as cultural resources, these pre-existing legacies and traditions may 
account for current manifestations of left patriotism and national-
ism; for example, in order to explain why Podemos could innovate 
by reclaiming patriotism from the Francoist tradition, which during 
the Spanish dictatorship of about 40 years killed tens of thousands 
in the name of the fatherland.71 Podemos did have a challenge to 
overcome: patriotism’s links to fascism in the collective memory. Yet 
the mere existence of this past allowed it to call for patriotism in the 
first place, so as to erase the Francoist shadow and return patriotism 
to its pre-Francoist heritage of democratic, libertarian, republican, 
socialist and communist credentials. Common decency as opposed 
to the fatherland itself, where the people are located and which the 
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people constitutes, was a relevant post-ideological signifier in its 
mobilisation.72 In Northern Ireland, the IRA achieved mass recruit-
ment for the purposes of armed activism in the late 1960s through an 
invocation of dignity, honour and pride in oneself and one’s commu-
nity, as well as a struggle for recognition from the opposite side – the 
Northern Irish establishment, loyalists and the British army.73 These 
elements of recruitment were subsequently institutionalised within 
the IRA’s political wing, Sinn Féin, which has never had a nativist or 
nationalist competitor to trigger these emotions for racist and xen-
ophobic reasons. In Greece, the rhetoric of national independence 
during austerity worked in favour of SYRIZA because it reminded 
people of the discourse of the once glorious Panhellenic Socialist 
Party (PASOK) and worked to mobilise many progressives.
Claims to the fatherland and national sovereignty by Basque, 
Catalan, Scottish and Northern Irish radicals, in addition to the 
Greeks perhaps, do not negate internationalist sympathies but coexist 
with them. Yet such coexistence seems less viable in the socialist 
imaginary in other parts of Europe where left nationalism has tradi-
tionally been a regressive force. In Cyprus, for example, nationalism 
in both the north and the south has been the chief obstacle to bicom-
munal peace. Since about 1968 (and more concretely, since 1974, 
after the junta-instigated coup in Cyprus and the subsequent Turkish 
invasion), AKEL has not spoken about nationhood. The Cypriot (not 
the Greek) flag, as opposed to the nationalist Right, define its per-
formances. Its policy on the country’s de facto division is markedly 
different from the other parties, and it is historically tied to the peace 
and reunification movement. Similarly, nationalism is incompatible 
with the Workers’ Party of Belgium, which owns the ‘franchise’ of the 
only bilingual and bicommunal party system actor in Belgium, oper-
ating in both Wallonia and Flanders. How progressive nationalism 
can be is determined by domestic historical legacies, political oppor-
tunities and constraints.
Notwithstanding this, peripheral nationalisms and the ways they 
shape the political agenda are topics towards which the Radical Left 
in Europe again remains divided. Many on the Spanish and European 
Left have voiced suspicion at the rise of Catalan separatism, seeing 
it as a nationalist phenomenon, which can be and is used by the 
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ruling classes to divide the economically oppressed.74 Even though 
the Radical Left since Lenin is sympathetic to the right of self-deter-
mination, many activists distrust both the leadership of separatist 
forces and the potential effects of secessionism on the national left 
and society more broadly. Others frame the Catalan question, and 
along with it the Kurdish, Corsican, Scottish and Palestinian move-
ments, not as national questions (ones which concern above all the 
sacredness of the nation state) but as questions of democracy, regard-
ing above all the democratic right to self-defence of the minority and 
its right to separation or secession. What remains of political essence 
across all cases is the civic component of nationalism, which can 
blend with socialism. 
retrospective
How has Radical Left rhetoric evolved since the 1960s and between 
three distinct waves of intensified contention? How are the distinct 
processes of rhetoric and ideology associated, in terms of ideologi-
cal changes leading to shifting rhetorical representations of political 
reality? Many patterns are common to both parties and movements 
– the language of democratic socialism, a break with doctrinaire tel-
eology, democracy translated according to ideological tradition, 
anti-capitalist versus critical social language and its predominance 
as a fact of historical defeat. As with ideas, the process of change 
began when the Soviet legacy came increasingly into question – a 
period marked by the Long ’68. The critical moment which removes 
the burden of frames that derive from outside the parties themselves 
was the end of the Cold War and its associated trends, such as social 
democracy’s rightward shift under the predominance of neoliberal-
ism. These processes together challenged and then ended the ideas 
driving international communism’s political language. Having said 
this, with RLPs there appears to be more change in their ideologi-
cal culture and more consistency and continuity in the pragmatism 
of their communicative expressions in the context of elections. The 
sloganeering and generic and emotional appeals observed in the 
movements are nationally inclusive, diffuse more easily and gain 
attention, but with an ideological cost. This cost may not be triggered 
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if a background ideology, a cultural radicalism, is sustained in an 
organised fashion – this was certainly the case for the mass western 
European CPs that allowed for a double identity, a purist and catch-
all rhetoric at one and the same time. 
As a schema of in-group versus out-group binaries, left populism 
is utilised for a strategic puzzle that at root is as old as the left itself: 
how to construct popular hegemony out of the majority’s partly 
distinct and partly overlapping grievances, many of which may not 
align closely with the party’s ideas. As we see later, the mass party line 
underpins the complexities of this strategic puzzle. Party populism 
on the Radical Left is thus not ‘new’ in the exclusive, definitional 
sense of new as a ‘break with the old’, or from the perspective of a 
highly successful, cross-country political trajectory for the European 
Radical Left compared to the past. The contemporary manifestations 
of populism signal something ‘other than the old’, which evolves 
between continuity and change, innovation and tradition, enthu-
siasm and rejection. At the same time, it is the object of a wider, 
long-lasting conflict between materialism and discursive critical 
theory, class and identity, confrontation and collaboration, anti-capi-
talism and anti-neoliberalism, socialist strategy and national culture. 
Not least, as in the movements, this left populism is never revolu-
tionary as theory, like Maoist populism was, but always combines 
oppositional identification and a structural root-and-branch vision 
with a social democratic solution and a statist spirit.
Much ‘newness’ can be granted to the left populism of the twentieth 
century, in the sense of evolution, or fluctuation towards conditions 
of severe crises which favour it as a rhetorical strategy and perfor-
mance. There has been no rupture with the past, in the sense of: a 
very recent historical discontinuity in the ideational realm; politically 
novel claims that escape the identity of post-Marxist reformism and 
declassing critical analysis; universally exceptional success; resonance 
across cultures, or easy agreement over issues of theory, strategy and 
the state. Left populism is a conflictual type of politics because it is 
highly variable in both normative and empirical terms. Nationalism, 
across time and like populism, is also a partiality and variable across 
context, a ‘double-edged sword’ that has a dark side and brings upon 
the Radical Left ideological and strategic contestability.75 Its utility 
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in alliance building and inspiring mobilisation risks a difficult coex-
istence with internationalism and can easily slip into romanticism, 
or worse a veiled mainstreaming. Yet the ‘newness’ in nationalism 
itself changes with each period considered. For the 1960s and 1970s, 
new was regionalism; for the GJM, new was its anti-nationalism and 
connection between levels of governance; while for post-2008, it has 
been economic sovereignty from the hegemonic forces of the EU.
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Party Organisation on the  
European Radical Left
introduction
Like movements, parties are political communities with particu-
lar structures, procedures and linkages to other organisations. As 
with movements, these interplay with ideology; in other words, 
traditions on the Left are associated with particular organisational 
forms. Moreover, as society changes parties have to respond in order 
to legitimise the performance of their key functions: representa-
tion, recruitment, policy formulation, participation and mediation 
between the state and the public. While, in the industrial age, parties 
were formed to mobilise the demands of a society empowered by 
democracy, the information age changed a number of things, includ-
ing more spontaneous engagement with political parties and a lack 
of permanent commitment. Taking party and party system evolution 
as a given, in order to delimit trends and variability in the organisa-
tional anatomy of the Radical Left, this chapter first consults the broad 
framework of party models. As was noted in Chapter 2, the shifting 
party models across time are organisational responses to social and 
political developments and are connected to distinct procedures, 
structures and linkages. In broad terms, we are interested in how the 
RLP organisation refracts democracy and the tension between verti-
cality and horizontality through conducing in this or that direction of 
power distribution within the wider party body and between institu-
tions and their environs. The spatial analogy to movements is, at the 
most basic level, whether RLPs face towards the streets or the parlia-
ment, and how they utilise and absorb digital spaces.
To this end, a subsequent focus is placed on parties’ intermedi-
ating function as a linkage between the state and society, from a 
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twofold perspective of the party itself and the movements. Specifying 
the structure that divides and also connects RLPs and movements, 
the capitalist state and seeking office in government, we further 
evaluate the general conviction that this party family tried to travel 
‘from the margins to the mainstream’, although with uneven, unim-
pressive and, even when it was impressive, with unsustained electoral 
success.1 How do state structures affect party policy and the party 
organisation? Finally, this chapter turns to the voters and supporters 
of RLPs to elaborate further the radical subject in time. This is done 
by looking into the composition of electoral constituencies – their 
social, material and political features.
structures and procedures:  
spaces and party models
RLP organisational practice since the 1960s is presented schemati-
cally in Figure 8.1, where the proceeding analysis is summarised. Our 
axes of discussion are party models, the continuum between vertical 
and horizontal structures, and their corresponding top-down to bot-
tom-up linkage strategies based on the broad distinction between 
being ancillary to the party and independent civil society actors. 
In the Long ’68, the strongest pillars of party organisation were 
found in the communist and social democratic traditions. Between 
them, there were significant differences, which were the product 
of their origins and versions of socialism, at the same time as they 
also shared distinctions from the ‘other left’. SDPs became mass 
parties first, and communists developed into mass parties primarily 
because of the broader ‘Popular Movements’ which they directed.2 
A propagandist strategy aimed at establishing a solid, social and 
cultural counter-hegemony. They always had a youth organisation, 
trade unions linked to the party, other front organisations such as 
for peasants and women or war veterans, the pro-peace and anti-
imperialist movement (which operated as a pole for democratic 
citizens), a party press which typically included a newspaper and a 
theoretical journal among other local or regional publications. These 
were ancillary structures, that is, they were associated with the party by 
statute or constitution and primarily served the objectives of the party 
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leadership. The CP was also connected, as in Italy, France and Cyprus 
most notably, to private businesses in the spheres of production and 
consumption, culture and sports. Its youth, local and national party 
festivals, affiliated cooperatives and the broader organic civil society 
that encircled it operated as a counter-society within the broader 
capitalist social life. In being vibrant, organisationally diversified and 
multisectoral, CPs and SDPs of the mass type politically appropriated 
space through their widespread branches and the mobilisation of 
party activists in neighbourhoods.
A long chain of decision-making bodies began with the local and 
workplace cell for the CPs or the local cell for the SDPs. Whereas the 
local cells of the traditional cadre and socialist parties were formed 
in geographical areas, communist groups also formed cells in work-
places. This original element of their organisation gave rise to high 
levels of solidarity resulting from a common occupation, which 
was more effective in contributing to tight organisation and com-
munity and mobilising capacity than residence. Workplace cells 
were more focused on practical questions of labour, with less time 
for open-ended debate and substantive constraints on the agenda of 
that debate. This could also differ according to the industrial area in 
question, specifically the density of workplace cells.3 Party members 
had demanding duties: to recruit new members, endorse the party 
programme, defend unity, protect matters relating to internal party 
affairs, regularly account for their activity and ‘self criticise’ their 
personal stance or activity. The cell system inscribed the principles 
in organisational terms and offered useful means of contact, propa-
ganda and recruitment during periods of illegality.
After the cell came the sectional, regional and federal commit-
tees, then the party congress which elected the Central Committee, 
after that the smaller political bureau and finally the general secre-
tariat which ran everyday affairs. The political bureau was the key 
agenda-setting and veto player in the decision-making process, and 
traditionally, although not always, its decisions were carried at the 
Central Committee. The broader principle of democratic central-
ism was one of vertical unity in action, meaning that dissent after 
a decision was made was punishable by the leadership. Discussion 
would be organised from the bottom up and application of decisions 
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from the top down. In applying the axes of democratic centralism, 
the communists would typically develop behaviour with certain key 
elements. Chiefly, factions were (and are still today in orthodox CPs) 
banned, although intra-party tendencies have existed almost invar-
iably across time. This meant that their potential functions were 
entirely concentrated in the central leadership, such as mobilising 
participation in the party’s affairs, articulating issue-oriented inter-
ests and representing certain groups or ideological traditions.4 To 
prevent the formation of factions, horizontal discussion in the arche-
typical CP was banned, while vertical structures also facilitated a 
quicker transfer of information between the top to the bottom and 
vice versa. 
The institution of apparatchiks (paid party personal) meant that 
militant activism was intermediated by cadres co-opted by the party. 
When extending to the cadres of associated organisations, often part 
of the party’s leadership, it becomes clear how the mass and central-
ist party was organisationally designed to reinforce the leadership 
line. Nevertheless, in spite of their discipline, which has been higher 
compared to their opponents, the internal critics of CPs have been 
many. Across countries, they were systematically put through the 
party’s disciplinary mechanisms, with expulsions as the ultimate 
punishment. Critics called into question the Leninist structures and 
demanded, among other things, horizontal communication, secret 
voting with the opportunity to promote particular candidates and a 
decrease in the role of paid officials.5
Democratic centralism was nevertheless variable across time and 
place, its trajectory determined by the relation between its constitu-
ent parts: centralism and democracy. Each in relation to the other was 
applied and verbalised by historical communist leaders in a fashion 
that reflected the conflict at stake within the party and their side and 
position in that conflict.6 During the 1960s and 1970s, democratic 
centralism was interpreted in relation to debates over the centrali-
sation of state socialism in the USSR, eastern Europe and China.7 
Casting the issue in wider terms, party bureaucracy has been the 
CPs’ (and SDPs’) chief strength. Part of this bureaucracy was ideo-
logical education. It was organised through specific party bureaus, 
regional and local seminars on theory, theoretical periodicals and the 
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funding of working-class history projects, museums and memorials. 
At the same time, agenda setting, veto functions and the crafting of 
the ideological and political line rested in the highest organs. While 
the party organisation was so deeply and thoroughly rooted in wider 
society that the party bodies could easily absorb, receive and consider 
vibrations from all corners of social life among their constituencies. 
Democratic centralism was disputed by the students of the 1960s 
within a larger discussion about bureaucracy, hence a typical critique 
of the New Left ran along the lines of ‘centralised organisation equals 
bureaucracy equals degeneration’. Critiques of ‘substitutionalism’, 
typically attributed as a term to Trotsky, claimed that Leninist party 
organisation operates by replacing the working class with the party 
and inevitably leads to personalisation and power abuse by the leader-
ship. From a Leninist viewpoint, the critique was somewhat different: 
that in Lenin’s own conception of party democracy, vanguardism and 
the centralism necessary for careful direction from the top were his-
torically limited.8 ‘Under conditions of political freedom our party 
will be built entirely on the elective principle. Under the autocracy 
this is impracticable for the collective thousands of workers that 
make up the party.’9 
Trotskyist and Maoist parties did not significantly diverge from the 
communist model of organisation. Their structure was that of the 
‘new type of party’, premised in democratic centralism and having 
the same decision-making chain as the communists. The Trotsky-
ists, however, invoked 1921 as the moment which determined the 
CPs’ organisational rigidity and blamed Lenin for misinterpreting his 
own principles and arriving at a centralist position. Ernest Mandel 
wrote that ‘nothing in Lenin’s writings suggests that the period of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat allows for only one party’, some-
thing which attests to why the Trotskyists appealed to 1921 in order 
to legitimise the formation of tendencies.10 To be more specific, for 
both the Trotskyists and the Maoists there was a certain variability in 
the distinctions between currents and organisational spirits.11 Some 
parties, like the Socialist Workers’ Party in the UK and the Com-
munist Revoutionary League in France allowed tendencies, while 
others – such as Workers’ Struggle in France and the Workers’ Party 
of Norway – did not. Maoism came in hierarchical as well as non-
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hierarchical forms (e.g., GP and one of its predecessor organisations, 
the Union of Young Communists (Marxist-Leninist) in France). The 
latter was more oriented towards a movement-party form, and used a 
method known as enquête – going out to the people and learning from 
them – as a preparatory stage for a ‘true centralist party’ whereby the 
individual and the collective were in absolute harmony.12
In particular, what came to be known as the left libertarian 
tradition – which cut into Trotskyist and Maoist spaces and had con-
nections to feminism and the environmental movements – can be 
credited with democratising radical spaces away from vanguardism, 
centralism and uniformity. Since the time of the Hungarian reform 
movement, and its crushing in 1956, democratic centralism had 
come under increasing scrutiny. Especially after the crushing of the 
Prague Spring and with bottom-up groups and mobilisations appear-
ing in the thousands in western Europe, the communist organisation 
was also criticised from within, although not in all CPs. The Long ’68 
still marked a critical moment in the verticality/horizontality tension 
that was at play from the twofold emergence of left radicalism in the 
nineteenth century, through anarchism and social democracy; the 
main historical transmutation being that the original intra–extra- 
institutional division became an intra-institutional one, as if anar-
chism was given ideological space in the socialist tradition. Across 
subspaces on the historical Radical Left – the communist, Trotsky-
ist and Maoist – it was argued that the institutionalised suppression 
of tendencies affected the party on multiple levels, inhibiting auton-
omous theoretical work, sufficient levels of pluralist expression, 
collective agency, flexibility and the appreciation of its own living and 
inevitable contradictions.13 
A more pluralist organisation would have been more reflective and 
representative of the diverse opinions of citizens with socialist alle-
giances, rather than allowing for the easy imposition of a common 
framework without meaningful participation in decision-making 
procedures. Given diversity and pluralism the party should also be, 
by nature, sufficiently competitive. ‘Thinking for oneself ’ was the 
intellectual fuel for many activists, which emanated from radical 
literature and culture.14 Where they were more influential depend-
ing on the ideological background of parties, these ideas, meant a 
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number of organisational changes. In Scandinavia, the New Left 
parties of the 1960s and 1970s espoused a non-Leninist organisa-
tional grid which abandoned democratic centralism. The Norwegian 
SV, established in 1972, offered an innovative organisational model 
to the extent that it was less hierarchical than its predecessor party 
organisation, developed a participatory organisational structure and 
sustained interaction with external social movements and citizens’ 
initiatives. From the beginning, SV also had a 40 per cent quota for 
both sexes at all levels in party bodies. The Swedish Left Party-Com-
munists in 1978 introduced a quota for as many women as female 
party members, in a wider process of explicitly committing to parlia-
mentary politics, rejecting democratic centralism and taking a more 
cautious and distant stance towards the USSR. 
The Eurocommunists also underwent change on organisational 
issues, which began to be debated and posed by the leadership two to 
three decades earlier. The year 1969 was when the Spanish and Italian 
CPs criticised democratic centralism as a communist organising prin-
ciple. Six years after that, the Rome Declaration by the PCF and PCI 
in November 1975, as well as other meetings in Berlin and Paris, com-
mitted to a plural party, the independence of trade unions, workplace 
democracy and opening state institutions to the working class.15 In 
accordance with the PCI’s heritage views, the party always blended 
class struggle with the democratic ideal. And these horizons were con-
nected in the quest for more autonomy from the USSR and the latter’s 
loss of a sacrosanct appeal. Without officially abandoning democratic 
centralism and the theory of the revolutionary vanguard, the Euro-
communists made openings on a number of fronts, not least in order 
to appeal more to the middle classes and catholic sections of society: 
• The party’s links with society at large and social groups in par-
ticular: becoming more oriented to emerging currents and 
allowing participation in the party as well as in independent 
SMOs.
• In the PCF, during the Eurocommunist phase, between 1977 
and 1979, the PCF’s position on workers’ control (autogestion) 
was changed to an enthusiastic one, to the extent it was now 
enshrined in party statute.
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• The traction between the mass membership and militant 
cadres: leading to revisions of earlier criteria and procedures for 
recruiting members and approaching sympathisers, or commit-
ment to full transparency for members.
• Modifying democratic centralism and engaging with more plu-
ralist arrangements: more tolerance for criticism and dissent, 
including the quasi-unofficial existence of currents and 
imposing no measures on dissidents.
• Debates and in some cases policies to enhance democracy in 
the electoral process, which are today standard, such as more 
candidates than places to be filled on the ballot, reflecting the 
increased significance of competition.
• Democratising the ideological process through more vibrant 
discussions at party congresses, where dissenting opinions are 
not institutionally undermined.16
In 1976, in East Berlin, the Conference of European Communist 
Parties promoted diversity by institutionsalising it in its statutes and 
argued for respect for different roads to socialism.17 Further democ-
ratisation on the Radical Left came gradually. The Eurocommunists 
did not break from democratic centralism until later, and therefore a 
tension arose here as well as between their attempts to democratise 
and their homogeneous, closed structures, with stringent procedures 
governing entry, participation and exit, and a centrally disseminated 
framework for interpreting the world and militancy through party 
obligation. That said, the period of the Long ’68, from the New Left to 
the Eurocommunists, signalled the initial and polymorphous critique 
of communist organisational orthodoxy through ideological revision 
within the party systems and movement spaces of western Europe. 
All this was happening in the broader context of rising individual-
ism, after the 1960s, in which the new, central significance placed 
upon the individual does not fit into the discipline of democratic 
centralism.
Today, RLPs mostly abide by the democratic principles of liberal 
democracy as constitutional practices at the level of the nation state. 
In their majority, they are participatory, representational, internally 
competitive, responsive and transparent.18 Βy the 1990s, parties like 
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Rifondazione, IU and Left Bloc practised policy consultations with 
movements and civil society in their manifesto-drafting processes. 
The SV in Norway and Vänsterpartiet in Sweden also employed this 
practice. DiEM25 used party member surveys for its policy formula-
tion process in the 2019 European elections. Today more than ever, 
any uniformity of ideas has come to be taken as fictitious. Demarca-
tions have been carried forward, indeed, mainly as concerns about 
centralisation as opposed to decentralised structures – hence most 
Marxist-Leninist parties – AKEL, the PCP and the KKE – have main-
tained agenda-setting and veto power for the higher echelons, most 
often the Central Committee. CPs are also different in their percep-
tion of competitive elections for party office and especially for the 
party leader – hence the long tenures in AKEL, the KKE, the PCP 
and the Dutch SP effectively translate into the absence of competi-
tive elections when the time comes, as a consensus pre-emerges in 
the central committees and ensures the supremacy of one selected 
nomination.
In these parties, democratisation processes that effectively reduced 
the top leadership’s power have not only been avoided for the most 
part but in certain cases the change has been towards centralisation. 
In the fluid environment of the Greek crisis, for example, the KKE, 
which still operates on the basis of democratic centralism, tightened 
the conditions for the readmission of members who were expelled or 
had left the party, having found that ‘few actually managed to reinte-
grate’. The KKE’s leadership also reintroduced powers allowing it to 
periodically review the party’s membership to ensure that members 
are suitable.19 Nevertheless, centralist features are not exclusive to the 
CPs. SYRIZA’s government experience led to centralisation and the 
concentration of power in the leadership, and the leader himself – 
Alexis Tsipras. Podemos functions ‘like a typical centralised party’, in 
terms of decision-making and candidate selection procedures;20 Sinn 
Féin has concentrated power over its leadership under Gerry Adams 
due to its military and clandestine past. Parti de Gauche, the party of 
Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has had no proper process of leadership elec-
tions, as it was established as a political vehicle for the promotion 
of its leader. Formal procedures can also be circumvented through 
tactical manoeuvring to outbid opponents.21 
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Wider social processes of party organisational change have inter-
posed power distribution within RLPs. We can register during the 
Long ’68 a reorientation towards attracting votes from all social 
cleavages and classes, thus expanding outside of traditional commu-
nist constituencies. This was also a more generalised shift of many 
parties, diluting their ideological base in order to expand their elec-
toral base in the light of increasing problems faced by the mass model. 
Chiefly: a decline in membership and party identification, with con-
sequent decreases in newspaper readership and subscriptions, the 
erosion of voluntary partisanship, a transformation towards a more 
balanced social profile in terms of groups and classes, and declin-
ing membership fees in total and in relation to overall party revenue. 
In this reality, a catch-all perspective could accrue most benefits in 
the age of declining political loyalties.22 In subsequent decades, Otto 
Kircheimer’s original diagnosis was in many respects reinforced in 
empirical terms, and indeed Eurocommunism in the 1970s showed 
a strong element of the catch-all mentality. It specified the middle 
classes as the target of an expansive electoral strategy.23
A key aspect of such transformations – membership – has declined 
dramatically in European party systems. This includes RLPs, 
although not all of them. The main outliers are still the PCF, PCP, 
AKEL and SP, which have about 51,000, 64,000, 15,000 and 44,000 
members respectively, which translates into a membership density of 
about 15 per cent in each case.24 Membership density is the number 
of members compared to the total number of members of all polit-
ical parties in the country, and it has gone down dramatically since 
the 1970s when the stronger CPs of France, Italy, Cyprus and Finland 
ranged between a third and half of all the members of the countries’ 
political parties.25 If we widen the scope to the ‘societal strength’ of 
parties, as measured by the number of RLP members compared to 
the electorate, the decline is even higher. It is estimated by Chioc-
chetti, based on a sample of eight western European countries, that it 
fell from about 1.5 per cent in most of the 1960s and 1970s to about 
0.02 per cent in the 2010s.26 Many aspects of party organisation have 
been affected: a decline in militant activists, problems of internal 
coordination and cohesion, gaps in communication with constitu-
encies, difficulty in developing ties of identification without social 
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roots, poorer capacity to initiate protest and lower utility of extra-
parliamentary mobilisation as a driver of political success.27 
To a certain extent, these factors explain the next organisational 
reconfiguration of the Radical Left party family in terms of struc-
tures. It came in the 1990s and 2000s, when this space stood out in 
five main cases of coalition party building (and various minor ones), 
whereby pre-existing parties or groups came together into a unified 
organisation: Left Bloc, SYRIZA, Die Linke, the NPA and the Front 
de Gauche, and less importantly the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP). 
Their chief predecessors were the IU from 1986 and the Danish Red–
Green Alliance since 1989. Within the IU, Red–Green Alliance, SSP 
and Front de Gauche the parties have been preserved as organisa-
tional units within the whole, while in Left Bloc they dissolved after 
six years and have been operating since then as factions. The same 
has happened to Die Linke, where the German Party of Democratic 
Socialism and Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative 
officially merged in 2007 a few years after they engaged in negoti-
ations. Unlike the RLPs of the 1960s and 1970s, the starting point 
builds on an acknowledgement of fragmentation and pursues the 
objective of a plural party trying to unify as much as possible. For 
the CPs, the point of departure was full and undisturbed unity, which 
in due course witnessed divisions and splinters. The road to unity is 
hard nevertheless, especially the beginning: in Die Linke and the Left 
Bloc it took six years after the mergers to arrive at a common pro-
gramme or platform, and in the Red–Green Alliance this took nine 
years.28 The Left Bloc rests on structures of routinised factionalisa-
tion. More broadly, factionalism has been naturalised on the Radical 
Left. The overarching perception progressively taking shape is that all 
groups and opinions have the right to exist and this is challenging. It 
is, however, healthier as a transition stage towards the establishment 
of counter-hegemony than dogmatic discipline. 
At the same time, more inclusive though looser linkages opened 
up through the participation and responsiveness potential of digital 
politics. Many political parties have taken the idea of the public square 
assembly to the internet, creating participatory online platforms for 
their members, and aspiring to provide members and supporters 
with more influence in the party decision-making process. Emulating 
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and departing from the pirate parties, Momentum inside the Labour 
Party acted as a campaign group for recruiting party members, and 
Podemos and FI have largely operated through open, accessible and 
user-friendly forums of deliberation and online primary elections 
and referendums. On these platforms the organisational machin-
ery of the party is substituted by software: for example, Rousseau, 
Plaza Podemos and My Momentum. In the age of the social media, 
parties extract data from their supporters’ online behaviour, which 
can be used for the purpose of adaptating to their opinions or any 
shifts therein.29 The outcome of platform-based party organisation 
can be more vertical than expected or believed by participants. The 
frequency of supermajority results supporting the party line in online 
and highly inclusive elections, referendums and policy decisions 
betray the tendency of concentrated and vertical power distribution, 
which remains unresolved by digital forms of organisation.30 The very 
use of social media individual-level data for navigating public opinion 
is nothing short of a definitive operational feature of the ideal-type 
cartel party: wide inclusivity combined with agenda-setting and veto 
power by the leadership. Processes of mediatisation, professionalised 
political communication and digitalisation are assumed to centralise 
parties by enforcing the party in central office and its professionals, 
which control communication strategy and central access to digital 
means of collective mobilisation.
Through digital access to politics, the membership boundary has 
been blurred. Most notably in Podemos and FI, all affiliates have voting 
rights (and most people vote online). Podemos’ Asamblea Ciudadana 
is a permanent body making decisions between conferences through 
online decision-making processes. One can acquire membership by 
registering on the website. SYRIZA has been getting closer to this 
approach. During its membership recruitment campaign, the leader-
ship utilised the slogan ‘Take SYRIZA in your hands’, and promoted 
a digital platform – currently utilised for member registration – that 
they hope will become a website through which members can partic-
ipate actively, express opinions and vote. Suspicious reactions from 
party officials warned that ‘if our members are people who vote on 
the criterion of popularity, the social media, and the physical appear-
ance of officials, then our future will be foreboding’.31
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The shift in boundaries is formally one towards open plebisci-
tary intra-party democracy, with democracy defined by its level of 
inclusiveness and a ‘fully democratic’ party as one that includes all 
citizens.32 Moving in this organisational direction reflects the dis-
course of citizenism in so far its mobilisation practice suggests that 
members and non-members should be equally involved in all organ-
isations by and for citizens. This variant of internal party democracy 
departs from the dominant approaches to party democracy driven 
by conceptualising the party as an organisation with clearly defined 
boundaries, as in the Leninist tradition. Yet, given that entry require-
ments are so low, members have almost no obligations, which is in 
stark contrast to the archetypical communist, Trotskyist and Maoist 
parties of the past. It may thus appear more democratic to grant 
members many rights and no obligations; nevertheless, this severely 
undermines political belonging by eliminating commitment. 
Mobilising through virtual space works in some respects but not 
in others. Based on her experience of the Occupy movements, Dean 
made the case for imagining and adapting the CP as an organisa-
tion that can reinvigorate socialist strategy and radical political force. 
This, she argues, is necessary for weaving the bonds of a ‘weness’ 
between radical subjects, something which classical socialist politics 
did very successfully.33 But to the extent that doing the above requires 
the physical presence – rituals, festivities, education groups, press, 
etc. – to be rolled back into a central organisation, the ideological 
tension not only remains but is much stronger than the 1960s and 
1970s, a period when CPs still reigned with communist legitimacy 
as highly centralised entities. A multitude of innovations has been 
recorded, for example, Labour-backing bots on Tinder, the daily use 
of memes for political propaganda, broadcasting anti-fascist confron-
tations or live streaming movements and party leader interventions, 
or using Google docs to organise meetings. Across the world, parties 
have responded to the decline of their memberships by introducing 
ways to get people involved. But are they sufficient to produce the 
principle of ‘one for all and all for one’? In the terms of Jodi Dean, 
this would be a realm that channels belonging into the political Left 
through combining rights and commitments, and in turn projecting 
a collective spirit into radical action.34 
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The overall mobilising capacity of these tools compared with a 
socially rooted organisation entailing political participation through 
all walks of life is at the least insufficient. Digital tools can thus 
support spontaneous, transparent, inclusive and tactical mobilisa-
tion, solidarity and protest. But alone they cannot substitute for the 
day-to-day mass-scale ‘societies within societies’ of the mass CP and 
its respective organisational reach. And they do not always translate 
into more party democracy.35 Virtual space may not be sufficient for 
comradeship, which is the result of concrete bonds, networks, rela-
tions, commitments, connections and norms, and the subsequent 
sense of belonging it brings about. Meanwhile, virtual space is not 
free of democratic deficiencies. Transcending physical space through 
virtuality can be helpful but insufficient for a strong socialist force 
that is not networked into the everyday lives of people and does not 
inscribe a collective political culture into its militants.
horizontality and verticality through  
the lens of linkage
Our dominant motif of the central role of linkage in mobilisation and 
resistance returns to centre stage because party models and spaces 
are relevant for linkage. They reflect the nature of top-down or bot-
tom-up strategy and which organisation commands more social and 
political capital. The horizontality–verticality continuum takes shape 
through parties’ internal decision-making procedures as well as in 
connection to society. Here, we develop a linkage between organ-
ised entities on the Radical Left, combining the strategic viewpoint of 
each key actor involved: movements and parties. Enthusiastic state-
ments that highlight ‘newness’, such as ‘a close interaction or even 
organic relationship with such movements seems to be one of the key 
characteristics that singles out newer parties of the populist left’, can 
be highly misleading.36 Today’s linkage on the European Radical Left 
has a strong sense of historicity.
In spite of the divisions and conflict between communist leader-
ships and students movements, there was substantive interaction 
on the Radical Left in the aftermath of 1968. Approximately 27 per 
cent of delegates to the 1979 provisional party congresses of the PCI 
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followed a ‘new’ or ‘mixed’ pathway to party membership, involving 
activism in a social movement organisation.37 A shared similarity of 
activist inflow into communist organisations is further documented 
by Michael Waller, who surveyed western European CP congress del-
egates’ characteristics in the 1970s, showing a ‘new member’ factor. A 
militancy ‘different in kind from that characteristic of traditional Sta-
linist democratic centralism’ was brought into the CPs. Over the long 
term, it both helped the CPs to reinvigorate in the electoral market and 
contributed to internal fragmentation and splintering, often igniting 
pre-existing divisions.38 The ‘new member factor’ for all parties was 
the product of a changing European society and economy, at the apex 
of economic growth, with social mobility mostly the product of edu-
cation. Parties as receptors of educational, occupational, demographic 
and other changes translated social developments into political ones.
For the PCI, the inflow of young people and women ‘contributed 
to slowing down the decline that the PCI had been experiencing over 
the 15 years previous to 1968’.39 As an ex-PCI militant, and critical 
figure of the extra-parliamentary Italian left, Rossana Rossanda 
described it: ‘the overlapping of the political shift of the historic com-
promise and the mass movement, from which the PCI extracted its 
political capital between 1968 and 1975’.40 In various struggles, com-
munist militants linked resources and conviction to local movements, 
from the feminists to the ecologist and anti-fascist fronts. Although 
nothing (as shown later on) is to be taken for granted (as was the case 
in Italy), the PCI (and especially its left wing under Pierro Ingrao) 
was constantly oriented towards the party machine and the outside 
realm of radicals working in the same direction of social change as the 
communist militants. Following an initially hesitant approach, which 
saw these movements become largely disassociated from the working 
class and its problems, by the 1970s it was participating in working 
groups with the peace and environmental movements, although not 
incorporating some of their central demands about nuclear power 
and ecological sustainability.41 During the Eurocommunist turn, the 
party’s approach to social movements was changing nevertheless. As 
a feminist PCI militant, Laura Lilli, argued, the party consented to 
communist women being active in both the PCI and the movements, 
thus introducing ‘a further, original Italian attempt at a “third way”’.42
Party Organisation on the European Radical Left
229
In Norway, Sweden and Finland, the CPs had made the peace 
movement a top priority from the 1950s and into the 1960s, and in 
their endeavour to fuse with society they often connected parlia-
mentary work to local and national assemblies, which also served 
as consultations of its parliamentarians and the party leadership.43 
Across the board, the Trotskyists and Maoists, without a parliamen-
tary presence, were constantly engaged in organising neighbourhood 
assemblies, issue campaigns, protests, strikes and cultural events 
within networks of other organised groups. At the same time, a 
vertical design operated, as in the CPs. Detailed bulletins of contact 
work were circulated by the party for militants and members, refined 
into principles, tasks, hierarchies, distinctions, categories and specific 
intents, and reached into leisure time.44 Trotskyist parties’ resilience 
– their existence over time in multiple countries without any sort of 
electoral power – directs us to their hybrid nature, comprising party, 
social movement and sect features.45 Which one prevailed was highly 
dependent on case and context.
Linkages with movements also formed in the so-called Euro-
socialist parties emerging in the 1970s in southern Europe and 
distinguishing themselves from the classic SDPs of central and 
northern Europe. Notably, the Socialist Workers’ Party of Spain was 
radicalised in the late 1970s due to widespread anti-Franco sen-
timent and the economic crisis that country was undergoing. It 
fathered momentum among disenfranchised and pro-democratic 
sections of the organised grassroots movements. In France, post-’68, 
the Socialist Party (PS) grew from 10,000 members in 1968 to about 
200,000 in 1981 under the leadership of Mitterand, outpolling the 
PCF by 1978.46 The small Parti Socialiste Unifié attracted both revo-
lutionaries and reformists in their common rejection of anti-Stalinist 
views and the ‘old’ SDPs. In Greece, local citizens’ movements and 
a variety of new left organisations formed PASOK’s backbone. The 
proliferation of social movements in France, Spain and Greece would 
produce the upsurge of electoral socialism, which in turn came to 
talk about women’s issues, cultural renewal and ecology.47 In the UK, 
Tony Benn advocated workers’ control, more transparency, critical 
reflection on bureaucracy and power abuse, emphasis on extra-par-
liamentary work, feminist values and alternative economic policies 
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with emphasis on economic democracy. As with the CPs and newly 
emerging parties, the inflow of movimentismo into the rising social-
ists in Greece, Scandinavia and the Iberian peninsula translated into 
a diversified composition, and thus a social basis that was broader 
and more multiclass than that of traditional social democracy.48 
During the GJM years, the prefigurative crisis that we outlined 
in Chapter 5 facilitated the ‘return of politics’ by movements. From 
the point of view of parties, since the GJM linkages with movements 
have maintained the status of a noble and strategic commitment in 
the fight against neoliberalism. Emulating Latin American mobi-
lisation on the Left, parties such as Rifondazione, IU, Left Unity, 
Left Bloc and Synaspismos established departments focusing exclu-
sively on social movements and often included hearings from civil 
society in their manifesto-drafting processes. In the Genoa Social 
Forum, alternative globalist and pacifist organisations came together 
on a permanent basis with Rifondazione in 2000–1 to discuss and 
organise demonstrations and common activities. Rifondazione con-
ceptualised the appropriate place for the party in relation to the 
movements as ‘contagion’, receiving cultures of activism, positions, 
ideas, concepts, methods and repertoires of action, and incorporat-
ing them into the party’s deliberations and political narrative.49 The 
first European transnational structure of left-wing parties and RLPs 
allowed for individual and movement membership beyond party-
based participation.50 
In France, the Collectifs du 29 Mai/Collectifs Unitaires Antilib-
eraux were organised by cadres of political parties and SMOs, coming 
together in 2005–7 to continue the coordination of the ‘left of the 
no’ to the European Constitutional Treaty, and to propose a common 
candidate for the subsequent presidential election. In Spain, Espacio 
Alternativo was created for the explicit purpose of bringing social 
movements closer to the IU. In Sweden, leading figures of Vänster-
partiet helped to organise Attac.51 Similar phenomena continued 
into the 2010s. In Germany, Die Linke supported and contributed 
to the protests against the G20 in Hamburg in July 2017. Its think 
tank, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, is a network connecting academ-
ics and activists of the democratic socialist tradition. In the UK, 
Left Unity has actively collaborated with the STWC, UK Uncut, the 
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Women’s Assembly and Black Activists Rising against the Cuts.52 In 
Spain, Podemos and IU have supported PAH. In France, the marée 
populaire demonstration on 26 May 2018 was jointly organised 
by parties (most importantly the FI and PCF), trade unions (most 
importantly the General Confederation of Labour) and civil society 
organisations. Under Marie-George Buffet, the PCF’s leader after the 
disastrous participation in the Lionel Jospin government, the party 
emphasised extra-parliamentary mobilisation and wide participation 
in social and political struggles. In Sweden, links and common local 
campaigns against spending cuts were undertaken between Vänster-
partiet and Megafonen, especially after the dramatic youth riots in 
Stockholm in 2013.53 In Greece, the youth organisations of the KKE, 
SYRIZA and ANTARSYA, through the network structure of their 
presence in labour and other groups and associations, contributed to 
the organisation of several protests.54
There are many more examples. However, it is highly questiona-
ble whether this has led to a widespread redefinition of the political 
space on the Radical Left in western Europe,55 since party–movement 
linkages and transversal and sectional interconnections between 
mobilising agents of left radicalism have rarely led to successful new 
RLPs. With Podemos, SYRIZA, the Labour Party and the Belgian 
Workers’ Party entering parliament in 2016 as the exceptions, in the 
rest of western Europe a realignment in left political competition has 
not been triggered: either a break into parliament, the emergence 
of a new successful RLP or radically altering the balance of power 
towards the left of the political spectrum. This is so, in spite of many 
dramatic declines in the vote for SDPs and ensuing internal upheaval. 
Beyond temporal variation there is spatial variation as well. A 
macro-historical pattern is that perceptions of how top-down or bot-
tom-up societal linkage needs to be is associated with ideological 
traditions. For the communists, the party as vanguard was irreplace-
able, whereas Gramsci identified the workers’ councils as the most 
significant collective organ of the proletariat. The Trotskyists have 
also been traditionally understood (and often (self-)satirised) for 
their revolutionary party militancy. In the ESFs, they were the most 
insistent on ‘more action, less movement’. A symptom of partisan, 
militant behaviour is the accusation (common in several campaigns 
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in the UK) that the Trotskyist vanguardists try to take over the 
movement or campaign. 
The democratic socialist tradition, including some of the early 
Greens, has veered between movimentismo and partisanship. The 
traditional communists criticised movement and individual mem-
bership inside the ELP and produced a fierce critique of the ESFs. 
The KKE called them opportunist, questioned their financing prac-
tices and did not participate in the Athens ESF once it realised it could 
not take over, while the PCP was softer in its approach, although still 
markedly different from parties like Rifondazione.56 Since early on, 
CPs and many Trotskyist parties, for example Workers’ Struggle in 
France, made a clear distinction between workers and the petit bour-
geois when it came to entry into the party. Probationary periods were 
a characteristic mark of this space, and this remains the case today in 
all the examples we have examined. AKEL in Cyprus barely engaged 
in a dialogue about movements, and disagreed about membership 
by individuals and movements inside the ELP.57 All of these parties 
are more selective because they can be: they have ancillary struc-
tures which organise important and well-known events that attract 
attention. Their annual youth festivals, for instance, are telling, and 
their branched structures enable proximity to events and informa-
tion across the country. Communist linkage necessitates that we 
understand dense, diversified and interactive party structures as con-
ducive to strong linkages. This is top down on the one hand, but on 
the other it sustains social roots in the long term and ingrains politi-
cal belonging.
The extremity of crisis conditions did not alter preformed strat-
egies towards civil society at large: orthodox parties continued to 
rely heavily on selected labour-related groups and ancillary struc-
tures, following exclusive, top-down strategies, while dismissing 
riots, students and youth movements. In contrast, the democratic 
socialists created channels of communication and interaction with 
them, accepting a mutual direction of influence to begin with.58 The 
patterns of the GJM years inside the Radical Left party family contin-
ued into the 2010s. It seems, therefore, that the ideas of socialism in 
their particular colours continue to contribute towards shaping par-
ticular targets, conditions and perceptions about radical civil society. 
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This is how ideology feeds into organisational practice. Still, the 
common factor across all RLPs – the ideological legacy of socialism 
and opposition to capitalism (or the establishment) – is what dictates 
a constant concern with linkage, whether bottom up or top down.59
How, then, should we assess the widespread talk of movement parties 
as a popular model of party organisation in the 2010s? En Marche! 
in France, Podemos in Spain and comedian Beppe Grillo’s M5S in 
Italy are parties of the crisis which tried to sustain many characteris-
tics of the movements out of which they emerged. SYRIZA in Greece 
and the Green Alternativet in Denmark invested immense energy 
in transposing movement demands into electoral politics. Podemos 
grew out of the indignados and 15M movements. Momentum in the 
UK has tried to influence the Labour Party from within. Movement 
parties span a large space on the political spectrum and are favoured 
by an anti-party tendency within the electorate and a political envi-
ronment of widespread protest and grassroots politics. Bottom-up 
processes, network-like structures, blurry member boundaries and 
mobilisation through activism and protest can overcome obstacles 
to popularity. 
Movement parties are not new phenomena strictly speaking, at 
least not for the Radical Left. It is important to note their continual 
existence, which validates rather than disposes of the tension between 
horizontality and verticality, and more broadly between the realm of 
civil society and the state. In the 1970s and 1980s, the New Left lib-
ertarian parties arose out of networks and coalitions between NSMs, 
espousing egalitarian politics and promoting inclusiveness and direct 
participation. The GPs’ fundis–realo debate revolved largely around 
the distinction between movement and party and its navigation. Out 
of the 1980s, a participatory organisation did not translate into the 
realisation of a rich membership and a fully democratic party. It was 
recurrently limited or resisted by parliamentarisation and thus the 
prioritisation of the party in public office.60 For the historical Left, 
although not for early ecological thought, this was the debate about 
the people, the masses, the revolutionary subjects, the ‘multitude’ and 
whether they should be hegemonised or could rise to the challenge 
themselves.61 
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Podemos is the modern exposition of the dilemmas between 
institutional and non-institutional politics, both at the individual 
and collective level. It is ritualised between factional competition 
within the party through recourse to or dismissal of the expression 
‘party-movement’.62 Momentum’s 2017 Constitution centralised the 
organisation compared to its previous branch-like structure, con-
centrating democratic activity online in a mass open space, and by 
implication sidelining the Trotskyists. It required all new members 
to be Labour Party members. In Greece, since 2015, movements 
demobilised in their support for a left government and the party was 
centralised in its new course of moderation that approximates more 
the ideological profile of PASOK than a Radical Left identity aiming 
at root-and-branch change. In fact, in Greece, Portugal, Cyprus and 
Spain anti-austerity protests demobilised while the Radical Left has 
been in government within a wider framework of austerity-driven 
governance.
the government, the state, the radical left
Linkage can be fully addressed when parliamentary office, govern-
ment and the capitalist state are taken into account, as the difference 
between opposition and power also informs party and movement 
strategies. We will return to this, after registering the relation of RLPs 
to the structures of governance, which radicals seek to enter and use 
as structures of resistance. These mediate any dynamics between 
electoral and non-electoral forces. If programmatic statements show 
what the party says (or promises), time in office reveals what the 
party does, and if this is consonant with its pre-office declarations, 
statutory rules of operation and the support it has been asking for 
from the movements and trade unions. 
In dealing with the strategy of the vanguard CP in pre-revolution-
ary and revolutionary situations, Lenin addressed the question of 
coalitions and, more specifically, the kinds of coalition that should 
be formed by CPs in advanced capitalist democracies and the reasons 
for their formation.63 Parliamentary opposition and coalition forma-
tion in pre-revolutionary situations had to be tactical, according to 
Lenin, that is, to ‘exploit conflicts of interest among the bourgeois 
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parties’.64 The problem has always been what ‘tactical’ actually means 
in particular circumstances. As an indication, it’s relatively easy to 
suggest that for revolutionary parties, tactical compromises mean 
manoeuvres which do not alter the commitment to the regime’s over-
throw, although it may be much more problematic to apply the term 
to a movement which does not challenge the regime itself and works 
in principium to change it from within. All parties agree on a twofold 
strategy on the basis of two axes – parliamentary and extra-parliamen-
tary pressures (e.g. strikes, demonstrations and ideological battles). 
This is also the root of the problems that parties oriented exclusively 
towards office, the so-called empty vessels, do not entertain.
Until the 1980s, governmental involvement of CPs was limited by 
geopolitical considerations, most importantly the ups and downs of 
the foreign policy crafted in Moscow. The events of 1989–91 worked 
in the direction of more governmental strength: their average gov-
ernmental strength as measured by ‘relevant seats’, within the cabinet 
or parliamentary support, during 1994–2015 is reported by Chioc-
chetti as double that between 1945 and 1988.65 Table 8.1 lays out 
further insights into cross-national patterns and comparison with 
SDPs and GPs. It enumerates CP/RLP, SDP and GP participation in 
distinct government cabinets per decade since the 1940s. When it 
comes to the actual decision to participate in a cabinet, independent 
of seats and the actual result of the coalition, there is equal frequency 
since the 1960s. Between 1945 and 2019, SDPs have participated in 
government a total of 224 times. SDPs have been closest to the state 
and their advantage begins on average in the 1940s or earlier. GPs, 
since the 1980s when they became established across many countries 
in Europe, enter government with more or less the same frequency as 
RLPs on average. At the same time, there has always been considera-
ble variation across countries, which is higher for the RLPs compared 
to GPs. In certain cases, the Radical Left has never participated in 
or supported government – Portugal until 2016, the Netherlands, 
Austria except in the immediate post-war period, West Germany, the 
UK except through the Labour Party, Switzerland and Malta. 
Whether we are concerned with the contemporary or historical 
Left, government participation leads to policy compromise and to 
working towards defusing popular unrest and preventing a radicalisa-
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tion of the political process. This in turn creates problems of identity, 
feeding into electoral losses whereby radical constituencies withdraw 
support from the Radical Left because they do not feel that their 
interests or ideas are any longer represented, or to punish the party 
for going against their preferred direction. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
the experience of the PCI during its ‘historic compromise’ is most 
revealing. The PCF’s participation in the early 1980s under Francois 
Mitterand led to a large drop in the polls, from 16.1 per cent in 1981 
to 9.8 per cent in 1986. More recently, such was also the experience 
of Rifondazione’s time in office during the first and second Romano 
Prodi governments in the late 1990s and 2006–8, respectively, which 
pushed the party out of parliament. Again, the PCF almost halved 
its vote after participating in the Lionel Jospin government between 
1997 and 2002 as part of the Plural Left coalition (Gauche Plurielle). 
During the 2000s, in Sweden, Finland and Norway, participation in 
government by the respective RLPs halved or significantly reduced 
their vote share. In Cyprus, AKEL lost about 4 per cent (30,000 votes) 
by 2016 and another 2 per cent (10,000 votes) by 2021.
On many occasions of government participation, radical left 
programmes actually turned into moderate neoliberal reform. In 
addition, policy achievements on various fronts are often easily 
undone or reversed by the right-wing government that follows. For 
these parties, the result of participation in national governments has 
been negative in both ideological and electoral terms.66 Electoral 
losses, it was observed, were the highest in countries with ‘dis-
criminatory electoral systems and a high number of small or newly 
emerging outsider parties’ acting as radical competitors.67 Post-crisis 
accounts confirm this pattern; in most cases of government partici-
pation, support was lost in the next election.68 Because government 
participation leads to problems with their image as radical or protest 
actors, RLPs also tend to shift emphasis back to their ideology once 
they leave government.69 This would be the essence of what in com-
munist, revolutionary discourse is called opportunism.
Policy changes due to incumbency are the result of co-optation, 
with very few exceptions. Co-optation as an outcome, and as form, is 
the institutional endorsement of neoliberal, free market-inspired or 
otherwise mainstream economic and social policies, combined with 
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a very soft reformism in areas unconstrained by neoliberal doctrine 
and capital accumulation. Commentators have pointed to the similar 
radicalism, its aspirations and its eventual fate, between Alexis 
Tsipras and SYRIZA, and Francois Mitterand who swept into office 
in 1981 as the first president from the Left in the history of the Fifth 
Republic, who formed a government with communist ministers for 
the first time after more than 30 years.70 Mitterrand’s ‘road to Social 
Democracy’ utilised radical rhetoric concerning revolution, ‘rupture’ 
with capitalism, the exploitation of man and the need to build a class 
front. The Common Program subscribed to by the PS, the PCF and 
the Left Radicals in June 1972 contained a lot of this kind of rhetoric, 
as did SYRIZA’s campaigning towards the elections of 2015, which 
took it to power.
On both occasions, two historical moments for electoral socialism 
turned into co-optation and in essence ideological defeat. Compro-
mise and retreat came in different ways across the two governments. 
In 1980s France it came through a combination of factors that were 
both external (largely international currency speculation) and internal 
(declining and unsustainable industry and pressure from within the 
state). Mitterand’s policies started off as markedly different from the 
UK’s Thatcher government. Mid-way the two converged through the 
French government’s ‘tournant de la rigueur’ (return to austerity).71 
In 2015, Greece co-optation came via the perceived lack of an alter-
native to the EU’s bailout programme, under immense pressure to 
repay the country’s accumulated debt and a refusal by EU elites to 
annul even part of it. The tangible outcome was the same for both 
Mitterand and Tsipras: the government reversing its own policies of 
redistributive planning in line with the demands of capital. In both 
cases, the policies which cohered with the government’s initial pledges 
were readjusted in the light of elections or holding office. Indeed, 
these very pledges already signalled various steps back from earlier 
declarations; the government programme embodied only a part of 
the radicalism that brought these forces to power. The sequence of 
this politics was similar: radicalism – anticipation – step back; victory 
and euphoria – initial radicalism – several steps back; disagreements 
and splits; still electorally successful (to sustain government). This 
last fact may have, in both cases, changed the acceptable parameters 
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of left-wing governance by way of legitimating political compromise 
or inculcating it as inevitable and necessary modernisation. If Mit-
terand’s 14 years in office is any indication, it proved to be a disaster 
for the PCF, as noted above, and contributed to liberalising French 
socialism.
For both the older CPs and the contemporary RLPs, a vital part of 
the story concerns the social democrats, always intermediating the 
causes and effects of co-optation by the parties to their left. From 
the 40 governments that the CPs and RLPs have participated in since 
the 1940s, and the tens of other cases where they lent parliamentary 
support, the vast majority have been centre-left governments in which 
the main party was the social democrats. In one of the three ongoing 
coalitions in western Europe where the Radical Left has been partic-
ipating recently – namely Portugal – the dilemma played out in four 
ways: the coalition’s rejection of legislative proposals by the PCP and 
Left Bloc, which interfere with economic commitments to the EU; 
the simultaneous ‘relaxed framing’ of the two radical lefts, so as to 
disassociate themselves from policies which contradict their political 
positions while still making sure the socialist government continues; 
the renewal of the government in 2019, on the basis of negotiating 
majority support in parliament bill by bill;72 the drop of the PCP’s 
vote at the 2019 elections, which also lost voters to the emerging Por-
tuguese right-wing extremists.
RLPs have been typical coalition partners for centre-left govern-
ments, as they also benefit from the social democratic protest vote: 
the ‘dissatisfied social democrats’, estimated at above 25 per cent of the 
votes gained by RLPs.73 While this refers to the contemporary period, 
overlapping electorates between communist/RLPs and the social 
democrats are a historical fact, since these electorates were mostly 
derived from the working class.74 Still, the argument that ‘the Right 
needs to go’ always occupies strong ground within radical left constit-
uencies and leaderships, and thus the memory of recent mistakes and 
compromises can fade relatively quickly. The boundaries between 
resistance and co-optation while in office become blurred in light of 
this argument of emergency that characterises periods of long tenure 
by right-wing and neoliberal governments. 
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Paolo Chiocchetti argues that the radical left electorate’s bipolar 
mentality would struggle to understand the refusal to enter a centre-
left government to oust the Right.75 Reading this formula, the 
mediating factor appears to be the party system. Multi-party systems 
generate different incentives to two-party systems; fragmented party 
systems also translate into multi-party governments, in which parties 
face more negotiators or ‘veto players’.76 Further, social democrats 
cooperate with the forces to their left when both sides perceive a 
mutual benefit, which, during the crisis for example, has only been 
the case in Spain and Portugal, not Greece or Italy.77 But SDPs often 
do need a certificate of progressive authenticity, which RLPs can 
provide. This by itself may suggest that radical constituencies or the 
need for symbolic credentials for ‘the necessary radicalism’ within 
SDPs can pull some of them into coalitions with the Radical Left.
However, given a number of recurrent patterns, the ever present, 
systemic challenge for RLPs does not concern exclusively the national 
level. Neither is it entirely dependent on the historical context, nor 
chiefly on leadership. It has been on average possible to enter exec-
utive office across western European countries, yet, as Miliband 
argued in outlining his theory of a ‘state system’, ‘the left has acceded 
to governmental power at various points in the twentieth century but 
not been able to conquer state power in its diverse forms and places’.78 
This goes back to historic French socialist leader Leo Blum’s dictum 
of ‘administrating power’ and ‘conquering power’.79 If it was an issue 
in need of theoretical reflection and strategic conception in the 1930s, 
this conquest appears even less plausible and meaningful today than 
before. This is the time of more fragmented electoral bodies, the hol-
lowing out of neoliberal political systems and the corresponding 
forms of public administration in fashion, the penetration of public 
institutions by corporate and private interests, the entrenchment of 
‘deep states’ globally, structural pressure for budget deficits and the 
powerful EU dimension of national politics. All this may not be tan-
tamount to saying that the Radical Left in western Europe cannot 
capture state power through government participation and sustained 
linkage with movements. At the very least, however, this has been 
an incrementally difficult undertaking. It recurrently causes both 
movement demobilisation and leads to the weak position of being 
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compromised and tarnished by ‘politics as usual’; at least in so far as 
more radical choices are avoided, such as quick and in-depth restruc-
turings of the public sector, the democratisation of the armed forces 
and central planning, which would translate into both executive and 
structural power.
The Radical Left has inspired widespread hope for redistribution 
and political reform. It has also always succumbed to pressure and 
relinquished, even if temporarily, the weight of its identity. In a sense 
the reason(s) for which it campaigned for votes in the first place have 
been contradicted. In Marxist terms, capitalist power can turn left-
wing governments into ‘instruments of its own interests’.80 Some 
authors who acknowledge these historical problems are hopeful: 
‘while it is true that such [radical left] formations would recreate 
many of the same contradictions in pre-war social democracy, this 
does not necessarily doom them to the same result’.81 But the question 
remains whether government reform by radicals must be the end 
result or one necessary step in a revolutionary direction. In response, 
it might be argued, ‘it is only through the collective experience of 
winning tangible victories and testing the limits of reformism that 
a majority will be won to revolutionary politics’.82 Though winning 
tangible victories collectively is an arduous task, if it is not also sub-
jective how concrete previous victories have been. What constitutes 
‘tangible’ will of course be politicised and potentially can serve as a 
way to suppress alternative views to a given struggle or to undermine 
the government.
For socialism as a globalist vision, government participation on a 
national scale is less important if it does not lead to contagion across 
other countries. If this doesn’t happen, socio-economic change 
can be easily backlashed into place by the forces of globally organ-
ised capital and in the absence of effective global organisation by 
the oppressed and labour. Although neither of these points makes 
it futile for the Radical Left to fight for and within government, the 
prospects do not look good. For governments that rely on national 
planning, it is crucial to keep unprofitable industries solvent, or 
to retain a strong welfare state and avoid austerity. The financial 
burden will affect the fiscal position of the state and limit its ability to 
finance other kinds of reforms, as well as stifle competitiveness. This 
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happened with Mitterand and even more with Tsipras and Greece. 
Such governments are also likely to witness chronically low invest-
ment rates and constant capital flight, which in the grand scheme of 
things becomes amplified through the mainstream media.83 From 
Mitterrand to Tsipras things have become much more challenging of 
course, the first of them initially followed the alternative of seizing 
control over investment by nationalising the banks. Must the Left 
incorporate into its strategy a plan of appropriating private invest-
ment? Within the EU, this is legally and politically impossible, and a 
task requiring the restructuring of the EU’s financial system regula-
tions from the ground up. 
Perhaps the problem is not so much that seeking government is 
justified, but that it is not sufficiently grounded in theory and vision. 
As Carl Boggs deplored for the New Left tradition, a ‘debilitating 
feature is the lack of a systematic theory of the state, of the relation-
ship between class or social forces and politics upon which the actual 
forms of democratic socialism could be articulated’.84 Certainly, ‘sys-
tematic’ theory necessarily means advanced arguments about how 
class politics can translate into socialist political goals. Yet, from the 
vantage point of 2020, more specific challenges to putting capital on 
the defensive through institutions may be evident. In particular, the 
elaboration of strategies for state capture is nearly absent except for 
certain texts premised on populism research, and Marxist theories of 
the state are far from blossoming. Within academia, Marxist theories 
of the state, society and utopia have little or no relevance in public 
administration and public policy, organisational studies, economics, 
international peace and development or qualitative and quantitative 
political science. 
All the acceptable versions of alternative systems of governance are 
founded upon SDP alliances to enter into government and provide 
high levels of employment, welfare services, taxation and redistri-
bution. Simultaneously, all such governments will have to finance 
their state investments through economic growth and by extension 
the capitalist profitability driving it. The question then becomes 
how to find effective replacements for economic growth that do not 
harm the planet, while at the same time sustaining profitability. Even 
further, how is this possible through alliances with the centre-left and 
Party Organisation on the European Radical Left
243
upon a two-dimensional axis of competition – on economic and non-
economic issues? Otherwise, what happened to the SDPs in the late 
1970s (the UK’s Labour Party), 1980s (French, Greek and Spanish 
Socialist Parties) and 1990s (Swedish Labour Party) will happen 
again: the Left in government liberalising the economy in order to 
increase profitability as the only way to boost investment and restore 
growth, which was affecting all constituencies.85 
There is an organisational story to co-optation as well, as it can only 
compound problems of policy drift away from one’s original goals. 
During government participation the flow of power within parties 
changes – they become more centralised, personalised and demo-
bilised in terms of their base. During incumbency, local branches 
may end up serving mostly as mediators to the party in executive 
office. The victory or success of parties that are movement allies has 
also witnessed reactive mobilisations on the part of the movement 
after the electoral contest. Podemos was initially engaged in a long-
term, ongoing debate about its political profile that included frictions 
between radical activists and the party’s institutional actors; the Trot-
skyist Anticapitalista tendency left the party not even a year into the 
Spanish Socialist-led government that Podemos is currently a part 
of. In the case of Momentum and the Labour Party, a thin line has 
been trodden between prioritising Labour’s electoral success and 
operating in a bottom-up mode, especially when it came to drafting 
and redrafting the organisational outline and Constitution.86 Within 
Momentum the main tension has been between older labour activists 
and Trotskyists committed to the mass party, delegation and repre-
sentative democracy, and young militants socialised in horizontal 
spaces, such as the Occupy London and student movements, who are 
suspicious of delegated authority.87
Given the party in central office is on average a weaker organisation 
than in the age of the mass party, participation in government entails 
a shift of personnel from party to government positions: for SYRIZA 
during 2015 and 2019, 104 out of 151 members of its Central Com-
mittee had been assigned a government post.88 This effectively means 
two things. One, the party cannot easily differentiate its activity from 
that of the government; it appears as ‘the governing party’, which may 
not always be wise in tactical terms. This is particularly the case when 
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there is co-optation towards the centre by the government, and the 
distance may at least signal the potential for the party to revisit and 
scrutinise its incumbency period. Two, the central office and the office 
on the ground are weakened as party cadres shift their attention to the 
state, meaning demobilised social penetration and working from the 
bottom up. For the Left Bloc, its ‘dual strategy’ – of using institutional 
politics to gain credibility among ‘former centre-left voters’, combined 
with pursuing a differentiation from systemic parties – is inhibited by 
its lack of mobilisation capacity due to a relatively small core militant 
constituency. The strategy is also contradicted by heavy reliance on 
the mainstream media, and investing most of their resources in par-
liamentary work.89 In the case of Finland and Norway, participation 
in government meant the later challenge of mending relations with 
social movements and trade unions.90 
During office, the autonomy of the core party leadership to under-
take key government decisions can happen in such a way that carries 
no legitimacy by the party body through the appropriate participa-
tion of party organs and members in deciding key issues. In line with 
theories of party government, the policy of the state should be drawn 
from within the party or parties running the government.91 If it is 
not, then the core leadership and their inner coterie, often includ-
ing politicians that are not party members, remains unaccountable 
to the party, the very organisational vehicle which allows partisans 
to become state officials. By limiting the internal accountability of 
party leaders, their external accountability as public office holders 
can be affected.92 Tsipras’s profound impact on the positive result of 
the first electoral test of SYRIZA in government in September 2015 
confirmed what had happened back in July before the referendum, 
when the Central Committee of the party was not properly con-
sulted or convened during the high-level negotiations with the troika. 
Between 2012, when SYRIZA shot up to more than 30 per cent from 
merely 4 per cent, and the present day the Greek Radical Left has 
been personalised.
This democratic deficit reflected the reality of EU politics during the 
eurozone crisis: the overrunning or bypassing of parliaments through 
speedy processes and agreements behind closed doors negotiated in 
the most elitist way between a few individuals in the Council of the 
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EU. Thus, as the Radical Left in capitalism is posited to manage the 
state’s affairs, it has been incapable of not internalising the democratic 
deficits of liberal governance, and manifests organisational character-
istics that are not very different from the establishment parties which 
systematically staff the executive. We are therefore prompted to 
return to the ‘movement party’. This may exist as an ideal-type organ-
isation, but on most occasions, with the Radical Left recently as with 
the Greens since the 1980s, this turns into a typical political machine. 
De facto then the movement party, on the broad left or otherwise, 
is a transitional party model.93 Having entered party competition, this 
model confronts political professionals and incorporates mainstream 
organisational party features. It also moderates the initial planning 
for a loose, activism-based and grassroots physiognomy. The Radical 
Left’s challenge is then to sustain movimentismo while fighting elec-
tions and interacting within the state apparatus. To do this, it needs 
to transcend no less than the very distinction between the extra-insti-
tutional realm and the entrenched hierarchies and self-reproducing 
ways of doing things inside liberal institutions.
the radical subject as voters of rlps 
Government incumbency, office seeking and any attempt to conquer 
the state become even more intricate when considering the social 
agents that condition participation in government affairs. Broadly, 
the social and material bases of mobilisation and resistance, within 
as well as beyond parties, are important. Let us, therefore, turn our 
attention to the evolution of RLP support within society and across 
demographics and class, having previously addressed the theories 
to the revolutionary agency that distinct eras ushered in. CPs in the 
1960s and 1970s, as we have seen, did not give youth (or any other 
category except the working class) the status of being destined to 
carry the future. Youth could thus only be organised as an append-
age to the blueprint of the vanguard party. Maoist, libertarian and 
Trotskyist parties recognised the significance of youth more vocally. 
Some parties, such as the French Maoist Union of Marxist-Lenin-
ist Communist Youth, explicitly recognised youth as the subject that 
commanded priority as potentially radical and important.94 This was 
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also the case with the British International Marxists Group, which 
engaged extensively with youth culture.95 The overall approach, not 
unique to France and the UK, was that students, petty bourgeois 
intellectuals and nationalist leaders are the vanguard force, which can 
bring about a revolutionary consciousness in the subaltern classes. 
The CPs were also confronted with debates on youth and student 
movement positions. In Sweden, the CP responded with relative 
success to the tension between the ‘Old Reds and Young Greens’. In 
Finland, the students were drawn to the Bolshevik wing of the CP. 
The PCI profited electorally by incorporating the new member factor, 
whereas the PCF’s support eroded as it lost parts of the working class 
without compensating with inflows from NSMs. In other countries, 
such as Cyprus and Belgium, the CPs lost out.96 For the CPs compe-
tition from the ultra-left (Maoists, Trotskyists, anarchists) was most 
pronounced in those sections of society for which the communist 
environment was rather hostile – the sub-proletariat of low-paid 
immigrant workers, disregarded by the unions and with no voting 
rights, and intellectuals who demanded a place in designing social-
ism but could see the constraints on free criticism or recognised the 
brutalities of Stalinism.97 Communist electorates were, in the past, 
mostly composed of blue-collar workers,98 although they were not 
always the most supported by workers among the available party 
options. The leading electoral force of the working-class vote in the 
1960s and 1970s and before were the SDPs.99 Even in Italy, where the 
PCI’s vote had one of the highest working-class shares among CPs in 
Europe, its percentage of wage earners was a minority.100 Therefore, 
before moving on to explicate contemporary class politics, it should 
be cautioned that the class relations of the CPs were much more 
nuanced than their own vision of the working-class party suggested.
Because of modernisation processes, changes in economic struc-
ture, the mass entry of women into the labour force, rising global 
economic interconnections and immigration, Europe’s workforce has 
become highly heterogeneous in terms of both salaried or non-sala-
ried wage workers and occupational experiences.101 The traditional 
industrial working class and new lower-skilled service workers are 
on average less in number as an electoral base for RLPs compared to 
professionals, which include skilled and semi-skilled service workers 
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and white-collar employees.102 Skilled workers in the service sector 
and social professions are equally or more likely than the archetypical 
working class to vote for the Left.103 This creates electoral quandaries 
because these sections of the population typically have more cultur-
ally liberal attitudes. It was part of the problem for the students in the 
1960s that came from the middle classes and were differently oriented 
from the working class on socio-cultural issues such as religion, pat-
riotism and sexuality, and the question of democracy and intellectual 
autonomy. 
To say the least, many CPs hesitated to adjust their worldviews in 
the face of these profound shifts. To mention the two most visible 
examples, the PCF and the PCI in the late 1960s expelled Roger 
Garaudy and the Il Manifesto Group, respectively, upon their similar 
suggestions to grant more theoretical and practical status to intel-
lectual workers and technicians. Effectively, they placed them on 
an equal footing with the working class and retheorised the relation 
between these two social sections. In France especially, a rigid ouvri-
erisme (labourism) refused to identify the new forces as classes. It 
rather spoke of them as strata. The PCF’s refusal to recognise non-
manual workers as part of the proletariat cost it dearly: in the 1970s, 
because of these votes flowing into the PS, the latter overtook the 
communists in electoral strength.104
During the Long ’68, it was clear that youth and women became 
targets of communist electioneering. CPs were getting old and turned 
to the votes of those comprising many of the NSMs, mainly out of elec-
toral necessity. One position which emerged in Sweden, illustrating 
the communist attempt to steer gender issues, was the offer of baby-
sitting services to women by the Communist Party of Sweden so they 
could attend more party activities.105 Moreover, the class composi-
tion of CPs had already changed between the immediate post-war 
period and the 1960s and 1970s. For the PCI, for example, 30 years 
after the war its electoral share was more skewed towards pensioners 
and housewives than factory workers. The schema between a prole-
tarian and bourgeois constituency, which CPs traditionally tried to 
seal by reporting the social categories of their congress delegates or 
members, was already a crude one by the 1960s. It was not easy to 
ascribe a class or the potential for a class consciousness to ‘permanent 
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officials of a party who were briefly workers but have been profes-
sional politicians for decades; or students; or housewives; or retired 
people; or intellectuals; or land-owning peasants; or the executives of 
communist business enterprises; or brain workers … .’106 
Predictive statistical modelling of contemporary RLP voting has 
recurrently identified a higher likelihood to choose an RLP in elec-
tions for voters who identify with the working class and who are 
union members, atheist, on the left of the political spectrum, young, 
dissatisfied with democracy and more educated.107 Class politics has 
not ended, rather its map was ‘redrawn into shape’.108 Traditional 
parties of the Left gradually became parties of the new working and 
middle classes, specifically the expanding white-collar employees in 
the state’s civil service and elsewhere; during the post-2008 crisis, 
the size of the public sector energised distributive conflicts.109 Most 
importantly, however, the two-dimensional axis of competition in 
most of Europe, whereby class and identity politics cross-cut, has 
meant RLPs drawing in middle-class voters to the Left because of 
their libertarian politics. New Left or new politics voters are indeed 
located to the right of those from traditional communist or other 
socialist parties.110 In the meantime, working-class voters who are 
less educated and more conservative on average may turn to radical 
right parties. Elderly citizens who rely on welfare state services and 
government subsidies tend to desire their continuation or expan-
sion, while they also have less tolerance for cultural openness.111 In 
the globalisation age, a progressive economic programme has been 
disassociated from socio-cultural dynamism. Cosmopolitanism is 
highly associated with open economic exchange, while traditionalist 
and culturally introvert views go hand in hand with protectionism.112 
This feeds into a sort of conflict line between the New Left and right-
wing extremist forces.113
It has been extensively argued that RLPs have lost their work-
ing-class profile and accommodate mostly the middle classes. It is, 
however, faulty to suggest an effect on the RLP vote of a declining 
working class.114 The working classes have certainly changed location, 
but voters at the low end of the service industry, or the non-active 
population, are still found in many statistical analyses as being highly 
likely to support the Radical Left. While, over the period between 
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the 1960s and the 1990s, one could more easily make the case, à la 
Inglehart, that material and collectivist issues faded towards irrele-
vance in the West, at least in the face of intergenerational change and 
individualistic cultures, the past 20 years have evidently suspended 
this scenario amid extreme inequalities and a series of economic and 
social crises. Even using the archetypical occupation-based catego-
risations of social class, in the majority of European countries the 
middle class has declined over the crisis years and wealth polarisa-
tion has increased.115 
More generally, if we follow class classifications adopted by liberal 
scholars – Giddens, Goldthorpe and others – then the working class 
decreased during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Goran Therborn, aptly 
summarises the global pattern:
Discourse about the new middle classes has grown into an ava-
lanche over the past decade. In and about Africa, Asia and Latin 
America it is predominantly triumphalist – about Eastern Europe, 
often more cautious – proclaiming the arrival of mass markets of 
solvent consumers. Whether right or wrong, class discourses are 
always socially significant, so the global surge of middle-class dis-
course is a noteworthy symptom of the 2010s … The working 
class is vanishing from Chinese and Vietnamese Communist Party 
documents, while in German-led Europe the ideal of an ‘entrepre-
neurial society’ has replaced the mid-twentieth century self-image 
of the ‘wage-earner society’. Political commentators generally see 
the middle classes as a promising foundation for ‘sound’ econom-
ics and liberal democracy … In the US, by contrast, the prevailing 
tone is of worry about the middle class’s decline in economic status 
and social weight.116
To understand ‘potential RLP voters’, it is thus crucial to combine 
substance with perspective and ask what each combination produces. 
If class is defined in income-related and occupational terms in the 
relevant scales, it misses the key Marxist proposition that relations 
to means of production, and thus forms of capital or the absence 
thereof, is what determines class. Pursuing this line of inquiry, Erik 
Olin Wright devised a social class classification schema capturing 
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the middle class as one of three things: workers with a managerial 
function and thus control in the productive process; cognitive capital 
in the form of a unique skill or specialised knowledge that is market-
able within the labour market as a form of capital; and petty capital 
as in owners of small and medium-sized enterprises.117 These catego-
ries did not change much until the crisis, when the impoverishment 
of the middle strata started to grow. From a Marxist perspective, ‘a 
rising middle class represented the vanguard of capitalist develop-
ment in nineteenth century Euro-America; no longer. Finance capital 
and the multinational corporations have long since usurped that role. 
Instead, the middle classes have to take sides in sharply polarised soci-
eties.’118 This reading of the social basis of resistance is pertinent, as 
it subverts the understanding of labels like left populism as twisting 
political rationalism and reality. It documents a different reality to 
begin with, which is more resonant with the populist schema than 
liberal analyses of the class cleavage in European societies. 
From class to age there remain patterns across the three periods 
of ‘newness’. ‘Younger people are often more likely to vote for left-
wing parties than older people’, and some studies suggest the trend is 
‘particularly pronounced among women’.119 At the same time, RLPs 
with libertarian orientations (like the GPs) are caught in a dilemma: 
between (1) advocating welfare retrenchment and market liberali-
sation to curb spending in pension benefits and health care, which 
target the elderly, and thus investing more in the young through better 
education and childcare so to sustain or enhance their status among 
younger private business people, students and public sector employ-
ees; and (2) not alienating their traditional, economically leftist 
voters who, in the light of RLP liberalisation, may shift to abstention 
or the SDP, or get tricked into the ‘cast a valid vote’ strategy of their 
opponents.120 
In trying to see how the tendencies of distinct periods translate 
into long-term trends, we must be careful to balance short-term stra-
tegic moves and difficulties by parties and their outcomes across 
countries. To observe ideological or demographic changes over time, 
Figures 8.2 and 8.3 show time-series data for RLP and SDP voters 
based on the Eurobarometer survey and European Social Survey. The 
time series presents the evolution for both types of parties in the per-
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centage of radical voters (1–3 on the 1–10 self-placement scale and 
0–2 on the 0–9 scale), the young (18–24 and 18–35) and women.121 
Both party families share certain trends: a decline in youth support 
and support from radical left identities, and a relatively stable trend 
for women and those aged 18–24. For both cases, the deradicalisa-
tion of their electoral constituencies began after the end of the Cold 
War, which supports the claim that the ‘end of history’ had an ideo-
logical impact for the Left within society as well as in party systems. 
For RLPs the electoral share of radical identities drops from about 80 
per cent to about 40: it is essentially halved. For SDPs it drops from 
about 30 to about 20: the drop is higher for RLPs. It is also notewor-
thy that about one in five voters of essentially neoliberalised parties 
(SDPs) identify with the far left of the political spectrum. 
Figure 8.2 Social democratic vote by gender, age and left–right self-placement 
(1979–2018)
Sources: Schmitt, Hermann, and Evi Scholz. Manheim Eurobarometer Trench File, 1970–
1999, 2nd ICPSR version (Mannheim, Germany: Mannheimer Zentrum fur Europaische 
Sozialforschung and Zentrum fur Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen [producers], 2001) 
(Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 2002), http://doi.
org/10.3886/ICPSR03384.v2; European Social Survey Cumulative File, ESS 1-8 (2018). Data 
file edition 1.0. NSD – Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and 
distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC, http://dx.doi.org/10.21338/NSD-ESS-CUMULATIVE.
Notes: Years that had very few data were excluded from the analysis. Weights were applied 
to ensure that each country is represented in proportion to its population size given the group 

































































WOMEN 18–24 18–35 LEFT
The European Radical Left
252
We can additionally argue that contemporary CPs and RLPs have 
faced increasing difficulty in reaching the young due to the emer-
gence of new parties which could be seen as competing to the Radical 
Left, and which in various cases, especially the Greens, attracted high 
numbers of young voters. That those between 18 and 24 only drop 
very slightly for both SDPs and CPs/RLPs may imply that structural 
changes in the economy, combined with cultural evolution, have not 
significantly altered their voting choices. The decline appears to begin 
in the 1970s or 1980s. This is not as pronounced for those between 
18 and 34, who show a decline in both party families, meaning this 
age group underwent a differentiated experiential transition from its 
Figure 8.3 Communist/Radical Left vote by gender, age and left–right self-
placement (1979–2018)
Notes: Years that had very Sources: Schmitt, Hermann, and Evi Scholz. Manheim 
Eurobarometer Trench File, 1970–1999, 2nd ICPSR version (Mannheim, Germany: 
Mannheimer Zentrum fur Europaische Sozialforschung and Zentrum fur Umfragen, 
Methoden und Analysen [producers], 2001) (Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv fur 
Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and 
Social Research [distributors], 2002), http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03384.v2; European 
Social Survey Cumulative File, ESS 1-8 (2018). Data file edition 1.0. NSD – Norwegian 
Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.21338/NSD-ESS-CUMULATIVE. Few data were excluded from the 
analysis. Weights were applied to ensure that each country is represented in proportion to its 
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younger subset between the pre- and post-Cold War period when the 
decline was recorded. It is also possible that this age group correlates 
the most with left radicalism as an individual identity, potentially 
explaining the parallel declines in these variables. Because of propri-
etary features that facilitate non-institutional politics, young people 
are typically protest subjects, but among them macro-political narra-
tives of triumph and revolt ‘no longer provide [them with] a readable 
map of systems of belonging’.122
This may explain the dissonance with the picture of social move-
ments. Academics, students and civil society have lost economic 
ground, as we saw in Chapter 5, and radical movements (and some 
RLP candidates) are very strongly associated with young age. Yet this 
is not so for most RLPs, with the exceptions of Corbyn in the UK 
and France.123 More widely, a part of the radical identities we saw 
in Chapter 3 opts either for abstention or another party rather than 
RLPs. 
The stability for women RLP and SDP voters suggests that, as has 
been argued elsewhere, gender issues have been invariably present 
in the appeals of left-wing parties.124 Female voters tend to support 
left parties in general, not favouring any specific strain of left-wing 
thought or practice, rather choosing a party depending on which 
value or policy (economy, environment, peace, social care or other) 
they prioritise.125 An increased likelihood for young women choosing 
the Left has not in any case radically shifted the percentage of this 
group in RLP vote shares.
Further on, an empirical study, which mapped congruence between 
the positions of RLPs and those of their voters, comparing it to agree-
ment between voters and parties on the extreme right, found that 
this depends on the issue dimension, and is on average higher for the 
latter group than RLPs.126 In addition, the demand side of RLPs is 
not really distinguished from the social democratic or Green voter or 
supporter in terms of socio-demographic characteristics but rather 
mostly on attitudinal variables, such as satisfaction with democracy, 
political trust and attitudes towards redistribution.127 Most RLPs also 
accommodate both traditional, mostly working-class, Eurosceptic 
supporters and those who are anti-austerity while holding pro-EU 
positions. RLP electorates are not and have never been wholly 
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defined by a Marxist consciousness and typical radical left iden-
tities. Again, there is a historical parallel here with the attitudes of 
PCF and PCI voters in the 1970s. As registered in various polls of the 
time, the majority did not desire revolution, they were split on issues 
of income inequality and nationalisation, many of them supported 
inheritance and property and their overall positive attitude towards 
socialism eroded between the 1970s and 1980s. In Italy, the majority 
of PCI voters, who were more influenced than the party leadership 
by the ‘bad governance’ attributed to the DC, supported Europe.128 
Any strict particularism about ‘revolutionary subjects’ in the Radical 
Left’s mobilised agency during elections finds at best partial corrobo-
ration. What echoes through history is Marcuse’s diagnosis that ‘[t]he 
immediate expression of the opinion and will of the workers, farmers, 
neighbors – in brief, the people – is not, per se, progressive and a force 
of social change: it may be the opposite’.129 How the last mobilisation 
wave we have been discussing has ended, as regards the Radical Left’s 
electoral relevance, renders Marcuse’s diagnosis very real.
retrospective
Many of the tensions inside social movements and between social 
movements and parties, as identified in Table 5.1, are also present 
inside most parties and within the party family: the horizontal–
vertical dynamic; the choice between confrontation and moderation; 
the potential of youth and alliances with the movements; the work-
ing-class vote in capitalism; institutional politics as opposed to the 
prefiguration that partisan mobilisation inherently entails; and the 
turn from movimentismo and revolt to party membership and support 
which took place during all periods of ‘newness’. Organisational var-
iations between parties correspond partly to ideological differences 
– RLPs, GPs, SDPs, left libertarians, Trotskyists and Maoists. They 
also undercut them, as distinct types sometimes employ similar 
organisational logics. Since the 1960s no distinctive model of party 
organisation characterises or has represented the Radical Left as a 
whole. Neither is there a fixed relation with government, linkage and 
the opportunities of movements feeding into parties. There has been, 
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nonetheless, a realignment to the organisational practices of demo-
cratic socialism taking the ideological lead. 
Today’s RLPs are more inclusive, diversified and encroached on by 
the state, and are weaker in organisation and membership than the 
traditional CPs. They are in many respects simply following general-
ised trends for most political parties. Hence, to a certain extent they 
become co-opted into trends of organisation that tamper with their 
original and militant intents. Yet time and again, movement–party 
interaction is so vigorous and active citizenship so vibrant that by 
the standards of democratic theory, which sees democracy beyond 
elections as a key criterion for democratic quality, the Radical Left’s 
contribution is systematic, even if unstable in linkage patterns.
Each period of ‘newness’ has increased the extra-institutional 
arm of activity within the political family and challenged party con-
ventionalisms, and this has heightened both the interpenetrative 
momentum and the tension and conflict between the movements on 
the one hand and parties on the other. A chief strategic continuity 
today, above all reflected in the years of Eurocommunism, concerns 
‘the centrality of the electoral objective, perceived as the sole key for 
acquiring popular legitimacy and embarking on social transforma-
tion’. This ‘tended to lead to the party’s programmatic moderation, 
bureaucratisation, and the absorption of its desires for change within 
the limits of the capitalist state’.130 Processes like this have been present 
for essentially all parties that view the electoral objective as participat-
ing in power. Manifestly, how the ideas and positions of RLPs relate 
to office seeking and incumbency appears more as a historical matter 
and less associated with moments of ‘newness’ or ‘crisis’. Resistance 
always turns into (more or less) co-optation or defeat, or both, under 
the rubric of running the state without having captured it.
To capture the state would mean (under any circumstances) 
pursuing policies satisfying at least one’s supporters: both voters and 
organised groups. Turning, therefore, to RLP vote composition, this 
is the conundrum of pursuing state power. Clearly, youth, students, 
feminists, ecologists and the lower classes have always played a 
central role in each period of ‘newness’, and are structurally more 
likely to opt for the Left in elections. Under neoliberalism a vast pop-
ulation experiences dispossession. However, there is no historical 
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subject standing out across time in terms of an electoral alignment 
between the RLPs and the majority of that group. Long-term RLPs 
increasingly become parties of white-collar workers, which doesn’t 
necessarily mean that the voters they attract are mostly the middle 
classes. Rather, both the working and middle classes are important 
as an electoral milieu, but their form, composition and ideological 
orientation evolves. There is, still, always a certain sectional and ideo-
logical distance between archetypical RLP identity and its electorate. 
Post-1989, it was reinforced by a decline in the share of radical left 
identities among RLP voters. 
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9
Conclusions: A Unified Retrospective
How are we to rethink the new in the political sociology of western 
Europe’s Radical Left recently or during previous waves of conten-
tion? What signs of continuity and change in radical agency and 
the context delimiting it? What does the evolution of the European 
Radical Left tell us about left radicalism as situated in capitalism and 
neoliberalism? And what are the prospects for the Radical Left if one 
is to briefly estimate the future of political families by looking at their 
past? ‘Newness’, our guiding scheme, has entailed a multidimensional 
perspective as a framework – movements and parties in terms of 
ideology, rhetoric and organisation. To conclude, we aggregate these 
into an overall assessment of evolution and its cross-national bearing, 
so as to consider the ways in which cross-actor and cross-dimension 
generalisations can or cannot be made about the presence, degree 
and meaning of ‘newness’. 
The arguments about continuity and change made in the preceding 
chapters are summarised in Table 9.1. The table provides a synopsis 
of identified, near universal patterns (or trends), their temporality 
between the three episodes of ‘newness’ and during their interim 
periods, and the broad mechanism triggering and facilitating change 
or interpreting continuity. Although the future remains unpredictable 
by common reason, so far most ‘newness’ was produced in the 1960s 
and foregrounded in the collective break with the socialist orthodox-
ies that had emerged prior to the 1960s. The Long ’68 stands out as 
a major critical juncture in the development of left radicalism, and 
the first New Left was markedly different than what emerged out of 
World War II in western Europe, which was the product of wider 
generational and societal change. Indeed, not only the New Left but 
the whole political space had changed by the end of the 1970s. The 
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and social democracy was paralleled in party systems by Eurocom-
munism, Maoism, Trotskyism and left libertarianism. 
In the realms of ideas, many processes unfolded from within the 
Long ’68: the defeat of revolution, rights advocacy, second-wave 
feminism and other movements oriented towards alternative readings 
of post-war welfare capitalism; demands that reached beyond 
labourism; revisions of working-class orthodoxy and discussions 
of new revolutionary subjects. Simultaneously, nothing short of a 
cultural revolution occurred. If the French Revolution signalled 
the emergence of the Left around the idea of political equality and 
developments in the second half of the nineteenth century, and up 
to the Russian Revolution made economic equality the next mark of 
the historical movement, the Long ’68 extended the Left’s horizon to 
culture and civil rights. Meanwhile, the rise of post-materialism, post-
structuralism and post-modernism brought a crisis upon Marxism, 
as historical materialism was gradually relegated in terms of attention 
and perceived explanatory power. 
The Long ’68 additionally spurned many organisational elements 
that were foreign and dissented against or diversified from the tra-
ditional CPs and SDPs, including unprecedented performances of 
cultural critique, squatting and centring resistance upon and through 
the university; uncivil or ‘unethical’ agitation alienating the con-
servative working classes; the opening of the CP organisation; and 
reconfigurations of working class form. The first seeds of a more 
democratic, pluralist, descriptively representative and decentralised 
(as well as declassed) party form were planted in the 1960s and 1970s 
across the whole of Europe. Processes of wide aggregation unrav-
elled, but without a referent point which was sacrosanct and universal 
across the mobilised. Party systems began changing because social 
cleavages realigned, the New Left (and subsequently the Greens and 
the liberal predominance therein) being the first signs.
The GJM period was an era for the Radical Left in so far as it 
brought unprecedented developments: a transnationalised Left suc-
ceeding the international communist movement as the force against 
American and Western neo-imperialism, through a growing front 
of EU-wide groups of movements, unions and parties. It began its 
unfolding through opposition to the Maastricht Treaty. Post-2008 
Conclusions: A Unified Retrospective
261
radical left movements, from the internet to the squares, from labour 
to radical ecology, political consumerism and urban movements are 
the same actors which mixed in the GJM. These are versions of the 
past in a different organisational format and in their experiential 
dimension – be it Occupy or precarious workers’ unions, solidarity 
mini-economies, organising on roundabouts, or pro-immigration 
mobilisation. They reflected emerging generational developments, 
and the processes they led to, such as radicalised youths, striking 
public sector employees, precarious organising or striking school 
children are the product of multiple capitalist pathologies. 
Beginning with the Long ’68, and highlighting certain aspects of 
change during each following wave, must not diminish the world-
scale transformation of politics that came about with the events of 
1989–91, throwing the communist movements into disarray and 
dislodging their fixed meanings and their already diminishing appa-
ratuses. Yet multiple processes of evolution had begun earlier, and 
were thus catalysed or sealed, not caused, by the fall of the USSR and 
subsequent developments. Out of the 1970s emerged a Left in crisis, 
social democracy shifting towards the centre and neoliberalism, and 
communism losing ground and in part becoming social-democ-
ratised. In other words, the fall of the USSR did not really disrupt 
the linearity of deradicalisation and retreat, the Radical Left taking 
a defensive position and eventually wavering between strong and 
soft reformism, a rebuilt social democracy of the 1960s and 1970s, 
which had been abandoned by its original original claimants, the 
SDPs. For the western European Radical Left at least, 1989–91 was 
also a part of a linearity in generalised trends towards co-optation, 
the broader context of the modernity shift from passions to interests, 
and the Keynesian bust and ensuing social, political and economic 
doctrines inspired by the free market and the globalised movement 
of capital. What the end of the Cold War did do, which is something 
that explains both the nature and the initial attitude towards parties 
of the GJM, was to seal the end of the communist identity. It ensured 
that subsequent forces of left radicalism had no pre-planned future 
scenario to fight for and necessitated a process of adaptation and 
rebuilding, a re-networking on incredibly fragmented foundations. 
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Above we described the Long ’68 as a milestone for the Radical 
Left, expanding its penetration into social structures through engage-
ment with cultural and post-materialist critique, performance and 
subversion. The GJM was a similar milestone in confronting the 
legal system – the overall institutional aspect of globalised capi-
talism – at its transnational nucleus. It reconfirmed an underlying 
imperialism that is more complex and plural, with features of a 
transnational capitalist class that interlocks political power but nev-
ertheless is articulated on imperialistic strategy. What, then, can be 
dissected as new in the 2010s? To begin, a number of elements that 
have been heralded as new are not entirely novel or particular. If the 
above processes signal an evolving Radical Left in western Europe, 
which changed again and again, sometimes to something very dif-
ferent than what it was, sometimes switching back to a previous self, 
many aspects of RLP functions recur. In other words, they resemble 
diachronic processes that need to be connected not (only) to histor-
ical events but primarily to the realities that do not change as these 
events unfold. We have seen municipalism and local-level action, cit-
izenship as a way of claiming rights, nationalism and populism as 
frames of sovereignty, the relevance of regionalism and self-determi-
nation for the Left in the light of the centre–periphery cleavage, being 
triggered again and again in certain places and at a European level. 
Moreover, during all three periods of ‘newness’ there are recorded 
tensions as well as aggregations, with initial protesting as the conten-
tion wave begins being suspicious of parties and unions, but as time 
passes there begin to develop intersections, networks, the impacts 
of office or office seeking and a subsequent reorientation by parties 
towards movements and by movements towards parties. 
Linkage is intermediated by another continuity: the Radical Left’s 
statism and electoralism, its office seeking and general striving to 
enter government, and its tendencies before, inside and after it. Dem-
ocratic participation was won through radical struggles and arose 
out of much worse circumstances. Yet liberal democracy creates 
dilemmas and a very complex electoral game, which at root is the 
gradualist nature of change through political conflict in capitalism. 
On the other hand, if state power is necessary for root-and-branch 
change, as Carl Boggs argued, ‘the opposite is equally true: an egali-
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tarian, self-managed society cannot be built strictly upon the terrain 
of state power’.1 Repeatedly, radical movements and the tensions 
of linkage between parties and movements raise this issue, and a 
growing rejection of capitalist liberal democracy reflects it by defini-
tion, save for the fact that we have not reached a coherent and uniting 
theory on how to remake the national state. The bigger question – 
why should Keynesianism and statism not come to an end this time? 
– cannot be answered with confidence. Utopias, utopian thinking and 
utopian theory have never been incorporated into left-wing electoral 
politics. Like for all parties, RLPs show that electoralism, necessary as 
it is, can erode social roots, cause reactive dissent and induce demo-
bilisation. And in the conflict between horizontal and vertical forms 
of politics, the institutional and extra-institutional or anti-constitu-
tional recurs again and again, each time as the next manifestation 
of the original anarchist–social democratic dichotomy of the early 
socialist movement; and it unfolds within movement milieus, within 
party milieus and between them. 
All these are diachronic encounters, all contested from within the 
political family, all rooted in the systemic setting and not merely in 
political circumstances. Capitalism, neoliberalism and processes that 
unfold therein propel grievances to come forward, but also bring 
about co-optation as if by design. In certain respects, then, and in 
spite of economic crisis, there has been more continuity than change 
in the sense of previous trends being carried forward. RLPs enter 
government and find themselves in a hostile environment, in coali-
tion relations with more moderate actors, facing electoral dynamics 
between co-optation and policy seeking, and drifting between the 
movement and the government, although in a particularised form. 
They succeed in elections then recede or drop or change organisa-
tionally after incumbency towards a cartel-like or less socially rooted 
form. They never monopolise the working and popular classes. Their 
potential for success is highly dependent on the format and mechan-
ics of the party system. Relations between movements and parties 
have been reinvigorated during all periods of ‘newness’, though they 
are still strained by the same contradictions as before. And there has 
not been a spike across the board in the absorption of the working 
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and popular classes or realignment within the left spaces of party 
systems back towards anti-capitalism and revolutionary spirits. 
Various fragmented critics of the Soviet Union since the 1950s 
– Maoists, Trotskyists, anarchists, social democrats, radical libertar-
ians, pacifists and ecologists – evolved into a more unified space of 
democratic socialist radicals at the intersection of movement–party 
mindsets and organisations. Today’s most powerful RLPs cannot be 
significantly differentiated from the Eurocommunist political mould, 
British democratic socialism of the 1970s or Swedish social democ-
racy in its glory days. In the long term, Eurocommunism continues as 
a policy package, a discourse oriented towards preaching and practis-
ing democracy, a third way that was a second way to begin with and an 
internationalism that defies existing geopolitical powers. Moreover, 
the crisis has changed little on average in terms of left-wing electoral 
fortunes. Within and across the three analytical dimensions of col-
lective action, we can evince significant evolution as well as recurrent 
patterning on the Radical Left in western Europe across different 
historical phases. But at the time of writing, the Radical Left is in a 
situation of marginality. Across most European countries, it is not 
in government (except in Spain, where it is losing electoral ground, 
Sweden and Finland), while its narrative on the pandemic has neither 
influenced policy nor seems to be gathering mass momentum for a 
comeback. If the immediate post-2008 period witnessed a refuelled 
radicalism by 2020, this wave of left-wing militancy and political 
hope has conceded much of the ground it initially occupied, both at 
the ballot box and in the streets.
Mechanisms of cross-country continuity and change are of a 
double geographical nature. Some events and processes are particu-
lar to Europe, but most are global. Events on other continents (North 
and South America, Asia and Africa) inspire, fuel or catalyse action 
within western Europe in solidarity, but also by way of emulation and 
adaptation to the national and European context. The Radical Left 
is embedded within a broader anti-systemic globality and it cannot 
be comprehended if separated from this. Its particular forms in time 
– violent guerrillas in the 1960s, movement-driven left-wing govern-
ments in the 2010s, Third Worldism, nationalism and regionalism, 
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municipalism and so many other things – are grounded in transcon-
tinental mobilisation and resistance. 
Particularly because left radicalism’s evolution between the 1960s 
and today has been a multi-factorial progression, intra-regional 
patterning and sequencing is still explained by the local manifes-
tations of, or exceptions to, general trends. So we need to spell out 
the general points of variability, because this is something to look 
for in assessing the prospects of a cohesive western European coun-
ter-hegemony led by the organised Radical Left. While the broad 
processes outlined in Table 8.1 have been more or less pervasive 
across all western European countries, national specificities refract 
rather than import European and global tendencies. There is always 
a plural presence on the Radical Left, but in some places some of 
its aspects are more popular and disseminated within the space as 
a whole. Consequently, what each national Radical Left in western 
Europe looks like is a matter of which ideological lineage, rhetorical 
performance and organisational practice has consolidated itself over 
others. To enumerate the chief points of differentiation within the 
political family: 
• The main receptors of the vibrations from the Long ’68, the GJM 
years and post-2008, have been the central and northern coun-
tries in western Europe, with the biggest – France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain – experiencing the most pronounced cases of 
mobilisation and resistance during each period of ‘newness’. 
• Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries 
(including Iceland) and Switzerland have also hosted labourist 
and ‘new politics’ movements and parties, both over time and 
during the three periods in question.
• Cyprus and Malta have had a very different historical trajectory. 
In Malta, the two-party system, and consensus and clientelistic 
politics, have sustained very limited protest potential. In Cyprus 
the cleavage around the conflict between the Greek Cypriot-
dominated Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot 
northern parts of the island have consumed most of the oxygen; 
and radical NSMs appeared only in the 2010s, about 50 years 
later than the rest of western Europe.
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• The environmental movements originated from central and 
northern Europe and so did the Red-Green and pirate parties. 
There is, therefore, a need to consider how the distinct politi-
cal culture of the North has both meant different temporalities 
in such things as more horizontality and democracy, and con-
stituted the starting geographical space for ideological and 
organisational phenomena, today forcefully espoused across 
the continent. 
• Across all countries, the theme of radical mobilisation and 
resistance reflects the domestic arena. Nuclear movements have 
flourished in countries with nuclear programmes; environmen-
tal activism was sidelined where there was ethnic or religious 
conflict, where conditions instead invited a fierce anti-imperi-
alism (as in Cyprus or Ireland); the politicisation of austerity 
(and anti-austerity) is the strongest where neoliberal policies 
are most intensified.
• Certain parties’ internationalist solidarity is diluted or chal-
lenged by an ethnocentric stance on immigration, reflecting 
electoral pressures from the mass party model and historical 
legacies about the national working class. 
• Left nationalism is an organic manifestation of the Radical Left 
in certain regions within states, but in other countries national 
identity is connected to dark forces and is perceived to refute 
internationalism.
• Left populism is always associated with RLPs and social move-
ments and is typically present on the Radical Left today, but in 
certain countries RLPs utilise it as theory and strategy, while in 
others the party system is frozen or stable. Even as a strategy of 
capitalising on crisis, this is unlikely to produce results.
• Certain movements (e.g. violent groups and protest) do not 
appear in some places, such as Austria, Norway or Cyprus, while 
they diachronically flourish in others, such as Greece. They are 
conditioned by political cultural traditions such as consensus or 
majoritarian politics, bipolarity and the resulting institutionali-
sation or ostracisation of violence and civil disobedience.
• In Greece, anti-systemic discourse on the Left and ‘institu-
tionalised’ civil disobedience and violence, such as university 
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occupations, is much more widespread than elsewhere due to 
the presence of a large extra-parliamentary space and the legacy 
of student repression by the junta state of the 1970s.
• Communism in the party system has not remained strong 
anywhere except for Greece and Portugal; labourism has been 
the only platform on the Left in the British party system; Trot-
skyism has a comparatively strong presence in France; left 
populism as theory is adopted by some but not other demo-
cratic socialist parties. 
• The parties with a long-standing organisational legacy and 
with relatively large membership organisations, such as the 
former clandestine CPs in Greece and Portugal, or the SP in 
the Netherlands, are also the only cases of electorally relevant 
Marxist-Leninism.
• Electoral endurance is thus associated with organisational 
density, but electoral success is chiefly a party system phenom-
enon and needs to be evaluated mostly in a relational sense, 
against the histories, organisational capacities and relations to 
the state of the Radical Left’s competitors.
• In spite of systematic patterns, the organisational conjoin-
ing of the Left – the linkages between movements, unions and 
parties – are also partly determined by an organic history or its 
absence, ideological views and the incentives and constraints 
groups have to coalesce or divide, including being in opposition 
or government. 
• Because of country legacies, the institutionalisation of the 
Radical Left across party systems also varies with regard to the 
line of separation between an anti-capitalist (revolutionary) and 
a reformist, democratic socialist-like left.
what goes forward?
For both movements and parties, different radical left currents 
develop at different stages, and while they ebb and flow and some-
times seem to have disappeared, they nevertheless reappear later 
as reverberations of their earlier selves, combining with each other 
to produce subsequent radical left movements, unions and parties: 
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a melange of currents and organisations. Responding to specific 
puzzles, opportunities and constraints may not be sufficient for a fun-
damental reconfiguration in the morphology of a political family’s 
ideational core, but it necessarily shapes the lexicon, mobilisation and 
impact of social and political actors. The differences evident from 
this macro-historical view signal the presence of innovation and evo-
lution on the Radical Left, although this is less so in terms of core 
practices, ideas and axioms, and more because of the way in which 
the struggle unfolds in space and historical time: through project-
ing certain ideas over and in relation to others; by framing collective 
identities differently (recognising or not social forces); and via utilis-
ing and embodying pre-existing or emerging material and symbolic 
resources. 
The three waves of mobilisation and resistance on the European 
Radical Left constitute syncopated expansions of this political family’s 
cycle, gradually enlarging its ideational, organisational and discursive 
scope beyond the main pillars of traditional communism and social 
democracy. This is the case even without changing its position and 
range on the political spectrum or its fundamental functions in the 
societal arena. Simultaneously, however, the European Radical Left is 
reconstructing its experienced meanings in a process of reflexive self-
evaluation, inheriting and processing ideas, practices and discourses 
from its own historical trajectory rather than innovating out of thin 
air or borrowing from competing political camps. Still, it is antago-
nistic to liberalism but also prone to acknowledging, incorporating 
or succumbing to some of its analytical tools and policies, subse-
quently modifying radical left strategy and igniting debates about 
when socialism stops being ‘new’ and ends up being replaced by an 
entirely different thought system. What changes importantly regards 
and reflects the status of the European Radical Left’s constituent tra-
ditions and their corresponding ideas, rhetoric and organisation.
In all periods of ‘newness’, the bequest of previous struggles is both 
a legacy to be drawn upon or emulated and a political toolkit that is 
insufficient for the new era, and thus a limit to be overcome – a form 
of mobilisation and resistance to be reinvigorated and appropriately 
designed based on ongoing exigencies. Hence, any ‘newness’ on the 
European Radical Left has not happened as a crushing break with 
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the past. This is more a situation of macro-historical cross-fertilisa-
tion between different traditions within left radicalism – a reshuffle 
of principles, values and actions across time so that some features of 
the political family become more accentuated than others as currents 
within the historical movement. These currents, or strains, of radical 
thought cross-cut parties and movements and are (at least somewhat) 
variable across countries. 
Because demobilisation and co-optation, and thus the annulment 
of resistance, have happened so vividly, suddenly and pervasively 
during the three occasions of ‘newness’ considered, the limits of party 
and institutional politics clearly stand out, especially in the realities of 
cartelised, state-encroached parties and generalised electoral absten-
tion. This is not to question the argument of perceiving them as 
structurally necessary to incite radicalism and propagate change. This 
popular normative approach notwithstanding, within the context of 
multiple, self-reproducing and intersecting constraints, what stands 
out in hindsight for all three periods of ‘newness’ is, above all, a his-
torical update in political argumentation – a shift from intellectual 
retreat to intellectual advance and back again; a further solidifica-
tion of small-scale resistance and autonomous self-organisation; and 
an expansive renewal of the radical democratic imaginary through 
acute intellectual ferment and activism – rather than an exception-
ally successful regional contestation of political power, or the lasting 
and effective control of the state. 
This, in turn, prompts us to highlight that for future purposes, 
the concern of those supporting or studying the Radical Left should 
not be merely RLPs and their relation to liberalism and capital-
ism. Rather, having linkage politics in mind, at stake is how RLPs, 
radical movements and other actors mobilise in parallel, both within 
and outside the state, in a way that is capable (or not) of tilting the 
political power balance. Paraphrasing Marx, our interest must lie in 
whether and how the Radical Left can turn from a political family in 
itself to one for itself.
270
Appendix 1
Historical Context and the  
Three ‘New Lefts’




Cold War (USSR’s 
leading role vs. USA’s 
leading role)
Crisis and critique of 
USSR continuing from 
the 1950s after Stalin’s 




War (and many other 
revolutions, wars and 
conflicts)
Chinese radicalism: 
global socialism split 
(Sino–Soviet split)
Gradual delegitimisation 
of Third World 
liberation movements
Profitability crisis (oil 
crises; end of post-war 
consensus)
Post-materialism, 
cultural and value 
change
Unipolar global landscape
Yugoslavian wars and 
NATO’s offensive/NATO’s 
expansion into eastern 
Europe
Invasion of Iraq and 
beginning of ‘War on 
Terror’
Latin American and Asian 
economic crises (IMF and 
World Bank as creditors 
and structural reform 
programmes)
A series of global crises 
starting in the USA: 
dot.com bubble, Enron 
scandal
9/11 – terrorist attacks on 
WTC’s Twin Towers in 
2001 and subsequent War 
on Terror
Neoliberalisation of 




consensus’ to ‘constraining 
dissensus’)
Pink tide in Latin America 
(resurgence of the Left)
A renewed rift between 
Russia and the West
Civil wars in Syria and 
Libya
Immigration crisis and 
‘cultural backlash’ 
Populism and anti-
populism (Donald Trump 
in the White House)
Economic crisis, extreme 
inequalities (bailout 
agreements in the 
European periphery)
Terrorist attacks in 
Europe
Far-right surge and 
increasing neoliberal 
authoritarianism 
Brexit and rise 
of regionalism – 
referendums for secession 
in Scotland and Catalonia
Climate change takes 
centre stage
Climbing disruption, 









End of Cold War/‘End of history’
Neoliberal globalisation
Intensification and enlargement of the 
EU 
Transformation of social democracy 
(beginning)
Significant party system change (new 
party families, voter realignments, catch-
all and cartel parties)
Rapid expansion of information and 
mobile technologies (beginning of social 
media age) and later ‘fake news’
Significant party system change (new 
party families, voter realignments, digital 
parties)
Transformation of social democracy
Dealignment, absention, anti-politics 
Global financial crisis (2007–8) 
spreading from the USA
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Appendix 2
Electoral Slogans of RLPs in Seven 
Countries (1960s–2010s)
PCF (French Communist Party)*
1962 To the future
[Vers l’avenir]
1968 From the first round – Vote Communist – To guarantee the benefits 
gained by the united struggle of workers
[Des le premier tour – Votez Communiste – Pour garantir les avantages 
acquis par la lutte unie des travailleurs]
1973 Changing Course – Program for a Democratic Government of 
Popular Union
[Changer de Cap – Programme pour un Gouvernement Démocratique 
d’Union Populaire]
1978 Updated Common Government Program
[Programme Commun de Gouvernement Actualisé]
1981 PCF slogan in legislative elections:
French Produce 
[Produisons français!]
Mitterand’s slogans in presidential elections:
Change Life 
[Changer la vie]
All of France’s forces
[Des toutes les forces de la France]
Unified France
[La France unie]
1986 Sen sortir, c’est possible. Avec le vote communiste
[Getting out is possible. With the communist vote]
1993 Six proposals for France
[Six propositions pour la France]
1995 Presidential elections:
Avec Jospin Jospin c’est clair
[With Jospin, it’s clear]
The President of true change
[Le président du vrai changement]
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2002 Program of the French Communist Party for the 2002 legislative 
elections. 10 Priority Objectives of the Communists for the next 
five years
[Programme du Parti Communist Français pour les elections législatives 
de 2002. 10 objectifs prioritaires des communistes pour les cinq ans à 
venir]
2007 Another Politics on the left
[Une autre politique a gauche]
2012 Left Front Coalition:
The programme of the Left Front and its joint candidate Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon – Human First
[Le programme du Front de gauche et de son candidat commun Jean-
Luc Mélenchon – L’humain d’abord]
Place au people
[The place of people]
Prenez le pouvoir
[Take the power]
2017 Left Front Coalition:
Legislative elections – 11 & 18 June – The people in the National 
Assembly – The left standing for the human first!
[Élections législatives – 11 & 18 juin- Le peuple à l’Assemblée nationale 
– La gauche debout pour l’humain d’abord!] 
Presidential elections:
The future in common
[L’avenir en commun]
I vote, they clear out 
[Je vote, ils dégagent]
The force of the people 
[La force du people]
PCI (Italian Communist Party)/Rifondazione Comunista
1963 Beat the DC. Strengthen the PCI. The electoral programme of the 
PCI
[Batterre la DC. Rafforzare il PCI. Il Programma elettorale del PCI]
1968 Time to change, you can change: PCI’s programatic appeal
[E ora di cambiare, si può cambiare: appello programma del PCI]
1972 The communists’ programme: for a government of democratic 
change
[Il programma dei comunisti: per un governo di svolta democratica]
1979 The communist programme for the eighth legislature – defence and 
reform of the democratic state
[Il programma dei comunisti per l’VIII legislatura – difesa e riforma 
dello stato democratico]
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1983 The alternative proposal for the Change
[La proposta alternativa per il Cambiamento]
1987 The PCI for the tenth legislature. The fundamental programmatic 
commitments
[Il PCI per la decima legislatura. Gli impegni programmatici 
fondamentali]
1992 Electoral programme. From the opposition to the alternative
[Programma elettorale. Dall’oppositzione per l’alternativa]
1996 Start again from the left for the alternative
[Ricominciare da sinistra per l’alternativa]
2001 Joint programme of Ulivo (Olive Tree):
Let’s renew Italy together
[Rinnoviamo l’Italia, insieme]
2008 Sinistra L’Arcobaleno:
Election programme for the 13 and 14 April 2008 elections of the 
Left the Rainbow: Make a Choice of Departure
[Programma elettorale elezioni 13 e 14 Aprile 2008 de la Sinistra 
l’Arcobaleno: Fai Una Scelta Di Parte]
2013 Rivoluzione Civile:
Coalition ‘Rivoluzione Civile’: I’m In
[Io Ci Sto]
2018 It’s time to make a stand [official translation]
[Abbiamo aspettato troppo… Ora ci candidiamo noi!]
PCP (Portuguese Communist Party)
1975 The PCP and the political moment
[O PCP e o momento politico]
1979 Joint programme of Alianca do Povo Unido (United People’s 
Alliance): ‘A programme for Portugal in April’
[Joint programme of APU Alianca do Povo Unido (United People’s 
Alliance): ‘Um programa para Portugal de Abril’]
1980 Joint programme of APU Alianca do Povo Unido (United People’s 
Alliance): With the PCP with the APU – Democratic majority, 
defeat of AD 
[Joint programme of APU Alianca do Povo Unido (United People’s 
Alliance): Com o PCP com a APU – Maioria democrática, derrota da 
AD]
1987 Joint programme of United Democratic Coalition: For a 
Democratic Majority and a Democratic Government 
[Para uma maioria democrática e um governo democrático]
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1991 PCP electoral programme: Project for the future for a better 
Portugal: Elections for the Assembly of the Republic
[Programa eleitoral do PCP: Projecto de futuro para um Portugal 
melhor: Eleições para a Assembleia da República]
1999 PCP electoral programme – A Left-Wing Politics for Portugal
[Programa eleitoral do PCP – uma politica de esquerda para Portugal]
2002 For a left-wing policy – Change for the Better – PCP’s electoral 
programme
[Por uma politica de esquerda – mudar para melhor – programa 
eleitoral do PCP]
2009 A breaking, patriotic and left programme – A commitment to 
workers, people and the country – Yes, a better life is possible.
[Programa de Ruptura, Patriotico e de Esquerda – Um Compromisso 
Com os Trabalhadores, o Povo e o Pais – é possível, uma vida melhor]
2011 PCP’s Electoral Commitment: For a patriotic and left-wing policy
[Compromisso Eleitoral do PCP: Por uma política patriótica e de 
esquerda]
2019 PCP Electoral Programme – Patriotic and left politics – Solutions 
for a Portugal with a future
[Programma Electoral do PCP – Política Patriótica e de Esquerda – 
Soluções para um Portugal com futuro]
SP (Socialist Party – Netherlands)
1994 Vote Against Vote SP
[Stem Tegen Stem SP]
1998 Resistance! Election Program of the SP 1998–2002
[TEGENGAS! Verkiezingsprogramma van de Socialistische Partij 
1998–2002]
2002 First Road to the Left: Vote for social reconstruction
[Eerste Weg Links: StemVoor Sociale Wederopbouw]
2006 A Better Netherlands for the Same Money
[Een beter Nederland, voor hetzelfde geld]
2010 A Better Netherlands for Less Money
[Een Beter Nederland Voor Minder Geld]
Choose a major clean up 
[Kies voor de grote schoonmaak]
2017 Take the Power
[Pak de Macht]
V-C/V/VKP (Left Party-Communists/Left Party/Communist Party of Sweden)
1960 For workers’ victory on the election!
[Fram för arbetarseger i valet!]
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1968 Main lines for left-wing politics
[Huvudlinjer för vänsterpolitik]
With VKP for left victory
[Med VKP for vänsterseger!] 
1976 Labour Policy and socialism for a better future
[Arbertarpolitik och socialism för en bättre framtid]
1979 Programme for the 1980s: Radical workers’ policy – The road to 
socialism
[ProgramFor 80-Talet: Radikal arbetarpolitik Vägen till socialism]
1982 Your Vote for VKP is a vote for a socialist policy
[Din röst för VKP är en röst för en socialistisk politik]
1985 Politik för socialism på svenska
1988 For Sweden 1988
[Till sverige 1988]
1991 Valet 1991: Arbete – Rättvisa – Demokrati – Grön Miljo
[Elections 1991: Justice-Democracy- Green Environment]




2006 Work – Democracy – Justice
[Arbete Demokrati Rättvisa]
2010 Shared Security – Individual freedom – A sustainable world
[Gemensam trygghet – individens frihet – en hållbar värld]
2018 A Sweden for everyone – Not just for the richest  
[Ett Sverige för alla – inte bara för de rikaste]
PCE/IU/Unidos Podemos (Spanish Communist Party/United Left/United We Can)
1977 PCE:
A communist vote is a vote for democracy.
[El voto comunista es un voto por la democracia]
1979 The useful vote is the communist vote. Electoral programme 
general elections 1979
[El voto útil es el voto comunista. Programa electoral elecciones 
generales 1979]
1982 Electoral programme of the Communist Party of Spain: approved 
by the Central Committee of the PCE at its meeting on 15 and 16 
September 1982
[Programa electoral del Partido Comunista de España: aprobado por el 
Comité Central del PCE en su reunión de los días 15 y 16 de septiembre 
de 1982]
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1989 IU:
Elecciones Generales 1989 – We are the alternative
[Elecciones Generales 1989 – Somos la alternativa]
1993 Yes, Izquierda Unida is the necessary alternative
Si, Izquierda Unida La Alternativa Necessaria
1996 Decide
[Decide]
2000 We are necessary – 2000 General Elections programme 
[Somos Necesarias – Elecciones Generales programa 2000]
2008 More Left – Electoral Program – General Elections
[más izquierda – Programa Electoral – Elecciones Generales]
2011 As United Left-The Greens: Plural Left:
Rebel!
[Rebelate!]
2016 As Unidas Podemos:
The smile of a country




Main slogan – A government with you [Un Gobierno contigo]
Manifesto title – Program for a New Country [Programa para un 
nuevo país]
IU manifesto:
Program for a country that fights – Programme for a country with 
a future 
[Programma para un pais que lucha – Programma para un pais con 
futuro]
KKE (Communist Party of Greece)
1981 For the Right to go away – For the change
[Για να φύγει η δεξιά – Για την αλλαγή]
Democratic cooperation, no more ’63
[Δημοκρατική συνεργασία, όχι άλλο ’63]
1989 Synaspismos – Coalition:
Nothing, nothing stops us, now ahead with the Left
[Τίποτα, τίποτα δεν μας σταματά, τώρα μπροστά με την Αριστερά]
1993 A Left Answer 
[Αριστερή Απάντηση]
1996 People, counter-attack, with a strong KKE 
[Αντεπίθεση Λαέ, Ισχυρό ΚΚΕ]
2000 KKE Strong Popular Front. The people has the power – [the people] 
can change the course 
[ΚΚΕ Ισχυρό Μέτωπο Λαϊκό: Ο λαός έχει τη δύναμη – μπορεί να 
αλλάξει την πορεία]
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2009 Powerful people with a strong KKE to undo their anti-popular 
plans 
[Δυνατός λαός με ισχυρό ΚΚΕ για να τους χαλάσουμε τα αντιλαϊκά 
σχέδια 2009]
2012 (May) Vote KKE – A new storm is coming – Strong KKE for the victory of 
the people – Don’t scatter your vote right and left 
[Ψήφισε ΚΚΕ – Έρχεται νέα θύελλα – Ισχυρό ΚΚΕ για να νικήσει ο 
λαός – Μη σκορπίζεις την ψήφο σου δεξιά και αριστερά]
2019 Your power on the next day
[Η δύναμή σου την επόμενη μέρα]
* For France, which has a semi-presidential system, presidential nominations sup-
ported by the PCF are included.
Sources: Manifesto Project.wzb.eu, Archive.org, scribd.com, archivoelectoral.org, 
polidoc.net (author translations, except where official).
Note: Coalition platforms or parties, and evolving party names, are noted in the 
table. Missing years could not be retrieved. Some parties ran for election for the 
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